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Preface
E scorted by Spitfires of 603 (City o f Edinburgh) Squadron, three white JU 52 transportaircraft came in to land at RAF Drem in East Lothian^ The planes carried senior
German military personnel from Norway, among them nine Kriegsmarine officers who
were put aboard a bus and driven through Edinburgh to Hawes Pier, Queensferry, where a
pinnace waited to take them out to the battlecruiser Renown.
As the pinnace speeded across the calm water m which the setting sun reflected the giant shape o f  
the Forth Bridge, the German officers looked eagerly around. Reaching the battleship, floating like a 
giant fortress in mid-stream, the German delegation.. looked up at the British Ensign flying proudly 
in the breeze. Climbing up the companionway, they stood stiffly to attention and saluted Navy fash­
ion, with the British guard lined up and the bo'suns whistle shrilling in traditional style.^
In the Admiral's dining cabin, British and Norwegian officers kept to their seats on one 
side o f the table as the 'nervously quiet and obviously ill-at-ease' German delegation was 
directed to the other side. Coldly dignified, Vice-Admiral Edmund Drummond asked, 
'Have the terms of the surrender which were handed to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
German Fleet by the Supreme Commander o f the Allied Expeditionary Foi^ce been re­
ceived by you?' Kapitan zur See Kruger rephed simply, 'Ja'.'^
Kapitan Kruger (left) and the 
Kreigsmarine delegation 
aboard Renown at Queensferry 
on 11 May 1945.
It was the evening o f Friday, 11 May 1945, and, after five years and eight months o f relent­
less, often savage struggle, Scotland's sea war had ended.
1 AIR 27 2080
2 The Scotsman 12 May 1945.
3 Ibid.
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Introduction
D is t o r t io n  a n d  R e c e iv e d  W is d o m  - T h e  C a s e  f o r  a  St u d y
In May 1993 Liverpool played host to an armada of vessels from around the world in 
commemoration o f the Battle o f the Atlantic. Merseyside Development Corporation spon­
sored the souvenir programme, so perhaps the pro-Liverpool bias evident throughout 
should come as no surprise.'^ But, while this publication ostensibly offered an over-view of 
the Battle of the Atlantic, the vital contribution of Scotland in general, and the Clyde in 
particular, was afforded only the most fleeting o f references. In short, it was an historical 
distortion.
This is nothing new; the anglo-centric drift to the historiography of Britain's wider role in 
the Second World War is reflected in the accepted wisdom, sadly prevalent within Scotland 
itself, that Scotland played little part in events between 1939 and 1945. So is this fair, and, 
in particular, did Scotland really play an insignificant part in the war at sea? An examina­
tion o f the available literature would certainly give that impression but, at least in respect 
o f aspects of Scotland’s role in the sea war, this thesis challenges that perception, and dis­
proves it. Why, then, have historians so comprehensively ignored Scotland’s wartime his­
tory and thus, apparently, condoned a misrepresentation?
This study, an assessment o f aspects o f Scotland’s neglected role in the Second World War 
at sea, may have been impelled by a perceived injustice, but it is not propagandist. It does 
not confront the issue o f anglo-centricity with another distortion, it does not ring-fence 
Scotland’s experience then lard it with narrow nationalism and it does not attempt a demo­
lition o f the part played by the rest o f the United Kingdom. Nor, for that matter, does it 
pretend to offer a comprehensive study o f Scotland in the Second World War. Rather, it 
determines, for the first time, important aspects o f Scotland’s maritime role between 1939 
and 1945 and identifies, in those respects at least, the substance o f her contribution.
Battk of the Atlantic 50'^ > Anniversary (1943-1993). (Brodie Pubiisliing 1993).
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T h e  L i t e r a t u r e
Any critical review of published writings with direct relevance to wartime Scotland is con­
strained by the fact that such works are, to say the least, thin on the ground. And of those 
that do exist, too many evoke what Calder refers to as ‘The Myth o f The Blitz’.^
Among the earliest titles with a direct relevance to Scotland’s war, Caulfield’s melodramatic 
account o f the loss o f the Afhenia (Caulfield ; 1958) has a narrow focus. One o f the few 
post-war publications to consider aspects o f Scotland’s maritime role, A  River Runs To War 
(Drummond : 1960) is worthy, if propagandist. Cast/e Commando (Gilchrist : 1960), an anec­
dotal account o f the author’s experiences at the Commando Basic Training Centre, Achna- 
carry Castle, is another product o f its period. Terror of Tobermory (Baker : 1972) describes 
the career of Admiral Stephenson o f Western Isles, the Western Approaches working up 
base at Tobermory, yet, by concentrating on one larger than life character, it less informa­
tive on the wider significance o f the Tobermory base. The Clydebank (Macphail : 1974) 
is a detailed account of the heavy air raids on Clydeside as they affected the town o f Clyde­
bank. But Dr. Macphail, who taught history at Clydebank High School, misrepresents the 
real story o f the Clydeside raids by making little reference to events outside Clydebank, 
thus contributing to the widely held and fallacious belief that only that town was bombed, 
a distortion enshrined in the generic term ‘Clydebank Blitz’ that has come to encompass all 
air raids on Scotland.
The 1980s brought a rash of titles on the wider history of the Second World War, but again 
nothing o f real merit on Scotland. Journalists Ian Nimmo and Paul Harris produced Glas­
gow and The Clyde at War (Harris : 1986), Aberdeen at War (Harris : 1987) and Scotland at War 
(Nimmo ; 1989). Heavily dependent on the photo archives o f the Glasgow Herald and The 
Scotsman these largely pictorial accounts contain little beyond images approved by the war­
time censor. But carefully posed photographs o f happy evacuees, grinning rescued seamen, 
ostensibly cheerful Scottish-Italians being herded aboard ships bound for Canada and ap­
parently joUy air raid survivors absurdly and self-consciously giving thumbs-up signs from 
the ruins o f their homes are, at best, unhelpful. And despite the fact that the 1970s had 
seen the release o f much archival material on the war, where Nimmo and Harris do offer 
editorial it is generally of the ‘Finest H our’, brave Clydesiders can ‘take it’ variety. This is 
not to suggest that the historiography o f the war should ignore patriotism and courage, 
but, faced since 1945 with seemingly relentless decline, the British have demonstrated a 
pervasive propensity for belief in their own propaganda.
The Myth of The BHt^ (Calder : 1991) appeared in 1991 and, notably in a chapter entitled 
Celts, Reds and Conchies, but also elsewhere throughout this thought-provoking book, the
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author includes much o f relevance to the Scottish experience o f war and its lingering effect 
on the national psyche. In his preface, Calder writes o f his ‘anger’ at the sentimentahsation 
o f the myth o f 1940, notably by politicians, and he is unable in his chilly, leftist analysis to 
keep his all-too-evident detestation o f Margaret Thatcher entirely under control. While lit­
tle work has been done on the Right in Scotland, Voices From War (1995) edited by Ian 
MacDougall, a leading light in both the Scottish Labour History Society and the Scottish 
Working People’s History Trust, is a must for anyone wishing to understand what made 
the Scottish working class tick during both world wars.
By the end o f the 1980s it was apparent to this author that, although a raft o f titles was 
being produced on the Second World War in general, there was almost no published work 
on what happened in Scotland, when it happened, where it happened and why. So, between 
1991 and 1993, I published three titles on Scotland’s war. The first attempt to introduce 
primary source material into narrative studies o f Scotland during the war, these were, nev­
ertheless, commercial ventures with limited scope. Also at that time, Scottish Television’s 
Scotland’s War series, which echoed the earlier World A t  War even down to the sonorous 
delivery o f its voice-over, was being screened. This too represented a welcome break from 
the hitherto ‘couthy’ representation o f Scotland’s war.
Thus, at the end o f a century which saw two truly global wars, sizeable conflicts such as 
the Boer, Korean, Falklands and Gulf Wars, not to mention the Cold War, in all o f which 
Scottish forces and bases were involved, it is surprising to find that the historiography of 
Scotland in at least one o f these global conflicts is so sparse. Indeed, a reading list for a 
course of academic study on the subject would be an unimpressive document as the stu­
dent would be forced to rely heavily on cherry-picking from titles with a wider ‘British’ or 
‘World’ interest. All too many of these, in particular American titles, refer to Britain as 
England, but this irritating habit is by no means confined to US authors; for example in 
Williams’ 1997 Fleet Sweepers at War, the Moray Firth is referred to as being off the English 
coast!
There is, o f course, no shortage o f published texts on the wider history o f the Second 
World War at sea. RoskiU’s prodigious output, notably his The War A t  Sea series, must un­
derpin any study of the period. Maund (1949) and Fergusson (1961) both make reference 
to the work o f the Combined Training Centres on the Clyde in their respective works on 
Combined Operations. Ashworth (1992), Buckley (1995), Nesbit (1995) and Franks (1995) 
and others include material on Coastal Command operations from Scotland and numerous 
accounts o f Arctic convoys have been published. Padfield’s fine study o f submarine war­
fare, War Beneath the Sea (Padfield : 1995), is comprehensive, yet it is an example o f the dis-
5 Calder : 1991.
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interest shown by historians in Scotland’s role for it largely ignores submarine operations 
in northern waters and, in particular, the work o f the Scottish flotillas. Evidential sources, 
often biographical, must be appraised in terms o f the context in which they were written 
and derivative reference works based on primary sources. The seminal A x is  Submarine Suc­
cesses of World War Two (Rohwer : 1999) to name but one, are vital but offer little guidance 
for the broader consideration o f diverse facts. The fundamental point is that none o f these 
titles attempts to place Scotland’s unique and vital operational contribution to the war at 
sea, or even the wider war, into perspective.
On the other hand, as the most intensely organised period in British history, the Second 
World War generated a vast archive o f primary sources. These range from the Western 
Approaches War Diaries, a sweeping chronicle o f events over millions o f square miles o f 
Atlantic Ocean, to the Queensferry ARP Post Log which offers a remarkably intense ac­
count limited only by the visible horizon. Some, compiled over a lengthy period, bear the 
mark o f many hands, others were written in the immediate aftermath of combat. Most are 
remarkably free o f prejudice and self-interest. Critically, however, as the bibliography for 
this theis shows, there are numerous primary sources on the part played by Scotland in the 
war, and on how the war affected Scotland. As the research for this thesis progressed, it 
was apparent that many of these documentary sources had rarely been examined since 
1945, some o f them not at all.
S c o p e  a n d  P r e s e n t a t i o n
In his introduction to Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind (Padfield : 1999) 
writes o f maritime supremacy as, ‘the key which unlocks most, if not all o f the questions o f 
modern history,’ and o f geography as, ‘the defining factor in the growth o f both territorial 
and maritime power[s] and their opposing systems of government.’*^ This has long been 
true o f the British Isles, and never more so than during both world wars when, by dint o f 
geography. Great Britain’s principal strategic significance was maritime. And this was im­
measurably enhanced in 1940 when, with the sole exception of the Rock o f Gibraltar, the 
entire European littoral from the Aegean to the North Cape was either in enemy hands or 
neutral.
In seeking to define the importance o f Scotland’s maritime role, this thesis addresses three 
fundamental questions. First, as so little is known of the course o f events around Scot­
land’s maritime fringe, what actually happened and how did her maritime infrastructure aid 
the war effort? Second, in what maritime and amphibious operations of the wider war did
 ^Padfield : 1999 pp. 1-5.
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Scotland play a part, and, third, how strategically significant was Scotland’s maritime role in 
these operations to the wider Allied effort?
No single work could, or arguably should, attempt a comprehensive, omniscient study o f 
Scotland’s Second World War, even her maritime war. The subject is just too complex, and 
so little is yet known about it, that no such study could hope to be coherent. And, as the 
written word invariably trivialises military history, in an effort to avoid superficiality this 
thesis confines itself to distinct operational aspects o f Scotland’s sea war. Selected to cover 
a range o f maritime activity, these include the early use o f the Home Fleet based on Scot­
land to contain the Kreigsmarine inside the N orth Sea and Scotland’s role in the Atlantic 
trade war, including convoy battles both in the North Western Approaches and the coastal 
convoy route around Scotland. The performance o f the Clyde, Scotland’s principal port 
and one the two principal UK ports, is examined and placed in context. And the role o f the 
Combined Training Centres and other training establishments around Scotland in the de­
velopment of the amphibious warfare capability that would ultimately see the Allies ashore 
in Normandy is discussed. Finally, the thesis looks at the role o f the Scottish-based Home 
Fleet surface ships and submarines, along with aircraft o f Coastal Command operating 
from Scottish airfields, in the maritime war in Northern Waters. This includes considera­
tion o f their part in fighting convoys through to the Soviet Union, in the defeat o f the U 
boats and the Kreigsmarine surface fleet, and in the campaign o f deception and sabotage 
that tied down an Axis garrison of 350,000 men in Norway, well away from the main bat­
tlefield in Europe.
The decision to concentrate on these areas o f study has been driven by the need to place 
Scotland's role in the context o f a world war, yet keep the resulting work within manage­
able proportions. And, while it may be that maritime history is too important to be left 
solely in the hands o f seamen, my own seagoing background was also a factor. But such is 
the enormous scope offered by study o f Scotland in the war, one o f the more frustrating 
features o f this project has been the amount o f material that has had to be left out. So the 
project aims to be more than merely an intellectual exercise in historical writing. In shed­
ding light on a neglected area o f Scottish, and indeed British, history, it is hoped that it will 
stimulate further study o f Scotland’s wartime experience.
Photographs can, as noted above, be misleading if used indiscriminately, but this should 
not mean that all historical writing should take purely textual form. This thesis is illustrated 
throughout both to illuminate adjacent text and to carry discreet information, though the 
images used have been selected with a critical eye. Maps accompanying the text are in Mer­
cator projection. It should be borne in mind that this has an increasingly distorting effect 
in northern latitudes as meridians o f longitude are opened out to allow the earth’s surface
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to represented as a flat surface and meridians o f latitude are stretched to compensate. 
While this makes charts navigationally accurate, it has the effect, particularly noticeable on 
large scale charts, o f making land masses appear disproportionately large the further north 
one goes. (Navigators in polar regions use gnomonic projection charts centred on the 
magnetic north pole and much pioneering work in polar navigation was carried out by war­
time RAF navigators operating from SuUom Voe on patrols to the far north.) For the sake 
o f continuity, naval date-time groups are used throughout the text and are presented as 
x x x x /x x  being time/date. Unless otherwise stated, all times given are local. Otherwise, and 
in line with contemporary practice, Greenwich Mean Time is given as x x x x Z /x x , British 
Summer Time as x x x x A /x x  and British Double Summer Time as x x x x B / x x . Central Euro­
pean Time is annotated (CET).
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L.Da'Dfer une
CONTAINMENT AND RETREAT - THE NORTH SEA 
AND NORTHERN WATERS TO APRIL 1940
Over-extended and unwieldy, by 1939 the British Empire lacked homogeneity and its 
oceanic trade routes had become all but impossible to defend. The Empire was also then a 
much looser confederation than it had been in 1914 and the whole-hearted support o f the 
dominions for another war was by no means assured. Meanwhile, the United States, 
pursuing a Pacific agenda, had insisted on the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance that 
had brought Japan into the First World War on the Allied side. British interests in the Far 
East were left dangerously exposed before increasing Japanese bellicosity, but sending a 
fleet to the new base at Singapore would leave the Royal Navy in home waters seriously 
denuded. Australia, New Zealand and India were thus all but indefensible.
Britain had made a tentative start on rearmament in 1934 but, notably in respect o f the 
RAF and Royal Navy, this was essentially defensive in nature. N ot that, at least in respect 
o f the Navy, this was anything new. Britain’s maritime Empire began to decline in the early 
years o f the century as her economic and naval dominance was challenged by younger, 
dynamic powers, notably the United States and Germany, and after the near-disastrous 
Boer War did so much to expose its vulnerability. This brought a gradual change in British 
maritime policy from defending far-flung Imperial trade routes to facing, in alliance with 
France, a rapidly rising military superpower across the North Sea. As the naval arms race 
that would culminate in the First World War reached a crescendo in January 1912, First Sea 
Lord Winston Churchill said, ‘The purposes o f British naval power are essentially 
defensive,’ and suggested that the British fleet was a necessity for a maritime power while 
the then nascent German Navy was a luxury’.^
The British Army in 1939 was small and, while an expansion programme had been 
approved, this would take time to have any effect. These widely-known military weaknesses 
lay behind many o f the apparent political failures in the 1930s and forced the British 
government into a policy o f containment when war broke out. There may have been no
1 Padfield : 1993 p. 820.
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other option, but British policy was also over laden with much wishful thinking. 
Intelligence assessments in the late 1930s had suggested that a fragile German economy 
had been over-extended by rearmament and that the population was restless as a result. A 
naval blockade, the principal British maritime strategy for almost 300 years, would, it was 
beheved, bring about a coUapse similar to that of 1918 in under two years.^ This sort of 
wholly fallacious strategic intelUgence, offering as it did the prospect of a quick fix, held 
considerable appeal for a British administration wrestling with an intractable conflict of 
worldwide strategic interests, uncomfortable economic reaUty and mihtary weakness. 
Though it must be said that German strategic intelligence about Britain and the United 
States in particular was even more at odds with reality. German territorial gains in 1940 
would render the whole concept o f their economic weakness obsolete.^
T h e  I n t r o d u c t io n  o f  C o n v o y
Addressed Admiralty Naval Wireless. From Malin Head Radio. 3 /9 /3 9 . Important Important.
Admiral Rosyth. Intercept 2059. Jamming near. SSSS SSSS SSSS Athenia GFDM torpedoed 5644
1405.4
The Glasgow hner Athenia  (13,581T) left Princes Dock in the Clyde at 1200/1 September 
1939 and, having called at Belfast and Liverpool, set course through the North Channel for 
Montreal. Among her 1,102 passengers were 469 Canadians, 311 Americans and 150 
European refugees. At 1939/3, some 150 miles west of Ireland, Kapitanleutnant Fritz- 
JuHus Lemp in \J-30 fired four torpedoes, one o f which hit Athenians port side at the 
bulkhead between the engine room and no. 5 hold. Two men were killed in the engine 
room, but much of the blast vented upwards through the hatch cover, kilhng and injuring 
women and children on the deck above. The Norwegian tanker Knute Nelson, the Swedish 
yacht Southern Cross and the 
American steamer City of Flint 
responded to Athenia’s distress 
message, arriving just after 0001/4, 
and the destroyers Escort, Electra 
and Futy came up at daybreak after 
being detached from the Home 
Fleet at sea west of the Hebrides.
Athenia sinking early on 4 
September 1939.
2 The Economic Blockade. History of the Second World War Civil Series, W. N. Medlicott. HMSO 1952-1959. vol. 1 p. 24-37. 
 ^See Strategic IntelUgence and the Outbreak of the Second World War article by Richard Overy in War in Histoty vol. 5 no. 1. 
4 ADM 199 140.
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One hundred and twelve o f Athenia’ passengers and crew died. Since overshadowed by the 
wider war, in September 1939 the impact o f U~30's torpedo did more than just sink one 
ship; it caused a worldwide reaction comparable to that which followed the sinking o f the 
Lusitania. German memories o f how unrestricted submarine warfare had done much to 
bring the United States into the First World War were only too clear, and various steps, 
including the crude faking o f U-30’s log, were taken to conceal Kriegsmarine involvement.^ 
In America, news o f the sinking shrieked from the front pages alongside news o f the 
British declaration o f war. In Glasgow, as elsewhere in Britain, the reaction was a mixture 
o f shock and revulsion. Most importantly, however, the Admiralty concluded, wrongly as it 
turned out, that unrestricted submarine warfare had begun and extended convoy 
arrangements without delay. (The first convoy had sailed Gibraltar for Cape Town on 2 
September, the day before war broke out.)
Britain’s Merchant Navy, and those o f her dominions, began the war in a seemingly 
dominant position with 32.5% of world tonnage, but this apparent strength concealed 
fundamental weaknesses.^ The interwar years had been difficult for world shipping, and 
particularly fraught for British shipowners who had to cope with economic depression, 
unfavourable exchange rates and increasing competition. British non-coal exports fell from 
a peak of 17 million tons in 1929 to 9.8 million tons in 1933, though it did recover to 13.5 
million tons in 1937. But, again excluding coal, in 1938 British exports were running at 
68% o f their 1913 tonnage. N ot only did British liner owners suffer from declining 
traditional industries, but they were also increasingly exposed to aggressive competition, 
most notably from Scandinavia. And British shipowners failed to build new tonnage, or 
reconstruct older tonnage, to meet the requirements o f new markets. By way of a 
comparison, in 1939 some 62.2% o f Norway’s merchant tonnage comprised modern, 
economical, diesel-powered ships as opposed to just 25.6% of the British merchant fleet.? 
British-owned tramps lagged even farther behind, the typical British tramp being then still 
a 9-knot coal burner. As a result, British share o f world seaborne trade had declined from 
52% in 1912 to 40% in 1936, a decline that was particularly marked outwith the Empire.®
Against a background of frequent disarmament conferences and constant financial 
constraints, in 1932 the Admiralty was operating on the principle, established in 1925, that 
the Royal Navy in home waters should be strong enough to hold the Une against a
 ^Fregattenkapitan Gunther Hesslet saw a BdU document, later destroyed, in which Lemp stated that he had believed 
Athenia was an Auxiliary Cruiser. But Vause : 1997 su^ests tliat Lemp made, . .a stupid mistake; it broke every rule 
in the book and put the U-Bootwaffe and the Reich Propaganda Office on tlie defensive immediately.' Caulfield : 
1958. Rohwer : 1999. Dunnett : 1960 p. 76. See also Brassey ; 1948 p. 39.
*> Merchant Shipping and The Demands of War. C. B. A. Behrens. HMSO 1978 p. 17 for comparative tables o f world 
tonnage over 100 tons gross in 1914 and 1937. See also 1939 figures for registered sliipping over 500 tons in British 
Shipping and World Competition Sturmey : 1962 pp. 139-140.
’ Sturmey op. cit. p. 84.
8 Ibid. p. 89.
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European aggressor until reinforcements could be brought home from the Far East. But 
the political and strategic landscape across Europe and in the Far East was changing 
radically and, faced with the bleak prospect o f simultaneous hostilities with Germany, Italy 
and Japan, Chatfield’s Admiralty, like its political masters, placed excessive, even naïve, 
faith the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement. N ot until the end o f 1937 was it 
acknowledged that only Germany could deliver a decisive blow at the heart of the British 
Empire. The two-power strategy was evolved whereby the Navy at Singapore should be 
strong enough to act as a deterrent to the Japanese and the Navy at home should be 
capable o f taking on Germany.^
The Navy’s newest capital ships. Nelson and Rodney, themselves less capable than originally 
intended, were 12 years old. With the exception of Hood which, though laid down in 1916, 
was not commissioned until after the 1918 armistice, all the other capital ships were First 
World War veterans. Considerable sums were spent, from 1933, on reconstructing four 
Queen EUtyaheth class battleships, yet Nelson, Rodney and the reconstructed Warspite were still 
slower than their German counterparts.^® Only the battlecruisers Hood, Renown and Repulse 
could have caught even the German ‘pocket battleships’ in a straight chase, and they would 
still have been out-gunned. The contest for the elderly but reconstructed Renown and the 
superannuated Repulse in the albeit unlikely event o f a straight fight against the German 
battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would have been even more unequal.
In anti-submarine warfare the picture in 1939 was just as depressing. The Navy had ended 
the First World War with 477 escort vessels, but, while Britain’s dependency on maritime 
trade had altered little, the number o f escorts had reduced to 201 by 1939.^^ It would be 
too easy to lay the blame for British unpreparedness for a trade war in the Atlantic at the 
door o f a parsimonious Treasury, but, as Peden writes;
.. .nothing can be more certain than that Treasury officials were under no illusions as to the danger 
posed by Germany, Japan and Italy.. .Deterrence o f  Germany was seen as the key, but a world-wide 
Empire and dependence on commerce inhibited concentration o f  defence resources against
Germany.^2
And, as Kennedy writes:
T he final irony o f  British d efence p olicy  in  the inter-war years was that the Treasury, cursed  
by the “rearmers” at the tim e and alm ost universally scorned in historical literature, was in
9 See Roskill : 1976 ch.s XI and XIII, also Peden : 1979 p. 113 et passim and The First Sea Lords (M.H. Murfett (ed) : 
1995), in particular ch. 11 by Eric Grove on Admiral Sir Ernie Chatfield.
The Queen Elii a^beth class rebuild programme first came under active consideration following machinery surveys in 
1928. Detailed planning o f the reconstruction o f 34,000 ton Warspite, the first ship to be taken in hand, got under 
way in June 1933 and the modernised Warspite began trials in August 1936 just as tlie new 64,170 ton Japanese 
battleship Yamato armed with 18” guns was nearing completion. O f the seven planned part or complete 
reconstructions, four had been carried out before war began. ADM 1 18774. Roskill : 1976.
11 Tliis does not include 20 Asdic-equipped trawlers. See Naval Folicy between the Wars monograph by Roskill.
12 Peden : 1997 p. 113.
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fact perfectly correct in  its Cassandra-like forebodings.!^
Wilmott takes a different line, suggesting that the Royal Navy was, in fact, not badly placed 
to meet the threat to trade in 1939, indeed better placed to defend British trade than 
Germany was to undertake an offensive against it.
A ny attempt to have built up British anti-submarine forces before die last couple o f  years prior to the 
outbreak o f  war w ould have b een .. .financially irresponsible and strategically irrelevant. In Britain’s 
straitened interwar circumstances any attempt on the part o f  the Royal Navy to have developed anti­
submarine forces would have encountered a very predictable response from the Treasury.!'!
At the core of Wilmott’s argument is his peculiar assertion that, until 1938, the Navy had 
no enemy in Europe. But, as Ranft et al point out, reports o f German naval expansionist 
intentions first reached London in April 1934 and further intelligence, some from the 
Deuxieme Bureau, followed at regular intervals. Notably, in January 1935, the British Naval 
Attaché in Berlin referred to conversations with Raeder and others and reported that 
Germany was concealing the construction o f two battleships which were over the treaty 
limits. These became Scharnhorst and Gneisenaud^ There were many other indications of 
German rearmament, notably in March 1935 when a kite-flying Hitler revealed to the 
British press the existence o f the Luftwaffe and, six days later, announced an imposing new 
German army of 36 divisions based on conscription.!®
Politicians, particularly in Britain and France were merely reflecting the national mood 
when, from 1935 onwards, they sought to avoid war, even if this meant ignoring the 
writing on the wall. But the Admiralty, which was receiving regular and clear intelligence o f 
German Naval rearmament, including U boat construction, both overestimated the 
effectiveness o f British Naval technology and underestimated the trade protection 
capability that would be required. From 1932, it was planned to build three cruisers and 
just two A /S escorts annually, then, in 1936, First Lord Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell assured 
Ministers that submarines would be less important in a future conflict than they had been 
in the First World War.!? That year’s estimates included two new battleships, the 1937 
estimates included three more battleships, two carriers and seven cruisers along with 34 
destroyers, 12 sloops and 15 submarines. As Grove writes, the then First Sea Lord Sir 
Ernie Chatfield accepted that he failed to fully recognise the true scale o f the U boat 
menace, and only in the 1939 estimates do escort vessels appear in numbers.!®
Thus, in 1939, the most immediate shortages lay in long-range escort vessels with sufficient
Kennedy : 1976 p. 297.
!4 Paper by H, P. Wilmott in Battle of the Atlantic — 50*^ ‘ Anniversaiy International Naval Conference. Howarth and Law (ed. s) 
see pp. 181-182.
Ranft etal : 1977 p. 138.
!** Home : 1990 p. 87.
!!' Peden : 1979 p. 166.
!8 Murfett (ed.) : 1995 p. 167.
12
North Western Approaches
speed, technology and hitting power to catch and destroy U-boats, and in tactics and 
training. Much of the responsibility for this must He with the Admiralty which, faced with 
the competing imperatives to defend both the centre and imperial trade routes, gave A /S 
warfare low priority between the wars. New construction priorities and the attendant 
personnel and training programmes may appear, with the benefit o f hindsight, to have 
been ill-judged, yet it is possible to sympathise with Admirals for whom the capital ship 
was the ultimate representation o f naval might. All their experience pointed to the torpedo 
and the bomb being erratic weapons o f dubious effectiveness, and the addition o f anti­
torpedo bulges was thought to have rendered capital ships all-but invulnerable to torpedo 
attack. This is not to suggest that the Royal Navy in 1939 was a paper tiger; it was after all 
much larger the Kreigsmarine, but it was scattered around the world in penny packets to 
protect imperial trade routes and meet the emergent threats from Germany, Italy and 
Japan. There were sloops, minesweepers and modern fleet destroyers, but capital ships 
dare not move witliout drawing on this already over-stretched force.
Britain still led the world in shipbuilding, but the depression had wrought considerable 
damage to heavy industry and the sudden growth in warship building had a knock-on 
effect on merchant vessel construction, using up yard capacity. Then the Treasury, keenly 
aware that the confHcting demands o f all three services were coming up against physical 
Hmits o f production, were concerned at the inflationary effect of naval expansion on the 
wider economy. New construction used up capacity hitherto used to manufacture export 
goods and demand for scarce raw materials and speciaHst machine tools, for example, 
meant rapidly rising imports. For example, 20 Hunt class destroyers were ordered in the 
1939 estimates. These small, Hghtly-built ships had insufficient endurance for ocean escort 
duty, but they did draw on scarce, generally imported special steels used in the manufacture 
o f turbine blades. The forming o f these blades and similar precision finishing work was 
increasingly dependent on machine tools imported from the United States.!^
It was the consequent need for an escort vessel with reciprocating machinery, which could 
be built quickly in large numbers, that led to the Flower class corvette. Based on a 
commercial whalecatcher design. Flowers were simpler, faster and cheaper to build than 
sloops or destroyers, and orders for 60 were placed in July and August 1939 with 16 
shipbuilders, few of whom had experience o f warship construction. Flowers were originally 
conceived as a coastal convoy escort as it was not considered that close escort would be 
required for ocean convoys which would, in theory, be beyond the range o f aircraft 
operating from Germany and U boats bottled up in the North Sea by the British blockade. 
Only capable o f 15 knots, almost four knots slower than a surface-running U boat, they
Kennedy : 1976 p. 297 et passim.
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were lightly armed with a single 4” gun and 40 depth charges. And, while they did have the 
range for ocean escort work, particularly in their earliest form, they were notoriously 
uncomfortable, their endurance being limited as much by the need to rest their crews as by 
effective range. As the Staff History o f the North Atlantic Campaign states, by the end of 
1940 it was apparent that neither sloops nor corvettes could stand up to the North Atlantic 
in winter.2o
Losses in Norway, at Dunkirk and elsewhere meant that, by mid-July 1940, the escort force 
available to Western Approaches Command comprised just 10 sloops, 22 destroyers and 
corvettes and ‘a number o f trawlers’. Additional ships were available from other 
commands, but that meant either reducing anti-invasion defences or abandoning convoy 
on, for example, the Gibraltar run.^i
Asdic, the underwater sound ranging device with its characteristic heterodyne pinging, was 
seen by many before the war as a panacea. Such was the confidence in its abilities, when 
the 1936 Naval estimates were presented to Parliament, MPs were reassured that, thanks to 
the introduction of what was euphemistically referred to as modern equipment, ‘...fewer 
destroyers could do the work formerly done by many.’ Whether this work was to be trade 
protection or protecting the fleet was not specified. But Asdic, particularly in its early 
manifestations, had serious shortcomings well-known to Royal Navy submariners; it had 
limited range, it could not determine the depth o f targets and it was readily deceived by, 
for example, fish, temperature layers and Asdic sets in other ships. And Asdic was only as 
good as the people operating it. Anti-submarine warfare had held little appeal for naval 
officers attracted by more glamorous branches o f the service. Little had been done to 
develop the tactics and teamwork that would bring success from 1941 onwards, but so 
evidently lacking in 1940.
Vitally, however. Asdic was unable to detect surface-running U boats. The Admiralty was 
aware o f this, yet the one thing that, as had been proved in 1918, would force U boats into 
Asdic’s operational envelope, namely maritime aviation, had been all but abandoned. With 
Kriegsmarine crews training for surfaced night attacks and maritime radar in its infancy, 
herein lay its most fundamental deficiency.^
Naval aviation, handed over to the RAF in 1924 and the subject o f prolonged demarcation 
disputes until it was returned to the Admiralty in May 1939 after a two-year campaign 
initiated by Chatfield, had withered on the vine and the Fleet Air Arm would play Uttle part 
in the Battle of the Atlantic until the appearance o f escort carriers in 1942.^ The RAF’s
28 The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939-1945 p. 19,
21 ADM 199 6. See also The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939-1945 ch. 5.
22 Hackman : 1984 for Royal Navy Asdic development.
2) Van der Vat : 1988 p. 72, 94,111-112.
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Coastal Command was principally expected to act as the eyes of the fleet in the event o f a 
German surface raider break-out from the Baltic to the Atlantic, this being seen from the 
mid-1930s as the greatest threat to trade. Oddly, it was also expected to offer unspecified 
cooperation to Bomber Command in the strategic air offensive and this subservient role to 
Bomber Command would hamper Coastal’s development throughout the war.24 But, there 
were more immediate problems to be faced. As Buckley writes;
Coastal Command began the war with a w hole host o f  failings and deficiencies. These were largely as 
a result o f  a lack o f  resources allocated during the rearmament process; o f  the influence o f  the 
doctrine o f  the flying boat; and o f  the strategical and political debate over the ability o f  aircraft to 
sink major naval vessels.^®
In 1937, the Joint Planning Committee had set a target o f 339 operational aircraft for 
Coastal Command, but only 194 were available in April 1939. But the actual number o f 
aircraft was not, at the outbreak o f war, the main problem. The Kriegsmarine was, after 
all, small with few ships or U boats operational. The real issue lay in the standard o f 
equipment, much o f it, like the inadequate Anson and the 20-year-old Vildebeest, 
hopelessly obsolete. The procurement process for new, operationally capable aircraft had 
failed with contracts being awarded to companies like Blackburn which had dubious 
track records. New types such as the Botha, Bolingbroke and Lerwick flying boat had 
failed and their programmes had collapsed. The Beaufort had more promise, but its 
programme had been delayed. For trade protection and reconnaissance duties, the 
Hudson landplane and the Catalina flying boat, imports from America, would act as a 
stop-gap until the long-range Liberator, an American-built Bomber Command reject, 
came forward in numbers.
Coastal Command’s procurement programme had become the subject o f a long running 
dispute, that would continue through the war, between backers o f the bombing offensive 
and advocates o f trade protection. Invariably, Coastal Command came off worst and, in 
September 1939, its order o f battle was ten squadrons of Ansons, one o f Hudsons and two 
o f Vüdebeests. In flying boats, there was one squadron o f obsolete Stranraers, another of 
the equally useless London and just two squadrons of the relatively modern Sunderland. 
But Shorts had turned over their lines to the new Lerwick flying boat which was rushed 
into production and proved a failure. Thus, when war broke out, production of the 
Sunderland, the one successful long-range aircraft available to Coastal Command, had 
stalled and was having to be hastily restarted.^®
Initially, the defence o f ports and coastal shipping was to have been the responsibility of
24 Terraine : 1985 p. 225. Buckley : 1995 The RAF and Trade Defence p. 117.
25 Buckley op. «/p. 113.
28 Tei-raine : 1985 p. 228.
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Fighter Command. Four squadrons were transferred from Fighter Command for trade 
protection duty in December 1939 as losses in coastal waters mounted, but progress was 
agonisingly slow. And, in addition to N orth Sea patrols including what was then its most 
important task, the patrol between Leuchars and Norway, Coastal was now required to 
patrol the enemy-held coastline from Norway to the Bay of Biscay and to cover Iceland, 
the Denmark Strait and the N orth Western Approaches. In 1940, it was to provide support 
for the RAF in the Battle o f Britain and mount attacks on enemy invasion shipping 
assembling in French and Belgian Channel ports as German successes heaped new 
priorities on an already overstretched Command.
If  the situation as regards ships and aircraft was poor, the condition o f the principal naval 
bases in Scotland was, if  anything, worse. Rosyth, vital at least until 1917 as it was better 
placed than Scapa Flow for getting heavy units into the central North Sea, had closed in 
1928. It had since been used as a shipbreakers’ scrapyard by Metal Industries Ltd and had 
not been modernised, though it was being reactivated as war broke out. Scapa Flow would 
be the Navy’s main base in northern waters, but its defences had been allowed to run down 
to a dangerous degree, as would soon be exposed by Prien and U-47. As the Navy moved 
onto a war footing, the battleships Royal Sovereign, Royal Oak and Ramillies lay at anchor in 
Scapa Flow on 21 August 1939. Surveying the defences. Captain Tom Baillie-Grohman of 
Ramillies recorded a lamentable picture of neglect: the Hoxa boom was in place and the 
gate through which he had just brought his ship was marked - but there was no gate. None 
o f the other boom defences were even that far advanced, there were no patrol vessels, nor 
was there any covering fire. Badlie-Grohman wrote:
It appeared that the B D O , w ho had been working on  the boom s for about a year, had, in spite o f  
frequent requests, been refused permission to work overtime. As it was only possible to work in the 
strong tides for a few hours round slack water, progress was extremely slow. This all seemed an 
appalling state o f  affaks, and it was with a sense o f  urgency that I instructed the B D O  to work 
overtime, and at fuU speed, and at the same time made a signal dkect to the Admkalty repeated to all 
concerned that this had been done, 'failing instructions from T hek Lordships to the contrary', thus 
putting the responsibility squarely where it belonged.
I found tliat two batteries o f  four o f  the latest A A  guns had lately been mounted at Lyness.
T h ese .. .had been manned for exercise between 12®* August and 18®* August by Territorials, w ho had, 
on  the latter date, returned to the mainland whence they had come. A t the m om ent (2F ‘ August and 
the following days) the guns were plugged, ammunition and breech blocks returned to som e rather 
distant magazine, and no crews were available.. .1 then inspected the B oom  D efence Vessels at the 
H oxa entrance and found the crews to be civilian RFA, mostly from the Orkneys. Between the two 
crews there was one World War O ne army artilleryman, w ho now  knew just enough to go over the 
single 3-inch AA gun in each vessel with an ok can. T he guns were plugged, and there was no 
ammunition on board.^?
And all this while, as Peden points out, large sums were being spent on the defences o f 
Singapore.28 Baillie-Grohman took his concerns to Rear Admiral Harold Blagrove, though
27 NhW  Rgmw vol. XXXIII pp 63-66.
28 Peden : 1979 p. 167.
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just how much urgency registered with the latter is a matter for speculation as, ironically, 
he drowned when Royal Oak was torpedoed inside Scapa on 14 October 1939.
Control o f merchant shipping was taken over by the Admiralty on 26 August 1939 and 
Naval Control o f Shipping Officers were in place in all major ports. The first outbound 
convoy sailed from the Clyde on 5 September.29 HX and O A /O B series Atlantic convoys 
began in mid-September, the first inbound Atlantic convoy sailing Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 
16 September. As the speed o f any convoy is limited to that o f its slowest ship, it was 
decided that only vessels capable of between 9 knots and 14.9 knots were to be included in 
ocean convoys. Faster ships could safely sail independently but slower ships were left to 
fend for themselves and suffered heavy losses.
By March 1940, the Atlantic convoys had settled down to a four day cycle. The Admiralty 
Staff History offers an optimistic gloss by implying that HX and O A /O B  convoys were, 
'brought across the Atlantic by an anti-raider ocean escort' when, in practice, this rarely 
amounted to more than a single Armed Merchant Cruiser, one o f the misleadingly titled 
converted liners hastily equipped with obsolete guns. But, such was the shortage o f escort 
vessels and aircraft as detailed above, close anti-submarine escorts were only provided east 
o f 12° west and occasional Coastal Command aircraft operated out to 8° west.^® Later, in 
July 1940, the Ministry o f Supply increased its import requirements by 1,000,000 tons per 
month and, as it would clearly be better for imports to arrive late than never, urgent 
consideration was given to providing escorts for slower ships.®! The first 8-knot SC 
convoy, SCI, sailed Sydney, Cape Breton, on 15 August 1940.®2 The shortage of escort 
vessels meant that only one sloop, Rentrance, was available and she was the first ship lost 
from the convoy, sunk by U-37 on 24 August.
From the outbreak o f war until June 1940 transatlantic traffic had been principally routed 
through the Western Approaches south of Ireland to ports in southern England, but 
German troops entered Paris on 14 June 1940 and the French government asked for an 
armistice three days later. The Rosyth war diary for 17 June opines, ‘At last we are fighting 
this war on our own. Provided the French Fleet falls into our hands, no particular 
difficulty should be encountered.’®® However, with France now enemy territory and ports 
in the south coast o f England untenably close to Luftwaffe airfields, all Atlantic convoys 
were rerouted through the North Channel. Outbound OA convoys from Southend 
continued until 24 October 1940, though they were diverted northabout round Scotland,
29 The Defeat of the Enemy Attach on Shipping 1939-1945. Ch. 5 for convoy organisation.
30 Ibid. p. 30.
31 ADM 199 6 for minutes of discussion in A. V. Alexander’s office on 18 July 1940 on the introduction of SC 
convoys. Rohwer : 1999.
32 ADM 234 372. The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping chapter 5 ss. 25 and 26.
33 ADM 199 363.
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Five converted merchant ships with a total capacity o f 2,600 mines formed the 1st 
Minelaying Squadron based at HMS Trelawnej in the Kyle o f Lochalsh Hotel, which was 
selected because it had a railhead and was well away from danger o f air attack.®'! The plan 
was to lay 60,000 mines in six months, out o f a total required o f 181,000. But the 
effectiveness o f the barrage was evidently dependent on the Norwegian government 
agreeing to its eastern end being closed up to their coast, and this was not thought to be 
likely. Before laying could begin, the Shetland-Norway scheme was abandoned when the 
German invasion o f Norway meant that the barrage would have been footed in enemy 
territory. The effort was shifted to the Shetland-Faroe-Iceland gap, a distance o f 500 miles, 
almost twice the original length, where depths o f over 500 fathoms were common, weather 
conditions were worse and currents stronger. Indeed, as Cowie writes, there were many 
places between Scotland and Iceland where it was physically impossible to damage a U 
boat with an antenna mine.®®
Laying began in June 1940 and, as in 1918, much trouble was experienced with premature 
firing, so many mines were laid with the antenna system sterilised. The schedule of almost 
10,000 a month proved hopelessly optimistic, partly because there were not enough escorts 
available for the minelayers and partly due to transport difficulties between the factories in 
England and Kyle, then there were air raids, in one o f which the mine assembly plant at 
Wolseley Motors in Birmingham was flattened. Minelaying continued, driven partly by the 
number o f mines that were being produced and the lack o f storage space ashore. In 
January 1943, however, the barrage scheme was abandoned in favour o f strategically-placed 
deep fields of moored magnetic mines. Two of these of these had, by then, been laid off 
the N orth Channel and north o f Cape Wrath to cover the ocean and coastal convoy 
routes.®® The 1*^  Minelaying Squadron was disbanded late in 1943.®?
Some 81,000 mines were laid in the Northern Barrage, 31% o f the British minelaying effort 
in the war. The scheme was hugely wasteful, costing £S million and tying up five modern 
merchant ships and numerous escort vessels that could have been more profitably 
employed elsewhere.®® The Admiralty Staff History concedes that.
54 The squadron comprised Southern Prince (10,917T — capacity 560 mines), Port Napier (5,936T -  550 mines), Port Quebec 
(5,936T — 550 mines), Agamemnon (7,593T — 530 mines) and Menestheus (7,494T — 410 mines). At 1335/27 November 
1940, Port Napier went on Great Kyle o f Lochalsh after oil &om a fractured breather splashed onto a donkey boiler 
and ignited. The fire was soon out o f control and Captain Tait ordered her 580 mines jettisoned, but the anchor 
cable of a collier which had fouled the port screw the previous evening also obstructed the port mine trap. This was 
cleared and local inhabitants were evacuated amid fears o f a vast explosion as Port Napier yr/as towed towards the 
Skye shore and cast adrift. At 1540/27, the first o f a series o f explosions took place and, at 1630/27, after one 
particularly violent explosion, part o f her superstructure landed on the beach. Cowie : 1949 p. 132 for squadron 
details. ADM 178 249, Macdonald : 1993 pp. 65-76 and Baird : 1995 pp. 230-231 for loss o f Port Napier. Mines still in 
Port Napier vrexe dumped in 137 fathoms west o f Kyle o f Lochalsh AF/62 2632.
55 Cowie : 1949 p. 133. See also Roskill : 1960 pp. 48-49.
58 Cowie : 1949 p. 137. Roskill ; 1954 p. 264.
57 Roskill : 1962 pp. 48-49.
58 Article by John Cowie in Nami Review no. 54 (1966) pp. 120-124.
North Western Approaches
N o  evidence has com e to light that this barrage affected enemy surface or U-boat operations. One U 
boat was destroyed by it.®^
T h e  M o n t r o s e  -  O b r e s t a d  P a t r o l
The southernmost element in the blockade was put in place when the 2"® Submarine 
Flotilla depot ship, HMS Forth, secured alongside Dundee’s King George V Wharf on the 
morning of 25 August 1939. Forth was joined the following morning by Seawolf, Swordfish 
and Sterlet, five o f her brood having already taken up patrol positions off south-west 
Norway on 24 September. Flag Officer (Submarines) Rear Admiral Bertram Watson 
opened his headquarters in Corriemar, Aberdour, on 31 August.®® Coastal Command 
Ansons o f 233 Squadron based at Leuchars were to operate an endless chain patrol 
between Montrose and Obrestad, but the 
Anson had insufficient range so five 
boats o f the 2"® Flotilla were stationed 12 
miles apart off south-west Norway to fill 
the gap. The patrol was established too 
late to intercept Graf Spee or Deutschland 
which had sailed Wilhelmshaven on 21 
August and 24 August respectively, but it 
was also directed against U boats making 
for the Atlantic.®!
The necessity to employ submarines on the 
Montrose-Obrestad patrol arose from the 
inadequate range of Coastal Command’s 
obsolete Anson reconnaissance aircraft. But 
submarines have a low height of eye, making 
them a poor reconnaissance tool, and, as the 
Ox/ey incident highlighted, there are inherent 
dangers in operating submarines so close 
together in a sensitive area.
Oxley sailed Dundee at 2000/4 
September, followed 24 hours later by 
Triton which was to take up the adjoining 
billet. Surfacing eight miles off Kvasseim at 2004/10, Triton’s watchkeepers sighted another 
submarine about one mile off and more than four miles inside her sector. Triton made three 
challenges by flashing light and fired a rifle grenade, but got no response, so torpedoes 
were fired and there was one explosion. When Triton closed the area there was no sign of 
the submarine, just oil-covered water in which three men could be heard shouting for help. 
Oxlefis Lieutenant Commander Bowerman and a rating were picked up.®2
Oxley was the Navy’s first loss o f the war, though two other Dundee-based submarines 
came close to sharing her fate. On 4 September Seahorse was attacked off the Tay by a 233
59 The Defeat of the Enerry Attack on Shipping 1939-1945. Naval Staff History, Second World War CB3304 (voL's lA  and 
IB). Revised edition published by the Navy Records Society 1997 p. 152.
80 The house had been earmarked in June 1939 as Aberdour was close to the Combined HQ at Donibristle and no 
accommodation was available in Rosyth. ADM 199 277.
8> Dundee Harbour Trust Wharf Books. Ashworth ; 1992 p. 20. Padfield : 1997 p. 70. ADM 234 380.
82 Neither Steele or Bowerman, who had just been called to the bridge when Triton’s torpedo hit, were blamed although 
it was apparent that Manley and Oxl^s lookouts had been slack. Following the sinking o f Oxley the boats on the 
Obrestad line were stationed further apart. Evans : 1986 pp. 195-199. ADM 234 380.
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Squadron Anson. Her after planes jammed, Seahorse had to surface, but Pilot Officer Yorke 
attacked again so the submarine dived out o f control and hit bottom  at 240 feet. Yorke’s 
aircraft was riddled by shrapnel from its own bombs and ditched in St Andrews Bay as 
another Leuchars-based aircraft attacked Sturgeon also off the Tay, but did no damage.^^ 
Then, off Aberdeen early on 14 September, Smrdftsh was mistaken for a U boat by her 
sister Sturgeon and attacked. Swordfish dived and the torpedoes missed, one passing close 
over her stern casing. She resumed her passage to Dundee, berthing on ¥orth at 0740/14.'^^
Speatfish, patrolling off Hautsholm late on 24 September, was depth-charged and severely 
damaged. Surfacing after dark, she signalled for help at 0510/25 and Nelson, Kodney, A rk  
Royal, Renown, the 18‘^ ' Cruiser Squadron and 11 destroyers sailed Scapa to bring her in. 
Southampton, Aurora, Sheffield, Glasgow and six destroyers sailed Rosyth and three Hudsons 
mounted patrols from Leuchars. Speatfish was met by Somali and Eskimo at 0100/26 and all 
ships turned for home.^^ At 0220/30 H-34 on passage to Scapa missed a U boat with two 
torpedoes 15 miles north of Kinnaird’s Head.^'' Seawolf missed the German cruiser Nürnberg 
in the Skagerrak at 0105/6 October and Sturgeon missed U~23 on 14 October.
In addition to the 233 Squadron chain patrol on the Scotland-Norway patrol line itself, the 
Coastal Command reconnaissance which began on 23 August included dawn patrols north 
o f the patrol line by London flying boats o f 201 Squadron operating from the depot ship 
Manela in SuUom Voe, and by Stranraer flying boats o f 209 Squadron from Invergordon. 
South o f the patrol line, dusk patrols were flown by 224 Squadron Hudsons from 
Leuchars.^^
The first encounter with the enemy came on 4 September 1939 when a 224 Squadron 
Hudson returned to Leuchars damaged after an engagement with a D 0 1 8  flying boat over 
the northern North Sea. On 8 October 1939, during attempts to intercept German heavy 
units that had been sighted off south-west Norway, another D 018  o f 2Kfg/506 was shot 
down by 224 Squadron Hudson 15 miles north-east of Aberdeen. Its four aircrew were
^ The investigation revealed that the aircraft was off track, but tire route used by submarines entering or leaving tire 
Tay was moved and arrival and departure times were adjusted to take place at night. AIR 25 232.
^  Stufgeotis CO Lieutenant G. D. Gregory was deemed partly to blame for not having acquainted liimself with other 
submarine movements, but Captain (S2) William Stevens was held mainly responsible for having sent inbound and 
outbound submarines along the same track, a recipe for disaster. Kemp : 1995.
“  See Roskill : 1954 pp. 68-69 for air attacks on the Home Fleet returning to Scapa. RN Submarine Museum. ADM 
234 380. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1972 p. 6
According to Rohwer, U~10 reported two torpedoes that missed, although Wynn states it was U-22 which herself 
reported carrying out an unsuccessful attack on a British submarine while on patrol off Orkney. Rohwer appears to 
confuse this attack with another one reported by U~3 at 2245/30 in 5745N 0800E wliich he credits to H-34 even 
though she was nowhere near tliis position. H-34 began patrolling off the Hebrides as protection for the fishing 
fleets but was required for training duties and replaced by H-43 at die end o f October. This patrol had no success 
and, after intermittent implementation, was withdrawn in May 1940 as more aircraft were then available. ADM 234 
380. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1997.
AIR 41 73. Ashworth : 1992 pp. 35-36.
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picked up by a Danish steamer and interned.^®
By mid-October 1939, 233 Squadron had re-equipped with Hudsons which had the range 
to reach Norway and the submarines were withdrawn from Norwegian coastal waters. 
The Admiralty were also concerned that Dundee and Blyth were inadequately protected 
against air attack, so the 2'^  ^ and 6**’ Flotillas were ordered to Rosyth. Forth and the boats 
not on patrol left Dundee on 14 October, ironically arriving in Rosyth just in time for the 
first air raid o f the war on 16 October.^o
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Scotland’s geographical position placed her naval and air bases at the heart of Allied maritime 
strategy in the North Atlantic as seen here with the principal blockade patrols of 1939-40. 
Blockade may have been flawed, but it was then the only strategy open to  Allied naval planners 
concerned with keeping the sea lanes open in the North Atlantic and elsewhere. And, from mid- 
1940, as the Allied supply route moved to  the North W estern Approaches, so the strategic 
importance of Scotland’s bases increased.
“  AIR 28 459. Asworth op. cit. p. 21.
Ramsay et al. : 1989.
™ The 6* Flotilla returned to Blyth on 21 November and were established ashore in HMS Elfin. DHT Wharf Books. 
ADM 234 380.
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The Montrose-Obrestad Patrol was hardly an impregnable barrier, not least because none 
o f the air patrols flew at night and, such was the paucity o f aircraft, just one going 
unserviceable was enough to leave a gap in cover. And patrols were often hampered by bad 
weather as, in November 1939, when Schamhorst and Gneisenau were returning from the 
sortie which included their engagement with RaimlpindiA  In one notable encounter on 10 
January 1940, a 233 Squadron Hudson engaged an H E l l l  over the east coast convoy route 
and, having run out of ammunition, attempted to down the Heinkel by dropping bombs on 
it from 100 feet above.?^ Then, on 24 February 1940, it was Hudson Q /224 out o f 
Leuchars that found the Graf Speeds supply ship Altm ark  hidden in a Norwegian fjord.
A tta ck s  o n  T h e  H o m e  F l e e t  a n d  its  Sc o t t ish  Bases  1939-1940
Much on the principle o f using a sledgehammer to crack a nut, in the early weeks o f the 
war the Royal Navy deployed its limited aircraft carrier strength on anti-submarine patrols 
in the Western Approaches.?® The foUy o f this strategy, a child o f Churchill’s relentlessly 
offensive approach, would be demonstrated by the near destruction o f A rk  Royal off the 
Hebrides on 14 September and by the loss o f Courageous in the South Western Approaches 
three days later. These sweeps clearly placed the valuable carriers at risk and subjected 
ships and crews to much wear and tear for httle return. By the end o f October the trade­
off in naval vessels was Courageous sunk and A rk  Royal near missed from the carrier force, 
the battleship Royal Oak sunk, the battleship Nelson only saved by the torpedoes that struck 
her failing to explode and the submarine Oxley lost to friendly fire while, on the German 
side, U-39 and U-27 had been lost, the latter due largely to slack lookouts.
But Churchill was also advocating CATHERINE, the sending o f a naval squadron into the 
Baltic, partly to attack German shipping and partly to give the Soviet government pause for 
thought before, as then seemed likely, it entered the war in alliance with Germany. 
CATHERINE was never attempted, but Vice Admiral Edward-Collins sailed Rosyth on 22 
September in Southampton with Glasgow, Aurora, Sheffield and destroyers o f the and 
Flotillas for a raid into the Skaggerak. Sir Charles Forbes sailed Scapa with units o f the 
Home Fleet as distant cover but this operation was aborted when the destroyers Javelin and 
Jersey collided.?"^
On 8 October the German battlecruiser Gneisenau and cruiser Koln, on a foray to tempt the 
Home Fleet across a U boat line and into range o f the Luftwaffe, were sighted off southern 
Norway by a 224 Squadron Hudson from Leuchars. Bomber Command Wellingtons were
Denis Richards, The Riyal A ir  Force 1939-1945. AHB Narrative HMSO p. 57.
72 AIR 28 459.
73 The foUy of using fleet carriers in this role was demonstrated when V-29 sank Courageous (22,5001) soutli-west of  
Ireland at 2000/17 September 1939. Courageous w&nt down in 18 minutes, taking 519 o f her 1,202 crew with her.
74 ADM 186 799.
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sent out but failed to make contact in heavy snow. Forbes sailed Scapa with Hood, Nelson, 
Rodney, Furious, Aurora, Belfast and nine destroyers and, despite being attacked by enemy 
aircraft the following day, returned unscathed on 10 October without sighting the enemy. 
Too slow to keep up with her more modern counterparts, the battleship Royal Oak was 
sent on a sweep across the Fair Isle Channel.?®
On 13 October, once again leaving the 
obsolete Royal Oak behind, Forbes sailed 
for Loch Ewe. Meanwhile, intelligence 
from a neutral merchant skipper diverted 
to Kirkwall by the Northern Patrol, a 
Luftwaffe reconnaissance flight on 26 
September and a patrol by \J-16 had 
shown that the eastern entrances to 
Scapa Flow were open and, late on 13 
October, Kapitanleutnant Gunther Prien 
took L7-47 through a gap between the 
blockships in Kirk Sound. The main fleet 
anchorage south o f Cava was empty so 
he turned north to Scapa Bay where lay 
Royal Oak and the seaplane tender Pegasus 
which they misidentified as the 
battlecruiser Repulse. Prien fired three 
torpedoes at 0058/14, one o f which 
struck Royal Oak's bow. U-47 then fired 
another torpedo from her stern tube but 
this missed. No reaction was detected so 
the forward tubes were reloaded, then 
three torpedoes ripped the bottom out of 
Royal Oak at 0118/14. The battleship 
capsized and sank, and 833 men died.?^
On 26 September 1939 the Home Fleet sailed 
Scapa to cover the return to Rosyth of the 
damaged submarine Spearfish, which had hit a 
mine. At 1100/26 a Swordfish from Ark Royal 
sighted three Dornier 18 flying boats shadowing 
the fleet. A flight of 803 Squadron Sea Skuas from 
Ark Royal intercepted them and DO 18 KY+YK of 
2/506 was shot down. Leutnant zur See von 
Reitenstein and his crew w ere picked up, as 
above, by Somali.
That afternoon, nine HE 11 Is of I/KG26 and four 
jU88s of I/KG30 attacked the Ark Royal group, 
one bomb falling off the carrier’s port bow. Ark 
Royal was undamaged though German 
propaganda credited Unteroffizier Karl Francke 
with having sunk her. An unexploded bomb 
glanced off Hood’s port bulge.
The next evening, 15 October, Repulse was steaming down the east coast o f Scotland 
towards Rosyth. Her progress was being monitored by the Luftwaffe who, like Prien's 
lookouts, misidentified her, this time as the battlecruiser Hood. But she was clearly an
73 Ashworth : 1992 p. 21. Ramsay et al : 1989.
76 ADM 199 158. The U Boat War in the Atlantic HM.SO 1989 p. 32. Published sources on Rcfyal Oak include McKee's 
Black Saturde  ^and Weaver's Nightmare at Scapa Flow. See also Padfield : 1984 pp. 201-202, Vause ; 1997 for the 
planning o f the operation and After The Battle no.72 on Scapa blockships.
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important target and, on 16 October, Hauptman Helmut Pohle commanding the new 
JU88s o f 1/KG30 received orders to attack her. Also off the east coast was HNO, a seven- 
ship convoy inbound from Norway for the anchorage at Methil.
Drone Hill RDF station at Cockburnspath detected Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft off 
Fife Ness and St Abbs Head between 0935/16 and 1129/16.?? Spitfires o f 602 Squadron 
scrambled from RAF Drem intercepted a reconnaissance H E l l l  ten miles east o f the Isle
of May at 1021/16 but the 
Heinkel escaped into cloud.?® 
Pohle led his 12 JU88s over East 
Lothian at 1420/16.?^ He wrote:
The order is quite definite; do not 
attack if she is in dock. The powers 
in Germany were still hoping there 
could be an agreement with England 
and civilian casualties should under 
no circumstances aggravate 
propaganda.. .1 could see the Hood 
[sic] already in the lock of Rosyth. 
However, in the Firth lay HMS 
Southampton and HMS Edinburgh at 
anchor. I attacked.. .the Southampton, 
but during the dive the top part of 
the canopy came off.®®
Two 602 Squadron Spitfires shot 
Pohle down near Fife Ness at 
1453/16 and the destroyer Jervis, 
escorting HNO off Fife Ness, 
picked up the injured Pohle and 
the body one o f his crew.®  ^ Red
Enemy aircraft appeared over Britain for the first time on 
16 October 1939 to attack Royal Navy ships at Rosyth. 
This German photograph shows the cruisers Southampton 
(left) and Edinburgh (centre) raising steam to  get under 
way as bombs fall around them. One has just passed 
through Southampton’s deck and hull to explode alongside, 
sinking her pinnance and the Admiral’s barge. Three men 
w ere wounded. section of 603 Squadron had 
earlier shot down another JU88 into the sea off Port Seton,®  ^Spitfires chased raiders across 
Edinburgh at rooftop height and bombs damaged Southampton at Queensferry and the 
destroyer Mohawk off EUe Ness.®® Thirteen died in Mohawk.^
77 Information from Ian Brown of the Historic Radar Archive, 12 January 1995.
78 This was Fighter Command's first engagement with enemy aircraft. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2073.
79 Hugh Barkla was in the Filter Room at Fighter Command Headquarters, RAF Stanmore, during the raid. He recalled 
that, despite the problems at Drone HiU, the raid was tracked by other RDF stations including Ottercops Moss in 
Northumberland and Douglas Wood near Dundee. Unidentified aircraft were also reported by Observer Corps 
posts in East Lothian. Letters to the author from Hugh Barkla 27 October 1994 and 15 November 1994. WO 166 
2127.
80 Letter to the author from Helmut Pohle 4 May 1992.
81 AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2073. AIR 28 166. Information from the late Group C^tain George Pinkerton. ADM 53 
109405. See also Observer Corps logs held by The Museum o f Flight, East Fortune Airfield.
82 By some seven minutes, this was the RAF's first victory of the war. AIR 27 2079. AIR 50 167. Jeffrey ; 1992 pp. 19- 
20. Information from the late Group Captain George Denholm, May 1992.
83 Information from Air Vice Marshal Sandy Johnstone and Wing Commander Hector MacLcan. HH50/5. Jeffrey :
■ (  >, in t’d I'lverlc-11
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1/KG30 returned the following day, this time to Scapa where they damaged the only large 
warship present, the training ship Iron Duke3^ Unlike Rosyth the day before, there was no 
fighter cover for Scapa, but one JU88 hit by anti-aircraft fire crashed on Hoy. Unteroffizier 
Ambrosius baled out and survived being shot at by gunners in the depot ship Voltaire 
Three hours later, at 1400/17, a second formation approached Scapa.®?
Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights ranged across Scotland searching for the Home Fleet 
which had clearly left Scapa. 603 Squadron shot down a reconnaissance F IE lll  of 
1(F)/122 four miles off St Abbs Head at 1435/22 October and three crewmen were picked 
up by Gurkhaft^ Early on 28 October an H E l l l  crossed the coast at Craü, went west to the 
Clyde, then followed the Forth and Clyde Canal eastwards untü, at 1010/28, it came under 
anti-aircraft fire between the Forth Bridge and Inchcolm.®^ It was intercepted by 602 and 
603 Squadron Spitfires over Tranent and brought down south-west o f Haddington.®*? Two 
o f its crew died and the pilot was injured.®?
Forbes had long been aware o f the vulnerability o f his ships to air attack and o f the 
inadequacy of the Scapa defences. On 7 September 1939 he had been told that there were 
800 German bombers within range o f Scapa and ordered to disperse his ships.®  ^ Some 
units were sent to Loch Ewe, though despite hurriedly laid anti-submarine nets, this was 
even less well defended than Scapa.®® Rosyth, its 40-mile approach channel vulnerable to 
mining, was never considered as a principal Home Fleet base.®'* It was, in any case, 150 
miles from where the ships really needed to be - the northern exit from the North Sea. So, 
following the loss o f Royal Oak, with Scapa clearly unusable, the only alternative base for 
the homeless Home Fleet was the Clyde. At first light on 29 October the 3*^'? Anti-Aircraft 
Division began removing guns from Rosyth and Glasgow to cover the Clyde Fleet 
Anchorage. Eight 3.7” statics from Glasgow and 16 from Edinburgh and Rosyth were 
moved to positions at Cloch Point, Loch Thom, Port Glasgow, Cardross, Helensburgh and 
Kilcreggan. The final layout had forty 3.7” statics covering the Clyde Anchorage with just
1992 p. 21. Edinburgh Evening Nem  17 October 1939. See also Queensferry ARP Log held by Edinburgh City 
Arcliivcs.
84 ADM 1 10091.
85 listing, and witli open scutdes awash. Iron Duke was beached in Ore Bay. Patched with concrete, she remained there 
as a depot ship until December 1945. ADM 199 362. ADM 1 18096. Ramsay et al : 1989.
86 Ramsay et al : 1989. McKee : 1978 ch 11.
87 Glass : 1994.
88 AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2079. AIR 50 167. See also transcript o f Ml.l.a eavesdrop on conversation between Unger and 
an Unteroffizier Grimm on 7/11/39 in WO 208 4117.
89 WO 166 2127.
90 AIR 25 232.
9* Seven montlis later, an apparent blind-landing receiver from this aircraft was recognised as the Knickebein radio 
bombing aid.
92 This nonsense reflects the wider terror o f air attack prevalent at the time. Roskill : 1954 p. 68.
93 ADM 1 9852. ADM 186 799. Roskill : 1960 pp. 48-49.
94 Roskill: 1954 pp. 77-78.
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eight guns left around Glasgow.®®
At the end of October, the Royal 
Navy came close to another 
disaster to rival Royal Oak. 
Reasoning that the Home Fleet 
would be wary o f entering the 
North Sea and bound by rules of 
engagement that made warships 
his principal targets, Donitz had 
stationed U-boats west of 
Orkney.®^ On 30 October lJ-56 
was 45 miles north o f Cape 
Wrath when Nelson, Rodney and 
Hood hove into view while 
returning to the Clyde after 
covering the inbound ore convoy 
NARVIKl. Kapitanleutnant Zahn 
fired three torpedoes, two of 
which hit Nelson with loud clangs 
clearly audible in the U boat. But 
they failed to explode and the 
ships sailed on, unaware o f the 
incident until 1945.®?
HEl l l  IH+JA of Stab Staffel KG/26 operating from 
Luneberg was brought down near Tranent while on a 
shipping reconnaissance to  the Forth and the Clyde on the 
morning of 28 October 1939, the first enemy aircraft to  
crash on mainland Britain. Credit was shared by 602 and 
603 Squadrons though the aircrew said that anti-aircraft 
fire from ships in the Forth had sealed their fate.
Remarks overheard on hidden microphones at the 
Cockfosters POW cage led Air Ministry scientists to  take 
a second look at the communications equipment aboard 
both this aircraft and the Heinkel shot down at North 
Berwick on 22 November 1939. It was discovered that the 
Lorenz blind-landing receiver (stub mountings for the 
aerial just visible under the aircraft pictured on page 36) 
was far more sensitive than would normally be required 
for that purpose. Thus was the puzzle of Knickebein, the 
first German radio beam navigation system, unravelled.
Forbes was keeping his ships on the move, but German observation of the Home Fleet’s 
wanderings had pointed to places where mines might profitably be sown by U boats and 
the longer nights meant that they could be accurately laid within the approaches to naval 
bases. On 27 October, \J-31 laid 18 TMB magnetic bottom mines in the entrance to Loch 
Ewe after first hitting the net barrage while trying to get inside the anchorage.®® 
Frauenheim's 0-21 laid mines in the Firth o f Forth the following day and Kretschmer's U- 
23 laid another field off Invergordon.®®
93 The withdrawal of heavy ships from the North Sea greatly concerned Churchill who, unable to shake off the
strategic imperatives of 1916, wrote to First Sea Lord Dudley Pound asking, “Why then should we chose the Clyde at 
the cost o f uncovering the island. Churchill was also concerned at the presence o f ‘Irish traitors in the Glasgow area’ 
who would pass news o f the fleet’s arrival by telephone to the German delegation in Dublin. WO 166 2127. Gilbert 
1989 p. 71.
96 The U Boat War in the Atlantic : HMSO 1989 p. 32.
97 Roskill : 1954 p. 82. Rohwer : 1999. Van der Vat 1988 p. 141.
98 The TMB mine, specifically designed for use by U boats, tvas an unearthed, magnetic pistol seabed mine with a 1,276 
lb warhead, twice the explosive charge of contemporary torpedoes.
99 The U Boat War in the Atlantic p. 12.
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At 1052/21 November Be fast was five miles west o f Fidra in the Forth, on a practice shoot 
with Southampton, when one o f U-2Vs mines exploded on her port side abreast the 
foremast. Captain George Scott tried to beach Belfast in shallow water at Inchkeith, but she 
lost steerage way. Her engines had been knocked out of line, turbine bearers twisted and 
fractured and boilers distorted. Lighting and power failed and every telephone in the ship 
jumped from its cradle, jamming the exchange. All four turrets had jumped, the roofs o f A 
and B turrets were open to the sky, gunpowder lay on the deck o f A turret and shell hoists 
and training and elevation mechanisms were distorted. Dozens o f nose-fused 6” and 4” 
shells were damaged and fuses had to be thrown overboard. The upper deck was buckled 
and cracked right across, the foremast was bent back, snapping aerials, and wireless sets 
were wrecked. Nineteen crewmen were injured and the listing cruiser was dry-docked at 
Rosyth that afternoon.?*?®
Nelson was entering Loch Ewe 0754/4 December to refuel her escorting destroyers after 
the abortive sweep to find the ships that sank Rawalpindi, when an explosion under her 
starboard bow whipped the fore part o f the ship violently upwards three times. She had 
detonated one o f the mines laid by 0-31 on 21 October and, listing to starboard and eight 
feet down by the head, she anchored in the lee of Ewe Island, Divers found 70 feet o f 
plating and frames dished four feet inboard and, just abaft station 60, there was a large 
hole.?®? Seventy-four men were injured, one officer and 45 ratings seriously, and there were 
numerous fractures due to concussion. The Rosyth war diary laments;
This littering up of the fairways with mines is having a wider effect than was at first expected. The 
damage done to Nelson is offset by the alleged sinking of a submarine by an aircraft, but the menace 
is stUl of a serious character. A day of rumours of more fidghtfulness.?®^
In thick fog eight miles north-west o f the Mull o f Kin tyre on 12 December the battleship 
Barham rammed and sank the destroyer Duchess, and 129 of the destroyer's crew were 
lost.?®® Barham, however, was scarcely damaged and, within hours, she was outbound with 
Hood and Warspite to escort TC I, the first troop convoy from Canada.?®'? At 1449/28 
December she was off the Butt o f Lewis as distant cover for the ore convoy HN5 when a 
torpedo from 0-30 struck her port side. Her forward shehrooms and magazines flooded 
and four men drowned.?®®
780 Her back broken, Belfastve&'s out o f action for two years. ADM 199 362. ADM 1 10670. Rohwer : 1999.
701 ADM 1 109897. Rohwer : 1999.
702 The 'rumours o f firightfulness* referred to supposed enemy sabotage o f dockyards and oil installations. Churchill 
told the War Cabinet that Nehon had been damaged but the news was kept secret for as long as possible, even from 
the Dominion Prime Ministers. Nelson crept out o f Loch Ewe on 4 January 1940, every hand who could be spared 
mustered on the upper deck in case o f another explosion, and rejoined the fleet in August 1940. ADM 199 362.
103 ADM 199 362.
104 TCI with 7,450 troops o f tlie 1“‘ Canadian Division vbo&sd Aquitania, Empress of Britain, Empress of Australia, Monarch 
of Bermuda and Duchess of Bedford arrived safely in the Clyde on 17 December. ADM 199 362. Roskill : 1954 p. 89.
70S Barham reached Liverpool the following day. Earlier, at 0230, Lemp had shelled and sunk the minesweeper trawler 
Barbara Robertson 35 miles west o f the Butt of Lewis. One o f the sweeper's crew was killed. See ADM 199 362.
■'( ( ,n i'd  < crk Ï
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Meanwhile, on 22 November, nine enemy aircraft had attacked the RAF depot ship Manela 
in Garth Voe, Shetland. The anti-aircraft guardship Coventry opened up and the raiders 
scattered, reformed over Sullom Voe and tried again without success. They then dropped 
16 bombs in N orth Harbour and strafed a flying boat. Raiders also appeared over Scapa 
Flow and Max Horton signalled the Admiralty:
This tnorning, 22"*? November, an enemy aircraft circled the anchorage at about 3,000 feet for some 
time disregarding a few shots fcom the Bofors gun at Hatston airfield. The absence of any air activity 
on our part with an air station in full view of the anchorage must counteract our propaganda as the 
numbers of British fighters. If importance is attached to neutral opinion, or to information reaching 
Germany, it is unfortunate that this state of affairs should exist at a base where a large number of 
neutral observers is always present.. .It is also natural that some misgivings should be felt by local 
inhabitants,?®** ___
An enemy reconnaissance aircraft was engaged by two Spitfires o f 602 Squadron over 
North Berwick at 1100/7 December. These flights often preceded a raid and, at 1251/7, 
Spitfires o f 72 and 603 Squadrons intercepted raiders near Fife Ness, 603 Squadron 
claiming two as damaged.?®? At 1023/1 January 1940, two JU88s attacked the guardship 
Coventry in Sullom Voe. Near misses caused extensive minor damage but no casualties.?®® A 
Gladiator from Sumburgh pursued one raider for 90 miles, but had to return for lack of 
fuel. A JU88 of 1/KG30 did not return to base and the other raider escaped over Lerwick 
and a Dornier reconnaissance aircraft appeared soon after.?®®
By March 1940, Scapa Flow’s fixed defences were deemed sufficiently strong to allow the 
Home Fleet to return. Fighter cover was being reinforced, 14 Group Fighter Command 
was being set up as operational control and RDF Chain Flome cover north o f the Tay was 
being improved.??® On 1 March, the Hurricanes of 43, 111 and 605 Squadrons arrived at 
Wick to cover the return o f the capital ships to Scapa.??? Hood and ValiantX^d the return on 
7 March. Then, intent on disabling Royal Navy capital ships ahead of the German invasion 
o f Norway, 15 enemy aircraft raided Scapa at 1950/16 March. One bomb fell through 
No)folk's quarter deck to explode in a fuel tank, killing three officers died and injuring one. 
The training ship Iron Duke was damaged by two near misses and bombs fell close to 
R o d n e y On land, 113 bombs fell, including nine UXBs.??® Churchill told the War Cabinet
Rohwer : 1999. Showell : 1989.
706 Chalmers 1954.
107 Two H E llls  did crash 40 miles east o f Leuchars. Two bodies were found at sea and one came ashore at Belhelvie 
on 16 December. AIR 25 232. ADM 199 362. Ramsay et al. : 1987.
108 ADM 199 377.
109 ADM 199 377. Ramsay et al : 1989.
110 a ir  41 73. The 14 Group Headquarters went to France in May 1940, returning to the north o f Scotland in tlie 
autumn o f 1940 when it was based at Inverness.
111 Ibid.
112 Norfolk suffered a direct hit through her quarter deck on port side abaft Y turret The explosion left a 16’x l2 ’ hole in 
her starboard side below the waterline, much buckling of bulkheads and compartments flooded. ADM 199 377. 
ADM 199 362. ADM 199 1050.
113 Cottages at Bridge o f Waith, four miles east o f Stromness, were damaged. Jim Isbister, killed when he went to help a 
neighbour and took the full blast o f a bomb, was tlie first civilian air raid fatality in Britain of the Second World'( oni'ti fA('i)(:iS
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on 18 March, ‘There is considerable feeling in the country that, while the Germans use 
bombs, we only drop leaflets.’??'? The following day, an air attack was mounted on Hornum 
air base and List harbour, both on the island o f Sylt.
The raid o f 16 March resulted in the fleet being ordered to sea during the next moon 
period between the 19 and 26 March. So it was that Rodney, Warspite, Renown and Repulse 
and 29 destroyers returned to Scapa on 27 March, just as the Luftwaffe began closely 
monitoring Home Fleet movements ahead o f the German invasion o f Norway. A 
reconnaissance H E l l l  o f 1(F)/122 was brought down off Wick at 1230/28 by 43 and 605 
Squadrons. That evening, two trawlers and ON23 and HN22 were attacked in the Fair Isle 
Channel. Four fighters were scrambled but no interception was made.??®
N a v a l  W a r  i n  N o r t h e r n  W a t e r s  t o  A p r i l  1940 i n  R e t r o s p e c t
Whüe the British Merchant Navy was still dominant, albeit though in decline, the Royal 
Navy that went to war in September 1939 in the North Atlantic and Home Waters was, by 
dint o f conflicting strategic priorities, defence cuts and poor planning, singularly ill- 
equipped to both blockade Germany and maintain the supply route, vital even then before 
the fall of France, to North America.
But the principal strategy o f the period was to blockade Germany, thus, it was hoped, 
bringing about an economic collapse and forcing a surrender. A product o f wider political 
irresolution and wishful thinking, this strategy was doomed to failure from the start, not 
least because the blockade was at best only partial and was rendered even less effective by 
the need not to offend powerful neutrals, notably the United States. Thus, for example, 
US oil companies were able to continue trading freely with Germany both by the North 
Atlantic route, and via eastern Europe.
One major German import which the blockade could do nothing to stop, was the 10 
million tons o f iron and other ores bought annually from Sweden. Almost half the yearly 
German requirement and vital to their war effort, this running sore for the Allies and 
Churchill’s Admiralty would, as we shall see in Chapter 5, be at the centre of the first 
major clash o f arms o f the war in western Europe.
The Northern Patrol, the Mine Barrage and the Montrose-Obrestad Patrol all involved a 
huge effort, particularly in the N orth Atlantic in winter, but the verdict must be that they 
achieved little. And weak naval preparedness and strategy had been exposed by notable 
setbacks in Northern Waters. There was the loss of the submarine Oxley off Norway, the
War. HH50/160. HH50/20.
"4 War Cabinet 1130/18 March 1940 quoted in Gilbert ; 1983 p. 192. 
"5 AF62/1339. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 1050
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sinking o f Royal Oak inside Scapa, the raids on the cruisers at Rosyth on 16 October and 
on Scapa the following day, the retreat o f the Home Fleet to the Clyde and Loch Ewe, the 
mining o f Belfast in the Forth, the loss o f Rawalpindi, the mining o f Nelson at Loch Ewe, the 
loss o f the destroyer Duchess, the torpedoing o f Barham and the mining o f the submarines 
Spearfish and Triumph. The destroyer Exmouth, the fleet minesweeper Sphinx, the Admiralty 
oiler Gretafield and the destroyer Daring had all been sunk and the cruiser Norfolk had been 
bombed in Scapa.
Then there had been some notable near-misses such as the torpedoes that exploded in the 
wake OÎ A rk  Royal on 14 September, the air attack on the Home Fleet on 26 September 
and on the destroyer Valorous the following day, the raid on the depot ship Manela and 
Coastal Command aircraft at Sullom Voe on 22 November, Zahn’s faulty torpedoes that 
hit Nelson on 30 October, Prien’s torpedoes that exploded close astern o f the cruiser 
Norfolk on 28 November and the bombs that near-missed the cruiser Coventry in Sullom 
Voe on 1 January.
And, as we shall see in the next chapter, U boats and aircraft had reaped a rich harvest o f 
merchant shipping, both allied and neutral, during this period in Northern Waters while 
themselves suffering few losses. The balance sheet hardly favoured the Allies, though with 
a preponderance of maritime power, they could afford to sustain relatively high loss rates. 
Matters were, however, about to take a decided turn for the worse as both Allied and Axis 
forces turned their attention to Scandinavia.
35
North Western Approaches
C'Dobter 1 a
A t t a c k s  o n  S h ip p in g  o f f  S c o t l a n d  a n d  t h e  
S c a n d in a v ia n  C o n v o y s  S e p te m b e r  1 9 3 9 -A p r il 1940
The Athenia had provided proof, if it were needed, that U boat patrols were in place off the 
coast o f Scotland and the N orth Channel at the outbreak o f war. Allied and neutral ship­
ping was vulnerable, particularly when in not in convoy. But U boat operations in the late 
1939 were hampered by restrictive rules o f engagement, reinforced after the Athenia epi­
sode, and by the fact the there were too few operational U boats. N or was there any effec­
tive cooperation between the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe in their anti-shipping war. 
This last was to dog German efforts in the trade war until 1945.
In the first weeks o f war, Raeder was exercised by the passage of 'contraband' across the 
North Sea to Britain and, following a meeting with Hitler on 23 September 1939, the rules 
o f engagement imposed after the Athenia incident were relaxed. U boats were authorised to 
use force against any Allied ships that tried to send an SSSS signal and those carrying 120 
passengers or less could be sunk in accordance with the Prize Rules. But this led to a sharp 
increase in sinkings o f neutral vessels, particularly in convoys to and from Norway, and 
brought loud protests from Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki, so the restrictions 
had to be reimposed a few days later. Raeder’s wish for a ‘Siege of England’ which would 
allow the sinking on sight o f neutral shipping in British waters led him to advocate, from 
late 1939, the occupation o f Norway.?
Britain, meanwhile, was engaged in a diplomatic offensive in Stockholm that resulted in the 
December 1939 Anglo-Swedish Trade Agreement which restricted raw material exports 
from Sweden to the belligerent powers to ‘normal’ prewar levels. Having gone to some 
lengths to secure this agreement, and with iron ore and timber exports a vital part of the 
Swedish economy, it was thus incumbent on the British to continue their share o f the 
trade.2
As seen in Chapter One, the Royal Navy was ill-prepared to meet the challenge o f a trade
7 See Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, September to November 1939 in Brassey : 1948. Also Blair 1997.
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war. But, despite early successes in what van der Vat has termed, ‘...a  shooting gallery full 
o f Aunt Sallies’,® in the first months o f the war U boat commanders found that time and 
again their torpedoes misfired or failed to detonate. U-27 was sunk on 20 September 1939 
after misfires by two o f her torpedoes alerted destroyers then, on 22 September U-21 re­
ported a misfire when she fired at destroyer off Berwick on Tweed.'* Prien reported that, 
while sinking Roja/ Oak in Scapa Flow, three o f U~47’s torpedoes misfired and, on 30 Oc­
tober, U-36 hit the battleship Nelson with two torpedoes, both of which failed to explode. 
By January 1940, Donitz was claiming that over 300,000 tons o f shipping would have been 
sunk but for faulty U boat torpedoes.® Torpedo problems continued into 1940, hampering 
U boat operations during the Norway campaign when, for example, U-48 ought to have hit 
the battleship Warspite. German torpedoes were fitted with two pistols, one contact and 
one magnetic, one o f which the U boat commander selected before firing. It was found 
that the magnetic pistol was too sensitive and the contact pistol would only work against a 
straight surface. Against a curved surface, the torpedo could glance o ff without exploding.®
Early Luftwaffe anti-shipping operations were also hampered, in their case by by lack of 
suitable aircraft and the fact that they were operating at extreme range from airfields in 
Germany. As with the RAF, the Luftwaffe lacked suitable aircraft, effective weaponry and 
specially trained aircrew in sufficient numbers. Having been principally intended to work 
closely with an advancing army over mainland Europe, its maritime capability was wholly 
inadequate and lacked coordination with, for example, the U-bootwaffe. And, mirroring 
the dispute between Coastal Command and Bomber Command in the RAF, the Luftwaffe’s 
contribution was dogged by a turf war between Goering and Raeder. As a direct result, 
there was no clear policy for an air war against seaborne trade.
Again like the RAF, the Luftwaffe lacked a specific anti-shipping weapon, the most com­
mon bomb it dropped over the Scottish shipping lanes being the 250kg Sprengbombe- 
Cylindrische, or SC for short. Thin-skinned SC bombs o f various weights had a high charge 
ratio but were designed for maximum blast effect in general demolition, not for sinking 
ships.? Aside from the torpedo, the one anti-shipping weapon that did offer the Luftwaffe 
and Kriegsmarine a real chance o f making an impact in the shipping war was the magnetic 
mine, but these were in desperately short supply. Discussing the planned German declared 
area off eastern Scotland, Raeder told Hitler on 22 November that, while mines were not 
actually to be laid, 'In this area our submarines wiU be able to sink ships without warning
2 The Economic Blockade. W. N. Medlicott. HMSO 1952-1959 vol. 2 p. 173 et passim.
3 Van der Vat: 1988 p. 172.
4 Wynn: 1997. Blair: 1997
5 Van der Vat : 1988 p. 173.
6 Wynn : 1997. Blair : 1997. Jones : 1986.
7 Ramsay et al : 1989 vol.l p. 157.
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and it will appear that they struck a mine.' It was hoped that this would paralyse traffic off 
the east coast and, on 1 December, the following warning to shipping was transmitted,
The German Government hereby gives warning that, in the course of operations against British 
forces and bases on the east coast of Britain, mines have been laid in an area bounded on the north 
by the latitude of Kinnaicd's Head up to 0“ 30' W and on the south by the latitude of St Abb's Head 
up to 1° 30'W and on the east by the line connecting the above points.®
Meanwhile, the secrets o f the magnetic mine had been exposed when one was made safe 
after falling on mudflats at Shoeburyness at the end o f November 1939.®
U  B o a t  A t t a c k s  o n  S c o t l a n d - N o r w a y  C o n v o y s
The waters between Scotland and Scandinavia were dangerous, yet trade with Norway and 
Sweden included important exports of coal and vital imports o f timber and, above all, iron 
ore. It had to continue and despite the fact that almost all o f the ships involved were neu­
tral, given the German reaction noted above, convoy was essential. The first Scandinavian 
convoy, HNO, had sailed from Norway on 14 October and arrived o ff the Forth two days 
later only to steam into the first air raid on Britain o f the war. The 12-ship NARVIK 1 fol­
lowed on 26 October, ten o f them arriving safely at Methil on 31 October, the other two 
proceeding independently to the Clyde. The first outbound convoy for Norway, the five- 
ship O N I, sailed Methil on 4 November 1939.?®
Methil and Bergen were assembly points and the routing and escorting o f Scandinavian 
convoys was the responsibility o f the Rosyth escort force.?? The cycle varied with the 
weather and the volume of trade and, in the early days, two convoys were run on a 16-day 
cycle. By early February 1940 this had reduced to two convoys, one inbound and the other 
outbound, every four days. ON convoys sailed Methil during the afternoon, passed 
through the Moray Firth west o f the normal track to bring the convoy under fighter cover, 
and were timed to pass the Fair Isle Channel, a focal point for U boats, in darkness. Arri­
vals off Norway were timed carefully to avoid twilight, the best time for U boat attack. The 
escort would then loiter offshore for four hours to await a Methil-bound HN convoy.?^
First victim on the Norwegian trade was the British collier Tmro (974T) sunk by U-36 at 
1830/15 September.?® U-32 sank the Norwegian Jem (875T) off Skudesnes on 28 Septem-
8 Brassey : 1948.
9 Ibid.
18 ADMT86 799 appendix G, -  __
1? Captain Ralph Kerr commanding the Rosytli Escort Force took command o f Hood on 15 February 1941 while she 
was in minor refit at Rosyth, and lost his hfe when she was sunk on 24 May.
12 ADM 186 799.
13 Truro's crew was handed over to a neutral Belgian steamer. Uojds War Tasses'vo\, 1. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn ; 1997. 
Survivors' accounts in The Scotsman 18/9/39.
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ber. Then, at 0550/4 October, Kretschmer’s U-23 sank the Glenfarg (876T) off Wick.?'* The 
Swedish Vistula (1,018T) was sunk by U-37 on 8 October 45 miles north-east o f Unst.?® U- 
34 was outbound for patrol at 0732/20 October when she sank the Swedish Gustav Adolf 
(926T) 40 miles north-east o f Shetland, killing two of her crew and injuring six. Later that 
day, at 1410/20, coastwatchers on Unst reported a vessel being shelled 20 miles to the 
north-east. Aircraft were diverted to the scene but were too late to save the colher Sea Ven­
ture (2,327T), outbound for Tromso, sunk by U-34A  Ten days later, on 30 October, the 
Caimmona (4,666T) was torpedoed three miles off Rattray Head by U-13A  That same eve­
ning the patrol trawler Northern Rover was sunk off Orkney by U-393^
U-18, U-21 and U-22 operated off the 
 ^ Moray Firth during November and U-22 
sank the KirkwaU-bound collier Parkhill 
(500T) 17 miles north o f Troup Head at 
2200/17. U-18 sank the Grimsby trawler 
Wigmore, part o f an Iceland-bound fish­
ing convoy, 25 miles north of Rattray 
Head at 2230/18.?® The destroyers Imo­
gen, Impulsive and Imperial were sent on a 
sweep of the area but found nothing. On 
20 November a torpedo fired by U-18 at 
the tanker Athelking exploded in the 
wake of Inglefteld off Rattray Head.
Four U boats operated in Scottish waters during November: U-47 in the Minch, U-35 in 
the Pentland Firth and U-31 and U-48 off Orkney. The operation was planned in conjunc­
tion with the sortie by Schamhorst and Gneisenau and the four boats formed a trap for Royal 
Navy units tempted out after the German ships.2® A large explosion in the wake of the 
cruiser Norfolk east o f Shetland on 28 November, assumed to have been caused by an air-
I
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14 One o f Vistulds boats reached Norwich the following morning and two drifters sailed Lerwick to search for the 
other which had nine aboard. But a south-easterly gale blew up and they had to run for shelter in Whalefirth without 
finding the missing men. One o f Glenfarfs crew died, the other 16 were picked up by Forester. ADM 199 2057. 
Robertson : 1981. Uqyds War Lasses vol. 1. Rohwer ; 1999. Wynn : 1997.
13 ADM 199 377. Rohwer 1999. Uqyds WarLassesvol. 1.
16 Lerwick Lifeboat picked up all Sea Venturis crew. ADM 199 2057. ADM 199 377. Services ty the Lifeboats of the Royal 
National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946.
17 Three o f her engineers died and 42 survivors were picked up by the Aberdeen trawler River Lassie, then transferred to 
the Peterhead Lifeboat. Rohwer ; 1999. British Vessels Last at Sea.
18 Northern Rover's loss remained a mystery until after the war. Uqyd's WarLassesvol. 1. Rohwer ; 1999. Wynn : 1997.
m All nine aboard Parkhills and all 16 aboard Wigmorrv/e t^c. lost. ADM 199 362. Uqyds War Usses vol. 1. Rohwer : 1999 
gives the time o f this sinking as 1330/18, but this is a probable misprint..
28 Blair : 1997. The U Boat War in the Atlantic p. 13.
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from a raft twelve hours later and ten more Fram survivors were found after 36 hours on a 
raft. Ten of the Fram's crew were lost.®'?
A ir  A t t a c k s  I n t e n s i f y
Luftwaffe reconnaissance of the Scandinavian convoy route continued in all weathers. At 
0938/29 January, in snow showers and a south-easterly gale, 609 Squadron Hurricanes 
scrambled from Drem and chased off an H E l l l  that had attacked a trawler in the Tay estu­
ary. This raider had also bombed and strafed Imperial Monarch (5,831T) and Otterpool (4,876T) 
off Montrose. Otterpool landed two injured crewmen at Dundee and Imperial Monarch reached 
Grangemouth badly holed.
At 1200/29 four bombs fell at Sullom Voe, none o f which did any damage, then at Scapa 
Flow shortly afterwards.®® The collier Giralda (2,178T) was bombed and sunk off South 
Ronaldsay on 30 January. Her 23 crew were seen in a boat drifting towards Water Sound but 
it hit rocks and capsized leaving no survivors.®® Thirty miles to the east, the same raiders
An He 111 shot down near North Berwick by 602 Squadron during a series of attacks on the 
east coast convoy route between Aberdeen and Cromer on 9 February 1940.
Attacks by aircraft such as this one from 5/KG26 w ere flown with great determination, often In 
dreadful weather, but the Luftwaffe assault on coastal convoys off Scotland and eastern England 
lacked coordination. Traffic on the route was all but continuous with long, two-column convoys 
almost merging Into each other, and convoys passing on opposite headings causing large con­
centrations of shipping In a narrow swept channel In which they had no room to manoeuvre 
under attack. It vvas also discovered In mid-19 4 1, after the worst attacks w ere over, that the 
Luftwaffe had been getting clear and accurate Intelligence of coastal convoy movements from 
the German decryption service, B-delnst. Yet Allied shipping losses on the coastal route, 
though serious, w ere never as bad as they ought to  have been, had the Luftwaffe accorded the 
antl-shlpping raids sufficient priority.
34 ADM 199 362. Macdonald ; 1993 pp. 123-137. Rohwer : 1999.
53 AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2102. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. HH50/160. Uoyds W arUssesvol 1. Ramsay et al : 1987. 
36 ADM 199 377. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. Services ly the Ufeboats of the Rqyal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946.
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sank the inbound Bancrest (4,450T) and damaged the naval trawler UllswaterN In St Andrews 
Bay, bombers attacked City of Bath (5,079T), Stancourt (563T) and the Hull trawler Lady Shirley. 
A 111 Squadron Hurricane engaged these raiders near the Isle of May, but they disappeared 
into a snowstorm, then were intercepted again near Coquet Island by 43 Squadron Hurri­
canes and one Heinkel was shot down.®®
Convoy ON 10 was due to sail for Norway on 5 February and the S*?* Minesweeping Flotilla 
sailed Invergordon on 3 February to sweep its route across the Moray Firth. At 0912/3 the 
fleet minesweepers Sphinx, Speedwell and Skipjack were off Kinnaird's Head when two raid­
ers attacked Sphinx. One bomb ripped through her bridge and foredeck to explode in the 
forward messdeck. The foredeck was folded back against the bridge, four o f her crew were 
killed and three seriously injured. Return fire was opened, albeit late, and a JU88 of 
2/K G 30 crashed in the Moray Firth. When its crew was picked up, they reported that they 
had been hit by return fire from a minesweeper. Also in this raid, the patrol trawlers Hugh 
Walpole and Arctic Explorer and the coaster Rota were bombed. None suffered serious dam­
age. The tanker British Eoyalty was attacked off Arbroath but escaped undamaged and the 
Norwegian Tempo (629T) was bombed and sunk near the Isle of May at 1000/3.®®
Speedwell took Sphinx in tow for Inver­
gordon at 1050/3 but the tow parted 
repeatedly in worsening weather. At 
0300/4 Sphinx was forced to abandon 
ship and Speedwell crashed alongside 
three times, picking up four men. The 
destroyer Boreas then made repeated 
attempts to go alongside and managed 
to take off another seven before, at 
0455/4, Sphinx capsized. Boreas picked 
up 30 survivors from the sea many of 
them choking on oil. Forty-six survivors 
were picked up in all; five officers and 49 ratings had been killed. Thirty bodies were 
washed ashore near Wick and at Walls in Orkney.®®
%
Her foredeck torn up by the explosion and her 
fore ends open to the sea, Sphinx wallows in w ors­
ening weather as Speedwell closes to  pass a tow.
37 ADM 199 377. O f Banarsls crew, one was killed; the other 31 were picked up by the destroyer Jape/in out of Scapa.
38 ADM 199 362. ADM 199 364. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2102. Information from Tayside Police Museum. Services ty the 
Lifeboats of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution 1939 - 1946.
39 Five o f Tempo's crew died and the tug Brahmin came across a lifeboat with her survivors off Elie Ness that afternoon. 
ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. Ramsay et al. : 1987.
68 Sphinx drifted ashore north o f Lybster on 5 February. The Board of Enquiry, held in Invergordon, found that the 
first attack had gone unopposed as it had taken three minutes for the guns’ crews to close up. Sub Lieutenant An­
thony BeUars said that the delay was due to officers being, ‘doubtful as to whether it was a test or a proper alarm. 
Sir.’ The ships’ armament had been poorly maintained, close range weapons had jammed after just a few rounds and 
the fuses of shells in the ready-use racks were not set. The fuse settii^ keys could not be found and fire was opened
( f n i r d  ■ i-' C r l o a t ,
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The tanker Gretafieid, a straggler 
from HX18, was torpedoed by 
U-57 at the eastern end of the 
Pentland Firth on 14 February 
1940, She drifted ashore, still 
burning, near Dunbeath.
Her loss, and that of eleven of 
her crew was a sharp reminder 
of the vulnerability of unescorted 
vessels on the coastal route.
That a tanker fully-laden with 
Admiralty fuel oil should be al­
lowed to proceed alone through 
waters known to  be dangerous 
was a notable lapse.
At midday on 10 February the trawler Theresa Boyle was bombed and sunk by HE115 sea­
planes 115 miles north-east o f  Aberdeen. Skipper Bell and his crew were picked up 20 
miles off Peterhead at about 1400/12.®? U-9 laid mines off Invergordon on 9 February.®^ 
U-50 sank the Swedish Oriana (1,854T), Buenos Aires for Malmo, north o f Muckle Flugga 
on 11 February.®® Shortly before midnight on 15 February, U-14 sank the Danish colliers 
Rhone (1,064T) and Sleipner (1,066T) in the Moray Firth with heavy loss o f hfe. On the fol­
lowing evening, Wolfarth sank the Swedish colhers Uana (1,664T) and Osmed (1,526T) off 
Kinnaird's Head.®"? The Panamanian colher E l Sonador (1,406T) sailed Methil on 16 Febru­
ary in ON 14, then disappeared with her 17 crew, sunk by U-61 east o f Shetland on 18 Feb­
ruary.®® U-61 then sank another ship in ON14, the Norwegian Sangstad (4,297T).®®
\J-23 was patrolling east o f Orkney on 18 February in the path o f the Methil-bound 30- 
ship HN12 when she torpedoed the escort destroyer Daring. From the 162 in Daring, only 
one officer and four ratings survived.®? In the Fair Isle Channel on 19 February, a torpedo 
from U-19 exploded off the starboard bow o f the naval oiler Daghestan then, on 21 Febru-
with unfuzed shells. Officers were also criticised for not getting the wounded off before the weather worsened as 
this had contributed to the heavy loss o f life. ADM 1 10785. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 365.
61 ADM 199 365.
62 At 1955/4 May 1940 the tanker San Tiburcio (5,995T) struck a mine laid by U-9 in 165° Tarbat Ness 4.2 miles. She 
sank, but all 40 crew were saved. Other mines were swept in the area between May and August 1940. ADM 199 365. 
ADM 199 477. Macdonald : 1993 pp. 107-121.
63 Oriana sank and 14 o f her crew died. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer ; 1999. Uqyds Warljosses 
vol. 1.
64 The trawler Uch Hope picked up 17 survivors from Uana and Osmed from a raft in 5807N 0212W, and landed them 
at Scrabster. Eight from the Uana were being taken home aboard the Swedish tramp Santos, but she too was torpe­
doed on 24 February and six of the Uana survivors were among the dead. In all, 10 were lost from Uana and 13 
from Osmed. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. Glass ; 1994. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vdL 1.
65 Rohwer : 1999. Uoyds War Losses vol. 2.
66 Sangstads master was the sole casualty. The rest of her crew were picked up by the destroyer Inglefield after being 
spotted on a raft by a 233 Squadron Hudson. ADM 199 377. AIR 28 470. Rohwer ; 1999. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1.
67 Daring was the first loss in convoy to be publicly acknowledged as the result of a torpedo attack. Her survivors were 
picked up by the submarine Thistle. ADM 186 799. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. ADM 234 380. Rohwer : 1999. 
Robertson : 1981.
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ary, U-37 torpedoed the Glasgow steamer Uoch Maddy (4,996T) south-east o f Copinsay.®® 
The Anti-Submarine Flotilla swept the area but found nothing, losing one o f their 
number to air attack in the process.®®
Royal Archer (2,266T) detonated a mine and sank off Gullane in the Forth on 24 February.?® 
That afternoon, the Asdic trawler Ijich Tulla reported a contact outside the Hoxa entrance 
to Scapa Flow. The destroyer Inglefield and more trawlers joined the hunt. Coventry City at­
tacked a contact in the Pentland Firth, another contact was depth-charged east o f South 
Ronaldsay and Ivanhoe, Gallant and Griffin were hunting another U boat reported in the Fair 
Isle ChanneL But that night, at 2154/24, the Swedish Santos (3,840T) was sunk east of 
Orkney by U-65. Santos had not been in convoy but was well illuminated with navigation 
lights burning and two floodlights shining on a Swedish flag. U-63 chased her for 90 min­
utes, then sank her with one torpedo.??
The following morning, at 0755/25, the submarine Narwhal escorting HN14 sighted U-63 
on the surface five mites astern o f the convoy, turned towards the U boat and worked up 
to full speed. The destroyers Inglefield, Imogen, Escapade and Escort joined the chase and 
dropped depth-charges. At 0950/25 U-63 surfaced and, as Inglefield and Imogen opened fire, 
scuttled herself. Oberleutnant Lorentz and all but one o f his crew were taken prisoner.?^
Enemy aircraft appeared off the east coast on 27 February and, at 1300/27, the trawler 
Aurora was attacked off Buchan Ness. Another trawler, Ben Vurie, was bombed and strafed 
by an enemy aircraft off Rattray Head.?® Meanwhile, 609 Squadron Hurricanes were east of 
St Abbs Head on one o f the new standing convoy patrols instituted after 602 Squadron’s 
successful interception on 9 February. An H E l l l  o f 2/KG26 dropped out o f cloud and 
was shot down to crash off Fife Ness at 1305/27. Four airmen were taken to Dundee.?'*
German preparations for their invasion o f Norway brought an increase in Luftwaffe moni­
toring of naval movements, particularly around Scapa Flow, in March 1940. There was also
68 Six of Loch Maddjs crew died and 33 survivors were found by the destroyer D/dm. D/am  stopped, and was about to 
pick them up,when she too was near-missed by a torpedo, and left. Shortly afterwards they heard two heavy explo­
sions as Inglefield, Imperial, Imogen and Diana hunted two submarines (actually 11-19 and U-22) in the Fair Isle Channel. 
Loeh Madefi broke in two and the stem half was towed to Inganess Bay by St Mêlions. The other half was sunk east of  
Copinsay by U-23 on 22 February. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. AIR 28 470. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn r 1977.
6^  HM trawler Fifeshire was bombed and sunk 50 miles east o f Copinsay. One o f her 22 crew survived. HM trawler 
Ayrshire vias strafed, though her crew escaped injury. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 377.
78 R/yalArche/'s crew o f  28 were landed at Leith by the trawler Tourmaline. Anodier mine victim in the same area was 
the trawler BenAttow early on 7 March 1940. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 365. AF62/2632. Rohwer : 
1999. Johnstone : 1986. Baird : 1993. Dundee CWwr (various from March 1940).
71 Twelve survivors were spotted on a raft in 5970N 0042W by a Hudson which directed the destroyer Gallant to pick 
them up. Santoshad been carrying eight survivors from Uar/a (see above), two o f whom survived the second sinking. 
ADM 199 362. ADM 199 365. Jones : 1986 p. 30.
72 U-63’s operational career had lasted five weeks and she appears to have been an unhappy ship. Her survivors, three 
officers and 20 ratings, were landed at Leitli by Inglefield and I/nogen on 27 February. Under interrogation, two officers 
blamed Lorentz for die loss, citing poor sliip-handling. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. Jones : 1986 p. 30-34.
73 AF62/1339. Glasgow Herald 21 ]anvtaiy 1942.
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an increase in attacks on the Norwegian convoys.?® Though there were few successes, at 
0615/1 March the trawler Star of Uherty picked up 19 survivors from the Norwegian collier 
Vestfos (1,388T) which had been bombed and sunk off Auskerry.?® 603 Squadron Spitfires 
shot down an H E l l l  off Aberdeen on 7 March.?? Three raiders dropped bombs into Scapa 
Flow the following afternoon, and two bombs fell close to the Kirkwall portion o f ON 18.
U boats were being withdrawn from southern North Sea and Atlantic patrols for Norway, 
and reconnaissance lines, principally aimed at detecting British warships, were set up off 
Orkney and Shetland and in the Moray Firth from mid-March. Schepke's U-19 intercepted 
ON21 in the Moray Firth late on 19 March and sank the Danes Minsk (1,229T) and 
Charkow (1,026T), both Methil for Esbjerg. At 0457/20, east of Wick, he sank two more 
Danes, Viking (1,153T) and Botha/ (2,109T) from HN20.?® Aircraft were seen over Shetland 
that afternoon and, between 1830/20 and 1950/20, three air attacks were mounted on 
HN20 and ON21. The Norwegian collier Svinta (1,276T) in ON21 was damaged and aban­
doned, but taken in tow for Kirkwall. Thistlehrae (4,747T), the anti-submarine trawler 
Windermere and the Northern Coast (1,21 IT) were also bombed, strafed and damaged.?®
The attack on ON21 
east of Orkney on 
2 1 March 1940. The 
Oslo-bound collier 
Svrnto is ablaze and 
the oiler Daghestan 
has been damaged. 
Svinta was torpe­
doed and sunk by U- 
5 7  off Copinsay at 
2210/22 March.
Two more Danes, Algier (1,654T) and Christianborg (3,2701’), both Philadelphia for Copen­
hagen, were sunk north o f Shetland by U-38 early on 21 March, and, in the same area on 
25 March, the Danish Britta (1,146T) was torpedoed and sunk by U-47. At 2013/25, off 
Copinsay, U-57 torpedoed the naval oiler Daghestan (5,742T) which had sailed Scapa Flow 
earlier that evening for Sullom Voe. Four died and 29 survivors were picked up by the na­
val trawlers Northern Dawn and Brontes.^ Then, at midnight, the Norwegian Cometa (3,7941’),
74 This was 609 Squadron’s first successful combat of the war. Another HEl 11 from the same raid was shot down off 
Coquet Island by Spitfires of 152 Squadron. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2102. ADM 199 364. Ramsay et al. : 1986.
75 Roskill : 1954 p. 143.
76 AF62/1339. ADM 199 362 Uqyds War Usses vol. 1.
77 Ernst Breiler was picked up by RAF HSL 272 at 1853/7 and taken to Leuchars. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 364. AIR 
25 232. AIR 28 459. WO 208 4117.
78 Eleven of the 20 aboard Minsk were killed as was the entire crew o f the Charkow. Fifteen o f the Viking's 17 crew died 
as did 15 o f Bothats 20 crew died. Wick Lifeboat picked up survivors spotted by an aircraft. Uqyds War Losses vois. 1 
and 2. ADM 199 362. Wynn : 1997. Glass : 1994.
74 Thistlehrae reached Trondheim only to fall into the hands of invading German troops on 9 April.
88 ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Glass ; 1994. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1.
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Oslo for Buenos Aires, was stunk by U-38 north-west o f Noup Head.®?
Intense air activity continued and the Northern Coast was again bombed and strafed on 29 
March off Kinnaird's Head. A reconnaissance o f Scapa Flow caused an air raid alert in 
Wick at 0840/31 and the anti-aircraft barrage opened up from Kirkwall. The cruiser Shef­
field was attacked by H E l l l s  east o f Orkney on 2 April and, at 2030/2, two enemy aircraft 
passed over John o' Groats on their way to Scapa. The Leith trawler Rafapiko was attacked 
o ff Copinsay. Duncansby Head Lighthouse was strafed and bombs fell on Flotta. A U boat 
sighted west o f Fair Isle was U-38 which had earlier that day sunk the Swedish Signe 
(1,540T) from HN23. Twelve Aberdeen trawlers fishing east o f Muckle Flugga were at­
tacked at 1420/3 April. Sansonnet took a direct hit and her ten crew crew were all lost. Gor- 
spen suffered two near misses, one o f her crew was injured and she was abandoned. Braemar 
cut away her gear as she made her escape. Delila was attacked for the second time in a week 
in the Moray Firtli, and her wheelhouse roof was shattered by gunfire. But she returned 
fire, claiming hits on one o f the raiders.®^
Two groups o f U boats were in position o ff the north o f Scotland by 6 April, the 6* 
Group (U-13y U-57, U-58 and U-5S7) west o f the Pentland Firth and around Shetland, the 
9‘?‘ Group (17-7, U-10 and U-19) east o f Shetland. A t 0250/6 JursFs U-59 sank the Norwe­
gian collier Navarra (2,118T) about 25 miles west o f Orkney. Ten o f her crew died and 14 
survivors were picked up by the Finnish steamer Atlas and landed at Kirkwall.®®
A t t a c k s  o n  S h i p p i n g  o f f  S c o t l a n d  a n d  t f ie  S c a n d i n a v i a n  
C o n v o y s  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3 9  t o  A p r i l  1 9 4 0  i n  R e t r o s p e c t
For the first winter o f the war, Scandinavia was the centre o f strategic interest for Allies 
and Axis alike, the latter then including the Soviet Union. Scandinavian convoys have to be 
set against the background o f  Allied and Axis interventionism. Admiralty attention was 
initially directed mainly towards the Baltic, and British interests lay principally in negotiat­
ing trade limitation agreements with strongly isolationist Norway and Sweden, in particular 
agreements that would limit Scandinavian exports to Germany. But Norway and Sweden in 
particular were heavily dependent on trade with both belligerent blocs, so negotiations 
dragged on inconclusively.
While Churchill’s Admiralty correctly identified the supply o f  Swedish iron ore as o f  cru-
8* Cometa had eariier beea intercepted by the Northern Patrol vessel Kingston Peridot which put an armed guard o f one 
officer and four ratings on board to take her into Kirkwall. Shortly before midnight Cometa was again stopped, this 
time by U-3S, witich sank her with a torpedo after the crew and passengers had abandoned ship. Three lifeboats 
were found by die patrol vessel Northern Sky on 26 March and the survivors were landed at KitkwaD. ADM 199 377. 
Uoyds WarLossesvol. 1. Roliwer : 1999.
82 ADM 199 363. AF62/1339. CE87/4/41. Ritchie : 1991. G/asgoP Hera/d 21 January 1942. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1.
83 ADM 199 363. Rohwer : 1999.
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cial importance to the German war effort and proposed measures to block it, Minister of 
Supply Leslie Burgin pointed out to the War Cabinet that Britain was dependent on Swe­
den for supplies o f ferro-chrome and calcium-carbide.®'? And there was also important 
trade in timber, paper and coal to consider, along with the likely loss o f supplies o f Danish 
foodstuffs that would follow on from an intervention. Much of the trade between Norway 
and Scotland was, in any case, carried in neutral ships and their losses to U boat attack 
served a perceived political purpose in driving neutrals forther towards the Allied camp.
Aside from the economic importance o f commerce and the strategic importance o f raw 
materials, for both Axis and Allies ahke the maintenance of maritime trade as a form of 
diplomacy was essential. Britain, for example, was negotiating the chartering o f a large part 
o f the Norwegian merchant fleet, in particular its 150 modern tankers. As Salmon writes, 
the tense and difficult shipping negotiations were one o f the principal factors that acted as 
a brake on Churchill’s interventionist schemes, first mooted on 19 September 1939.®® And 
among the cargoes carried out from Britain were carefully disguised packages o f aid for 
Finland, then engaged in the Winter War with the Soviet Union. So the Scandinavian con­
voys organised from Rosyth remained, for the time being, a necessity.
The Luftwaffe contributed little to German efforts to stop sailings between Scotland and 
Norway. The main German effort was undertaken by U boats and it is noteworthy that 
among those honing their skills in the waters off Scotland, practising the night attacks 
from within convoys that would prove so successful in the autumn o f  1940, were future 
aces such as Kretschmer, Moehle, Rollmann, Schepke and Prien. U boats on their own 
were too few in number to make an appreciable difference over a sustained period in 
coastal waters, but had there been closer coordination with the Luftwaffe, the German 
anti-shipping offensive off Scotland would have been considerably more effective.
There is little evidence that the Royal Navy learned much from its experience on the N or­
way run. But their convoying o f neutral shipping, along with the sinking, by 8 April 1940, 
o f  55 Norwegian ships by German forces, contributed much to the speedy arrival o f N or­
wegian tonnage in Allied ports in April 1940.®® Willmott suggests that the accession o f 
Norwegian merchant shipping to the Allied cause represented the most significant German 
failure in their 1940 Norway campaign. Certainly, in 1941, 40% o f ah foreign flagged ves­
sels entering British ports were Norwegian.®?
By the end o f March 1940, the Home Fleet was back at a reinforced Scapa and military
84 Minutes o f War Cabinet no. 122 o f 22 December 1939 quoted in Gilbert : 1989 p. 110,
85 Salmon et al. \ 1995 p. 10.
86 Papers- by Atie Thowsen and 0ivind Schau in Salmon et al r 1995 Chapters 7 and 8.
87 From Neutrality to NATO  - The Norwegian Anmd Forces and Defense Policy 1905A955 Ph.D dissertation by David G. 
Thomson, Ohio State University 1996. p. 214.
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forces were massing in Scotland, France and in north-western Germany. Increasing Ger­
man activity ahead of their invasion o f Norway led to a sharp increase in sinkings o f 
mainly neutral vessels both  in and out of the Norway convoys. Thus was the stage set for 
the first major collision o f the war in western Europe, the campaign in Norway, Scotland’s 
role in which is examined in detail in Chapter Five.
I
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f 7vrer i oree
B a t t l e  o f  T h e  A t l a n t i c  - P a r t  I  
L u f t w a f f e  O p e r a t i o n s  a g a i n s t  S c o t t i s h  C o a s t a l  C o n v o y s  a n d  
C o a s t a l  T a r g e t s  J u n e  1940 t o  M a y  1943
Prior to the Allied collapse in Norway and France, the main outbound OA series convoys 
assembled off Southend and steamed round the south coast o f England collecting ships 
from Southampton and other ports before heading into the Atlantic via the South-Western 
Approaches. Outbound convoys from Liverpool and the Clyde, the OB series, rendez­
voused with OA convoys in the South Western Approaches. Inbound convoys followed 
the reverse route but, from July 1940, most ocean traffic began using the North Channel 
and the North Western Approaches. This route kept the convoys as far away as possible 
from Axis-held territory and Luftwaffe airfields, but it also caused massive disruption, par­
ticularly for traffic to and from British east coast ports.
Pre-war British imports had exceeded 50 million tons, but this figure was cut from the out­
set. Behrens compiled the following table showing imports and net consumption of im­
ported supplies in millions o f tons from Ministry o f War Transport data:
First year of war 
Second year of war 
Calendar year 1941 
Calendar year 1942 
Calendar year 1943 
Calendar yearl944
Imports44,2 Changes in stock level Net consumption Î ^ .3  :
31.5 +1.9 29.6 !
30.5 +1.4 29.1 ' 
25.3^ " :22.9 -2.:^
26.4 ! +2.8 23.6 '
25.1 -1.9 27.Ô 1
Merchant Shipping and the Demands ofWarWASO 1978 p. 201
Dramatic reductions in imports there may have been, but, even at full capacity, the princi­
pal west coast ports on the Clyde, the Mersey and at Avonmouth could only handle about 
two thirds of trade in 1940 in addition to military traffic. So, under pressure from the Min­
istry o f Shipping, the Admiralty began escorting coastal convoys around the north o f Scot­
land to and from east coast ports. FS and FN convoys between the Thames and Forth be­
gan on 9 July when F N l sailed Southend for Methil. From there it became E N l for the 
passage northabout to the Clyde, eventually to feed Atlantic convoy OA180. WN convoys 
from the Clyde to Methil began immediately, though the O A /O B series continued into
S3
N orth  W este rn  Approaches
October 1940. The M T/TM  series between Methil and the Tyne began running in Decem­
ber 1940. However, from 10 September 1940, only ships o f less than 6,500 GRT were al­
lowed to use east coast ports as far south as the Humber, coasters only being allowed 
south o f the Humber. The tonnage limit was later raised to 8,500 GRT though restrictions 
on types o f cargo and ships remained. For example, diesel-powered vessels were barred 
from the east coast as they were more likely to detonate acoustic mines.?
As noted in the previous chapter on the Scandinavian convoys, conditions o f the coastal 
route were very different to those on the Atlantic, one writer who was there describing it 
as the ‘quick-fire corner o f the war’ .2 Between the Pentland Firth and the Forth, and on to 
the south, the convoys had to keep to a narrow swept channel that only allowed them to 
run two abreast. This meant that a 50-ship convoys frequently straggled out over many 
miles, making it impossible for the few, ill-armed escorts available to protect the whole 
convoy. In one respect at least, coastal convoy schedules were dictated by the tide and the 
need to ensure a safe passage o f the notorious Pentland Firth where the tide can run at 
eight knots and the weather can be appalling, particularly when a gale blows against the 
tide. It was common for the Commodore o f a strung-out convoy could find that only some 
o f his ships had got through, the rest being trapped and at the mercy o f the Luftwaffe until 
the tide turned.
Navigation had to be precise, yet the swept channel was marked only by occasional dimly 
lit buoys. All shore lights had been blacked out, though they could be shown briefly if  a 
convoy was in the vicinity. After an air raid in August 1940, Peterhead NOIC Captain 
Hewett wrote, Tt is considered that Buchan Ness Light is being used by enemy aircraft as a 
landfall and departure...Buchan Ness Light, the only light remaining lit for the use of 
shipping locally, is doused by me on receipt o f Air Raid Warning “yellow” for so long as is 
considered necessary.’ Following the raid, the light was only shown for a maximum of five 
minutes in every thirty minutes.®
Unlike in the Atlantic, o ff the east coast there was no margin for error. A case in point was 
WN7, a 35-ship convoy that had experienced dreadful weather as it passed through the 
Pentland Firth on 3 April 1941. The convoy was bombed as it passed Rattray Head, then, 
as it passed Aberdeen, two steel derricks on the Commodore ship Stuart Queen, weakened 
by seas when dodging the air attack, crashed to the deck. This induced a 10° compass error 
which, due to bad visibility, was not noticed until, as Commodore Harry Rogers wrote.
* Belirens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, HMSO 1978 p. 136.
2 Nicholas Monsarrat in Three Corvettes (Cassell 1945).
3 ADM 199 365
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At 2000/3,1 made the Bell Rock on the port bow instead of passing three miles outside of it. As 
soon as I saw this I did an emergency away, but owing to the gale, bad visibility and straggled condi­
tion of the convoy, aU ships did not obey this and it was later reported to me that the SS Erne Frank- 
ham [sic] (nationality unknown) had collided with the BeU Rock..
The Belgian Emile Franqui had, in fact, struck the unlit Bell Rock, and then freed herself 
only to run ashore on the nearby Abertay Sands.^
Outside the swept channel, a British offshore minefield stretched from Shetland to the 
English Channel and a particular hazard facing shipping off the east coast was British 
mines that had broken loose, often during easterly gales. One victim was the Fleet Air Arm 
target ship St Briac  ^ a former passenger steamer working as a radar training ship for the 
FAA training establishment at HMS Condor, Arbroath, which blundered into the minefield 
during a storm on 12 March 1942 and sank.^
For coastal convoy survivors taking to boats there was at least the consolation that, unlike 
in mid-Atlantic, traffic on the coastal route was all but constant and RNLI Lifeboats, pa­
trol craft, air-sea rescue launches, minesweepers and convoy escorts were never far away. 
But being caught on a lee shore in bad weather was highly dangerous. In the case o f the St 
Briac, Lifeboats from Broughty Ferry, Arbroath and Montrose launched and the Free 
French tug A.hielle JL" sailed Aberdeen. One o f S t Briads boats was found by the tug Empire 
Earch, but the other ran ashore near Collieston and 14 o f the 17 aboard were drowned.^ 
The destroyer Kockingham was another victim, heavily damaged by a British mine off Aber­
deen in September 1944.®
The U boat effort having concentrated in the Atlantic by mid-1940, Scottish east coast 
convoys were up against the Luftwaffe. Convoys constrained within the narrow swept 
channel were, on the face o f it, easy targets and, with the growing demands on the east 
coast ports, shipping traffic off the east coast was, by 1941, almost continuous and not 
hard to find. But the Luftwaffe was designed for operations with, or immediately ahead of, 
the Wehrmacht, so neither its aircraft or its crews were suited for anti-shipping operations 
over long distances such as those between Norway and Scotland. And, as Coastal Com­
mand’s anti-shipping Strike Wings were to find operating off Norway from 1943, operating 
o ff enemy territory brought the Luftwaffe’s unescorted bombers close to British Chain 
Home RDF stations and Fighter and Coastal Command airfields. The Luftwaffe’s greatest 
handicap, however, was that it’s anti-shipping operations off the British east coast were a
4 ADM 199 14.
5 Emile Franqui % passengers and all but 18 o f her crew were taken off by the Broughty Ferry lifeboat Mona, then she 
was refloated and made Methil under tow. ADM 199 14. ADM 199 400. ADM 199 401. ADM 199 412.
6 ADM 199 401.
Forty-seven died in the St Briac incident ADM 199 401.
8 Baird : 1993.
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side-show conducted without coherent poHcy. As Bletchley Park discovered in 1941, the 
Luftwaffe had excellent intelligence o f convoy movements, yet were powerless to intervene 
decisively.®
From mid-1940, the principal Luftflotte 5 units operating across Scotland from Stavanger 
Sola in Norway and Aalborg in Denmark were 2/K G 26 (H e lll)  and 2/K G 30 (Ju88). Re­
connaissance was the responsibihty o f the H e l l ls ,  D ol7s and Ju88s o f 2(F)/22, 3(F)/22,
1(F)/120 and 1(F)/121, and there were regular weather reconnaissance flights west of
Shetland by Wekusta-Kette X’s H e l l ls .  These were chiefly intended for operations 
against, and to support operations against, land targets. But three designated anti-shipping 
staffeln of Kfg/506 (H e ll5) based at Stavanger achieved a higher strike rate per sortie 
than the landplane Luftwaffe units, thus demonstrating the need for appropriate training. 
What the anti-shipping campaign off Scotland in 1940-1941 did achieve was to provide 
Luftflotte 5 units with experience that would prove invaluable in their operations against 
the Arctic convoys from 1942 onwards.
Ranged against the German units |Iwere 13 and 14 Groups, Fighter |
t !Command. 13 Group had been j
covering the north of England and
the
base
An isolated sector was set up at Protection for convoys around Scotland and the east
coast of England vyas provided by Fighter Command 
Wick to provide fighter cover for aircraft such as the 602 Squadron Spitfire shown
the Home Fleet base when Scapa ' Twhich had been fitted with high-angle anti-aircraft
Flow was reopened in March 1940. armament.
This left the coast between the Forth and Caithness undefended so detachments o f fighters 
were sent to Coastal Command airfields at Leuchars, Montrose and Dyce. But this was an 
imperfect solution, not least because the Coastal Command fields were not linked to the 
Fighter Command control system, so 14 Group was established on 1 August 1940 with its 
headquarters at the Drumossie Hotel, Inverness, to cover the whole area between the Tay 
and Shetland. Sector HQs were at Dyce, Wick and Kirkwall and among the first opera­
tional units were 603 Squadron’s Spitfires and 141 Squadron’s Défiants at Dyce and Mon­
trose and the Hurricanes o f 504, 232 and 3 Squadrons at Castletown and I n v e r n e s s .
9 ADM 223 2.
’8 The BoyalAirForce 1939-1945 vol. 1 The Fight at Odds. Denis Richards (HMSO 1974) p. 68-69. AIR 25 250.
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Approval for the first 20 Chain Home RDF stations was given in August 1937 with a target 
date for completion o f April 1939. In Scotland, the first Chain Home stations were built at 
Drone FIUl near St Abbs Head, Douglas Wood near Dundee, School HiU near Aberdeen 
and Netherbutton on Orkney to cover Scapa Flow, the latter two passing plots to the iso­
lated sector HQ at Wick while the others passed plots to the main Fighter Command Filter 
Room at Stanmore. Due to the earth’s curvature, Chain Home was ineffective against low- 
flying aircraft, so the network was enhanced by Chain Home Low stations to fill the gaps 
beneath and on either side o f Chain Home transmissions, the first Scottish CHL stations 
being at Cockburnspath and Doonies Hill north o f Aberdeen.
Given that the use o f the east coast ports was essential, the east coast convoy route around 
northern Scotland was a vital artery. While the Luftwaffe offensive was at its height be­
tween July 1940 and June 1941, some 111 vessels totalling almost 400,000 tons were sunk 
or damaged in the swept channel between the Pentland Firth and Berwick-upon-Tweed. 
Had not the east coast route been kept open, an intolerable load would have been placed 
on the principal west coast ports in the Clyde and Mersey. Military operations around the 
world would have been hampered, if  not abandoned altogether, and industry, particularly 
in the hinterland o f river ports like the Tees, Tyne and Humber, would have been severely 
disabled.
But the Luftwaffe did not confine their attentions to the east coast. Raids were mounted 
against coastal towns and across Scotland against Clydeside. This chapter considers, there­
fore, the hitherto untold story o f the Luftwaffe air offensive against Scottish coastal con­
voys and targets on the Scottish maritime periphery from 1940 onwards.
F i r s t  R a i d s
The first post-Dunkirk air raids against Scotland were directed at coastal land targets, prin­
cipally Rosyth naval base, in late June 1940, Operating from newly acquired bases in N or­
way, 15 H e l l l  bombers of 3/K G 26 launched a raid against Rosyth late on 25 June. At 
0020/26 an H e l l l  was shot down into the river off Grangemouth by FHght Lieutenant 
Ken MacDonald o f 603 Squadron. Another H e l l l  plotted over Glasgow and Ardeer was 
intercepted near Turnhouse by 603 Squadron Spitfires and jettisoned its bombs south of 
Edinburgh, then was intercepted by 602 Squadron’s FHght Lieutenant Johnstone and 
crashed in the sea off Barns Ness at 0204/26.^^ 3/K G 26 returned the following night, scat-
" MacDonald's victory was the second successful night interception by a Spitfire. One body was recovered. HM 
trawler Kathleen picked up three survivors from Johnstone's victim and the body of Gefrieter Wahner was later re­
covered from sea. WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2074. AIR 27 2079.14H50/160. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 
400. HO 198 198. Information from the late Air Vice Marshal Sandy Johnstone, the late Group Captain George 
Denholm and the late Group Captain George Pinkerton.
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tering bombs atound Dalmeny and Cramond, and again in the early hours o f 28 June when 
bombs fell south o f the Forth and near Dundee. At 0030/30 Aberdeen Harbour was 
bombed and the Empire Henchman was attacked off Peterhead. Early on 1 July incendiaries 
fell on a timber yard and a school in Torry, Aberdeen, and bombs fell in the Tay.^^
None o f these poorly directed attacks had caused casualties but, at 1635/1 July, a raider 
dropped two bombs beside Wick harbour, killing 14 and injuring 22.*3 At 1930/1 four 
Ju 8 8 s o f 3(F)/121 approached the Forth, two o f them being chased out to sea by 602 
Squadron after dumping bombs in Belhaven Bay.^4 6 0 3  Squadron shot down a Ju 8 8  of 
8/K G 30 off Aberdeen on 3 July,^^ and another 8/KG30 Ju 8 8  o ff Stonehaven that eve- 
ning.^^ Enemy aircraft were plotted off the east coast late on 5 July and again the following 
night. At 1813/7, 602 Squadron intercepted two 1/KG30 Ju 8 8 s o ff St Abbs Head and shot 
one d o w n . L a t e  on 8  July, mines were dropped into the Forth and bombs fell near Grail, 
at Lossiemouth and Forres.^® 602 Squadron claimed one Ju 8 8  down in flames off Fife Ness 
at 1750/9 and another damaged.^®
Despite these early successes for 602 and 603 Squadrons, the Spitfire was no nightfighter 
and, despite the short hours of darkness, raiders were able to roam across Scotland at night 
almost with impunity. One raider plotted 45 miles east o f Arbroath at 2248/10 July crossed 
the coast near Leuchars, crossed Perthshire, Stirlingshire, Loch Lomond, Helensburgh and 
Dunoon, then dropped five bombs on Mull and attacked a trawler off Tiree before return­
ing to Norway completely unchallenged.^^
Costliest among these early air raids on coastal targets was that which began at 1253/12 
July when H e l l l s  o f 9/K G 26 dropped 19 bombs across Aberdeen. Two fell in the boiler 
shop at HaU Russell’s and two more exploded outside. Twenty shipyard workers were 
killed and 50 were injured. Yellow section, 603 Squadron, shot down one o f the raiders on 
South Anderson Drive at 1255/12, but the crash resulted in further casualties on the 
ground. In all, 29 died and 103 were injured 21
12 w o  166 2128. HH50/160.
13 HH50/160. ADM 199 377. Glass ; 1994.
14 AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2074. WO 166 2128.
13 Tlifee aircrew were killed and Unteroffizier Heringlehner was picked up unhurt by a trawler. Bordfunker Friedrich 
Rabe’s body was recovered later and buried at Dyce. AIR 50 167. AIR 27 2079. Ramsay et al : 1987.
i<* Gourdon Lifeboat Margaret Dawson found the bomber off Foulshaugh Cliffs, north-east o f Gourdon. It was almost 
submerged and none o f its crew had survived, AIR 27 2079. Ramsay et al ; 1987. Services bj the Lifeboats of the Boyal 
National Lifeboat Institution 1939-1946.
1^  AIR 27 2074. Ramsay et al : 1987. Information from Wing Commander Hector McLean.
18 AIR 25 232. HH50/160.
19 AIR 27 2074.
20 WO 166 2128. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. HH50/160. HH50/161. Ramsay et al : 1987.
21 Muddle gripped the emergency services and Medical Inspector Dr J. Nairn Hay wrote that, despite the police being 
inundated with calls for ambulances, only two were sent. Then a policeman refused to allow the first ambulance near 
the scene, so lorries were commandeered and Nairn Hay’s report describes dead, dying and grievously injured lying'( ii\ erica)
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Thirteen enemy aircraft were plotted over Scotland in the early hours o f 13 July, some 
penetrating to the west coast. One raider passed over Edinburgh, Hamilton and Barrhead, 
then followed the railway through Bridge o f Weir to Greenock, dropping bombs at Bar­
rhead, Paisley and Bridge o f Weir. Seven 50kg bombs fell in Greenock where one man 
died. Other enemy aircraft scattered bombs across Renfrewshire, Angus, Fife and East Lo­
thian. 22 An H e l l l  seen o ff Rattray Head at noon on 15 July was shot down off Peterhead 
by 603 Squadron.23 That evening, among 12 bombs to fall in Leith, one demolished a tran­
sit shed at Victoria Dock, one burst in Portland Place and one, a UXB, was discovered in 
Nicoll Place.24 Another raider appeared at midnight on 15 July, dropped bombs on remote 
country between Fort William and Mull, then went south over the Clyde.
Enemy aircraft were active over the convoy lane off Kinnaird’s Head on the afternoon o f 
16 July and, at 1557/16, two bombs fell at Peterhead Prison. Twenty-six people were in­
jured when six bombs were dropped on Fraserburgh five minutes later and, at 1620/16, 18 
bombs fell on Portsoy, injuring two. Meanwhile, an H e l l l  of 9/KG26 that had attacked 
naval vessels 25 miles to the north was shot down by 603 Squadron. Another enemy air­
craft circled off Gourdon at 1802/16 and a ship was bombed off St Abbs Head.2<5
The ICI explosives plant at Ardeer and Irvine Harbour were targeted at 1452/17 July, then 
two more raiders laid mines o ff Montrose that afternoon and a 603 Squadron Spitfire dis­
appeared while attempting to i n t e r c e p t . A  raid on Leith on 18 July killed seven and the 
first raid on Glasgow the following morning killed three and injured 31.2® At 0140/20 a 
Ju88 dropped two mines off Gourock and another mine between Irvine Shipyard and Ar­
deer Dock. Mines were also dropped in the Forth off Inchkeith. Two mines exploded at 
Stirling at 0220/20 injuring 32, three o f them seriously, and leaving 29 families homeless. 
Three bombs exploded at Peterhead Academy and one was reported on the shore at
on mattresses and improvised stretchers being driven at high speed to the Royal Infirmary. Those still alive on arrival 
at Woolmanhill had suffered greatly from a lack o f  essential first aid and terrible wounds to the head, trunk and 
limbs had been left exposed. Rapid transportation in heavy vehicles had a^avated injuries and increased shock. The 
four aircrew in the Heinkel o f 9/KG26 were buried in the Old Churchyard at Dyce. For Nairn Hay's report see HO 
199 197. See also ADM 199 364. HH50/162. Ramsay et al : 1989.
22 HH50/160. HH50/161. WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. HO 198 198. Gmnack Telegraph. Glasgow Herald
23 Obergefreiter Reinhardt killed. Oberleutnant HoUmann, Unteroffizier Walz, Obegefreiter Probst and Obergefreiter 
Trefzger were sighted in their dinghy by a 224 Squadron Hudson, then came ashore near Fraserburgh on 17 July. 
ADM 199 365. AIR 27 2079. Ramsay et al : 1987.
24 The Bomb Disposal Section from Dreghorn Barracks made tlie UXB safe by 0837/17. H H 50/160. AIR 25 232.
WO 166 2128. ADM 199 363. HO 198 198.
25 This raider dropped two mines into the Kyles o f  Bute off Tighnabruich Pier. One exploded immediately, the other 
detonated at 2245/17 July. ADM 199 363. WO 166 2128.
26 Two men were injured during the fighter attacks and believed killed. Oberleutnant Lorenz unliurt and Unteroffizier 
Beer took to their dinghy and were picked up by an RAF HSL. James ‘Black’ Morton’s Spitfire was lût by return fire, 
but returned to base safely. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. ADM 199 377. Ramsay et al ; 1989.
27 WO 166 2128. HH50/160. AIR 25 232.
28 WO 166 2128. HO 198 198. HO 199 201. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. Edinburgh Corporation War Damage Records.
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Strathbeg Bay.2® A Ju88 appeared over Leith at 0559/22 July and dropped a 1,000kg bomb 
in the river off Seafield and another beside Albert Dock. A shed and AFS station were de­
molished, one fireman was killed and eight injured. Banff and Macduff were also 
bombed.®® Air activity began again in the early hours of 23 July with the laying o f mines in 
the Forth at 0005/23. At 0023/23 around 100 incendiaries were scattered over Granton 
Harbour, bombs fell across Fife, near St Abbs Head, and in the sea off Arbroath.®^
M a g n e t i c  M i n e s
Mines laid by U boats had scored two notable successes in Scottish waters, namely the near 
destruction o f the cruiser Belfast and the damaging o f the battleship Nelson, both in 1939. 
Luftwaffe mine laying sorties in Scottish waters during 1940 and 1941 used mainly the 
500kg Luftmine A magnetic ground mine.®  ^ These were dropped off Aberdeen and the 
Tay, but the Forth with its heavy commercial and naval traffic was a particular target, as 
was Scapa Flow. Few vessels o f note were sunk, though even the merest suspicion that 
mines had been dropped was enough to close harbours and major rivers until they could be 
swept. The disruption to tightly organised convoy schedules could be considerable.
Air-dropped magnetic mines first appeared off Scotland in the summer o f 1940, notably 
off Montrose on 17 July and in the Forth on 23 July. Then three were dropped at the en­
trance to Aberdeen at 0200/26 July 1940 and the sweepers Eldorado and Neofhaven took al­
most ten days to clear the channel during which time shipping movements were re­
stricted.®® The loss of the Salvesen tanker Salvestria (11,938T), inbound for Grangemouth 
from HX55 with 12,000 tons o f oil the following day, amply demonstrates the vulnerability 
o f vessels in a narrow swept channel. She was heading up the swept channel for Inchkeith 
gate with three other ships when, at 1749/27, she detonated a mine and settled, burning 
fiercely, by the stern. The swept channel was marked by a line o f buoys topped with white 
flags and both Captain Jamieson and Pilot Flockhart were adamant that they had passed 
within 100 feet o f the buoys. The Enquiry found that the buoys marking the centre line of 
the channel became, ‘displaced either to east or west o f the charted position owing to the 
direction o f the tidal stream.’®'* Two mines fell in the Tay on 28 July and, later that day, the
29 WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. ADM 199 363. HH50/160. HH50/161. Stirling Observer.
30 WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2074. Edinburgh Corporation Air Raid Damage Repairs records held, unindexed 
at the time o f consultation, by Edinburgh City Archives.
31 WO 166 2128. WO 166 3261. AIR 25 232. HH50/160.
32 Ramsay et al : 1989 p. 147-149.
33 ADM 199 364.
34 Ten o f her crew died. ADM 1 10775. ADM 199 363. AF62/2632. JJoyds War Lasses vol. 1.
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sweeper Gadfly was badly damaged when her ‘M’ sweep exploded one o f the electrically- 
fired British defensive mines laid in the Tay to deter unwanted visitors.®®
The coaster Orlock Head (1,563T) was bombed, strafed and set on fire west o f Scrabster at 
0200/28 July. Six o f her 25 crew died and Orlock Head sank off Strathy Point.®® An 
8/KG26 H e l l l  was shot down off Montrose at 1205/30 July by 603 Squadron.®? At 
2350/2 August the coaster Highlander (1,216T) was attacked by three H e l l 5 seaplanes off 
Tod Head and shot two of them down.®® Sirens sounded in Lerwick at 2354/2 as a small 
number o f bombs fell in open country, then, at 0045/3, the 42-ship WN4 came under air 
attack off Cape Wrath. Two enemy aircraft attacked the leading ships with bombs and ma­
chine gun fire and an unexploded bomb lodged in White Cresfs stokehold.®® A bomb ex­
ploded close to Autocyclus and another hit the mainmast of Somali, then fell on deck without 
exploding. Fierce fires started aboard Statira (4,825T).4®
Raiders dropped mines into 
the Forth early on 4 August, 
the Tay on 5 August, and the 
Forth again on 7 August. At 
0012/8 August two raiders 
dropped nine bombs in the 
Clyde between Inverkip and 
Cloch Point, two more on the 
beach at Lunderston Bay and 
three close to Ardgowan 
House and, early on 13 Au­
gust, aircraft mined the Clyde 
between Port Glasgow and 
Dumbarton Rock.'** At
This Hel 15 seaplane of l/Kfg 506 from Stavanger flew into a 
hill near Arbroath at 0355/15 August 1940 after being 
blinded by a searchlight during anti-shipping sortie to the 
Tay. Generally commanded by Kreigsmarine officers, these 
aircraft w ere employed on minelaying and anti-shipping mis­
sions off Scotland.
35 Grandage MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 87/61/1. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 400.
36 Twenty-five survivors were rescued by Thurso Lifeboat. ADM 199 377. Services the Lifeboats of the Bjyal National 
Lifeboat Institution 1939- 1946.
37 AIR 27 2079.
38 The first Hel 15 was hit by anti-aircraft fire and crashed. The second dropped bombs which missed, then it too was 
hit, lost height, struck Highlanders port lifeboat and crashed onto her deck. Highlander made Leith the following 
morning with the wreckage still aboard and, to protect her from reprisals that might arise from the widespread pub­
licity, was renamed St Catherine. ADM 199 363.
39 White Crest dropped back while her crew hauled the UXB on deck, ditched it over the side, then rejoined the convoy 
the following day with a hatch cover secured over the hole in her side. ADM 199 13.
46 Statinf s crew were saved and she was beached, still burning, at Stornoway. Lieutenant Stannard commanding Arab 
made a ‘strong plea’ for better HA armament. James Nelson also recommended that at least six machine guns should 
be fitted to ships in coastal convoys and that these should be manned by the Army. The idea was taken up with the 
Admiralty by Lawrence Holt and led directly to the formation o f the Maritime Anti-Aircraft Regiments of the Royal 
Artillery. ADM 199 13. ADM 199 363. Roskill : 1962 p. 50-51. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1.
41 ADM 199 365. ADM 199 372. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. D-TC 8/10 76.
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2245/13 August 12 raiders dropped bombs across Peterhead and Fraserburgh where three 
died and five were injured. The raid spread south over Aberdeenshire and, though the alert 
did not sound over the city, bombs fell around Aberdeen harbour.42 Four raiders dropped 
mines at Scapa Flow early on 20 August, one exploding on land near Kirkwall. Six raids 
entered Scottish airspace late on 21 August, two of them unsuccessfully attacking a convoy 
at anchor off Methil.43 Four bombs in Peterhead at 2139/22 left four dead and six in- 
jured.44
C o n v o y  A t t a c k s
Torpedo-carrying Hel 15 seaplanes attacked OA203 twelve miles off Wick at 2200/23 Au­
gust 1940, damaging the Beacon Grange and sinking Makalla (6,667T) and Elanishen 
(5,053T).45 Three days later, at 2055/26 August, HX65A was attacked six miles off Kin- 
naird’s Head by eight Ju88s and four H el 15s. Cape York (5,027T) was set on fire and Re- 
meura (11,445T) was torpedoed and sunk, though her crew were all saved. Cape York sank 
in flames off Rattray Head while under tow of Saucy.^ A raid on Peterhead at 0017/27 Au­
gust left three dead and five injured, 
then, at 0015/28 eight bombs fell at 
Monifeith east of Dundee, one kill­
ing one and injuring four. Sirens 
sounded in Aberdeen at 0045/28, 
just as bombs began to fall at Nigg,
Cove Bay and St Fergus. Twelve 
bombs exploded at Invergordon at 
0250/28.47 Makalla
42 At 0003/14 an enemy aircraft passed over Lochwinnoch heading towards the Clyde. The raider was one of several 
dropping transmitters and bogus instructions to non-existent agents. The New British Broadcasting Service an­
nounced later that day that agents were being hidden by Fifth Columnists. According to the OKW war diary, *We 
dropped pack assemblies in order to feign a parachute landing, which caused great excitement in the British press.'
14 Bttn. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders recorded; ‘Report from Whitecraigs Post, Home Guard. Plane dropped 
leather suitcase, later that two or three parachutists had landed on Eaglesham Moor. Subsequent action by various 
units left something to be desired.’ ADM 199 364. ADM 199 377. HH50/160. WO 166 2128. WO 166 4126.
43 Two fighter patrols took off from Turnhouse but were unable to intercept. At 2355/21 Ju88A-l 4D+LT of 9/KG30 
crashed 40 miles east o f Berwick after its engines overheated and caught fire. Two crewmen died and two were cap­
tured after 12 hours in their dinghy. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. Ramsay et al : 1989.
44 ADM 199 365. HH50/160.
45 Twelve o f Makallds 84 crew died and 17 were injured. Survivors from Makalla and Uanishen were landed at Lyness 
by HMS Leith and SS Kylehrvok Beacon Grange, with 26 crew missing, anchored off the Caithness coast to await a tug. 
Still burning, she was towed to Kirkwall the following day by Buccaneer and Salvage King and beached. Once the fire 
was out, she was refloated and arrived Dundee on 11 September 1940 where her cargo was discharged. ADM 199 
363. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Uoyds War Losses vols. 1 and 2. Sendees ly the Ufeboats of the Bayal National Ufeboat 
Institution 1939 - 1946.
46 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 365. Baird. Ueyds War Losses vol. 1.
47 ADM 199 365. HH50/160. HH50/162.
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Lagosian on fire after being bombed during the attack on 
OA208 off Peterhead on 2 September 1940 with the res­
cue tug Seaman standing by.
At 2310/2 September OA208 was 
attacked 10 miles south-east of 
Peterhead and Lagosian (5,412T) 
was left burning fiercely and aban­
doned. The Dutch Delftdijk 
(10,220T) was bombed and 
torpedoed but reached Aberdeen 
under tow o f Saucy and Lagosian 
was towed, still burning, to Peter­
head by the tug Seamanf^ The col- 
Her Ashby (4,868T) was also dam­
aged but made Leith.4® SL44A was bombed off Cruden Bay at 2120/6 September and St 
Glen (4,647T) was sunk and three o f her crew killed. Dorrington Court was damaged and 
towed to Peterhead by Seaman, and the coaster Gannet was abandoned. Peterhead Lifeboat 
found a boat with 24 men from the Gannet whom she took back to their ship, then stood 
by as she was towed in.®® WN14 was attacked by an H e l l l  in the Moray Firth at 2110/11 
September and the tanker Alexia (8,016T), outbound for Curacao in ballast, was damaged 
by near misses.®* At 2230/11 the trawler Beathtuood was bombed and sunk while at anchor 
off Montrose Coastguard Station. Six o f her eight crew were lost.®^
A mine laying and bombing raid on the Forth began at 2130/15 September. Explosions 
and gunfire could be heard over Methil at 2140/15 as an Hel 15 dropped a torpedo into 
the convoy anchorage. A convoy was attacked near the Isle o f May and the fishing boat 
Sunbeam was damaged by a mine near Inchkeith. The coaster Halland (1,264T) was bombed 
and sunk eight miles east o f Dunbar and an H el 15 was shot down by a naval trawler 7.5 
miles north-east o f Eyemouth at 2156/15.®® At 2230/15 Nailsea River (5,548T) was hit by 
an aircraft torpedo four miles east o f Montrose and sank with the loss o f six o f her crew.®4 
Two days later the Norwegian Augvald (4,81 IT) was damaged when she detonated a mine
48 Saucy (5791) sailed Aberdeen at 2330/3 with Delfidijk in tow bound for the Forth. At 1935/4 she had just cast off the 
tow 1.25 miles north-west o f Inchkeith when she detonated a mine and sank. ADM 199 364. Baird : 1993.
49 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 365. British Vessels Lost A t  Sea. Uoyds War Losses vol. 2. Services ty the Ufe­
boats of the Kqyal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946.
50 ADM 199 195. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 365. ADM 199 377. ADM 234 372. Services fy the Ufeboats of the Rqya/Na­
tional Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. Uoyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2.
51 Alexia had been torpedoed and badly damaged by \]-99 on 2 August (see below). ADM 199 13. ADM 199 363.
ADM 199 377. Ucyds War Usses vol. 1. Ramsay et al : 1989.
52 The Aberdeen trawler Star of the North lying nearby slipped her anchor to escape. Engineer James Ruddiman, lost 
with Beathmod, had been aboard the Dorothy Gray (Minesweeping Trawler 96) when she and the destroyer Garry 
rammed U-18 off Hoxa Sound on 23 November 1914. ADM 199 364. CE87/4/41. Baird ; 1993. Ritchie : 1991.
55 Halland sank in three minutes and 17 of her 22 crew died. Hauptman Bergman, Oberleutnant Lucas, Feldwebel Kali- 
nowski and Hauptman Kreipendorf were all rescued unhurt by a fishing boat and landed at Eyemouth. ADM 199 
365. ADM 199 364. AIR 25 232. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. Baird : 1993. Ramsay et al : 1989
54 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. British Vessels Lost At Sea. Utyds War Losses vol. 1. Baird ; 1993.
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off Methil. Then, at 2352/18, the coaster St Catherine, formerly the Highlander that had 
steamed into Leith with the wreck o f a Heinkel on her deck, was unsuccessfully attacked 
by an enemy aircraft off Stonehaven. Meanwhile, at 2215/18, an enemy aircraft passed 
over a small convoy in the Moray Firth and continued towards Invergordon. The convoy 
included the coastal tanker Shelbrit 1 (1,025T) bound for Inverness with petrol and aviation 
fuel. At 0735/19 Shelbrit 1 passed the Whistle Buoy off the Sutors and set course for Nav- 
ity Buoy. Seven minutes later Captain McGurk, battery commander at South Sutor, heard;
.. .a dull explosion, and on looking up observed the vessel approaching Inverness Firth partly lifted 
out o f the water and covered with a cloud o f grey smoke. Within about four seconds there was a 
flash o f flame and the ship and the surrounding sea went on fire. About a quarter o f an hour later, at 
about 0800, part o f the vessel appeared for a few seconds outlined in the flames, and then disap­
peared again.®®
Shelbrit 1 sank slowly and her crew of 21 were lost.®® Three raiders appeared over the Tay at 
0200/25 September, bombs fell in Dundee and the trawler Strathfinella was strafed off 
Cruden Bay.®7 In another air attack six miles north-east of Peterhead at 2005/26 Fort Deni­
son (8,043T) in OA220 was hit first by a torpedo and then strafed. A signalman was seri­
ously injured and many crew to jumped overboard to escape. Sixteen died and Port Denison 
sank.®® In the same attack, Welsh Prince (5,248T) and Suva (4,873T) suffered bomb damage. 
Two days later, at 2020/28,
HX73A was attacked by aircraft 15 
miles north o f Kinnaird's Head.
Hit by two bombs, Dalveen 
(5,193T) sank and Queen City 
(4,814T) was damaged.®® The raid 
continued into the early hours of 
the following morning, one 
bomber starting a huge fire at the 
Caledonian Distillery bonded store 
in D uff Street, Edinburgh, and
Port Denison, the Commodore ship In OA220, with a 
complement of 86 and outbound for Liverpool and 
Auckland, was hit by an air-launched torpedo, then 
strafed and set on fire, before sinking off Rattray Head.
55 ADM 1 10778.
56 One body, that of Third Engineer E. McVicker, was recovered. Doubts were expressed about the cause of the ex­
plosion, but the balance of opinion at the Enquiry was that it was caused by a mine dropped by the aircraft that had 
crossed the previous night. ADM 1 10778. ADM 199 363.
57 AIR 25 232. WO 166 3261. HH50/260. ADM 199 363.
58 Peterhead Lifeboat found Port Denison sunk and Naval vessels picking up survivors. The escort trawler Pentland Firth 
took 40 survivors to Lyness. At 0200/27 Bluebell transferred another eight survivors to the Lifeboat which landed 
them at Peterhead at 0300/27. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 372. Services hy the Lifeboats of the Payai Na­
tional Lifeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. Naval Review vol. XXXVI - XXXVII pp. 191.
59 Thirty-two survivors from the Dalveen's 43 crew were landed at Lyness. Two of Queen City's crew died and Fraser­
burgh Lifeboat picked up her Master and 14 others from a boat. Another 20 survivors were landed at Thurso by the 
escort trawler Windermere. Queen City was towed to Aberdeen by Abeille IV. See statement by Chief Officer McQueen 
of Dalveen in ADM 199 2134. See also ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. Services ty the Lifeboats of the Rjyal National Life­
boat Institution 1939 - 1946. Uoyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2.
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scattering incendiaries towards Leith.®®
OA222 and SL47A were attacked five miles off Peterhead at 2020/30 September and 
Mountpark (4,648T) and Empire Success (6,009T) were damaged. A reconnaissance D ol7  flew 
down the port side o f WN19 off Wick at 1430/1 October. The convoy continued towards 
Rattray Head until 1930/1 when two raiders attacked, dropping torpedoes which missed 
two Dutch ships, Mijdrecht oxià OtterlandA HX74A was attacked by three H el 15s five miles 
east of Peterhead at dusk on 2 October. The Heinkels approached from the north at 50 
feet, damaged the Trehata (4,817T), then were themselves attacked by Hurricanes o f 145 
Squadron and one was shot down.®2 Bombs also fell at Fraserburgh, Montrose and Crail. 
Flares were dropped over Dunbar and two ships were attacked at Methil.®®
A mine exploded under its parachute over Inchkeith early on 8 October,®4 then a D ol7  
reconnaissance aircraft crashed off Rattray Head at 1500/8 following engine failure.®® That 
evening, Bellona II  (840T) was set on fire in a seaplane attack off Inverbervie.®® At 0025/16 
October a raid circled south o f the Clyde then dropped four bombs south o f Greenock. 
Incendiaries fell at Port Glasgow.®? At 1055/18 October a Ju88 dropped bombs off North 
Berwick, damaging an Observer Corps post, and on the foreshore at Crail.®® Three raiders 
attacked OA232 off Aberdeen at 1835/20 October, torpedoing the Conakrian (4,876T).®® 
Four days later, at 0150/24, seven UXBs fell around the examination trawler H. E. Strood 
off Aberdeen. Two Ju88s laid mines in the Clyde at 0500/25 and, at 1830/25, 13 enemy 
aircraft crossed the east coast. Bombs and incendiaries were dropped around Montrose 
harbour where a factory was wrecked and the examination drifter Duthies was sunk. At the 
airfield, the officers' mess, two hangars and eight aircraft were destroyed. Six died and 21 
were injured. A train was strafed between Montrose and Arbroath, the Naval Air Station at 
Arbroath was attacked, bombs were dropped close to the CHL station at Anstruther, at
60 HH50/160. WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. WDA 1844 939.
61 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 13.
62 Hel 15 S4+AH of 1/506 made off to the south streaming smoke and flames. It crashed five miles south-east o f Kin- 
naird’s Head and three men were picked up from a dinghy. ADM 199 364. Ramsay et al : 1989.
65 HH50/160. WO 166 2128, AIR 25 232.
64 The patrol craft Persevere was blown up by a mine near Inchkeith on 27 October 1940, HMS B/acM Swan was damaged 
by another in the same area on 1 November and another patrol vessel. Goodwill, was sunk off Inchkeitli the following 
morning. Ten more mines were discovered in the Forth during November and early December, along with one off 
die Tay. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 365. ADM 199 400.
65 Leutnant von Eickstedt, Hauptman Hardt and Oberfeldwebel Freund from D 017P 4N+GK o f 2(F)/22 were 
picked up by fishing boat ADM 199 363. Ramsay et al : 1989
66 Nine died in Bellona II. Gourdon Lifeboat rescued 10 from the burning ship and took another eight off a Dutch ves­
sel that had picked them up from a small boat. Another survivor was found by a trawler and landed at Fraserburgh 
She went ashore the following day, still burning, in Strathlethen Bay and was declared a total loss. ADM 199 364. 
ADM 199 ?m. Services by the Ufeboats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939-1946. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1
67 AIR 25 232. WO 166 2128. HH50/160
68 HH50/160. WO 166 2128,
65 Conakrian came ashore at Bridge o f Don and was further damaged in air attacks as she lay beached but was refloated 
on 23 September 1941 and towed to tlie Tyne for repair. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. AIR 25 250. Services ty the 
Ufeboats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 -1946. Uoyds War Losses vcA. 2.
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Boarhills and in St Andrews.^® The raid ended at 1915/25 with an unsuccessful torpedo 
attack by a H el 15 on the examination drifter Avance off Aberdeen^*
Enemy aircraft dropped flares over the Forth and Tay between 0200/26 and 0400/26 Oc­
tober, then bombs fell in and around the Forth and searchlight posts at Methil and Ar­
broath, East Linton and a train on the east coast main line were aU strafed. Little damage 
was done, but, at 1820/26, three H e l l l s  approached Wick and seven bombs fell at the 
airfield, only one o f which exploded, wrecking a hangar. In the town, 14 bombs killed 
three and injured 20.72 Another three Heinkels from 3/KG26 attacked Lossiemouth air­
field ten minutes later. One Heinkel blew up over the airfield, three RAF personnel were 
killed, five injured and one Blenheim destroyed.7® Later that night a parachute mine ex­
ploded prematurely over Ayr Harbour. At 2202/28 October a raider over the Forth was 
picked up by a searchlight on Inchkeith and engaged by the anti-aircraft battery there, then 
a vivid flash lit the night sky. Two H e l l l s  strafed the examination trawler off Aberdeen 
five minutes later. Like the raider over the Forth, these aircraft were mine laying, but once 
again their mines exploded in mid-air.74 WN29 was attacked by torp e do -carrying aircraft 
o ff Kinnaird's Head at 1930/3 November. Kildale (3,877T) was sunk and Fraserburgh Life­
boat found Eros (5,888T) hit in the engine room with the escort Challenger standing by.7®
Bombs were dropped across Aberdeenshire and Fife between 1850/3 and 2008/3, then 
there was a lull until, at 0231/4, Queens ferry ARP post logged anti-aircraft fire over the 
Forth. Flares were dropped over St Andrews at 0240/4 and Dundee at 0310/4. Five 
bombs in Torry, Aberdeen, killed four and injured 44, and nine bombs fell near North 
Berwick at 0345/4.7® That night, bombs were scattered across Scotland, some falling on 
Speyside, others near Dunbar and in Fife. Bombs and flares fell along the Clyde valley, in 
particular at Coatbridge and MaryhiU, six damaged Edinburgh Zoo and four fell at Dun- 
d e e .7 7  Twelve raiders appeared the following night, the most serious incident being eight
70 One bomb at Anstruther killed two and, in St Andrews, 12 people were injured. AIR 25 232. AIR 25 250. AIR 27 
866. WO 166 2128. WO 166 3621. ADM 199 363.
71 ADM 199 364.
72 Some 140 houses in Wick, were damaged and two bombs fell at Tlirumster. ADM 199 377. Glass : 1994
73 Four German airmen died instantly. The otlier H e llls  were damaged by ground fire but returned to base, each with 
one injured crewman. AIR 25 250. HH50/160. Ramsay et al ; 1989.
74 It seems likely that the bright flash over Inchkeith was also the premature explosion o f a mine as Luftwaffe records 
quoted in Ramsay et al : 1989 do not show any casualties for tiiese raids. The Heinkels at Aberdeen dropped bombs 
close to the derelict Conakrian. AIR 25 250. HH50/160. ADM 199 377. Ramsay et al ; 1989.
75 Two o f Eroi 46 crew had died and 26 were in Challenger. The Lifeboat transferred the rest, then helped pass a tow 
and Challenger brought Eros in to Aberdeen. ADM 199 377. Services by the Ufeboats of the Royal National Iceboat Institu­
tion 1939 - 1946. Uoyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2.
76 AIR 25 232, AIR 25 250. HH50/160. HH 50/161. Queen ferry A RP Log.
77 Ibid.
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250kg bombs across Dundee that killed three and injured 14. Bombs also fell at Dyce, 
Buckie, Fraserburgh and Corpach.?®
An enemy reconnaissance aircraft was plotted passing along the convoy route west from 
the Pentland Firth at 0940/6. Messages from the aircraft were intercepted and showed that 
it had reported the position o f WN31. At 1818/6 WN31 had just completed its passage o f 
the Pentland Firth in single file and was at its most vulnerable, reforming into two col­
umns. Unable to see the raider despite being in the centre o f the convoy, the escort sloop 
Hastings logged;
At 1818, Hastings vras about two miles from Duncansby Head, and abeam o f the tenth ship in the 
convoy which had just started to form two columns. Four rapid explosions were heard and smoke 
and flames were seen coming firom one o f the ships near tlie head o f the convoy. Tracer was seen 
coming from the escort trawlers. N o aircraft was heard or seen until 1825, when one was heard and 
indistinctly seen about 2,000 feet and flying 340 degrees.. .Tracer was being fired intermittently by 
ships ahead, and at 1855 two more explosions followed by smoke and flames from another o f the 
leading ships. Aircraft was not seen by Hastings vAio was by then about two miles off.7®
Four bombs left the Commodore ship C/an Mackinlay (6,365T) ablaze and sinking with five 
dead.®® In the second attack, a bomber approached the convoy from eastward and badly 
damaged Harborough (5,415T), injuring two o f her crew.®*
EN23 was attacked off Aberdeen at 1815/11. One bomb hit Trebartha (4,600T), killing 
four. The rest o f her crew, including 10 injured, were strafed as they took to the boats.82 
Creemuir (3,997T) was sunk and Harlaiv (1,141T) reported one glancing hit by a bomb, and 
two near misses, and entered Aberdeen for repairs.®® WN35 was southbound five miles 
north o f Rattray Head at 1800/13 when it was attacked by two low-flying H el 15s and the 
Belgian Anvers (4,398T) was sunk.®** An H e l l l  bombed Aberdeen Harbour at 1900/13 and 
two H e l l l s  mined the convoy anchorage at Methil.®®
S t Catherine II  ex-High/ander (1,216T), which had shot down two Heinkels in August 1940 
and had survived another attack the following month, sailed Aberdeen on 14 November to
78 HH50/160. HH50/162. HO 199 204.
79 ADM 199 13.
80 ADM 199 13. ADM 199 377.
81 Lieutenant Hughes in Blackjly had been advised diat an air escort o f Blenheims would join tire convoy at 1600/6 but 
it was, ‘at no time in evidence.. .About five minutes after the initial attack one o f our fighters appeared and replied 
correctly to our challenge. The rest o f the convoy fired on him, however, and we were later advised that merchant­
men have no means o f distinguishmg friend from enemy at night’ Harbon>ugbv/&s towed to Scapa by Buccaneer, Bandit 
and Abeille 21 and arrived in the Tyne on 5 December 1940 for repair. ADM 199 13. ADM 199 377. AIR 25 250. 
Uoyds War Losses vo\.s 1 and.2.
82 At 1820/11 Gregness Coastguard reported flares south-east o f Findon and Aberdeen lifeboat found the abandoned, 
burning Trebartha at 2000/11, then SS Oberon with survivors. A transfer was deemed unsafe, so the Second Coxswain 
o f the Lifeboat boarded Oberon and piloted her into Aberdeen. Trebartha went ashore on 12 November at Cove Bay.
83 Creemuir sank in tliree minutes, 26 o f her crew died and her 13 were picked up. ADM 199 364. CE87/4/41, Services by 
the Ufeboats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. Lloyds War Losses vo\.s 1 and 2.
84 One oiAnveri 37 crew died. ADM 199 364.
85 The Forth was reopened after being swept at 1616/14. ADM 199 121. ADM 199 363.
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join EN25 for Kirkwall. Still just off the harbour entrance at 1800/14, she was torpedoed 
by an H el 15 and sank in four minutes. One passenger and 14 o f her 24 crew died.®® WN40 
was attacked off Rattray Head on 19 November and an H el 15 attacked WN55 in the Mo­
ray Firth at 1720/20 December.®?
The coaster Bay Fisher (575T) was bombed and sunk off the BeU Rock with the loss o f 
eight o f her crew at 1100/7 February.®® A raider passed over Scapa Flow at 1935/11 Feb­
ruary and bombed the trawler Eamont off Dunbeath Harbour. The trawler Arnold Bennett 
was strafed off Lossiemouth, the trawler John Dunkin (202T) was bombed off Buckie and 
the coaster Cantick Head (488T) was strafed nortli o f Kinnaird’s Head.®® Hurricanes o f 111 
Squadron intercepted a raider over Montrose at 1745/13, but it escaped in bad visibility.
EN71 was attacked by H e l l l s  o ff Aberdeen 35 minutes later and a bomb exploded close 
to Cape Rodney (4,512T). Oregoni was hit by a bomb and other ships were strafed. Two 
bombers appeared over Aberdeen an hour later, dropping bombs in and around the har­
bour, one of which caused 15 casualties.®® EN72 sailed Methil at 0600/15. Two reconnais­
sance flights were detected o ff the east coast in a southerly gale and snow, bombs were 
dropped at Stonehaven and Wick and a ship was strafed off Sarclet Head. At 1810/13, 
when EN72 off Peterhead, a H e l l l  dropped three bombs, none o f which did any dam­
age.®* The naval trawler Ormonde was sunk off Cruden Bay at 1830/16.®^
EN73 was in the convoy anchorage at Methil on 17 February, its saiUng delayed by bad 
weather, when a Ju88 dropped three bombs at 1115/17.®® Another Ju88 flew up the Cro­
marty Firth to Invergordon at 200 feet and dropped two bombs on naval oil tanks, three o f 
which were damaged. This raider also strafed a moored Sunderland and a patrol trawler.®4 
A Dornier 17 dropped four bombs near Lerwick at 1220/17, kilUng two and injuring four, 
then strafed the naval trawler Beaconsfieldf^  ^EN74 was passing the Isle of May at 1030/19 
when a Ju88 dived out o f a snow squall and dropped two bombs that near-missed Athelsul- 
tan which Umped back into Leith with two holes in her side. A Ju88 appeared out o f fog at 
1021/21 February and strafed the naval signal station at Buddon Ness in the Tay, then flew
86 ADM 199 364. AIR 25 250. Aberdeen Harbour Commission Minutes vol. 20/2/56. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. j
87 ADM 199 13. I
88 Four survivors were taken to Dundee in the naval trawler Heliopolis. ADM 199 400. Ucyds War Losses vol. 1.
89 Eamonfs crew were landed by the naval trawler Harmony and she drifted ashore (he following day next to Dunbeath 
Coastguard Station which was hurriedly evacuated as a UXB was still aboard. Eight o f the nine aboard John Dunkin 
were rescued when she sank under tow. ADM 199 412. ADM 199 397. AIR 25 250. CE87/4/41. Services by the Ufe­
boats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 -1946. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1.
98 One o f the raiders was claimed damaged by a 111 Squadron Hurricane. ADM 199 16. ADM 199 401. AIR 25 250.
91 ADM 199 16.
92 There were no survivors. ADM 199 401.
93 ADM 199 16. ADM 199 412.
94 One o f tlie bombs, a 500kg UXB, pierced no. 17 tank but was made safe. Tliousands o f gallons o f oil spilled onto 
die railway and into the Firth. ADM 199 412. HH50/160, AIR 25 250.
95 ADM 199 401. HH50/150.
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into a hill at Pitaklie Wood, north o f Dundee.®® Four enemy aircraft were plotted over 
northern Scotland on the evening of 22 February, then Out Skerries and Stroma Light­
houses were strafed and two bombs were dropped at Portsoy. At 1840/22 two 111 Squad­
ron Spitfkes engaged an H el 15 off Peterhead, then, at 1856/22, an H el 15 dropped a mine 
in the path of EN75, also off Peterhead.
WN90 was southbound across the Moray Fkth  in a storm at 1135/26 when a Ju88 bombed 
the straggler Empire Steelhead (7,744T) which was towed to Invergordon. On 27 February an 
H e l l l  attacked trawlers off Peterhead and shipping off Stonehaven and the coaster Noss 
Head (438T) disappeared while on passage to Kirkwall.®? Two reconnaissance flights by 
Ju88s flew along the east coast on 1 March, one strafing the trawler S t Agnes No.1 o ff Kin­
naird's Head at 1350/1, killing two o f her crew. EN79 and WN91 were about to pass each 
other off the Aberdeenshke coast that evening when both convoys were attacked. From 
EN79, the Atheltemplar was hit by two bombs and set on fire. Another bomb hit the 
Tewkesbury, coming to rest unexploded on gratings in the engine room from where it was 
extracted by her crew and ditched over the side.®® The 24-ship WN91, meanwhile, was at­
tacked by an H e l l l  and Commodore Cashmore in Forthbank wrote;
Enemy aircraft was first sighted about 1925 flying about 320® distance about 2 miles on my port 
beam. HMS Curacao was then engaging her. Aircraft was engaged from time to time by escorts and 
vessels in the convoy and reappeared flying up the two columns being engaged continuously, then 
flying out o f sight. At 1944 (approx) enemy was observed flying towards leaders o f columns athwart 
convoy at an altitude o f about 150 feet. Aircraft was engaged, dropped a stick o f  two or three bombs, 
disappearing in a steep climb in the poor light. One bomb appeared to make a direct hit on the wire­
less cabinet, demolishing it, the Second Radio Officer, Mr L. J. Moser, undoubtedly being instantly 
killed although no trace o f  him was found. One or two other bombs striking the vessel in the same 
vicinity exposing engine room and No. 4 hold, placing main engines, steering and lighting out o f ac­
tion.®®
Forthbank (5,057T) burst into flame. She lost fke main pressure and a bucket chain had to 
be organised, then Gavotte came alongside and got hoses across. Forthbank'^ midships ac­
commodation was burnt out and she had four dead and five injured. One of her attackers, 
an KG26 H e l l l ,  crashed in the sea off Melrose Head.*®® Another KG26 F le ll l  was lost
96 Tlie Junkers probably lost its way in bad visibility as examination o f the wreck revealed it was on a mission to Kin­
naird's Head. Four crewmen killed. AIR 25 232. ADM 199 400. Ramsay et al : 1989.
9? Noss Head was Leith 25/2 for Kirkwall with coal and bricks and 12 crew. She sheltered in Gardenstown Bay &om 
1000/26 until 0830/27 and was not seen again, but two rafts, each with one body, were washed ashore at Deerness 
on 1»!: March, and Tarracliff Bay on 2"® March. The cause o f her loss has never been established, though EN78 did 
hear explosions and firing near the Pentland Firth at 2100/28. Uoyds War Losses vol. 2. ADM 199 16.
98ADM199 16.
99 ADM 199 13.
108 Oberleutnant Huhn, Unteroffizier Grossardt, Gefrieter Hanel and Unteroffizier Mannling were taken prisoner. 
Salvage work on tlie aircraft revealed that one wing had been damaged by a kite wire and a ship in the convoy con­
firmed that her kite cable had been carried away. Several holes caused by macliine gun fire were also evident. ADM 
199 13. See also ADM 199 401. ADM 199 412. Ramsay et al ; 1989
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when, at 2002/7 March, it hit the mast o f the trawler Strathblane in the Tay and crashed, 
leaving two unexploded bombs on the trawler's deckd®^
EN83 sailed Methil at 0230/9 March and, at 1440/9, was attacked by one aircraft which
o
o  o  o
'% vmm *.
fig. 22
Commodore Cashmore’s sketch of the attack on W N 9I illustrates how coastal convoys 
forced into tw o straggling columns by the narrow swept channel w ere so hard to defend. It 
was impossible to  provide the whole convoy with anti-aircraft cover, and the Commodore 
lost sight of most of his charges whenever the lead ships rounded a headland. At the Pent­
land Firth, where spring tides run at over eight knots, the lead ships could make it through 
while stragglers w ere trapped on the wrong side of the race where, unescorted, they w ere 
vulnerable to  attack.
dropped two bombs that did no damage. EN83 was attacked again off Tod Head at 1807/9 
but once more no damage was done. At 1955/9 a bomber attacked the Commodore ship 
Esmond and dropped four bombs, one o f which was a direct hit disabling her engines and 
steering gear and setting her on fire.^ ®^  At 2030/9 WN95 was abeam o f Rattray Head in 
bright moonlight, and southbound towards EN83, when an aircraft flew down the convoy 
and several ships opened fire. Another aircraft flew over WN95 at 0545/10 March as it 
passed the Bell Rock, but did not attack.
EN84 was off Tod Head at 1935/11 March when an aircraft showing navigation lights ap­
proached the convoy. Commodore Macmillan in Jamaica Producer wrote:
101 The four aircrew from H e lll  IH+HH died and the trawler crew were uninjured. AIR 25 233. ADM 199 400. Ram­
say et al ; 1989.
102 Esmond h id  seven wounded. The fire was put out, jury steering was rigged and she proceeded to anchor seven mUes 
south o f Peterhead at 2335/9. ADM 199 16. ADM 199 401
103 ADM 199 13. ADM 199 16. ADM 199 401
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When at a distance o f 2 or 3 cables the pilot gave his engines full throttle, maintaining an altitude of 
about 20 feet and heading straight towards my funnel. I considered that the pilot could not possibly 
clear masthead height now and would turn to port after attacking. I ordered the helm to be star­
boarded with the intention o f fouling the plane with the foremast, or at least upsetting his plan o f at­
tack. As soon as the ship's head began to move he opened fire with all his forward machine guns at 
close range and at the same time climbed steeply.. .Seeing that he might not clear, the plane at­
tempted to swerve to port and in so doing fouled the foretopmast with his tad. A terrific jolt was felt 
on board as the tad struck the upper crows nest. The foretopmast backstay and wireless aerial came 
crashing down on deck and the kite, which was braded up at the masthead (there being insufficient 
wind to fly it) was carried away. At the same time, great pieces o f aircraft came hurtling down on the 
bridge, maindeck and into the sea. As the ship steadied on her course, the plane was seen to side slip 
round my stem in an unstable manner and tracers firom the rear ships were seen attacking him. Very 
soon afterwards, a huge column o f water was seen to spout up about a mde away, on the port quarter 
of the convoy. It is considered that this was caused by the plane diving into the sea.^ ®'*
Ten minutes later another aircraft approached the convoy and dropped bombs that shook 
the Poyal Star (7,900T). Lieutenant Commander Aubrey, escort commander in Foiuej, re­
ported that this raider was last seen heading towards the coast, pursued by anti-aircraft fire 
and losing height. At 1954/11, another enemy aircraft under heavy barrage fire passed 
within 20 feet o f Royal Star, flew up the convoy from astern, then headed towards the 
coast. An H e l l l ,  it was attacked by a 42 Squadron Beaufort from Leuchars and, at 
2200/11, Coastguards reported flares in St Andrews Bay. Three survivors were picked up 
by the minesweeper Gadfly and taken to D u n d e e .
Lieutenant Commander Bob Aubrey (left) commanded the escort for W N 95 and two of the 
Luftwaffe aircrew brought down during the attack on that convoy are seen (right) under escort 
in Dundee
104 ADM 199 16.
105 ADM 199 401.
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A ir  A t t a c k s  o n  C l y d e s i d e  a n d  S c o t l a n d ’s M a r i t i m e  F r i n g e
The first serious night raid on Glasgow began at 0102/18 September 1940 when an H e l l l  
scattered bombs and incendiaries east o f the city but did httle damage. At 0207/18 another 
H e l l l  dropped bombs and incendiaries which started fires around Queens Dock and cra- 
tered Kelvin Wharf. At 0236/18 a third raider dropped bombs onto the fires at Queen’s 
Dock and incendiaries into Dumbarton Road. A bomb exploded between the underground 
railway tunnels below Meadowside Park, another damaged Yorkhill Quay. In Yorkhill 
Dock, the cruiser HMS Sussex was hit by a 250kg bomb that exploded among oil tanks 
abaft the engine room. As burning oil flowed through the ship towards the stern, attempts 
to flood magazines failed and there was clear danger of a massive explosion that would 
have devastated Partick, Yorkhill and Govan. Evacuation zones were created on either side 
o f the river and then, at 
0440/18, just as the evacua­
tion was getting under way, 
another bomber scattered 
incendiaries and bombs 
across the centre of Glasgow.
The after magazine in Sussex 
was eventually flooded, but 
torpedoes and depth-charges 
lined the burning cruiser's 
upper deck so the Govan 
Ferry with mobile pumps 
aboard was manoeuvred 
alongside the cruiser. The 
evacuees were allowed home later that morning, but fire fighting in Sussex continued 
through the day and not until 2100/18 was the situation under control. Two charred bod­
ies were found in the gutted cruiser's gyro compartment. Twenty-nine officers and men 
had been injured.
A Ju88 was caught in searchlights over Govan Iron Works at 0055/19 September. In Glas­
gow, bombs fell beside Paisley Road West and at Maryhill, and the Clyde was closed due to
m
sJJi
Detail from a Luftwaffe reconnaissance photograph of the 
upper Clyde showing Yorkhill Dock where the cruiser Sussex 
was severely damaged during an air raid on 18 September 
1940.
106 That night’s Glasgow Etvning Citityn quoted an official communique which stated that, ‘A few enemy aircraft dropped 
bombs in the Glasgow area, where slight damage was done to industrial premises.’ Despite the smouldering, listing 
cruiser lying in full view of morning commuters, the Glasgow Herald was only able to describe Sussex as, ‘A burning 
structure.’ Sussexvsas repaired and the Japanese surrender at Singapore was signed on board in 1945. HH50/160. D- 
CD 9/9/28. D-TC8/10/96. T-CN 657/1-13. WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. Ramsay et al : 1987. Drummond : 1960.
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suspected mine la y in g d ® ?  Raiders appeared over Clydeside at 0244/24 October and bombs 
fell near Paisley and in Greenock where a tenement was hit, killing seven and injuring 
ten.ios At 1830/6 November a raider dropped four bombs on Campbeltown which hit the 
pier and the Royal Hotel, killing seven and injuring fived09 At 1930/20 December, enemy 
aircraft were plotted coming up the Irish Sea towards Clydeside and, at 2040/20, bombs 
fell across the east end o f Glasgow, injuring 17. Two 500kg UXBs were dropped into the 
British Aluminium plant at Corpach at 0850/22 December. The Ju88 responsible then at­
tacked the Icelandic trawler Arinbjorn Hersir (32IT) three miles north o f Rathlin Island."O 
Fourteen enemy aircraft were plotted flying up the Irish Sea on the evening of 9 February 
1941 and, at 2300/9, four o f them dropped mines, bombs and incendiaries on Campbel- 
town.i^^
With the compromising o f the German radio navigation and ranging systems, Knickebein, 
X-Gerat and Y-Gerat that had done much for the accuracy o f early air raids over southern 
England and the Midlands, what Professor Jones calls the Battle o f the Beams had been 
won by February 1 9 4 1 . And Luftwaffe Enigma messages, their encypherment relatively 
insecure conipared with Naval Enigma, were read from May 1940 until the end o f the war 
almost without interruption. But this did not mean that the entire Luftwaffe bombing 
campaign was rendered ineffective, if for no other reason than that, once a raid was in 
progress, there was almost nothing that the minuscule British nightfighter capability and 
anti-aircraft barrage could do about it. In the case o f the first heavy air raid on Clydeside 
which began on the evening o f 13 March 1941, there is clear evidence that the attack was 
expected. Aside from possible decrypts, none o f which appear to have survived, Luftwaffe 
reconnaissance flights following a well-established pre-raid pattern were detected over cen­
tral Scotland that morning.
Accounts o f the Clydeside raids may be found in This Time of Crisis (Jeffrey : 1993) and The 
Clydebank Blil^ (Macphail : 1974), so this thesis will concern itself with the effect o f the 
raids on maritime activity on and around the Clyde. The first waves o f bombers began 
crossing the coast o f East Lothian at 2112/13 and, at about 2125/13, the first bombs be-
This was at the height o f die invasion scare and, at 0111/19, a Mr Reid reported parachutists descending on Max­
well Park. Armed search parties found nothing. WO 166 4054. HH50/160. D-TC9/10/96. D -CD9/9/26  
Mines were dropped in die Forth and the Clyde, one exploding off North Berwick during the raid and another off 
Greenock at 0111/25.HH50/160. HH50/161. WO 166 2128.
Hamisli Mackinven accounts to author 3 January 1994 and 31 January 1994. ADM 199 372. AIR 25 232
110 The raider went east over Aberdeen. The UXBs were made safe by a party from 91 Bomb Disposal Section. An­
other attack on Corpach was made by a Ju88 at 0815/15 January 1941, but the bombs fell some distance firom the 
factory and did no damage. AIR 25 233. AIR 25 250. WO 166 2128. WO 166 4054. HH50/160. Allen : 1996.
111 Two o f the mines exploded on hitting the loch. Two people were killed and 15 injured. Hamish Mackinven account 
31 January 1994. ADM 199 658. AIR 25 250.
112 Jones : 1978 ch.s 11-22.
112 Sebag-Montefiore : 2000 p. 82.
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gan to fall. Among these were bombs and showers of incendiaries which set alight to a 
timber yard at Singer’s works in Clydebank, a distillery in Yoker and oil tanks at Dalnottar. 
It was this, and not a predetermined targeting o f Clydebank, that led to such a heavy 
weight of attack falling on that burgh over the two nights. The raid continued into the fol­
lowing night and, at 1800/15, some three hours before the first bombers appeared, the 
Ministry o f Home Security were able to warn Civil Defence authorities on Clydeside.
Û
Clydebank (above) seen from the 
north, and Glasgovy Road, Yoker, 
(right) on the night of 13-14 
March 1941. Air raids on Clyde­
side w ere principally targetted on 
the maritime-related concerns 
that together formed an inte­
grated arms industry. But, despite 
the widespread destruction, 
docks, shipyards and other mari­
time industries escaped serious 
damage. This was in sharp con­
trast to Merseyside where air 
raids left the docks and other 
industries in chaos.
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f
Despite the concentrated nature of the attack on that burgh, it is unfortunate that the air 
raids that spread across Central Scotland in 19 4 1 have been lumped together under the ge­
neric ‘Clydebank Blitz’. The heavy raids of March, April and May that year w ere primarily di­
rected against targets in the Forth-Clyde valley with maritime significance such as docks, ship­
yards and associayed engineering works. Indeed, some of the worst incidents during the raids 
did not even take place in Clydebank. A land mine in Paisley killed 92 and here, beside King­
ston Dock in Glasgow, at least 110 are known to have died when a land mine exploded be­
tween a tram and a tenement in Nelson Street late on 13 March.
By the time raids ended at 0300/15, some 1,095 missiles not including incendiaries had 
been dropped on Clydeside, around 700 o f them within a 2Vz mile radius of Clydebank 
Town Hall. In Glasgow, 647 died, 1,680 were injured and over 10,000 were homeless, 
6,835 homes having suffered major damage, almost 700 of them beyond repair. In Clyde­
bank, then a separate burgh, there were 346 known dead and more than 12,000 homes 
damaged or destroyed. But, despite the loss of life and destruction, industrial damage was 
sHght. In Glasgow, the Fairfield and Alexander Stephen shipyards had been hit, but pro­
duction at either yard was little affected. Denny’s Shipyard in Dumbarton was hit by two 
parachute mines, one o f which damaged two ships under construction. Nearby, at Dalnot­
tar Tank Farm, seven oil tanks had been set alight along with one at the Admiralty Oil De­
pot, Old Kilpatrick. At the Yarrow shipyard, however, a parachute mine at 2335/13 
brought an office building down onto a shelter which, in turn, collapsed killing 67 workers 
and injuring 80. Another mine two hours later destroyed the electrical and paint shops and 
production was slowed for six months.
Singer’s Clydebank works, largely involved in arms production, had been heavily damaged, 
yet the great prizes, the shipyards, had scarcely been touched. John Brown’s reported that, 
despite a large fire, they had sustained only minor damage and could have continued nor­
mal production had their 10,000 workforce been available. But post-raid trekking to safer 
areas meant that, late on 15 March, the Ministry o f Home Security estimated that, from a
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pre-war population o f 48,118 which had been inflated to almost 60,000 by war workers, 
barely 2,000 were left in Clydebank. A major effort involving feeding arrangements and 
housing repairs was mounted to bring vital workers back and subsequent estimates of 
Clydebank population were;
1 4 /4 /4 1 4881
2 6 /4 /4 1 7154
1 0 /5 /4 1 6969
1 9 /6 /4 1 11877
2 3 /8 /4 1 19431
The second heavy raid on Scotland began at 2130/7 April 1941 with an attack on Leith 
Docks that killed three but did no significant damage. The raid was poorly directed, bombs 
being scattered across Scotland, but Rosyth Dockyard and Queen’s Dock, Harland and 
Wolff's and Connell’s Shipyards and Meehan's Ironworks, all in Glasgow, were hit, none o f 
them seriously. Four bombs fell close to the Torpedo Trials Range in Loch Long, Renfrew 
and Abbotsinch airfields were hit and other bombs fell from Thurso to The Borders, but, 
as the Regional Commissioner reported, ‘Little or no industrial damage was done.’^ ^^  Casu­
alties on the ground were 95 killed, 98 seriously injured and 415 slightly injured. One en­
emy aircraft was shot down.
The third and final large-scale air attack on Scotland took place over two nights, 5-6 and 6- 
7 May 1941. The first raiders appeared over Clydeside shortly after 0001/6, bombs falling 
in Maryhill and south o f Glasgow. At 0117/6 the first o f 80 bombers detailed to attack 
Greenock with 112 tonnes o f high-explosive and 80,146 incendiaries dropped its bombs. 
Visibility was bad and, once again, the attack was poorly concentrated with bombs falling 
across Scotland from Argyllshire to Fife and Ayrshire. Twenty nine died in Greenock but 
the worst incident was in Paisley where 90 died when a First Aid Post took a direct hit. 
Some damage was done at Rothesay Dock in Clydebank and a major conflagration at Mil­
ton petrol storage depot was averted by three quick-thinking Argyll and Sutherland High­
landers.
The raids resumed the following night at 0030/7 with a heavy attack on the ICI explosives 
plant at Ardeer, Irvine, where 64 bombs and hundreds o f incendiaries fell in the factory. 
More bombs and incendiaries fell across Irvine Harbour and town. The Clyde was blocked 
by mines east o f King George V Dock and mines fell in John Brown’s Shipyard at Clyde­
bank. But by far the heaviest concentration o f attack was on Greenock where among the 
first targets to be hit were Ardgowan Distillery with its 3,000,000 gallons o f whisky, Del- 
Hngburn Power Station and the neighbouring Westburn Sugar Refinery. All electric power
"4 HH50/1.
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failed, rivers o f burning spirit ran down the hill towards Victoria Harbour, setting buildings 
alight, and rescue workers at the Sugar Refinery had to contend with pools o f boiling 
syrup. As in the case of Clydebank in March, these massive fires acted as a beacon for fol­
lowing raiders and the east end o f Greenock was heavily damaged. Considerable damage 
was done at Greenock Harbour where quays were cratered, the pumping machinery for the 
important East India Graving Dock was wrecked and two vessels were destroyed in a di­
rect hit on Lamont’s Dry Dock. But it was soon apparent the most o f the damage in the 
harbour had been caused by blast effect and that cranage and other cargo handling equip­
ment remained intact.
One notable feature o f this raid was the success o f the STARFISH decoy sites across central 
Scotland in diverting a considerable weight of attack away from vital industrial and mari­
time targets. STARFISH sites around Greenock and Clydebank attracted 565  bombs and 
mines, though the position o f one site west o f Loch Lomond resulted in 63  bombs, three 
UXBs and a parachute mine falling in and around the village of Cardross.
On the night of 5-6 May 1941, the main weight of attack fell on and near Greenock. 
One large bomb destroyed the coaster Blue Stone in Lamont’s dry dock, hurling the 
Admiralty drifter Gowan Hill against the dock wall. Repairs to the heavily damaged 
shipyard w ere well in hand by 26 May.
At John Brown’s Clydebank shipyard damage was restricted to  tw o timber stores 
and a pattern store destroyed during the March raids. Despite much of its 10,000 
workforce having been made homeless, by I April, Brown’s w ere able to  report that 
all but 650 men w ere back at work and production was almost normal. And it was 
the same story elsewhere across Central Scotland with damaged industrial concerns 
being speedily repaired and normal production being restored.
While air raids on Scotland, indeed Britain generally, never reached the intensity of 
the attacks on German cities by Bomber Command and the USAF, the resilience of 
industry on Clydeside and elsewhere appears to have made little impression on Al­
lied advocates of area bombing.
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Over the two nights raiding on the west o f Scotland, 455 people died, 328 o f them in 
Greenock, and 434 were seriously injured. At the time of the raids, the population o f 
Greenock was estimated at 95,000 including war workers and service personnel. About 
8,000 o f the 18,000 homes in the town were damaged, a considerably smaller proportion 
than in Clydebank in March. Some 5,575 people were evacuated from the town by 8 May 
and there was a what one report describes as, ‘a considerable unofficial exodus o f people.’ 
Before the raid, the prospect o f an attack on Greenock had been viewed with official ap­
prehension, not least because there were only two main roads in and out of the town. As 
foreseen, though the main road through Port Glasgow did stay open, road and rail links 
were indeed badly disrupted and this helped to prevent a repeat o f the trekking evident at 
Clydebank.
While much of the workforce remained in Greenock, industrial targets had suffered heav­
ier damage than in the March raid. Yet the effect on production was much less severe than 
expected. By 26 May, Greenock and Port Glasgow’s principal maritime-related undertak­
ings damaged in the raids were reporting:
Name
A. &. C. Head,
Alexander Tough & 
Sons.
Mamifacturing
Boatbuilders.
Ropeworks.
Blast damage.
Damage
Blast damage.
Aluminium Castings Ltd Heavy castings
Barr & Co.
George Brown & Co
Gourock Ropework Co. 
Ltd, Port Glasgow and 
Greenock.
Greenock Dockyard Ltd
Jas. Lamont & Co. Ltd
John G. Kincaid Ltd.
Port Glasgow & Newark
Saüclotli Co. Ltd.______
Rankine & Blackmore 
Ltd.
Brassfounders.
Shipbuilders.
Ropes etc.
Buildings destroyed by fire. Plant not 
badly damaged. _______________
Blast damage.
I State of Production
I N ormal._____
: Normal.
Some production restored. 
Normal.
Blast damage.
Shipbuilders.
Scott’s Shipbuilding & 
Engineering Ltd.
Ship Repairers.
Marine Engineers. 
Canvases.
Marine Engineers.
Shipbuilders.
Fire and blast damage to roof of flax 
store, net works and ropewalk.
Blast damage.___________________
Normal.
Two heavy bombs exploded in dock, 
i Apart from wrecked and damaged 
I vessels, severe damage to buildings 
j  including macliine and engine shops, 
j  dock pump house, joiners shop and
1 qf&es.________________  „
I Extensive damage to buildings.
I ^lax tow store destroyed by fire. Fire 
1_ and blast damage to otlier buildings.
I Brass finishing and pattern shops 
I destroyed. Boiler shop, smithy and 
I upper machine shop damaged.
Normal.
Normal.
Scottish Aviation Ltd | RAF flying boat
maintenance.
I  Severe damage to around 200,000 sq 
j  feet o f walls and roofs, main offices 
I and drawing offices destroyed, boüer 
! house, power house and electrical
j  plant badly damaged.______________
j  Severe damage to sheds and fitting 
[  and macliine £hops.
Will be some time before 
normal production re- '
stored but repairs well in I
hand. I
Production returning to 
normal.
Normal.
Production to recommence j 
in latter three on 26 May, !
repairs to others under i
way.
Production to be affected 
for some time.
Normal.
And, outwith Greenock,
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Ayrshire Shipyard Ltd,
Irvine______________
Babcock & Wilcox Ltd,
Dumbarto n __
Babcock & Wilcox Ltd,
Renfrew.______ _____
Clan Line Repair W ork, 
Glasgow._____
Dawson Downie Ltd.,
Clydebank.______
Dennystoun Forge Co. 
Ltd, Dumbarton.
Shipbuilders.Ferguson Bros., Port
Glasgow .   _
ICI Ltd., Ardeer, Irvine. | Explosives manufac-
Shipbuilders
Tubes and brass 
parts.
Boilers and arma-
ments._________
Sliip Repairers.
Pumps.
Heavy forgings.
turers.
Blast damage
Blast damage and canteen de- 
stroyed.
Blast damage
Blast damage to works, gates, roofs 
and v ^ s  o f  14 departments.
Brass Foundry badly damaged and 
blast damage to buildings.
Blast damage to buildings.
Blast and fire damage.
Sixty-four bombs and hundreds of 
incendiaries. Twenty buildings de­
stroyed and over 100 damaged.
Normal.
Normal.
Normal 
Nomial. ;
Production almost normal. I 
Normal. I
Normal.
John Brown Ltd, Clyde­
bank.
Litligows Ltd., Port
Glasgow._______
Lobnitz Ltd., Renfrew.
R. McAlister &.. Son,
Dumbarton._____
Wm Hamilton & Co. 
Ltd., Port Glasgow._
Wm. Denny Bros, Dum- 
Wrton. _
Wm. Simons &. Co.
Ltd., Renfrew.
Shipbuilders
Shipbuilders.
Shipbuilders.
Boatbuilders.
Shipbuilders.
Sliipbuilders
Shipbuilders
Slight damage.
Slight blast damage.
Slight blast damage. 
Blast damage.
Slight blast damage.
Production almost normal, j 
Cliief casualty was nitrates, j 
cordite production at 70% I 
and most repairs to be i 
completed within a mqntli. } 
Normal production, except j 
as affected by earlier r^aid. _ |
Normal. ii
Wormaï. s
Normal.
Extensive blast damage. 
Slight blast damage.
Normal, 
i  Production almost normal. | 
I Normal. i
Sources: HH/50 1-5. HH 50 92. HO 198 198. HO 198 205. HO 199 410. HO 207 1089.
During this peak period o f air raids on and around Scotland between March and May 1941, 
the Luftwaffe mounted at least 940 sorties and lost 12 aircraft over Scotland or during sor­
ties to Scotland. While the small number o f German aircraft shot down illustrates the inef­
fectiveness of the British defences, it is also clear that the raids on Scotland had little little 
real effect on the war effort. There were still sharp raids, notably over Edinburgh on 6 Au­
gust 1942, Edinburgh and Glasgow on 25 March 1943 and lastly at Aberdeen on 21 April 
1943 when 113 died and 235 were injured. But the Luftwaffe effort had lacked coherence 
and judicious planning throughout, it had neither the training nor the aircraft to mount a 
strategic bombing offensive and, particularly in 1941, it was subject to constantly changing 
priorities.
C o a s t a l  C o n v o y s  - M a r c h  1941 t o  M a y  1943
Wick was bombed at 2037/17 March 1941 and then, at 2050/17, the Norwegian Einar Jar/ 
(1,858T) was hit by an air-launched torpedo and sank near the Bell Rock.^^^ On 22 March a 
wreck was bombed off Aberdeen, an Observer Corps post at St Fergus was strafed and
"2 One Greek fireman was lost and 21 survivors were landed at Aberdeen. ADM 199 400. ADM 199 401. ADM 199 
412. Baird : 1993.
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bombs fell in the Tay and on Shetlandd^^ At 1134/23 March one o f two Z G /76  M EllOs 
attacking Suhom Voe was shot down by shore batteries, then two raiders flew down the 
Caledonian Canal shortly after 1300/23, one bomb narrowly missing a vessel at Cullochy 
Lock and, at 1815/23, the trawler E/mra was bombed and sunk west o f Shetlandd^? On 24 
March the Beaverbrae (9,956T) was bombed and sunk off Shetland and a 111 Squadron Hur­
ricane damaged a JuSB off Montrosed^®
On 26 March the Chain Home station on Unst was strafed and bombed, two trawlers were 
attacked o ff the Bell Rock and the Empire Mermaid was bombed west o f the Hebrides4^  ^
Unst Chain Home was attacked again at 0814/27 then, at 0750/28, a Ju88 strafed Fair Isle 
N orth Lighthouse and again bombed Unst Chain Home.^^o Later that day, Staffordshire 
(10,638T) was bombed and set on fire west o f Shetlandd^i The Norwegian Veni (2,982T) 
was bombed and damaged west o f Shetland on 29 March. ^ 22 0850/30 Unst radar site
was attacked yet again, as was another Chain Home site at Wick, then, that afternoon, a 
Ju88 bombed the submarine Seawolf off Dunbar and strafed BeU Rock Lighthoused^s At 
2120/30, bombs fell at Crah and Kingsbarns in Fife and, at 2140/30, a Kondor dropped 
four bombs at RAF Sumburgh424 The trawler Ontario was bombed and sunk off Shetland 
on 31 March. 125 Bell Rock Lighthouse was strafed again at 0823/1 April, then a Ju88 sank 
the patrol trawler Cramond Island off Eyemouth at 1404/1 and another trawler, Fortuna, dis­
appeared when sent to assist, Two bodies were washed ashore at Berwick.^26 Cruden Bay 
Brickworks was bombed at 1525/2 and was attacked off the Bell Rock at 2000/2,
returning to Methil with two UXBs aboard .^27
WN7 was southbound, off Rattray Head at 0757/3 April when the Filliegh was strafed by a 
Do215. Another Do215 attacked the convoy off Aberdeen that afternoon and the Har- 
w as damaged by a bomb. 2^8 EN94 was attacked near the Bell Rock at 1512/3 and the 
Geddington Court (6,903T) was holed by a bomb. Three coasters were also attacked off Mon­
trose; the Assuan (499T) ran for shelter in Montrose and went aground at Scurdie Ness, the
"c AIR 25 250: ADM 199 397.
117 HH/50 160. AIR 25 233. AIR 27 866.
11® Beavethrai  ^entire crew o f 84 were landed at Lyness by Tatfar. ADM 199 397. 
in' Empire Memaid sank on 28 March. Twenty-one (Red, AIR 25 250- ADM 199 397.
120 ADM 199 401. HH/50 160.
121. Fourteen passengers and 14 crew died. S ta ffo rdsh irebeached at Loch Ewe on 29 March and repaired on the 
Tyne. U<^d‘s War Losses vol, 1.
^'^Uojd's War Losses vol. 2.
123 a i r  25 233. ADM 199 412.
124 HH/50 160. ADM 199 401. A IR 25 250.
125 Lfoyd s^ War Losses vcA. 1.
126 St Abbs Lifeboat picked up survivors from Carmond Island. Four of her crew died. St Abbs MFV M/%/ Way picked 
up die men on the raft. The raider was intercepted and damaged near Alnmouth by Flight Lieutenant Young of 317 
Squadron. ADM 199 400. ADM 199 412. Services ly theUfsboats of the Hojal National Ufeboatlnstitutiotr 1939-1946.
127 HH/50 160. ADM 199 412.
128 ADM 199 14. AIR 25 250.
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collier Cairnie was sunk and the Greenmm (784T) disappeared with ail 14 h a n d s R o s e -  
hearty, an Observer Corps post at Inverallochy and the village o f St Combs were strafed at 
1120/4 and a Ju88 was sighted over Helmsdale that afternoon by a civil m a i l  p la n e d ^ ®
The Bell Rock was strafed again at 1000/5 April and bombs in Fraserburgh killed four and 
injured 194®^  The Orkney steamer S t Clement (450T), outbound from Kirkwall to rendez­
vous with WN9, was sunk by two near misses off Girdleness at 2150/5 and Rattray Head 
(496T), which had straggled from the convoy, was also sunk in this a t t a c k d 2^ A Ju88 passed 
over Scapa at midday on 6 April, then five raiders attacked EN95 o ff Aberdeen at 
2134/6433 Also on 6 April, the Faroese trawler Naeraberg, Dnnstan (5,149T) and Olga 
(2,2521) were bombed and sunk west o f S h e t l a n d 4 3 4  Bombs fell near Stonehaven at 
0338/7, a Ju88 was plotted off Aberdeen at 0800/7 and the trawler Sylvia was sunk at 
1 0 0 0 / 7 4 3 5  That evening, as raiders crossed central Scotland to Glasgow, bombs fell near 
Thurso and a trawler was bombed and strafed off Buchan Ness435 A Ju88 strafed trawlers 
off Fraserburgh at 1442/84^
Hurricanes o f 43 Squadron intercepted at Ju88 over North Berwick at 0645/9 and, at 
1212/9, the Naval trawler Invertay was attacked off Girdleness43® The Aberdeen examina­
tion trawler and Torry Battery opened fire, damaging an H e l l l ,  and the sloop Hastings was 
diverted from W N ll to pick up four German airmen from a dinghy off Peterhead435 A 
north-bound convoy was attacked that evening off Wick and a trawler was strafed off Ab­
erdeen. The tanker British Workman (6,9941) and Bandorian were damaged.^^o That night, 
trawler and a convoy were attacked off Copins ay, two more trawlers were attacked off Fra­
serburgh and Thirlby (4,8871) was bombed and strafed west o f the Hebridesd^i Five trawl­
ers were strafed west o f Shetland at 1600/11 and the Swedish Kexholm (3,8151) was 
bombed and sunk west o f Shetland on 12 Aprild'^^
WN14 was approached by an enemy aircraft off Aberdeenshire at 1330/15, but the raider 
was driven off by AA fire from HMS J a s o n Bombs fell at North Berwick and Greenock
129 All seven from Cairnie wete picked up. AIR 25 250. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 400. ADM 199 401. ADM 199 412.
3^0 A small boy received gunshot wounds at St Combs. AIR 25 250.
131 HH/50 160. ADM 199 412.
132 St elements, Chief Engineer and three crew from Battrcy Head were lost. AIR 25 250. ADM 199 397. ADM 199 401.
133 ADM 199 16. HH/50 160.
134 aD M  199 397. IJojds War Losses vol. 1.
135 Ibid.
136 ADM 199 397.
137 a i r  25 250.
138 AIR 27 442. ADM 199 401.
139 The aircrew insisted that they had had engine failure during a training flight the previous night, but Hastings signalled 
that, ‘It is not considered they had been so long in the water.’ ADM 199 401. Ramsay et. al. ; 1988.
140 ADM 199 397. ADM 199 412.
141 ADM 199 658. ADM 199 372. L/ojds War Losses vol. 2.
142 ADM 199 397. L/qyds War Losses vol. 1.
143 ADM 199 14.
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early on 16 April, then the Norwegian Favorit (2,826T) was bombed and sunk o ff Shetland 
at 1130/16AW A Ju88 dropped two bombs in Fraserburgh at 1522/17, killing seven and 
injuring six seriously.^ ^^ ® Ju88s operated over the Northern Isles on the morning o f 18 
April, one strafing Fair Isle N orth Lighthouse and another circling over HMS Frince of 
Wales west o f Hoy. The steamer Fothdale was slightly damaged by one of five raiders plot­
ted off Fraserburgh that evening and eight bombs were dropped near T h u r s o . A  Ju88 
strafed a convoy off Fraserburgh at 1610/20, then bombed and strafed the streets, kiUing 
one and injuring four s e r i o u s l y . A  convoy was attacked off Montrose at 1335/21, then 
the Naval trawlers Dorothy Famhert and Chrysolite were strafed o ff Cruden Scaurs at 1500/22 
and the Skipper o f the Dorothy Lambert killed.
At 2145/22 the 14-ship WN17 signalled for fighter cover after it was attacked six miles 
south of Girdleness. The convoy was attacked again at 2154/22 and this time the Silverlarch 
was strafed from bridge to stern and near missed by b o m b s . A t  Peterhead, bombs fell in 
a fish curing yard and the N orth H a r b o u r . Shipping was again attacked off Aberdeen­
shire the following night and bombs fell on land at Old Deer.^®  ^ Enemy reconnaissance 
aircraft appeared over the Pentland Firth and Fair Isle Channel on the morning o f 24 
April.132 At 2120/24, the 26-ship WN18 was southbound off Auchmithie when a raider 
appeared and repeatedly attacked the convoy in the face of heavy barrage from the escorts. 
Dolius was escorted into Largo Bay with her shaft tunnel and one hold fioodefi^#
On 25 April, five raiders attacked shipping off the east coast and the Norwegian mine­
sweeper Boertund was bombed and strafed in the entrance to the Tay. Two bombs fell at 
Pittenweem.^®'^ Mountpark (4,648T), inbound for Manchester with grain, was bombed and 
sunk west of the Hebrides on 26 A p r i l . W N 1 9  was east o f Wick at 2145/27 when an 
H e l l l  dropped five bombs around the Dutch Meliskerk, one a direct hit that failed to ex­
plode. As the Dutchman made frantic signals for help, another raider dropped bombs close 
to the port column, but did no damage. An H e l l l  first plotted east o f Montrose at 
0324/28 strafed a goods train, shot up an army post near the Bullers o f Buchan, injuring 
an officer, and strafed St Fergus. WTSfl9 continued its passage towards Methil until a Ju88
144 w o  166 2129. HH/50 160. AIR 25 233. [
145 AIR 25 250. HH/50 160. j
146 AIR 25 250. ADM 199 397. 1
147 ADM 199 412 AIR 25 250. HH50/160. |
148 ADM 199 401.
149 ADM 199 14. I
150 ADM 199 401. I
151 ADM 199 397. HH/50 160. '
152 ADM 199 397. f
153 ADM 19914. ;
154 AIR 25 250. ADM 199 400. I
82
lorth Western Approaches
found it off Rattray Head at 0851/28. The raider was beaten off by intense AA fire, then 
strafed Cruden Bay and dropped two bombs at Newburgh that left one injured seriously. 
Raiders continued to follow the convoy throughout the day, but kept out o f range. WN19 
reached the Forth late on 28 April.
G e r m a n  S i g n a l s  I n t e l l i g e n c e
In a report entitled Continued Compromise of British Convoy Movements dated 20 August 1941, 
Bletchley Park Naval Section provide an insight into German advance knowledge of 
coastal convoy sailings off Scotland.^®? This intelligence, derived from decrypts o f Luft­
waffe signals traffic, showed that, from 24 July 1941, German decrypts o f British signals 
traffic were giving Luftwaffe units in Norway as much as 12 hours notice o f British convoy 
sailings. Among the decrypts o f Luftwaffe signals to their base at Stavanger were;
1215/6/8  According to sailing schedule 6 /8 , presumably in the early afternoon, since the |
convoy is leaving the Firth o f  Forth. ___________________________   _  i
1845/7 /8
1441/8 /8
1316/11/8
According to sailing schedule, WN59 will be proceeding south at 0100 /8 /8  in the ] 
Pentland Firth.
According to sailing schedule, W N60 will be off Wick southbound at 0200/9 /8 .  |
According to sailing schedule, proceeding south, WN61 will be o ff Wick at 
0400/12/8.
1316/12/8
1816/12/8
1319/14/8
According to sailing schedule, WN62, southbound, will be in Moray Firtli, latitude \
o f  Dunbeath, at 0400/13/8.___________        J
B report: Northbound convoy at 1200/Î2 /8  in square 1548,15 west (bomber I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -      JAs the convoy is proceeding to the Atlantic northabout it will, according to 
schedule, presumably leave the Firth o f  Forth in the early afternoon o f 14/8 .
1600 /1 4 /8  [_ B report^ Fighter pmtection^for ccmvoy PATTERN took off at 1528.
Decrypted intelligence such as this is generahy fragmentary, often revealing only one side 
o f a conversation, but it was clear to Bletchley that the Germans had precise knowledge of 
some shipping movements off Scotland and that this was derived from British signals, 
though it is noteworthy that the decrypts refer principally to the WN convoy schedule, in­
telligence on northbound EN convoys clearly emanating from air reconnaissance. And, 
while this report only refers to the first two weeks o f August 1941, it is intriguingly titled 
Continued Compromise..., thus inferring that this had been the case for some time. A 
search o f relevant files at the Public Record Office has not yielded information on the 
situation prior to August 1941.
But, despite this excellent intelligence, Luftwaffe attacks on shipping were increasingly rare 
as German air strength was concentrated in eastern Europe for Operation BARBAROSSA
155 Six o i Mountpark’s 41 crew died and survivors were landed at Oban by Umtali. ADM 199 658. Uoyds War Losses 
vol.l.
156 Meltskerk was escorted into Kirkwall by the tug Buccaneer anA the trawler Preston North End Her UXB was removed 
and dumped in deep water. ADM 199 14. ADM 199 397. HH/50 160. AIR 25 250.
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and later in Northern Norway to counter the Arctic convoys. Two reconnaissance sorties, 
clearly searching for WN59, did pass up the east coast from Montrose to the Pentland 
Firth early on 8 August, but failed to find the convoy and turned back southwards to drop 
bombs at RAF Dyce and in Aberdeen. Two JU88s looking for WN 62 appeared off the 
east coast at Stonehaven and Cruden Bay on 13 August, one damaging a ship off Port- 
lethen and strafing fishing vessels.
With Luftwaffe appearances over the coastal convoy route off Scotland increasingly rare, it 
became hard to keep crews, even o f naval vessels, at a high degree o f readiness. The haz­
ards o f complacency were illustrated at dusk on 8 December 1941 when H e ll  Is attacked a 
Naval trawler off Aberdeen, injuring three ratings, then bombed and strafed four trawlers 
o f the 41 Minesweeper Group off Lunan Bay, sinking the sweepers Milford Earl and Bhi- 
neas Beard. All 11 aboard Bhineas Beard were lost, as were six from Milford EarlA^
A l l  t h e  A d d i t i o n a l  R i s k  
S c o t t i s h  C o a s t a l  C o n v o y s  i n  R e t r o s p e c t
The mathematical case for keeping the east coast convoy route open was clear. In 1939 
Britain had imported 55 milUon tons of goods including all o f her oil, much o f her raw ma­
terials and half o f her food. Imports were dramatically reduced from the first year o f war 
and successively thereafter but, even at full capacity, the principal west coast ports on the 
Clyde and the Mersey could only handle around 20 million tons. And, even were that pos­
sible, landing everything on the west coast would place an intolerable strain on the trans­
port infrastructure. Thus, without the use o f the port facilities on Forth, the Tyne, the 
Tees, the Humber and the Thames, shipping could only opoerate at greatly reduced effi­
ciency, much o f British industry would grrlnd to a halt for want o f raw materials, food 
supplies would dwindle and, given the narrow margin that then lay between survival and 
collapse, defeat would have been inevitable. And later, without these port facilities, the Al­
lied military build-up that would culminate in Normandy would have been impossible.
157 ADM 223 2.
158 NOIC Dundee, Captain Hurt, wrote that Lieutenant F. R. D. Corbett RNVR, First Lieutenant in Milford Earl,
. .assumed command when his commanding officer was killed at the beginning o f the action. Although suffering 
from considerable facial injuries, he worked indefatigably to save liis sliip and to keep all available armament in ac­
tion. ..he took all possible steps succour o f the wounded and tlie safety of his crew.’ Corbett was awarded a DSC. 
Hurt also recommended Leading Telegraphist L. E. Welch RNVR o f Milford Earl who salvaged a Lewis gun from 
the wreckage, improvised a mounting and, ‘although he had not handled this weapon before, opened an accurate 
fire on the aircraft, thus helping to prevent the accurate aiming o f a second salvo of bombs.’ Welch received a 
DSM. But the Admiralty Board o f Enquiry found that, ‘These ships were not in the required state o f readiness to 
meet attack by enemy aircraft, but they did eventually put up a strong, if  not very effective, resistance to the deter­
mined attacks o f the enemy aircraft of which there may have been more than one.’ Lieutenant W. M. Morrison, the 
senior officer o f the group, lost in Milford Earl, was blamed for the unpreparedness and Captain Hurt was instructed 
to improve the gunnery o f all minesweepers operating from Dundee. ADM 1 12310. ADM 199 400. AIR 25 250.
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But one incident illustrates top-level nervousness about the east coast route. Ellerman’s
Ciiy of Calcutta was due at Loch Ewe in 2 March 1941 with a munitions cargo and was to
continue round the north o f Scotland to Methil and Hull. On 28 February, however, the
Prime Minister intervened personally, minuting First Lord A. V. Alexander;
This ship must on no account be sent to the east coast. It contains 1,700 machine guns, 44 aeroplane 
engines and no fewer dian 14,000,000 cartridges. These cartridges are absolutely vital to the defence 
o f Great Britain.
Churchill’s minute points out that sending a ship such as this down the east coast, ‘with all 
the additional risk’ would be, ‘abominable’.^ ®°
Two weeks later, on 11 March, as attacks on the east coast convoy route intensified, the 
Lend-Lease Bill passed its final hurdle in the House o f Representatives. Then, in Washing­
ton on 27 March, the first formal United States and British Commonwealth (USBC) staff 
conversations concluded with the Joint Basic War Plan Number One, while, that same day in 
London, the ‘Destroyers For Bases’ was signed. Lend-Lease was by no means the ‘most 
unsordid act’ o f ChurchilUan oratory, but it did give Britain’s beleaguered war economy far 
greater access to American productive capacity than hitherto. Now, more than ever, would 
have been the time for the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe to mount a decisive and coor­
dinated attack on British convoy routes and the vulnerable east coast convoys should have 
been a prime target. Yet, despite the obvious importance o f the east coast route, the Ger­
man effort against the all but endless lines o f shipping off Scotland was too little, too late 
and largely ineffective. Some disruption to convoy sailings was caused and ships were sunk, 
but there was never any danger o f the east coast being closed to shipping.
To be fair, however, the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine were operating at several disadvan­
tages. The Kreigsmarine, like the Royal Navy, remained heavily committed to its capital 
ships, and the German tactic in spring 1941 was to maintain pressure on the Royal Navy 
with a series o f Atlantic operations, o f which ROSSELSPRUNG, the foray by Bismarck was 
but one, while pursuing operations in the Mediterranean basin alongside the Italians. In the 
end, however, both the Axis and the British, in particular the Royal Navy, were excessively 
committed to the Mediterranean for three years. For example, while the German interven­
tion in the Balkans induced an ultimately fatal delay in the start o f BARBAROSSA, the British 
wasted resources and threw away ships pointlessly in the strategically irrelevant defence o f 
Crete. But the British could absorb naval losses with greater equanimity than the Kreigs­
marine for whom the loss o f Bismarck was not only a disaster in itself, but it also effectively 
put an end to hopes for a capital ship strategy in the Atlantic.
459 Gilbert : 1989 p. 1017. 
160 Ibid.
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The Luftwaffe, heavily committed to the air war over southern England in 1940, then 
forced to husband resources for the invasion of the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean, 
had insufficient suitable aircraft in the North Sea and Atlantic theatres. In 1940-41 its 
crews were largely untrained in long-range anti-shipping warfare and its weaponry was un­
suitable. British coastal convoys were restricted to a narrow lane where slow-moving ships 
were strung out like targets in a coconut shy. But they were also relatively close to RAF 
fighter bases and, increasingly through 1940 and 1941, radar cover, and this made them 
easy to defend.
Perhaps most significantly, however, over the N orth Sea, as elsewhere, the Luftwaffe suf­
fered from ever-changing strategic imperatives and a lack o f clear direction. In one respect, 
however, Luftflotte 5 units in Norway did gain much from their attacks on the Scottish 
convoys. A year later, when these same units were committed to the air offensive against 
Allied convoys on the Arctic route, experience gained off Scotland made them a more 
formidable adversary.
In its attacks on Scotland’s maritime periphery, the Luftwaffe could never bring enough 
strength to bear to be decisive. While the loss o f life and property was often appalling, in­
dustry and society in general proved notably and unexpectedly resilient to bombing. Ar­
guably, this was a factor that should have had greater influence on British thinking when 
the RAF strategic bombing offensive against Germany was being planned early in 1942, 
and on the long-running dispute between Coastal and Bomber Commands over long-range 
aircraft allocation.
By 1943, much of the Luftwaffe had been expended over the Soviet Union and, as if to 
emphasise the changed balance o f air power over the North Sea and Atlantic, a Ju88 night 
fighter crew sent from Stavanger to attack the BO AC flight between Leuchars and Stock­
holm on 9 May 1943 signalled their controller that they had engine failure, then headed for 
Aberdeen to defect. Spitfires found the bomber with its undercarriage down and firing 
flares and escorted it in to Dyce. The aircraft was hidden in a hangar and an immediate 
security clampdown was ordered, but there was intense local excitement, not least because 
many believed its appearance heralded another Hess-style peace mission. Some 2,578 let­
ters posted in the area between 10 and 12 May were examined and 400 referred to the arri­
val o f the Junkers. ‘Helen’ in the Met Office wrote,
I should not be telling you this, so keep your thumb on it or I’ll get shot. We were aroused by Flor­
ence yelling through the door “Air Warning Red”. . .we looked out and Maisie said, “Oh, its only a 
Mosquito,” when o ff went the ack-ack, and, shepherded by the new fighter flight the thing came in 
and landed!!! And out stepped three Jerries complete — and I think this is pukka gen — with a des­
patch case. '^’^
The Junkers was extensively evaluated and is now in the RAF Museum, Hendon. AIR 15 413.
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Chapter to m
Battle  o f  Th e  Atlantic  - Part II 
Th e  N o rth  Wester n  Approaches 1940 -1941
German forces crossed into Luxembourg and France at 0430/10 May 1940 just as the cruiser 
Berwick arrived at Reykjavik from Scapa Flow. Marines went ashore to prevent German use 
of Iceland for airfields and U-boat bases. German successes in Norway had made it seem 
nicely that Iceland might be next and, in any case, spare U-boat crews were living there as 
welcome paying guests. Icelanders were reluctant to reveal the whereabouts o f U-boat men; 
they were paying good money and some had formed relationships with the wives and daugh­
ters o f absent fishermen, but a few well-placed bribes soon had them rounded up. Iceland's 
importance as a naval and air base in the Battle o f the Atlantic, and, later, for the Arctic con­
voys, was incalculable and the bloodless capture o f the island paid handsome dividends.^
While Donitz had recalled aU ocean-going U boats from the Atlantic in April 1940 for the 
invasion o f Norway, the Type IICs were still successful in Scottish coastal waters. lJ-13 sank 
the Swainbj (4,935T) off Shetland on 17 April and damaged the tanker Scottish American 
(6,999T) in the Pentland Firth on 28 April.^ \J~5S sank Astronomer (8,401T) off Kinnaird's 
Head at 2253/1 June® and, on 27 June, lJ-62 sank the trawler Castleton off Orkney.'^ At 
1250/10 July the Canadian destroyer S t Laurent escorting OA180 reported the Dutch Alwaki 
(4,533T) sinking 12 miles north-east o f Cape Wrath after she had been torpedoed by U-61.^
As noted in Chapter Three above, following defeat in Norway and France, from July 1940
4 While Quill and barrister Pen Slade were interrogating German Consul Gerlach, die Marines smelt burning and were 
just in time to prevent Frau Gerlach from incinerating diplomatic cyphers and odier documents in the bath. ADM 
199 377. McLaclilan : 1968.
2 Scottish Ametican was not, as claimed by Schulte, and as stated in Rohwer, sunk, but was found by the trawler Bracon- 
dem and towed into Loch Eriboll where her cargo o f Admiralty fiiel oil was discharged. ADM 199 363. Rohwer :
1999. CE87/4/41.
3 In the crew's quarters aft cots, tables and sleeping men were hurled against the deckhead. Casualties had to extracted 
from the debris in pitch darkness as the water level rose Leicester City and Stoke City landed 109 survivors. U-58 was 
pursued for 43 hours before making her escape and returned to Kiel on 17 June after an otherwise uneventful patrol. 
ADM 1 10237. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn ; 1997.
4 On 28 June HMS White escorting ShoalfisheravA the Admiralty oiler Carindak through tlie Minches reported at­
tacking a U boat contact in 5828.3N 0535W. The U boat was reportedly blown to the surface by depth charges, tlien 
sank again. Wynn : 1997. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 377. HO 198 198.
3 Alwakh  crew were picked up by tlie cruiser Coventry which was escorting minelayers into Kyle o f Lochalsh. ADM 199 
363. ADM 199 377. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. Sims : 1972.
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British convoys were rerouted through the N orth Channel and the N orth Western Ap­
proaches, as far as possible away from enemy held territory and particularly his airfields. 
But this concentrated shipping into a narrow funnel, the North Channel, seemingly ideal 
conditions for U boat warfare. When U boat anti-shipping operations resumed in mid-May, 
however, there were just 24 ocean-going boats in commission, three less than in September 
1939 and, at Raeder’s behest, six o f these were diverted to positions around Scapa Flow. 
At this, arguably the only point when the U boat could have been a decisive, war-winning 
weapon, once again the Kriegsmarine’s lack o f war preparedness meant that they were un­
able to bring sufficient strength to bear.*»
First out in the Atlantic post-Norway was U~37 which sank the Swedish Erik Frisell 
(5,066T) west o f the Hebrides. Also west o f the Hebrides and in the North Channel, U-48 
sank Stancor (798T) on 5 June, then sank Frances Massey (4,212T) and damaged Eros 
(5,888T) on 7 June. Three AMCs, Carinthia (20,277T), Scotstoun (17,046T) and Andanta 
(13,950T), were sunk between 6 and 15 June, the tanker Scottish Minstrel (6,988T) was tor­
pedoed by XJ-61 on 16 July and the Swedish O. A . Brodin (1,960T) and Fellside (3,509T) 
were sunk on 17 July. That night, at 2317/17 and six miles off Cape Wrath, U-37 sank Ma­
nipur (8,652T) from HX55A. The Norwegian Gyda (1,591T) was sunk east o f Islay by U-38 
on 18 July, U-62 sank the Pearlmoor (4,581T) nearby at 1828/19 and Empire Conveyor 
sunk 40 miles west o f Iona, probably by U-122, on 20 June.^
With the exception o f Andania, these early sinkings had all been within 10° west, that is 
within 50 miles west of the Butt o f Lewis. But even the few Coastal Command aircraft 
then available were becoming more troublesome with U-37, for example, having come un­
der attack in the Fair Isle Channel on her outward passage in May. Now the Royal Navy 
and RAF were escorting convoys to 17° west, and this took them out o f what were then 
'British Waters' in the terms o f the U boat rules o f engagement. Donitz knew o f the 
change in poHcy from B-deinst decrypts, but operating U boats that far west posed prob­
lems as the older Type VIIs had only half the range o f the later VIIBs. Donitz flew to 
Lorient on 22 July to confer with Lemp, RoUmann, Salmann and Kretschmer, four o f his 
most experienced commanders. Inspections o f Lamp's U-30, RoUmann's U-34, Salmann's 
U-52 and Kretschmer's U-99 revealed that only U-99 was in good condition. The other 
three were in urgent need o f refits and were to be patrolled back to Germany.®
RoUmann left first on 23 July and attacked O B I88 west o f the North Channel sinking Accra
6 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 371, ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999.
7 Ibid,
8 Blair ; 1997 p. 177
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(9,337T), Vinemoor (4,357T), Samhre (5,620T) and the tanker Thiara (10,364T).^ Kretschmer 
took a more westerly course off Scotland and, between 0500/28 July and 1324/31, and, from 
OB191, sank Auckland Star (13,212T), Clan Mentfes (7,336T), Jamaica Progress (5,475T) and 
Jersey City (6322T) and damaged the tankers Strinda (10,973T), 'Lucema (6,556T) and Alexia 
(8,016T), all from OB1914® The three tankers hmped into Greenock at 2125/4, but these 
attacks by just one U boat had cost O B I91 some 32,345 tons sunk and 25,545 tons damaged. 
And the only counter-attack that came even close to being effective was by a Sunderland 
from Oban. The escort achieved almost nothing beyond picking up survivors.
Type Ils were still mounting 
inshore patrols and, at 0720/3 
August, U-57 sank the Swedish 
Atos (2,126T) off Islay." The 
Type VII and IX boats were posi­
tioned astride the route into the 
North Channel. Early on 4 
August, the Type VII \J-52 sank 
Gogovale (4,586T), King Alfred 
(5,272T) and Geraldine Mary 
(7,244T) from HX60 then, as 
HX60 approached the North Channel that evening, the Type IIC U-58 on inshore patrol 
sank the Greek Pindos (4,360T)." O B I93 was outbound west of Islay the following morn­
ing when U-56 torpedoed Boma (5,408T).^4 The trooper Mohammed AH E l Kebir (7,290T), 
Avonmouth for Gibraltar in HX61 with 607 troops and 162 crew, was sunk in 5522N 
1318W at 2025/7. Ten crew and 50 troops were lost.^® U-30 sank the Swedish Canton 
(5,779T) near Tory Island on 9 August and, at 0012/10 some 60 miles west of Islay, yet 
another AMC, Transylvania, was torpedoed by U-56 A  On 13 August, U-60 sank the Swed­
ish Nils Gorthon (1,809T) 40 miles west o f Islay." At 2200/14 August, 30 miles to the
Her cargo of newsprint and sulphide spilling out and 
three of her crew dead, Geraldine Mary, inbound for 
Manchester in HX60, sinking w est of the Hebrides after 
being torpedoed by U-60.
9 All 32 aboard Vinemoor vrere reported safe. Twelve crew and 12 passengers were lost (lom Accra. Twenty-five died 
from Thiara. ADM 199 372. Slader : 1988. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Lasses vol. 1.
10 ADM 199 372.
ADM 199 372. Rohwer ; 1999. Robertson : 1981. Lloyds War Losses vol. 2.
42 Six died. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999.
43 Vanoc sank the stem half of King Alfred by gunfire after picking up all but seven o f her crew. At 2152/5 Sandunch had 
31 survivors from Geraldine Maiy, another four were in Vanoc. A boat from Geraldine M ay  landed on Lewis at 2030/8 
August. Two engineers and a passenger died. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1.
44 Three of Boma's crew died. ADM 199 371. Rohwer : 1999. Slader : 1988.
45 ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Slader : 1988. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1.
46 Englishman and Salvonia sailed but Transylavania sank at 0438/10. Fifty of her crew were lost and her Captain, 42 
officers and 229 ratings were rescued by Havelock. ADM 199 372. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999.
47 The naval trawler St Keenan picked up nine from Nils Gorthon. A  raft with eight aboard was sighted by an aircraft and 
Anthony picked them up. Four of Nils Gorthon's crew died. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Lasses vol. 1.
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south, U-59 sank Betty (2,339T)4® The tanker Sylvafield (5,709T) reported a U boat shadow­
ing HX62, then, at 2230/15, that she had been torpedoedd^
There were clear signs that aircraft were becoming the most effective U boat deterrent. 
Empire Merchant (4,864T) was sunk by U-100 at 0740/16 in 5521N 1340W.^‘^ At 1415/16 
Sunderland H /210 from Oban was escorting OA198 and searching for boats from Empire 
Merchant ysPnen a conning tower was sighted in 5635N 1255W and Flight Lieutenant Baker 
dropped two depth charges which appeared to blow the Lf boat right out o f the water. A 
further attack was made with four 2501b bombs and U-51 rolled over and sank. The air­
craft alighted Oban 1849/16 and Baker was awarded the DFC. U-51, clearly damaged, was 
returning to Lorient on 20 August when she was sunk by the British submarine Cachalot A
The first coordinated wolf-pack attack in the North Western Approaches began when the 
Swedish collier Hedrun (2,235T) and Alcinious (6,198T) in OBI 97 were hit by U-48 and U- 
46 respectively shortly after the convoy dispersed south-west o f Rockall at 1100/16 Au- 
gust.22 Lemp's U~30 then moved in on O B I97 and, at 1906/16, torpedoed Clan MacpheeA"  ^
A t 2030/20 the Greek Leonidas M. Valmas (2,080T), a straggler from HX64, was torpedoed 
by \J-46 west o f the Bloody Foreland and left derelict. 4^ JJ-57 attacked the 28-ship OB202 
some west o f Islay at 2310/23, torpedoing Cumberland (10,939T), Havildar (5,407T) and St 
Dunstan (5,618T), all within five minutes.^®
The tanker Ea Brea (6,665T), Aruba for Dundee in HX65 with fuel oil, was torpedoed by 
U-48 in 5720N 1115W at 1233/24 and two o f her crew died.^ ^^  An Oban-based Sunderland 
spotted U-48 on the surface astern o f the convoy at 1919/24 and dropped three bombs 
which missed. The convoy split o ff the Butt o f Lewis, HX65A heading for east coast ports, 
and HX65B making for the Clyde and Mersey. At 0145/25 U-48 attacked HX65A, sinking
48 Betty's Chief Officer, Second Engineer, Radio Operator and one Chinese crewman, the only survivors from her 34 
crew, were landed at Belfast on 18 August. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997.
49 Sylvafield was sunk by U-51. Three o f her 39 crew died and 16 were landed at Tobermory by tlie trawler Neivlands. 
Another boat was sighted by an Oban Sunderland. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn ; 1997.
28 Boats from Empire Mervhartt wiûi more than 30 survivors aboard were sighted by an Oban Sunderland that afternoon. 
Another was sighted the following day and Salvonia picked up the five aboard that. Thirty four more survivors were 
picked up by the Yugoslav Supetaraxxà the destroyer Warwick. Seven o f Empire Merchants crew were lost. ADM 199 
13. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Ucyds War Lasses vol. 1.
24 AIR 28 615. AIR 27 1298. ADM 199 371. Franks : 1995.
22 Hedrun sank hut Alaniousma.de Greenock at 2050/18. Salvonia also carried 17 survivors from Hedrun. Rochesterland&d 
another three from Hedrun. ADM 199 371. Roskfil : 1962 p. 53-54.
23 SS picked up '13 Europeans and 38 natives' from ClanMacphee, but was herself sunk in 5446N 2030W by U A  
early on 19 February. Survivors, including some from the Clan Maphee, were picked up from two rafts by tlie de­
stroyer Wellington. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uoyds WarUrssesvol. 1.
24 Seven survivors were taken off by Folkestone at 1640/23 and two men sighted on a raft by a 210 Squadron Sunder­
land were picked up by Arrow. Sixteen o f Leonidas M  Valmad crew died abandoning in panic. She was towed to the 
Clyde but was broken up in Karnes Bay. ADM 199 371. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. Uoyds WarLassesvcA. 1.
25 Cumberland sank off Malin Head while under tow of Englishman, Havildar vras towed in by Salvonia and repaired. St 
Dunstan was reported 40 miles west o f Islay at 0736/24. Fourteen Lascars from her 63 crew had died while attempt­
ing to launch a boat, but the survivors were stiU aboard. Schelde took her in tow, but she sank in 068° Pladda Light 
4.25 miles at 0837/27. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 2057. Rohwer : 1999. Lloyds WarLossesvol. 1.
26 One boat widi 14 survivors from La Brea reached Loch Boisdale at 2100/25. The other landed at Islivig on the west 
coast of Lewis at 2100/26. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997.
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Empire Merlin (5,763T) and the tanker Athelcrest (6,852T). That evening, at 1848/25, U-57 
sank the tanker Pecten (7,468T) from HX65B,2? then U-124 attacked HX65A off the Butt of 
Lewis torpedoing Stakeshy (3,900T) which stayed afloat on her timber cargo, Godetia 
counter-attacked at 2307/25 but U-124 still managed to torpedo Fircrest (5,349T) and Har- 
palyce (5,196T) at 2351/25.2® HX65A continued through the Pentland Firth and, as de­
scribed in Chapter Three, came under air attack north of Kinnaird’s Head. Meanwhile, U- 
100 was west o f the Hebrides and, at 1820/25, 140 miles west of Barra, torpedoed the Ja­
maica Pioneer (5,471T).2^>
W OLFPACKS IN TH E  N O R T H  W ESTER N  APPROACHES 1940-41 
The first SC convoy, SCI, was approaching the Hebrides at 1530/27 August when U-28 
torpedoed the Norwegian Eva (1,599T), inbound for Sharpness with timber, in 5750N 
1115W. One crewman died. Leith reported another ship torpedoed at 0332/28, then picked 
up 28 crew from the Finnish Elle (3,868T), inbound for Ardrossan with spoolwood, which 
had been torpedoed by U-101. Leith sighted a periscope in 5702N 0953W at 1613/28 and 
the destroyers Hurricane, Witch, Sabre and Scimitar w ett sent to sweep the area.®°
U-101 intercepted OA204 west of Islay at 2330/28, damaging Hartismere (5,498T) and sink­
ing Dalblair (4,608T), Astra (2,393T) and the Swedish Alida Gorthon (2,373T). Schepke's 
final victim in OA204 was the Empire Moose (6,103T), sunk at 0330/29.®^ Baltisan (6,803T) 
was damaged when the convoy came under air attack at 1203/29.®^ Meanwhile, at 2007/28, 
HX66 was attacked by U-28 in 5806N 1434W and l^no (3,946T) was sunk. The convoy 
split west o f Barra Head at 1200/29, then U-32 fired a torpedo through the North Channel 
section, HX66B. Mackay counter-attacked, but U-32 escaped and, at 0130/30, torpedoed 
Mill Hill (4,318T), Chelsea (4,804T) and the Norwegian Nome (3,971T) from HX66A 25 
miles north-west o f the Butt o f Lewis.®®
27 ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Lloyds WarLossesvol 1.
28 Godetia stood by Stakesbj until tlie tug Thames arrived and took her in tow for Stornoway where she was beached still 
ablaze in four holds on 27 August. Firmst sank immediately and all 40 o f her crew were lost. ADM 199 372. ADM 
199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vo ls  1 and 2.
Jamaica Pioneer satik at 0100/26. At 1256/26 an aircraft from Oban sighted two lifeboats in 5648N 1018W, signalled 
the lifeboats their position and gave tliem a course to nearest land. Anthony picked up 11 officers and 29 crew firom 
two boats. One boat with 15 survivors was still missing but, at 1400/27, Wanderer found this boat which contained 
Jamaica Pioneer's master and 13 crew in 5609N 0839W and took the survivors to Belfast. The only casualty had been 
the Cliief Officer lost when the ship sank. ADM 199 371. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. The U boat War in the Atlantic.
30 ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999.
34 Flartismere suffered no casualties and reached tire Clyde two days later under her own power. Five o f û it Astra's 26 
crew were lost. From Dalblaits 42 crew, tiiree were killed in the initial explosion and 24 were picked up by Alida Gor­
thon. When she too was sunk, 11 o f her crew died along witli 20 of the survivors from the Dalblair. All 36 aboard the 
Empire Moose were saved. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer ; 1999. Uoyds War Losses vols 1 and 2.
32 Ibid. 1
33 Chelsea and Mill Hill were botli afloat at 0300/30 but the tugs Thames and Superman found nothing due to dense fog I
and were recalled at 1701/30. Eleven survivors from Chelsea were landed at Thurso by the trawler Lord Cedi on 31 |
August, leaving 24 missing. All 34 aboard Mill Hill died. ADM 199 377. Rohwer :  1999. Uoyds WarLossesvol 1. j
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Escorted by a 210 Squadron Sunderland from Oban, troop convoy TC6 Inbound for the 
Clyde from Halifax on 3 1 August 1940. Nearest the camera is Duchess o f  York, leading the 
centre column is HMS Revenge and furthest from the camera, from left, are Empress of 
Australia, Monarch o f  Bermuda and Samaria.
U-59 and U-60 had attacked OB205 w est of Tiree the previous evening, U-S9 damaging 
two freighters and U-60 damaging the liner Volendam which was carrying, among 884 pas­
sengers, 3 17 evacuee children. Also off the North Channel were U-38, which sank Har 
Zion (2.508T) from OB205 on 3 1 August, and U-46 which sank Ville de Hassek (7 ,4 6 1T) 
w est of Lewis. U-IOI was off the Bloody Foreland. U-47 and U-32, the latter having dam­
aged the cruiser Fiji on I September, w ere w est of the Butt of Lewis. U-lOO had just left 
the area after sinking four ships totalling 15,277 tons and damaging Hartismere (4.608T).
That night, OB205 was attacked 130 miles west o f Islay, U-59 torpedoing the tanker An- 
darra (8,009T) at 2100/30, the Greek San Gabriel (4,934T) at 2130/30 and the Dutch hner 
Yolendam (15,434T), outbound for New York with 884 passengers, including 317 seavacs, 
at 2330/30. The British Har Zion (2,508T) was sunk by U-38 at 0100/31 and the Greek 
straggler EJploia (3,876T) was picked off by U-101. Meanwhile, the Belgian Yille de Hasselt 
(7,461T), independent at 14 knots for New York, was sunk 100 miles to the west by U- 
46.^ Yille de Hassells sister ship Yille de Mons (7,463T), inbound independent west of the 
Hebrides at 1500/2 September, was torpedoed by Prien’s At 0215/3 U-60 sank the
Gibraltar-bound collier Ulva (1,40IT) 180 miles north-west of Inistrahull.®® Prien then tor­
pedoed Holt’s Titan (9,034T) in OA207 in 5814N 1515W at 0028/4.®?
Four days earlier, on 30 August, B-deinst had decoded details o f the rendezvous between the
34 Andarra reached Greenock on 1 September. Thames beached San Gabriel at Cardross, but she was later declared a 
total loss. Two of her 24 crew had died. One died in Volendam which was towed to the Clyde by Salvonia. All but one 
of the 37 aboard Har Zion died, but 27 from Ejploia were aboard Anthony and the Belgian trawler Transport picked up 
13 from Ville de Hasselt. The Icelandic Hihnir picked up another boat and the rest o f the Ville de Hasselt s crew were 
aboard Fleetwood trawlers. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War 
Losses vois 1 and 2.
35 Twenty-one crewmen from the Ville de Mons were landed at Roag, Lewis, by the trawler Ben Aden at 0700/7. Another 
boat with 14 survivors landed on Lewis the following morning and 17 were picked up near Cape Wrath by the 
trawler Querria. One man died of exposure. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1.
36 Three o f Ulva's crew died and 17 survivors were landed at Castlebay. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War 
Losses vol. 1.
37 Titan sank quickly. St Laurent and Godetia picked up 23 Europeans and 66 Chinese. Prien wrongly claimed to have 
damaged another 4,000 ton steamer. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 372. Roskill : 1962 p. 54-55. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds 
War Losses vol. 1.
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53-ship SC2 and its eastern escort at 1200/6 September in 5700N 1950W. Donitz disposed 
U-47, U-28 and U-65 across the convoy’s track and it was first sighted by U-65 late on 5 Sep­
tember. The Western Approaches escorts Scimitar, Skeena, Scarborough, Perimnkk, Apollo, West- 
cott and Berkshire under Commander Arthur Knapp in Uomstoft joined on 6 September and 
Coastal Command patrols were mounted, but five ships were still sunk.^^ Von Stockhausen 
followed the convoy and, despite worsening weather and being briefly forced away by Skeena 
and Perimnkle, reported its position until Prien sank Neptunian (5,1551), Jose de Lamnaga 
(5,3031) and the Norwegian Gro (4,2111) at 0430/7. Just then a Sunderland from Oban 
forced Prien to dive, but he gave chase and, at 2124/8, sank the Greek Possidon (3,8401) in 
5642N 0933W.3^ At 0345/9, however, U-28 moved in and sank Mardinian (2,4341), then 
headed west until, at 0235/11 in 5534N 1556W, she intercepted OA210 and torpedoed the 
Harpenden (4,6781) and the Dutch Maas (1,9661).40
Late on 14 September, the 41 ship SC3 was in 5640N 1504W. It was a calm night with a 
full moon and an oily swell when, at 2328/14, the escort sloop Dundee’s .st&tn was blown 
o ff by a torpedo from Bleichrodt’s U-48 A  Bleichrodt then sank the Greek Alexandros 
(4,3431) and Empire Volunteer (5,3191), then left the convoy and, at 0915/15, came across 
the straggler Kenordoc (1,7801) and despatched her with his deck gun.^z
Kretschmer's U-99 was closing the North Western Approaches from a sweep out to 5824N 
2501W where, at 2053/14, he had torpedoed the Norwegian Hird (4,9501), a straggler from 
HX70. Late the following day he sank another Norwegian, Eotos (1,3271), west o f Rockall, 
then, on 17 September, he and Stockhausen attacked HX71 and sank one ship each.43
Prien, having been sent westwards on weather reporting duty, sighted HX72 on 20 Sep­
tember.'^ Bad weather meant that Commodore Rogers had had great difficulty persuading 
his 42 elderly charges to keep station even at SYa knots. HX72's sole ocean escort was the 
AMC Jervis Bay until sunset on 20 September when, with the convoy still 500 miles west of
38 The U boat War in the Atlantic^. 40. Padfidd 1997 p. 92. Showell ; 1989 pp. 40-41.
39 All 36 aboard Ueptunian were lost. Jose de Uarringa sank quickly and her 40 crew died. Eleven o f the 32 aboard Gro 
died. Seventeen o f the Possidon's crew died and 31 were picked up firom rafts. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 
1977. Showell : 1989 p. 41. Van der Vat : 1990 pp. 219-220. Edwards : 1996. Uoyds WarUosses^o\.% 1 and 2.
^  Maas sank immediately with the loss o f all but two o f her crew. Harpenden stayed afloat and Marauderh&à her off 
Ailsa Craig at 1615/15 after a difficult, four-knot tow escorted by Jason and Hibiscus. All but one o f her 29 crew sur­
vived. Harpenden was moored in the Gareloch and her machinery was fitted to a new ship. Her hulk was repaired in 
Glasgow and renamed Empire Stour, ADM 199 372. Rohwer ; 1999. Uoyds WarUossesYoX.  ^1 and 2.
V  passed a tow but Dundee sank at 1250/15 in 5646N 1426W. Dundeds Captain and OOW were censured for
tlieir 'grave error' in not immediately commencing pumping operations as die inflow could have been controlled 
wliile steam was still available. ADM 178 250. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999.
42 Five o f the 30 aboard Alexandros died, as did six of the 39 aboard Empire Volunteer. Thirteen survivors from the 21 
aboard Kenordoc vrete picked up hy Anthony, ADM 178 250. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 1976. Rohwer : 
1999. Wynn : 1997. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1.
43 Hird was towed in to the Clyde by Marauder, All her crew survived. Eight survivors from Latos came ashore at Borve 
at 1730/20. From HX71 Kretschmer hit sank the Crown Arun (2,3721) after allowing her 25 crew to take to the 
boats. Stockhausen's victim, another straggler, was Tregenna (5,242*1) and again all her crew were saved. ADM 199 
372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Slader : 1988. U yd s War Losses vol.s 1 and 2.
44 Showell : 1989 p. 42.
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Ireland, Jems Bay was diverted to a westbound convoy. The Western Approaches escort 
was not expected to join until the afternoon of 21 September so, for 20 critical hours, 
HX72 would be undefended.
Prien signalled the convoy's course and speed and Donitz ordered a wolf pack consisting 
o f U-29 (Schuhart), U-32 (Jenisch), U-43 (Ambrosius), U-46 (Endrass), U-47 (Prien), U-48 
(Bleichrodt), U-63 (Stockhausen), U-99 (Kretschmer) and U-100 (Schepke). Prien shad­
owed the convoy until the next day when he, Kretschmer, Bleichrodt and four other boats 
formed a wolf pack, later joined by Schepke in U-1003^
HX72 was stiU well out to sea at 2024/20 September, when U-138 (Luth) attacked the out­
bound OB216. New Sevilla (13,801T), Boka (5,560T) and Empire Adventure (5,145T) were aU 
torpedoed in quick succession ten miles north-west o f InistrahuU.'*^ Luth followed the con­
voy for four hours, then, at 0124/21, City of Simla (10,138T), outbound for Bombay, was 
torpedoed on the starboard side abreast the mainmast. She took on a heavy hst to star­
board, but righted herself and began to settle rapidly by the stern.^^ The sloop Scarborough 
dropped three patterns o f depth charges on an asdic contact, but Luth escaped unharmed.
Meanwhile, at 22° west, from HX72, 11 ships were sunk, two were damaged and more than 
100 merchant seamen died.
Time Ship Tons Cargo Bound Crew Lost
0112/21 Jnvershannon 9,154 13,241 tons o f Admiralty fuel oil. Curacao - Scapa 47 16
0319/21 Baron
Blythsivood
3,668 5.450 tons o f iron ore. Wabana - Port 
Talbot
35 34
0349/21 Elmbank 5,156 Timber and metals. Cowichan - Bel­
fast.
56 1
04Î4/21 Blairangus 4,409 1,852 fathoms o f pit props. St John’s - Methil. 34 7
2210/21 Canonesa 8,286 7,265 tons o f refrigerated and 
general cargo
Montreal - Liver­
pool
63 1
22ÎÔ/2Î1 Torinia 10,364 13,815 tons o f Admiralty fuel oÜ Curacao - Clyde ^ 55 L  52213/21 Dalcaim ^ 4,608 8,000 tons o f wheat. Montreal - HuU 42 0
2238/21 Broompark 5,136 5,136 tons o f lumber and metals. Vancouver - Glas- 1
2322/2"r Empire
Airman
"6,586 7,000 tons o f iron ore Wabana - Cardiff 3 7 ' 33
2330/21 Ftederick S. 
Fales
10,525 13,849 tons o f  Admiralty fuel oil. Curacao - Clyde 48 16
2350/21 Scholar 3,940 5,484 bales o f cotton, 2,023 tons 
o f steel, 965 tons o f timber and 
otlier general cargo.
Galveston - Man­
chester
42 0
0114/22 Simla (Nor) 6,013 4,120 tons o f scrap and 2,023 
tons o f steel.
Philadelplria — 
Tees. 5
U-99U:9l
Aj J V
Ï / Î TU-/00
U-100
u-ido
UA8
u-100
u-100
45 Ib id .
46 jsjgjK/ Sevilla sent an SSSS at 2025/20, then sank nine miles west o f the Mull o f Kintyre at 2310/21 while under tow of  
Salvonia and Seaman. New Sevilla carried 285 crew, two o f whom died. Amble picked up 107 survivors and others were 
aboard Salvonia and Superman. Empire Adventure vem taken in tow by Superman, but sank west o f  Islay at 0350/23. Her 
Second Officer, Second, Third and Fourth Engineers and 16 crewmen were missing, though Uoyds War Losses gives 
21 killed. Two survivors from Boka died after being picked up by Vanquisher making eight lost Eom her 34 crew. 
ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Uojds WarLossesvol. 1.
47 One crewman and two passengers died. Thirty-two survivors were picked up by a trawler, others were landed at 
Lough Foyle by Vanquisher and 146 were picked up by the SS Guinean. UGD 131/1. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. 
Rohwer : 1999. Allen : 1996. Slader : 1988. Lloyds WarLossesvol. 1.
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At daybreak on 22 September a litter o f broken and sinking ships, wreckage and oil marked 
the track o f HX72. Shikari was proceeding to Londonderry with survivors from Torinia and 
Scholar vài&ix, at 0615/22, Collegian (7,886T) signalled that she was exchanging fire with a 
surfaced U boat. At 0749/22 Collegian signalled that the U boat, actually U~32, had disap­
peared. Skate, Shikari, Towestoft and Heartsease came up and Lowestoft depth-charged a con­
tact, but U-32 got away.^®
The survivors o f HX72 straggled into the Clyde over the following two days, among the 
last to reach safety being Pacific Grove (7,117T) and Broompark which were together in the 
N orth Channel on 24 September escorted by the corvette La Malouine when they were at­
tacked by an enemy aircraft. La Malouine was overcrowded with 118 survivors and was 
lucky to escape damage. Broompark and Pacific Grove suffered minor bomb damage."*^
There was httle U boat activity in the N orth Western Approaches during the ensuing fort­
night, though U-137 did intercept OA219 late on 25 September and sank Manchester Brigade 
(6,042T) with the loss o f all but four o f the 62 aboard and the tanker Stratford (4,753T), 
and damaged Ashantian (4,917T). Finally, at 0310/26, U-137 sank the Norwegian Asgerd 
(1,308T). In bad weather, Scimitar yrr&s unable to find any survivors.^o
At 0520/30, while escorting OA220, the destroyer Rochester collided with a lifeboat from 
Marbriton (6,694T) which had been torpedoed 300 miles west o f Islay on 24 September. 
Seven survivors were picked up, but another boat with 16 aboard had last been seen sailing 
east on the 26* so air sweeps were mounted to find them. The missing boat was sighted in 
5647N 1102W and the survivors were picked up by the sloop Jason A  U-58 sank Confield 
(4,956T), a straggler from HX76, in 5648N 1017W at 2030/8 October.^z SC6 was attacked 
at 2110/9 in 5811N 1357W by U-103 and the Greek Zannes Gounaris (4,407T), Craigwen 
(3,697T) and the Greek Delphin (3,816T) were torpedoed at intervals o f one minute. 3^
British listening stations picked up a U boat signalling from 5657N 2000W at 1259/11 Oc­
tober and deduced that a U boat had sighted the 32-ship HX77. The signal came from 
Bleichrodt's U-48 and his attack on the convoy began at 2050/11 with the sinking o f the
48 Tlie BdU KTB for 22 September 1940 quoted in Padfield : 1983 pp. 219-220 states, 'Because o f accurate shadowing 
reports, this convoy was attacked altogether by five boats which were originally up to 350 miles away from die point 
o f first sighting.. .The actions o f the last few days have shown that the principles established in peacetime for using 
radio in contact with the enemy and training the U-boat arm to attack convoys were correct' This conclusion was 
wrong, at least in respect o f radio communication, which was to prove the U boat's Achüles heel.
49 Btvompark suffered one man dead. ADM 199 372. Uqyds WarLossesvol. 2.
50 ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Losses vo\.a 1 and 2.
51 Marbriton had been torpedoed by U-32 (Jenisch) and sank in about 30 minutes. The boat run down by Loehestervraz 
overcrowded with 19 men. Ibid. ADM 199 142.
52 Thirty-one survivors from Conjieldwete. picked up by Periwinkle. At 1210/9 Weston reported Confield still afloat on her 
timber cargo and with Captain Sage and four men aboard, but awash as far aft as amidships. The men were taken off 
at 1330/9 and Conjieldveaz despatched. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 1707. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999.
55 Delphin was last seen drifting towards Rockall by Hastings at 1230/12. AH of her crew survived. Craigwen carried 34
crew o f whom seven were lost. She stayed afloat until despatched by a torpedo from U-123 late on 10 October. One \
man was lost from Zannes Gounaris. ADM 199 372. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds WarLossesvol, 1. j
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Norwegian Bradanger (4,624T). Another Norwegian, Emma Bakke (4,72IT) was torpedoed 
and sunk at 2100/11, then Port Gisborne (8,390T) was sunk nine minutes later. The Norwe­
gian tanker Davanger (7,102T) was torpedoed at 2314/11, and, at 2340/11, the Commodore 
ship Empire Audacity signalled that she too was being attacked, but she survived and was 
found proceeding alone in 5622N 1154W by Periwinkle at 1515/13.^
Bleichrodt's sighting report brought more 
U boats towards HX77 and, at 1919/12,
Pacific Ranger (6,856T) was sunk in 5620N 
1143W by U-59. U-101 torpedoed and 
sank the Canadian St Malo (5,779T), a 
straggler from HX77, at 2225/12. U-103 
sank the Estonian Nora (1,186T) at 
0746/13, U-138 torpedoed and damaged 
the Norwegian Dagrun (4,562T) at 1432/13 
and U-37 sank Stangrant (5,804T) at 
1957/13.55 The AMC Cheshire (10,552T) 
sighted oil and wreckage from HX77 some 
120 miles west o f the Bloody Foreland at 
2000/14 and began searching for survi­
vors. From D /F  fixes it was known that U 
boats were in the vicinity, so she steered a 
zig-zag course, but was torpedoed at 
2028/14. The torpedo from U-137 tore a 
36-foot hole in her starboard side, but 
Skeena and Gladiolus escorted her safely 
into the North Channel.5^
In addition to their anti-submarine duties, in 
fine weather the Oban-based Sunderiands 
undertook air-sea rescue operations.
Stangrant was inbound for Belhist with steel 
and scrap in HX77 when whe was torpedoed  
and sunk by U-3 7 on 13 O ctober 1940. A Sun­
derland found 21 of her crew in a boat west 
of the Hebrides on 15 O ctober and, as seen 
above, brought them to  Oban.
That night, OB227 was attacked west of 
the Butt of Lewis by U-93 (Korth) and U- 
138 (Luth). Korth sank Hurunui (9,331T), then Luth sank Bonheur (5,327T) and hit the 
tanker British Glory (6,993T) at 0410/15. Pirouette picked up 43 survivors from British Glory
54 Six o f BradangeH crew were lost, 24 survivors were picked up by Clarkia. Salvonia searched for the Emma Bakke but 
found only wreckage. Port Gisborne carried 64 crew, 26 o f whom died. Survivors were picked up by Salvonia on 21 
October - see below. Twelve were picked up from Davanger, 17 died. ADM 199 372. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1.
55 Pacific Rangedz 53 crew were picked up, 19 o f them hy Antelope escorting OB230. Sixteen o f St Male's 44 crew were 
picked up, along with survivors from Port Gisborne, by Salvonia on 20 October. Nords Master and 18 o f her crew were 
picked up by Uith, which was escorting SC7, on 18 October. Dagmn reached the Clyde under her own steam. Leith 
also found 17 Stangrant survivors while the action around SC7 was at its height. Another 21 were picked up by an 
Oban Sunderland, but a boat with 16 aboard was lost despite having been sighted by a Sunderland on 16 October. 
ADM 199 59. ADM 199 372. Rohwer ; 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2.
56 Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997.
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and the trawler Sphene picked up Bonheuds crew of 39. Later that afternoon, at 1615/15, the 
convoy was attacked by U-103 and the Thistlegarth (4,747T) was sunk.57
At 0003/16 October, half way between Iceland and the Hebrides, Leith gained a contact 
1,200 yards ahead o f SC7, then sighted a hastily submerging U boat and fired three pat­
terns o f depth charges before Asdic contact was lost. Leith’s target had been Bleichrodt's 
U-48 and, on the basis o f her sighting report, Donitz ordered U-38 (Liebe), U-46 (En­
drass), U-99 (Kretschmer), U-100 (Schepke), U-101 (Frauenheim) and U-123 (Moehle) to 
converge on the convoy.5* SC7 had comprised 35 ships but, while Leith was attacking U-48, 
U-124 had found the straggler Trevisa (1,813T), a 25-year-old Canadian Laker unsuited to 
the North Atlantic. Fourteen survivors were picked up at dawn by KeppelA That afternoon, 
another U boat was D /F d  west o f Shetland in 60N 15W, in the track of OB228. Later, at 
2020/16, an air patrol reported a U boat in 5956N 1500W. This was Korth's U-93 and, at 
0217/17, he sank the Norwegian Dokka (1,168T) and Uskbridge (2,1\SV)A
Leith, a Grimsby class sloop 
under Commander Roland 
Allen, was part of the es­
cort for SC7 In October 
1940. Capable of 20 knots 
and well armed, these 
1,000 ton ships appeared 
to  be ideal convoy escorts. 
But they proved too  fragile 
for the North Atlantic in 
winter and w ere employed 
thereafter on more tem­
perate, stations.
Bleichrodt, meanwhile, followed the 34 ships and four escorts of SC7 past Rockall until, at 
0400/17, he torpedoed the tanker Languedoc (9,512T), Haspenden (4,678T) and Scoresbj 
(3,843T).^^ At 0817/17 a Sunderland attacked U-48 in 591 IN  1750W with two depth-
57 Hit by one torpedo, Hurunui sank in 18 minutes, one man dying in the explosion, another drowning while abandon­
ing ship. The other 72 were picked up by SS St Margaret helote being transferred to Fowey. Englishman and Schelde 
sailed Greenock to British Glory then 30 miles west o f Barra Head. The tanker was beached in Karnes Bay on 18 Oc­
tober, then dry-docked for repairs. Heartsease picked up nine survivors from Thistlegarth on 18 October. The survivors 
said that another boat containing 29 crew and one gunner was making for the shore. ADM 199 59. ADM 199 372. 
ADM 199 377. ADM 199 397. ADM 199 1707. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2.
58 Flotillenadmiral Otto Kretschmer recalled the attack on SC7 for the World A t  IFar television series, part 10: Ü Boats 
in the Atlantic 1939-1944.
59 HMCS Ottawa sank Trevisa by gunfire. The survivors were landed at Greenock at 1705/17 by KeppeL ADM 199 372. 
Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. Rohwer : 1999.
60 Ten died in Dokka and seven survivors were picked up by Folkestone. Uskbridge's boiler exploded and her crew aban­
doned shortly before she sank. ADM 199 1707. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds WarLossesvol. 1.
6' Langredods 79 crew got away in boats after firing a distress rocket and were picked up by Bluebell. Scortsbfis crew got 
away in four boats and were picked up at dawn by Bluebell which then closed the still-floating Uinguedoc which was 
beyond saving and, at 1127/17, Bluebell sank her. ADM 199 121. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 1707. 
Rohwer : 1999. Lund & Ludlam : 1973. Slader : 1988. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1.
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charges and a 2501b bomb, and a patch o f oil was seen five minutes after the second attack. 
The aircraft signalled the position to Scarborough but the response by the escorts was mud­
dled and U-48 got away. The pack attack on SC7 began that evening and first to be hit was 
Matheran (7,653T), torpedoed and sunk by U-38 (Liebe). Second to go was the Dutch 
Bilderdijk (6,8561) immediately astern o f Matheran and hit as she altered course to avoid 
her. Five minutes later the Uganda (4,966T), Montreal for Milford Haven with 2,006 tons 
o f steel and 6,200 tons of lumber, and immediately astern o f Bilderdijk, was also torpedoed 
by U-38 A  As Whitehall and Arabis swept down the starboard side o f the convoy and Jason 
swept down between the eighth and ninth columns, the convoy made two emergency 
turns, first 40° to port, then, at 2155/19, the original course o f 080° was resumed. By 
2150/19, however, a steady drizzle had reduced visibility and the tanker Shirak (6,0231) 
did not see the signal to resume 080° and became separated from the convoy and, at 
2235/19, was torpedoed by UA7. Blackfly was picking up Shirak’s crew from three boats at 
2326/19 when Shirak was hit by another torpedo, this time from Bleichrodt’s U-48. Lieu­
tenant Commander George Cooper in Sturdy wrote that, '...the  torpedoed tanker suddenly 
blew up and lit up the whole o f the western and northern sky for miles.'*’5
Meanwhile, to the south-east, two tankers, the Swedish Caprella (8,23OT) and Sitala 
(6,2181) had been torpedoed by U-100. Sitala was Manchester-bound with 8,444 tons o f 
fuel oil and one o f her 45 crew died. Caprella carried 11,300 tons o f fuel oil and the explo­
sion near the main pumproom on her starboard side amidships broke her back. The star­
board lifeboat was hurled across the deck and smashed, sheets o f flame shot up over the 
bridge and her bow and stern began to rise as she settled. The Chief Officer was lost, but 
52 others were picked up by Lady Elsa.^^ The convoy made another emergency turn 40° to 
port but Wandby (4,9471) was torpedoed by U-46 (Endrass) at 2322/19. A minute later, 
another o f Endrass' salvo found the Ruperra (4,5481). Lieutenant Commander Russell in 
Whitehall heard a heavy explosion at 2326/19 and reported that Ruperra burned fiercely for 
four hours, 'making the firing o f star shell unnecessary'. At 2337/19 La Estancia (5,1851), 
Methil-bound with 8,333 tons o f sugar, was sunk by two torpedoes from U-47.^^
Following SC7 inbound was 48-ship HX79 which was joined early on 19 October at 20° W 
by the escort from OB229- The convoy was attacked that evening by U-38 which sank 
Matheran (7,653T) and Uganda (4966T) in quick succession. By 0620/20 attacks by four U 
boats including Prien’s U-47 and Schepke’s U-100 saw twelve ships torpedoed, eleven o f
62 Rohwer credits Prien with the Bilderdi/k, but the KTB derived timings given in Rohwer : 1999 do not correspond 
with the convoy report In addition, her position in die convoy and the fact that the attack came from the same side 
and general area, would tend to indicate that liebe was responsible. ADM 199 2057. Rohwer : 1999.
65 Cooper's report and Bkckjljz actions in ADM 199 59. Rohwer : 1999. Utyds WarLossesvol. 1,
64 The trawler put a crew aboard the Sitala at 1200/21 and she got under way, then sank at 0700/22, the volun­
teer crew being rescued by carley float. ADM 199 59. ADM 199 1707. ADM 199 2057. Lund and Ludlam : 1973.
65 Ibid. ADM 199 2057. Rohwer : 1999.
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which, totalling 65,104 GRT and including four tankers, sank. Meanwhile, the escorts were 
once again reduced to the role o f Hfeboats, picking up survivors. Counter-attacks were im­
peded by the inclusion o f the Dutch submarine 0-14 as part o f the ocean escort and Lieu­
tenant Commander Russell, SO escort in Whitehall, wrote that her presence astern o f the 
convoy, ‘hindered the escort vessels considerably’.^  ^ One rare counter attack began at 
0005/20 when the corvette Hibiscus sweeping down the starboard side o f the convoy 
gained asdic contact. Depth charges were dropped, but contact was lost.5? Lieutenant 
Commander Cooper in Sturdy wrote, 'Further attacks were expected on 20* October, but 
none materialised. A large diversion to the S.E. after dark was an effective counter­
measure.'^^
Operational difficulties meant that only one more large-scale attack was mounted in the 
North Western Approaches in 1940. This pack attack, on HX90 between 1 and 3 Decem­
ber, left 12 ships totalling 78,316 GRT sunk and one ship of 3,862 tons damaged. Among 
the losses with HX90 were two tankers and the AMC Fotfar. A week later, Kapitanleutnant 
Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 mounted a lone attack on HX92 west o f the Hebrides, sink­
ing four ships totalling 26,111 GRT and damaging the tanker Cardita (8,237T).'59
Throughout this period, while B-deinst, the German decryption service, had provided ex­
cellent intelligence o f British sailing schedules, U boats were still spending too much time 
looking for convoys. And open-ocean reconnaissance was something for which U boats, 
unstable platforms while surface running and with poor height-of-eye, were singularly ill- 
suited. This wasteful deployment o f scarce assets was only necessary as cooperation from 
the Luftwaffe in the reconnaissance role was negligible.
66 Sturdy z Lieutenant Commander Cooper wrote that, early in that night's attack, he had seen a submarine off to star­
board of the convoy. 'This looked like 0-141 he wrote, ‘but diere were doubts at the time.’ It is likely tliat this was 
indeed 0-14 as, after the Shirak was torpedoed, the submarine had turned 90° to starboard and narrowly missed be­
ing rammed by the SS Induna who tliought her hostile. 0-14'z inclusion as part o f tlie ocean escort was ill-advised. 
ADM 199 59, ADM 199 1707.
67 At 1402/21 Whitehall signalled survivors accounted for from HX79 were, Uganda: three in Whitehall and 38 in Jason; 
Bilderdijk: 39 in Jason; Whitford Point, tiiree in Sturdj, Buperra: 35 in Coreopsis and two in Courtier, Caprella. 52 in Lady 
Elsa; Sitala. 43 in Lady Elsa, Janur. 33 in Hibiscus; La Estancia. seven in Courtier, Matheran: two in Loch Lomond since 
torpedoed. It was separately reported that 37 survivors from Shirak were in Blackjly. ADM 199 59. ADM 199 372. 
ADM 199 1707. ADM 199 2057. ADM 234 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997.
68 Cooper's report is in ADM 199 59. Sturdy did not long outlast HX79. On 26 October she sailed Londonderry to 
escort SC8, Shikari and Sturdy searched for the convoy but were unable to find it in appalling weatiier. During the 
night o f 28-29 October the two destroyers lost sight o f each other and Sturdy was low on fuel, so Cooper turned for 
home. With a fuU gale blowing, and the ship Hght, speed was reduced to 516 knots. At 0420/30 Sturdy ran ashore on 
the west side o f Islay. Distress signals were sent, giving the wrong position, and Tobermory Lifeboat found nothing. 
Five men died taking lines ashore. Cooper was initially cleared o f blame by C-in-C Western Approaches but Their 
Lordships disagreed stating that he should have established an echo sounder watch and should have requested a 
D /F  fix. An acrimonious exchange o f letters led to a Court Martial at which Cooper was found guilty. ADM 1 
11542. Moir & Crawford : 1994 p. 194.
69 ADM 199 377.
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L u f t w a f f e  O p e r a t i o n s  o v e r  t h e  N o r t h  W e s t e r n  A p p r o a c h e s
On 6 January 1941, the Luftwaffe reluctantly handed over control of the Focke Wulf 200s 
o f 1/KG40 to the Kreigsmarine. In an uncanny parallel with the British dispute over 
Coastal Command, the Luftwaffe’s maritime capabihty had, by then, been the subject o f a 
six-year wrangle between Goring and Raeder, with maritime interests invariably coming off 
worst. Early Luftwaffe interventions against shipping targets around Britain, and Scotland 
in particular, were poorly directed and httle more than irksome. Then a long-range recon­
naissance wing, 1/KG40, was formed at Merignac in Brittany in July 1940 with the fragile 
FW200 Kondors, albeit stiU firmly under Luftwaffe control.
Two Kondors appeared over the North Channel early on 16 September, one setting the 
trooper Aska  on fire off Rathhn Island, the other damaging City of Mobile A  At 1000/8 Oc­
tober a K G /40 Kondor sighted five ships 
north-west of MaUn Head and attacked 
the largest of these, the trooper Oronsaj, 
with four 250kg bombs, one of which 
hit. Oronsay eventually made the Clyde 
with four dead and 12 injured. Three 
weeks later, on 26 October, a Kondor 
scored one of the most significant anti­
shipping victories during the Battle o f 
the Atlantic when it set the Canadian 
Pacific hner Empress of Britain (42,348T) 
as she approached the North Channel.^’
OB234 was attacked outside Belfast 
Lough the following day by another 
Kondor, one ship being damaged, and this 
aircraft reported that the Empress was 
StiU burning fiercely throughout her 
length as it passed.^^
Empress o f  Britain, first bombed and set on fire, 
then torpedoed and sunk, off the North Channel, 
was the largest Allied merchant ship lost in the 
war.
A Kondor attacked HX84 west o f the North Channel on 8 November, damaging the Empire 
Dorado (5,595T) which made the Clyde safely, and the Swedish Vingaland (2,734T) which 
was sunk the following day by the ItaUan U boat Marconi. The coaster Sandra (1,028T) was
70 Eleven o iA skds  186 crew died along with 19 of the 358 French Colonial troops aboard. Survivors were picked up 
by Hibiscus and Jason, the Dutch MV Princes Irene and several trawlers. The abandoned Aska drifted ashore on Cara 
Island, still burning, the following day. ADM 199 372. Uqyds War Losses vol.l. Laxon and Perry : 1994 p.l74.
71 Twenty five crew and 20 passengers died, then the gutted derelict was torpedoed and sunk while under tow for the 
Clyde. ADM 199 372. Seamer : 1990. Uqyds WarLossesvol.!.
72 Uqyds War Losses vol. 2. Allen : 1996.
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missed by bombs from a Kondorneat Rathlin on 16 December and the Trevarrack was badly 
damaged by another Kondor on 29 December. The rescue tug Englishman and the steamer 
Temple Mead were bombed and sunk near Tory Island on 21 January, all 18 aboard the tug 
and 14 o f the crew of the Temple Mead died.^5 Two convoys were attacked west o f Islay on 
the morning o f 28 January and the steamers Pandion and Baron Renfrew were damaged. A 
Coastal Command Sunderland engaged this Kondor and both aircraft retired damaged. Fur­
ther west, the Grelrosa (4,574T) was sunk by two near misses from another Kondor and five 
of her crew were lost.^ **
l/KG40’s Fw200C Kon­
dors ought to have 
played a more signifi­
cant role in the Battle 
of the Atlantic, but they 
w ere all but neutered 
by a turf war between 
Donitz and Goring over 
who should have opera­
tional control over 
these valuable aircraft
The sinking o f the Grelrosa at 15° west was possible only because the Kondors were by then 
operating from France and Norway, thus affording them a considerably increased operat­
ing range over the Atlantic. This combined with the transfer to Kreigsmarine control 
meant that the aircraft could be used to gather effective intelligence for U boats in the 
North Western Approaches. An early example o f this new coordination of effort came 
when, at 1206/22 February 1941, a Kondor attacked OB288 in the Minch shortly after the 
convoy had left Loch Ewe. The destroyer Malcolm, leading the escort, reported that no 
ships were damaged, but the sighting report from the aircraft led to a patrol Une of six U 
boats being estabUshed across the convoy’s expected Une o f advance. OB288 lost seven 
ships sunk in the ensuing battle. Prien’s L-47 returned the complement four days later, 
homing Kondors onto OB290. Two ships were damaged and Holt’s Anchises (10,000T) was 
sunk with the loss o f 13 crew and three p a s s e n g e r s . ^5
Then, at 1435/2 March 1941, Hurricanes o f 3 Squadron claimed to have damaged a Kondor 
east o f Sumburgh. But this aircraft reported OB292 west of the North Channel and U-70, 
U-47, U-95, U-99, U-108 and U-552 were directed to form a patrol Une west o f Rockall 
across its expected Une o f advance. At 1350/4 a JU88 was intercepted by 253 Squadron six 
miles south west o f Sumburgh and claimed as damaged. This aircraft reported OB292’s 
latest position, leading to the repositioning o f the U boat patrol Une formed on 2 March,
75 ADM 199 658. Uqyds WarLossesvol 1.
74 ADM 199 658. Military Archives, Freiburg, RL7 Ic 28/1/41 quoted in Allen : 1996. Uoyds WarLossesvol 1.
75 Ibid.
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but the convoy was routed away and not sighted. The U boats did find the following con­
voy OB293, sinking three ships from that convoy and damaging three more."^ *^
Cooperation between the Luftwaffe and U boats in the North Western Approaches was 
never properly exploited and, from April 1941, losses of fragile Kondors began to mount. 
On 18 April Kondor F8+AB attacked OB346 and hit Pilar de Laringa with one bomb, but the 
ship’s gunners returned fire and the aircraft crashed. l/K G 4 0 ’s Staffelkapitan Fleigel was a 
serious loss as he had been continuously in action against Allied shipping since the unit 
moved to Bordeaux in July 1940.'^’^
B a l a n c e  Sh e e t  i n  t h e  N o r t h  W e s t e r n  A p p r o a c h e s  1 9 4 0
The first table below gives sinkings, due to enemy air and U boat activity, in Scottish 
coastal waters and the N orth Western Approaches, o f ships o f all nations during the last 
seven months of 1940 when the trade war was at its most intense o ff the Hebrides. It in­
cludes data on sinkings o f AMCs, principally as the loss o f tliese ten large liners, ideal 
troopships as they were, would have serious consequences in 1942 and thereafter.
Merchant Ship s o f  all nations
1940 Number sunk Gross Tonnage
June 8 30,274
' J«iy 19 100,343August 42 211,559
September 53 265,772
October 65  ^ 336,970
November 35 147,431
December 23 142,298
T ota l 245 1,235,347
Royal Navy A M C s __
Number sunk3
. .
3
A '
10
GrossJTonnage 
" " 51 ,273
— —
. ± . .
10,552
" 4 4 7 2 0 2
LS,402
143,807
J
Included in the above are 67 non-British flagged vessels weighing in at 250,753 GRT sunk 
in Scottish coastal waters and the North Western Approaches during this period, among 
them 17 Norwegians, 14 Swedes, 10 Dutchmen and 13 Greek vessels. This table gives data 
on British-flagged tonnage only.
1940 
June
_ÎÂ_Au g u s t___
September
October
British flagged 
ships sunk in 
NWA
16
Total of British 
flagged ships 
 swik
" "67.........
 68
28
41
November
December
T otal
45
25
16
178
52eC  
68  '
63
467
%age of total 
sunk lost inN m  __
" i0%' 7
7" 47%""Y^% " 
66%......
British tonnage 
sunk in NWA
  2^168 ”
25%
38%
92,259
162.742^  221J20 
"250,758 
115 ,298
Total British 
flagged tonnage 
lost 
 283,400
275,700
279,100
“3247800
302,400
113,249
984,594
313,100
257,400
2,035,900
%age of British 
tonnage sunk lost 
ioNWA
'  9^  " ......." 333^
" 60%
6 ^  
% 8^
37% "
"4 3 % ' ’
" 48%
! Principal sources; Various ADM and AIR series files. Rohwer : 1999. Statistical Digest of The 
\       IP’grH MSO 1955 table 158. L.lqyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2.
Both tables demonstrate the intensity o f  the trade war o ff Scotland and in the N orth 
W estern Approaches that followed on the German acquisition o f French U boat bases
76 AIR 25 250. ADM 199 397. Rohwer ; 1999. Dunnett : 1960 p. 77. JJojds Warhossesvolz 1 and 2.
77 Ramsay et al. : 1985.
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and Norwegian air bases. During the last seven months o f 1940 almost half the total 
sinkings o f British shipping due to enemy action took place either in Scottish waters or 
west o f the Hebrides and N orth Channel. This war o f attrition peaked in October with 
the battles around HX77, OB227, SC7 and HX79 when over 80% o f total British ton­
nage sunk was lost in the N orth W estern Approaches.
GREENLAND
HX72
OA232C
SL44A^
O A 205 J
B AY OF BISCAY
t l r + : r ; - r  I T - : - r m - i T T  I
The principal con voy attacks off Scotland and in the N orth  W estern  Ap­
proaches, Septem ber to  D ecem b er 1940. Sustained actions against convoys  
are show n as solid lines along its general line of advance. Air attacks are 
show n in red and italic type.
Losses at this level could not be sustained, but neither could the level o f effort put in 
by the U boats in that month. Novem ber gales, crew exhaustion and poor U boat ser­
viceability brought a respite for the British. Then, perceiving that convoys were being 
routed further north and that the British seaborne and airborne A /S  forces were be­
coming more o f a threat in the N orth W estern Approaches, from November 1940 
Donitz began moving the U boat operational area north and then west, first beyond 15°
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west and then, in April 1941, to the Newfoundland Bank.^* But this brought its own prob­
lems. By early 1941 there were fewer operational U boats available than there had been at 
the outbreak o f war and, when these went to sea, they were operating further from base 
and in far more inhospitable conditions. Then there was the difficulty o f finding convoys 
when Luftwaffe co-operation was minimal.’^
For the British, pack attacks, and the resultant shipping losses at the end o f 1940, came as 
a severe shock, but, as Padfield observes, ‘...in  November 1940 a minor revolution in 
method was in t r a in .L e s s o n s  were being learned, or, more to the point, expensively re­
learned. There was a clear need for more effective central control of the anti-U-boat war to 
ensure the best use o f scarce resources both in hardware and intelligence. Ports had to 
work more efficiently, turnaround times had to be reduced and ships, once at sea, had to 
be properly protected. Aircraft capable o f longer range and armed with effective radar and 
weapons were needed, though had there been a staff history o f the 1914-18 trade war, the 
effectiveness o f aircraft against submarines would have been readily apparent.
In the intelligence field, and thanks to the work o f its Submarine Tracking Room which 
had begun hypothesising future U boat dispositions using direction-finding and traffic 
analysis o f then stüi undecrypted Kreigsmarine signals®^ by the end o f 1940 the Admiralty 
Operational Intelligence Centre had begun diverting convoys away from known concentra­
tions o f U boats.®2 It was also apparent that, to counter the wolfpack, escort vessels must 
be trained and organised to operate as a group, using synchronized tactics that whenever 
possible, should also inviolve aircraft. ASV and surface ship radar, albeit primitive and un­
reliable, was coming forward, as was VHP radio equipment which allowed greater coordi­
nation between escort vessels themselves and between escort vessels and aircraft.
The first escort groups began forming at Greenock, Londonderry and Liverpool in Octo­
ber 1940 and, as we shall now see, Scotland’s role in working up the new escort groups, 
and in developing new A /S tactics, was crucial. Further, as wül be demonstrated later in 
this chapter, Scotland played a significant role in the naval intelligence war and in the air 
war against the U boats, and the role o f her main port complex on the River Clyde was 
crucial to the eventual Allied victory.
™ Roskill : 1960 The N a^  at Warp. 93.
The U Boat Warm the Atlantic HMSO vol. 1 pp. 57-58, 62-64 and 73. Padfield : 1995 p. 101-120. van der Vat : 1988 
pp. 254-259.
*0 Padfield : 1995 p. 104.
German Naval Enigma signals were not decrypted with any useful currency until April 1941. See section below enti­
tled Scotland’s Tart in Breaking Enigma.
82 Padfield 1995 pp. 103-104.
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H M S  W e s t e r n  Is l e s  -  E s c o r t  G r o u p  T r a i n i n g
Losses in the Atlantic convoys at the end o f 1940 had exposed serious shortcomings in the 
training and tactics of the naval escorts which, as described above, often found themselves 
reduced to the role o f lifeboats, picking up survivors from sunken merchant ships they 
were seemingly powerless to protect. But the interwar years had seen the Royal Navy’s 
anti-submarine warfare branch starved o f resources. Excessive faith was placed in Asdic 
and A /S personnel were derided as ‘Fingers’ a soubriquet derived from the heterodyne 
pinging employed in Asdic to make the system audible to the human ear. Restrictions on 
fuel consumption had meant that A /S warfare exercises were conducted around well- 
rehearsed fleet manoeuvres rather than ill-disciplined merchant convoys. A /S  attacks prac­
tised then were designed to counter the established British submarine tactics and British 
submariners who proposed night attacks on shipping were ignored.
Such was the shortage o f escorts and trained personnel to man them when war broke out, at 
first there was no time to develop effective countermeasures to the U boat threat. In April 
1940, First Sea Lord Dudley Pound instructed 62-year-old retired Admiral Gilbert Stephen­
son to set up a training establishment for British and French escort vessels at Lorient in 
France. By July, however, with the enemy lodged across the Enghsh Channel, too close for 
comfort to existing naval establishments in southern England, Stephenson set up shop at 
Tobermory on the Isle of MuU.®^  Tobermory offered a large, sheltered anchorage close to 
the railhead at Oban, with easy access to the sea. Above all, however, there the business of 
training could be conducted well away from possible enemy interference.
While elements o f the Tobermory syllabus would be instantly familiar to present-day Royal 
Navy sea trainees, from the first Stephenson had to adapt pre-war sea training to take ac­
count o f dilution by hostilities-only personnel. Nothing was taken for granted and every 
aspect o f the newly commissioned ship’s capability from machinery, navigation, ship- 
handling and administration to weapons and sensor systems came under scrutiny. In the 
case o f a corvette, for example, Stephenson and his staff had just 16 days to turn the ship 
into an effective fighting unit capable o f working as part o f an escort group. So there was 
no time, as Baker notes in his biography o f Stephenson, for emphasis on Naval traditions 
so much a part of peacetime tra in ing .S tephenson  said,
I decided we must have priorities — and my number one priority was Spirit this was the first essential, 
the determination to win. Next came Discipline: it is no good being the finest men in the world if you 
are not going to obey orders. T)îàx.à—Administration: making sure the work of the ship was evenly di-
88 Signal in ADM 1 13255 dated 11 July 1940 from Admiralty to Cs-in-C, Captain A /S /W  et al:
Arcangements have been made for tlie A/S working up practices of newly commissioned ships to be carried out at Tober­
mory under the orders of Commodore Stephenson, who will be accommodated on shore at first and shortly in HMS Western 
which has been fitted out as an A/S training ship. Hunt class destroyers will however continue to work up at Scapa for 
the present.
8“^ For Western Isles syllabus, see ADM 199 1729.
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vided; that meals were in the right place at the right time; that the whole organisation of the ship was 
both stable and elastic. Then, lastly — and this may surprise you — lastly. Technique — how to use the 
equipment. That would have been quite useless unless the spirit was right in the first place.®^
The first fall day began with an inspection of the ship by Stephenson and his staff, then as 
many of her crew as could be spared went ashore for a film, aptly titled Escort Teams A t  
Work to reflect the teamwork-based approach, and a pep-talk by Stephenson. The rest of 
that day, and the ensuing four days were taken up with intensive training in basic seaman­
ship, boatwork, signaUing, gunnery, depth charge and hedgehog drills, radar and A /S war­
fare instruction. On day six, ships sailed from Tobermory for two days o f exercises with a 
submarine which had been relegated to training duties or a newly commissioned boat itself 
working up. Boarders were repelled, navigators worked out search patterns, engineering 
staff reacted to a series o f notional disasters and seamen practised HAGGIS, the Tober­
mory-devised drill for boarding a surfaced U boat, trapping her crew inside and towing it 
to port.®  ^ Two further days o f harbour training were followed by three days o f A /S exer­
cises in the Minches, the ships anchoring for the night in Loch Lathaich, then three more 
days at Tobermory which included night firing practice.
His staff may have missed little, but Stephenson’s primary concern throughout was the ba­
sic procedural training o f the men who would fight the ship, namely the A /S warfare com­
mand team and specialist weapons ratings. The programme was intensive, though not to the 
point of crew exhaustion, and one who went through the Tobermory scheme recalled how:
.. .every moment was packed with tension and exertion. Damage control crews leamt the position of 
every valve so that they could be located blindfolded in the total darkness of a closed compartment 
below the waterline. Gun’s crews learnt to get off six broadsides in thirty seconds, on a rolling wet 
deck with another turret firing over there heads.
Towing warps were rigged and taken over to ‘damaged’ flotilla mates in sea boats under oars. Steer­
ing engines broke down. AH electrical circuits failed. The cypher officer lost his cypher books. The 
galley stove was put out of action. High pressure hoses knocked ammunition parties off their feet.
The ship’s boats fell off their davits. Heavy depth charges were manhandled flom ship to ship. Lad­
ders between decks went missing.
. ..Fire in the Transmitting Station. Fire Number One thrower set to shallow. Torpedo starboard! Lower the 
port seaboat. Rig scrambling nets. Clear lower deck, hoist the starboard whaler. Wire round the port screw.
Ship not answering her helm, - head paying off to starboard. Stream a fog buoy. Echo-sounding broken 
down, take a sounding with lead line and report the nature o f the bottom. Depth charge adrift on the port 
side aft. Doctor required for an emergency operation on another ship. Rum jars broached by a near miss, 
what’s your first action? Periscope to starboard. How far? Thirty yards. Open fire! Five rounds bearing green 
five-oh.. .And when you’ve done that lot and are climbing into your hammock -  Get out and do it again, but 
this time faster. You heard the pipe, get fell in .,.
For the young recruit who had just completed his three months’ shore training, it might have seemed 
that the instructors were being unnecessarily bloody-minded, but at this stage of the war there were 
enough people around who had seen and heard a tanker go up in a sheet of flame, or had been 
picked out of a freezing bog of oil fuel on a dark Atlantic night, to convince him that the effort was 
worthwhile.®^
By early 1943, with the convoy battles in the Atlantic and Arctic reaching a crescendo, To-
85 Baker ; 1972 p. 121.
86 Operation HAGGIS described in Bum : 1998 p. 192 fn. 17.
87 Bum : 1998 pp. 13-14.
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bermory was working at full capacity. That January, the Director of Anti-Submarine War­
fare noted that, while Fleet destroyers were working up at Scapa Flow and Western Ap­
proaches destroyers were working up at Londonderry;
Tobermory is the only working-up base available for new construction and recommissioned sloops, 
corvettes, trawlers, whalers and yachts and it is considered that, in general, these are in more need of 
concentrated working up than are destroyers.®®
Sloops and frigates were coming forward in large numbers, then destroyers began arriving 
at Tobermory due to a lack o f facilities at Londonderry and Scapa but a lack of berthing 
space and staff meant that Stephenson had to turn them away. As Stephenson wrote on 2 
February 1943,
If, for instance, Tobermory has a full complement of vessels working up, including trawlers and 
whalers, and a signal is received requesting that a destroyer be accepted for a week’s work up, West­
ern Isles has no option but to decline. This means that time, energy and space is being devoted to the 
working up of a trawler or whaler whose duties may be confined to escorting coastal convoys or the 
defence of Reykjavik harbour, in preference to a destroyer or corvette who may be required for the 
escort of ocean convoys, on the safe arrival of which out victory in this war is so largely dependent.®^
First Lord A. V. Alexander suggested cutting the training programme but the reaction of 
the Director of Minesweeping was typical. He wrote that he,
.. .would view with horror any relaxation of the already scanty training of A/S and M/S vessels.^
Stephenson suggested that Loch Lathaich on the Ross o f Mull some three miles east o f the 
Sound of Iona, already in use by Western Isles as an anchorage, should be developed with 
facilities ashore at Bunessan. While Tobermory could deal with 240 vessels annually, the 
addition o f Loch Lathaich would increase this to 350. But the scheme was abandoned in 
August 1943 when it was found that it would cost /[100,000 and take nine months to com­
plete. A former Coastal Forces establishment at Stornoway was about to be vacated and 
offered facilities in place. HMS Mentor^ the Stornoway base, commissioned on 14 Decem­
ber 1943 under Commander D. M. Cann whom Stephenson seconded from Tobermory. 
Mentor was mainly to work up corvettes and smaller craft, leaving Western Isles free to con­
centrate on corvettes, frigates and Western Approaches destroyers.
In addition to existing exercise areas west o f Mull, two new exercise areas, necessarily also 
submarine sanctuaries, were established in the Minch. Area A for daylight exercises lay be­
tween Stornoway and Lochinver and Area B for night exercises stretched south from 
Rubha Reidh into the Sound of Raasay. Here ships exercised their AA guns in close range 
work against kite targets towed by an ML, submarines acted as radar and asdic targets and
8® ADM 1 13255.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 There were teething problems at Mentor as, when the base commenced operations on HMS Pluc^ on 16 December, 
there was no Gunnery Officer, other key personnel had not arrived, only two obsolete radar sets were available for 
instruction and ammunition was in short supply. ADM 1 13255.
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MLs played the part o f E  boats.^^
As Coastal Command’s Sunderlands began operating from Lough Erne in Northern Ire­
land in 1941 and long-range, shore-based aircraft began operating from airfields in the 
Outer Hebrides in 1942, so RAF Oban was relegated increasingly to a training role. On 17 
May 1942 Wing Commander Tom Moseley met Stephenson at Tobermory to set up a pro­
gramme o f joint exercises involving aircraft from Oban and ships from Western Isles and 
Mentor. The first exercise took place two days later when 228 Squadron Sunderlands carried 
out radar approaches and dummy attacks on a submarine and escort vessels west o f lona.^^
The diminutive Stephenson was a larger than life character and his dynamism and eccen­
tricities are legendary, so perhaps it was inevitable that his personal achievements at To­
bermory would be overshadowed by anecdote. Western Isles and Mentor were in a difficult 
position in that, geographically at least, they came under Flag Officer Greenock, but in 
many respects Stephenson was directly responsible to the Director o f A /S Warfare at the 
Admiralty, and C-in-C Western Approaches. Stephenson used this to his advantage, gain­
ing a great deal o f independence as a result, but his unconventional, forthright approach 
exasperated fellow officers and often got him into hot water. '^^
At 2201/20 October 1944, Stephenson signalled C-in-C Western Approaches Max Horton: 
H1VIS Clover the thousandth vessel to be worked up at Tobermory sailed at 2200 today.
Horton replied:
Hearty congratulations on the thousandth vessel. T he unique methods o f  training employed and die 
high standards you have set have been o f  the utm ost value in defeating the U-boat and preserving the 
old traditions. HELEN OF TROY’s historic achievement was no greater although possibly gained with 
considerably less effort.^®
Mentor h&d to pay off on 15 November 1944 when the submarine sanctuaries in the Minch 
were closed after U boats began operating close inshore off the west o f Scotland.®*  ^ But 
training at Tobermory continued after the end o f the war in Europe with sloops and Bay 
class frigates being prepared for service in the Pacific. In all, 911 ships had passed through 
Western Isles by the time it closed, some o f them more than once. Start hay^ her crew the 
last o f 1,139 to work up at Western Isles, sailed on 30 September 1945 and the base paid off 
on 5 November. By that time Stephenson had gone, his departure marked by 560 signals of 
thanks from ships that had worked up at Tobermory and Stornoway.
92 Ibid.
93 Two months later, on 25 August 1942, Moseley died when a 228 Squadron Sunderland taking the Duke o f Kent
from Invergordon to Iceland crashed in Caithness. AU aboard the aircraft except for tail gunner Sergeant Andrew 
Jack were kiUed. AIR 15 656 for the joint exercises. AJier The Battle magazine no. 37 for the Sunderland crash.
94 ADM 1 12817 for successive interventions by Admirals Noble and Horton in 1942 and 1943 respectively.
95 ADM 1 13255.
96 The closure o f Mentor did not take place due to a faU-off in demand, as stated by Goldrick in his paper (Chapter 12 
Work Up) on Tobermory and other training in The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945 — 56<^> Anniversaiy International Naval 
Conference. Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (ed.s) published by Greenhill Books in 1994.
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Tobermory and Stornoway provided sea training designed to weld an escort’s crew into an 
effective fighting unit, and worked escorts together in groups under conditions as close as 
possible to those they were to meet with the convoys. Meanwhile, at Campbeltown, the 
A /S Training Flotilla based at HMS Nimrod gave officers and specialist ratings training in 
the use of asdic and radar equipment. The Nimrod syllabus was biased towards tactical A /S 
training in the most effective deployment o f sensor arrays and weapons systems and the 
Campbeltown training staff establishment at 49 officers and 442 ratings was considerably 
larger than that at T o b e rm o ry .In  late 1943, the Campbeltown fiotilla comprised 14 
vessels including the large, modern A /S  yacht Shemara, two elderly ex-French torpedo 
boats and several ancient trawlers. But the older vessels did not behave like modern 
escorts, having neither the turning circle, speed, acceleration or layout, and all but Sbemara 
and the yacht StModwen were fitted with obsolete A /S equipment. The older vessels were 
also unreliable, being defective as much as 60% of the time.^® The flotilla was re-equipped 
early in 1944 to include two destroyers fitted, like Sbemara and St Modwen, with Type 145 
asdics and up-to-date radar, and four corvettes. Six trawlers fitted with earlier Type 123 
and Type 127 asdics were retained for RN Patrol Service training.
A steady stream o f worked-up ships and trained personnel were coming forward from To­
bermory, Stornoway and Campbeltown, and escort and support groups based at Greenock, 
Londonderry and Liverpool were practising new tactics developed at sea and at the West­
ern Approaches Tactical Unit in Liverpool. From  late 1941 there was an ever-increasing 
emphasis on group training, that is training the escort group to operate as a team, all doing 
the same thing at the same time in response to an attack and with the minimum of sig­
nalled instructions. But, as we shall see later in this chapter, arguably the principal weapon 
in the A /S  armoury would always be air cover.
S c o t l a n d ’s P a r t  i n  B r e a k i n g  E n i g m a
As Sebag-Montefiore rightly points out in his book on Enigma, the cryptanalysts at 
Bletchley Park who broke the German Naval codes could have done little without the Brit­
ish seamen who, at great risk to themselves, captured manuals and codebooks. And, from 
February 1940, Naval forces based in Scotland played a central role in successive ‘pinches’ 
o f Enigma intelligence material.
97 The Tobetmoiy establishment was 230 all ranks. ADM 112918. ADM 113255.
98 Tliis meant that numerous extra engineering staff were required to keep the ships at sea, thus contributing to the 
high complement maintained at Campbeltown. The two French TBDs 1m  Cordelien and L,’Ineomprise, though 40% 
and 30% defective, still required 66 personnel each to keep them available for day running. This was at a time when, 
for example, Combined Operations was desperate for such personnel to man its assault craft and it was this need to 
release manpower that principally drove the decision to modernise the flotilla. ADM 1 12918.
99 Ibid.
too Sebag-Montefiore : 2000.
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U-33 was laying mines in the Clyde at 0300/12 February 1940 when lookouts in the mine­
sweeper Gleaner spotted her on the surface south o f Arran. Kapitanleutnant Hans von Dre- 
sky dived but Gleaner gained asdic contact and fired a pattern o f four depth charges. Von 
Dresky ordered \J-33 to the bottom and Lieutenant Commander Hugh Price in Gleaner 
turned figure eights overhead while the throwers were reloaded. At 0501/12 Gleaner 
dropped a pattern at slow speed and, at 0522/12, the badly damaged \3-33 was seen on the 
surface. Price ordered gun action and turned to ram in position 150° Pladda 4.& miles. Five 
rounds were fired then, at 0530/12, the U boat scuttled. Gleaneris boats rescued nine and 
the naval trawler Kingston picked up 22, o f  whom 20 later died. Fishing trawlers picked up 
ten, two of whom died. Survivors revealed that U-33*s first lay o f five mines had been 
completed near the Mull o f Kintyre.
Von Dresky, who did not survive, had distributed rotors for U-33's Enigma encyphering 
machine among his crew with orders that they be ditched when the sailors went over the 
side. But three rotors were discovered in the pocket o f one survivor and sent to Bletchley 
Park. U~33’s rotors gave British cryptanalysts the wiring pattern for two o f  the eight rotors 
used by Kreigsmarine signallers, but they did not provide the decisive breakthrough that 
would allow Naval Enigma to be read. Documents taken from the German patrol trawler 
Polares o ff Norway on 26 April 1940, and brought back to Scapa Flow, provided a limited 
break into Enigma, but a breakthrough would not come for almost a year^^i
During CLAYMORE, the March 1941 Combined Operations raid on the Lofoten Islands 
launched from Scotland and described in detail in Chapter Five, a boarding party from the 
destroyer Somali took Enigma settings for the Home Waters network valid for February 
1941 from the German trawler Krehbs. These allowed February messages to be decrypted, 
and, consequentially, the reconstruction o f the all-important bigram tables which indicated 
message settings to the recipient.
On 9 May 1941, in what has become arguably the most famous naval operation o f the war, 
U-flO was captured along with a complete Enigma and a treasure trove of supporting 
documents. U-110 sank under tow, but the hoard o f Enigma material, which filled two 
packing cases and included a full set o f bigram tables and an Offif<fer officer-only coding 
manual, was brought back to Scapa Flow on 12 May in the destroyer Bulldog. Meanwhile, 
on 10 May, three cruisers and four destroyers led by Admiral Holland in Edinburgh had 
sailed Scapa Flow for Operation EB, an expedition to capture the German weather- 
reporting trawler Miincben known to be operating north-east o f Iceland. The boarding 
party, once again from Somali, found manuals containing Home Waters rotor settings for
101 Pqi- Qleanei’% report, see ADM 199 371. A detailed account o f the sinking and the recovery o f the Enigma wheels is 
in Sebag-Montefiore 1 2000 ch. 6 The First Capture. See also Smith ; 1998 p. 82. Drummond : 1960. Kahn : 1991.
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June 1941. On 21 May Bismarck and Prin^Eugen sailed Bergen for the sortie that would lead 
to the destruction o f both Hood and Bismarck, then on 4 June, one o f Bismarckls supply 
ships, Gedania, was captured along with cypher material and brought back to Scapa Flow.
These captures, in particular that from the München, allowed Enigma messages to be read 
currently for the first time. In mid-June, however, new bigram tables were introduced. Ear­
lier tables, vital to the decryption process, had been reconstructed following the capture o f 
Enigma wheels from V-33 and Polares, but reconstructing the new 1941 tables would take 
time. A possible short cut would be to capture another weather trawler carrying the new 
tables, so Operation EC was mounted from Scapa Flow on 25 June 1941 by the cruiser N i­
geria and the destroyers Tartar, Bedouin and Jupiter. The target was Lauenhurg (344T) which 
had sailed Trondheim on the night o f 27-28 May to relieve the Sachsen. From the move­
ments o f her predecessors, it was deduced that she would be at sea at least until the end o f 
June and would thus be carrying Enigma settings for both June and July. Lauenhur^s sig­
nals were monitored and showed that, obligingly, she was maintaining a steady position 
near Jan Mayen Island. Then, in thick fog on 28 June, D /F  bearings from Tartar and a 
home station brought the EC force within sight o f her. Nigeria opened fire with 6” practice 
rounds and the trawler's crew took to their boats as the second salvo landed. A boarding 
party from Tartar searched the trawler, then she was sunk to avoid the possibility of her 
capture becoming known to the enemy. Among what Sebag-Montefiore describes as a, 
‘mass o f charts and signalling papers,’ were found the hoped for Enigma plug, rotor and 
ring settings. Taken together with previous pinches, the haul from Lauenhurg allowed 
Bletchley Park to read naval messages almost concurrently until the end o f July 1941, and 
time to reconstruct the all-important new bigram tables. '^^^
New bigram tables were introduced in November 1941, but, by a happy coincidence, 
Combined Operations were planning two Commando raids from Scotland against the coast 
o f Norway, Operations ANKLET and ARCHERY. These raids are described in detail in 
Chapter Five, but before they sailed Scapa at the end of December 1941, a Naval Intelli­
gence team was attached to the ARCHERY force in the hope of finding the new bigram ta­
bles. A small convoy was discovered in Ulvesund and, under fire from enemy troops 
ashore, the boarding party left the destroyer Onslow bound for the armed traWler convoy 
escort Eohn. The trawler’s commanding officer was shot dead from Onslow in the act of 
throwing confidential books over the side, but a complete set o f the new bigram tables was 
found in his cabin along with five Enigma rotors. Also during ARCHERY, the destroyer Offa 
captured a complete Enigma machine and another set o f bigram tables from the armed
102 Sebag-Montefiore : 2000. Naval Intelligence report dated 19 June 1941 on iMuenburg ki ADM 223 2. Winton : 1988 
p. 182. Smith : 1998.
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trawler Donner. Meanwhile, further north, during ANKLET, another Enigma machine, bi­
gram tables, rotors and coding manuals were captured from the trawler Geier by a party 
from the destroyer Ashanti
A fourth rotor was introduced to the Triton net used by the Atlantic U boats in February 
1942 and this led to blackout that lasted until the end o f the year when it was broken using 
material taken from D-559 but, as Sebag-Montefiore writes:
The captures made during Operations ANKLET and ARCHERY helped to usher in a golden period for 
the Bletchley Park codebreakers. The H om e Waters Naval Enigma settings used by Germany’s sur­
face ships, and by the U  boats in the Arctic, were broken every day for the rest o f  the w ar.. .It was a 
codebreaking feat which was to save countless lives, especially in  the Arctic.**^
Since the publication of the The Ultra Secret (Winterbotham : 1976) and the mass o f titles 
that have followed, the Bletchley Park codebreakers have acquired almost mythical status 
being, in the eyes of some, almost single-handedly responsible for the Allied victory. But 
this has disguised the fact that Allied decryption successes were actually achieved through 
a partnership between Bletchley Park and the Royal Navy. And naval units operating from 
in Scotland played a central role in securing the vital intelligence and hardware that led to 
the breakthroughs in 1941 and 1942.
It would be quite wrong, however, to present the timeous decryption of German naval 
messages as the decisive factor in winning the Battle of The Atlantic. Many factors com­
bined to bring about the defeat o f the U boats, but Professor Rohwer deduced that, be­
tween June and December 1941, some 300 Allied merchant ships were saved by decrypt- 
derived intelligence which allowed effective evasive routeing.^o® This may be something o f 
an exaggeration, but the loss o f anything approaching that number o f additional mer­
chantmen would have significantly slowed the Allied build-up in Britain and had a knock- 
on effect on wider military operations. And, as wiU be seen in Chapter Six, decrypt-derived 
intelligence did much to ensure the success o f Allied naval operations in northern waters, 
notably in the sinking of Schamhorstm December 1943. There were blackouts when Home 
Waters Enigma could not be read, or only read after a considerable delay, but a powerful 
example o f the value of the Scottish ‘pinches’ lies in the diversion o f the Arctic convoy 
P Q I2 away from the German battle group led by the Tirpitti in March 1942. Sadly, one 
blackout would coincide with the sailing o f the ill-fated PQ I 7 that July.
Sebag-Montefiote : 2000 pp. 185-197.
104 Ibid p. 198.
105 Yhe Operational Use of Ultra in the Battle of the Atlantic. Paper by Dr. Jurgen Rohwer for tlie Medlicott Symposium, 
Edinburgh 1985 p. 19 ref. 2.
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C o a s t a l  C o m m a n d ’s U  B o a t  W a r  f r o m  S c o t l a n d
As noted in Chapter One, Coastal Command went to war in 1939 hopelessly ill-equipped 
for the range o f tasks it was presented with. Saddled with largely obsolete aircraft and a 
failed procurement programme, Coastal also spent much o f the war playing second fiddle 
to Bomber Command’s insatiable appetite for the latest equipment. But, as Buckley writes, 
Coastal was not initially expected to play a major role in the U boat war as the Admiralty 
held the view that Asdic and convoy would suffice to protect trade and the Air Staff 
wanted to concentrate on developing its heavy bomber force.
The efficiency o f the few remotely modern operational aircraft and trained aircrew avail­
able in 1939 would be dramatically increased by radar, but the early ASV sets in service 
from January 1940 were scarce in number and, while they had a nominal range o f 12 miles, 
they were only really capable of detecting large vessels at a range o f up to four miles in fa­
vourable conditions. The much improved centimetric LRASV mk. I ll  set, capable o f de­
tecting a convoy at 40 miles, and a surfaced U boat at 12 miles, was delayed until 1943, in 
no small measure due to Bomber Command’s insistence that the landplane version, HzS, 
should have priority. And even if they did find a target, until 1942 Coastal’s A /S weaponry 
was wholly inadequate, most o f its aircraft only carrying the useless 1001b Cooper bomb. 
One o f  these, dropped in error, hit a British submarine, the total damage amounting to 
four burst light bulbs.
Between September 1939 and May 1940, Coastal Command aircraft reported 102 U boat 
sightings and carried out 72 attacks, though, as the staff history acknowledges, many sight­
ings, particularly in the early days, were ‘extremely d o u b t f u l . B u t ,  from the first, and de­
spite manifest shortcomings in aircraft, weaponry and training, Coastal exercised a dispro­
portionate influence over the trade war, at least during the hours o f  daylight. From the 
moment when, on 31 July 1940, a Sunderland from Oban arrived over convoy OBI 91, 
forcing U-P9 to break off its attack, and time and again thereafter, the arrival o f aircraft 
over a convoy was enough to force a U boat to submerge, thus denying it speed and ma­
noeuvrability and rendering it vulnerable to attack by the escorts. From late 1940, this led 
Donitz to move the U boat operational area gradually westwards, away from the North 
Channel where a concentration o f U boat activity would have proved most effective.
But the Admiralty remained greatly concerned at the lack of resources being made available 
to Coastal Command. Coastal’s Air Officer Commanding wrote on 16 July 1940 o f the
A ir  Tower and the Battle of the Atlantic 1939-45. Paper by John Buckley Journal of Contemporary Tiistoy\o\. 28 (1993). 
187 The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945 — 56'  ^Anniversary International Naval Conference. Ch. 20 Allied Land-hased Anti­
submarine Warfare p. 373. Also Terraine : 1985 pp. 401-457.
108 AIR 41 73 p. 377 appendix III.
109 ADM 199 372. AIR 27 1298
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need for an immediate increase in strength of three flying boat squadrons, one general re­
connaissance squadron and two long-range fighter squadronsd^® The Whitleys o f 102 
Squadron had been lent from Bomber Command for A /S duties over the North Western 
Approaches in September 1940, but had been reclaimed by Bomber Command on 8 Octo­
ber, just as the U boat war was beginning in earnest. Not including 16 Group covering the 
Channel and southern North Sea, Coastal Command’s order of battle on 1 November 1940 
(Scottish bases shown in red) demonstrates how particularly its Sunderlands, the only long 
range aircraft it possessed, had been concentrated to cover the northern exit from the 
North Sea and the North Western Approaches:"^
15 Group JHQ, P lym outh .
Heston
i St Eval
Mount Batten
Pembroke Dock
Carew Cheriton 
' Aldergrqve
PRU _______
217 Squadron 
236 Squadron /BJFl^tTRlJ.
Spit fire/H udson  
A nson/Beaufort
10 Squadron RAAF (part pQ
209 Squadron (part o£)
Limavady 
H ooton Park 
Oban
321 (Dutch) Squadron 
502 Squadron (part of) 
224 Squadron (part oQ 
i  48 Squadron (part o f) 
236 Squadron (part of) 
502 Squadron (part oQ 
48 Squadron (part o f )_  
_rip_Squadron_______
Blenheim
Spitfire/Hudson
Of)  ^ J Sunderland
Lerwick
Anson
A nson/W hitley
Hudson
Anson
Blenheim
Whitley
Anson
Stanraer
) 10 Squadron RAAF (part of) 
I 201 Squadron (part o f)
I 240 Squadron
209 Squadron (part of) _
IPort Ellen ! 48 Squadron (part o fj
I Sunderland 
I Sunderland 
I Sunderland 
Stranraer 
I Lerwick 
Anson
18 Group H Q , Pitreavie C astle
Sullom Voe
Sumburgh
Wick
Leuchars
Stornoway
Thornaby
Kaldarnes
Gibraltar
201 Squadron (part of)_
204 Squadron
700 Squadron FAA (part of) 
248 Squadron 
42 Squadron
269 Squadron
A Flight PRU
612 Squadron (part of)
254 Squadron
233 Squadron
_ _ 2 2 4  Squadron (part_of) 
^ 20  (Dujchj Squadron 
612 Squadron (part of)
220 Squadron
608 Squadron
98 Squadron
202 Squadron
Sunderland
Sunderland
Walrus
Blenheim
Beaufort
J ludson  
Spitfire/H udson
Anson
Blenheim
Hudson
Hudson
Hudson (in training)
_Anson
Hudson
A nson/Botha
Rattle _
London
Source; AIR 41 73
Including 16 Group, Coastal had seven flying boat squadrons with 36 aircraft, 22 general 
reconnaissance squadrons with 402 aircraft and one and a half squadrons comprising 12
119 The Sunderland had a still-air endurance o f 1,700 miles, or approximately 12.4 hours, at its economical cruising 
speed of 137 knots. AIR 41 73 p. 372.
Ill Ibid. appendix 1.
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aircraft lent by the Fleet Air Arm. Average serviceability from this total o f 450 aircraft 
was, however, just 14 flying boats and 196 o f all other types."^
First Lord A. V. Alexander wrote on 4 November 1940 that Coastal Command’s strength 
should be, ‘nearer to 1,000 aircraft in operation at the earliest possible moment.’"® In 
March 1941, the Blenheims o f 53 and 59 Squadrons, which had been lent from Bomber 
Command to patrol the N orth Sea in June 1940, thus allowing Coastal to reinforce its 
squadrons covering the North Western Approaches and the Bay of Biscay, were perma­
nently t r a n s f e r r e d .  1^ 4 Long range, and subsequently very long range, aircraft would become 
available from mid-1941 onwards, but initially only in penny packets. It has been argued by 
Buckley and others that tlie Atlantic Gap could have been closed by mid-1942 had aircraft 
been diverted in sufficient numbers from the bombing campaign, yet;
Despite the near total disaster of 1940-41, when Britain came closest to losing the war because of the
Batde of the Atlantic, the Air Staff, backed by Churchill, continued to refuse Coastal Command the
aircraft it needed to maintain its defence of British trade."®
To ‘British trade,’ Buckley might have added the military build-up in Britain that would have 
to take place ahead o f an invasion o f Europe, but, for Churchill, Portal and others, among 
them many influential Americans, Coastal Command aircraft were merely being used defen­
sively. Arthur Harris, single-minded and stubborn in his advocacy o f strategic bombing, be­
lieved that wars should not be fought defensively. Indeed Harris, who took over at Bomber 
Command in February 1942, famously held that he could win the war by bombing alone and 
that Coastal was, ‘An obstacle to victory.’"^ This was all very well, but if the Allies were to 
win the wider war, they must first hold the line in the Battle o f the Atlantic.
The British, and subsequently Allied, strategic bombing campaign was, as Jones suggests, 
‘an emotional certainty,’ in part as a response to the Luftwaffe blitz on British cities, and in 
part because it was the sole means by which, between 1941 and 1944, the war could be car­
ried into Germany."^ But Professor Jones presents the debate over equipment allocation 
between Bomber and Coastal Commands as polarised, when it was really a question o f de­
gree. As Price points out, three squadrons totalling around 40 VLR aircraft, ‘would have 
gone — and later did go — a long way towards nullifying the threat to convoys in mid- 
Atlantic.’ After all, it was far from uncommon for Bomber Command to lose that many 
aircraft, and more, in a single night over Germany.
112 Ibid.
"5 Alexander quoted in Air Historical Board Narrative The RAF in the Maritime Warvol, 2 Home Waters September 1939 
to June 1940. AIR 41 73. Buckley : 1995 p. 120.
"4 Ibid.
"5 Buckley : 1995 p. 115.
"6 Terraine : 1985 p. 426.
"7 Jones : 1978 p. 388.
"8 Price : 1980 pp. 54-58 and p. 78.
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While it had a vital anti-shipping role from its Scottish bases (which is examined in Chap­
ter Six), Coastal Command’s principal task throughout the war remained countering the U 
boat threat to trade. One o f its first units to take up a war station was 209 Squadron at 
RAF Oban early in October 1939, though Oban was a backwater for the first nine months 
o f the war, and the base saw little action. This was just as well as, with its two Stranraers 
and two Lerwicks subject to constant breakdowns and a chronic shortage o f spare parts, 
serviceability ran at less than 50%.
The enemy’s arrival on the Channel coast meant that the Atlantic convoy route had to be 
moved north. This led to a reorganisation o f Coastal Command and, on 17 July 1940 RAF 
Oban passed from 18 Group to 15 Group. New aircraft arrived that same day when 210 
Squadron replaced 209 Squadron, and complement rose to two Lerwicks, four Stranraers 
and, most importantly, six Sunderlands. Further reinforcements in the form of the Sunder­
lands 10 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, arrived on 30 July.
Operations over the North Western Approaches had begun in earnest on 16 July with a 
search for the U boat that sank a tanker from HX55 west o f the Hebrides. On 18 July a 
Sunderland attacked a possible U boat and, on 16 August, a 210 Squadron Sunderland en­
gaged a Kondor over the convoy lane, returning to Oban with battle damage. Two days 
later, another 210 Squadron Sunderland escorting OA198 west o f the Hebrides and search­
ing for survivors from a sunken merchantman sighted a U boat. Depth charges and bombs 
blew the U boat onto its side, and a kill was claimed. U-51 survived only to be sunk by the 
British submarine Cachalot vsx the Bay o f Biscay while trying to make L o r i e n t .
On 2 August 1940, a Sunderland forced U-99 to break off its attack on OBI 91, on 12 Au­
gust a Sunderland sighted a U boat close to HX52 off Islay and directed destroyers to the 
spot. The arrival o f a Sunderland over SC2 early on 7 September helped break up the at­
tack on that hard-pressed convoy. On 25 September, two Oban Sunderlands were respon­
sible for one o f the most famous air-sea rescues o f the war, sighting, dropping supplies to, 
and guiding rescue ships to 46 survivors from the evacuee ship City of B e n a r e s On 17 Oc­
tober 1940 a Sunderland from Oban escorting the beleaguered SC7, depth charged U-48, 
forcing it to dive, then guided the sloops Scarborough and Fowej in for further, albeit unsuc­
cessful, attacks. SC7 was decimated, and Oban aircraft played a vital role in the rescue o f 
survivors, but at least one U boat had been forced away from the convoy .^22
U-32 was bombed off the North Channel on 29 October, then escaped only to be sunk by
"9 AIR 27 1293. AIR 28 615. AIR 28 618.
120 AIR 28 615. AIR 27 1298. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997.
121 AIR 27 1298. ADM 199 371.
122 ADM 199 121 ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377.
North Western Approaches
destroyers the following e v e n i n g A ^ s  Sunderland B/210 attacked a U boat, probably U-104, 
in the Atlantic convoy lane at 0930/19 November, but the depth charge failed to explode 
as the U boat crash-dived. It seems probable that this was the same U boat claimed as sunk 
by the corvette Rhododendron during an attack on OB244 two days la t e r .’ 4^ Then, in a tragic 
end to 1940, all but one o f the 12 aboard a 210 Squadron aircraft died when it crashed on 
landing at Oban on 27 December after hitting a horsebox from the wreck o f the steamer 
Breda, bombed and sunk nearby four days earher.i^s
At 1044/6 January 1941 the steamer Empire Thunder (5,965T) in OB269 was torpedoed and 
sunk by U-124 some 180 miles west o f Cape Wrath. HX99 was diverted clear o f the area 
and a 210 Squadron Sunderland left from Oban to search for survivors. Thirty survivors 
were picked up by an escort, but the Sunderland sighted a U boat on the surface thirty 
miles to the east. Two depth charges were dropped and a large steel plate was thrown into 
the air from the crash-diving submarine. The damaged Italian U boat Marcello was sunk 
shortly afterwards by HMS MontgomeiyT^^
Operational control of Coastal Command passed to the Admiralty on 17 February 1941 
with the opening o f the new Western Approaches Command Headquarters at Derby 
House in Liverpool, a move that reflected the change from the pre-war orientation towards 
the North Sea to the Atlantic. As Richards writes:
...a strong force was concentrated in the north-west under 15 Group. The effect was almost instan­
taneous, In April the U boats began withdrawing to mid-Atlantic. By June they were scoring nine- 
tenths of theic successes beyond the limits of our air patrols. So profound a transformation was, of 
course not merely a change of battleground. To reach their new patrol areas the U boats to spend far 
longer on patrol, and when they got there they found no such wealth of targets as in the narrower 
waters nearer home.*^ ?
The first Coastal Command squadron o f five VLR Liberator mk. 1 aircraft, 120 Squadron, 
formed at Nutts Corner in County Antrim in June 1941. These aircraft were stripped and 
lightened to give them a range o f 2,300 miles at 4,000 feet, though it would be some 
months before they were operational, and even longer before they acquired effective ASV 
radar and weaponry. With shipping losses in the North Western Approaches running at 
perilously high levels in October 1940, a series o f meetings had led to the development of 
the more effective ASV mk. 2 set, aerial depth charges and wireless sets that allowed inter­
communication between air and surface e s c o r t s . ^ ^ s  Throughout 1941, however. Coastal 
Command remained critically short of aircraft, not least because, as Terraine notes, ‘six
123 ADM 199 1159.
124 AIR 27 1298. AIR 28 615. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 1139.
125 AIR 28 615.
126 ADM 199 397. ADM 199 658. Rohwer : 1999. The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939-1945 - Naval Staff 
History, Second World War CB3304 appendix 2.IV.
127 The Royal AirFotre 1939-1945 vol. 1 The Fight at Odds Desm Richards (ed.) p. 344.
128 Ibid. p. 271.
I l7
North Western Approaches
Stirlings could be manufactured with the same effort as three S u n d e r l a n d s . I n  October 
1941 Churchill, perhaps kite-flying but more probably demonstrating a woeful ignorance 
of maritime air power, suggested transferring some 60 Whitley and Wellington aircraft 
from Coastal to Bomber Command, citing the fact that U boats were confining their activi­
ties to, ‘more distant waters,’ without seeming to understand why this was so. And all this 
was against the background of ingrowing U boat menace."® One o f the most powerful advo­
cates o f the continued existence o f Coastal Command was First Sea Lord Dudley Pound.
Advances in training, weaponry and technology began to improve Coastal’s performance 
against U boats from mid-1942. On the afternoon of 15 September 1942, Whitley Q /58  
sighted U-261 on the surface in a rough sea 150 miles north-west o f Cape Wrath in 5949N 
0928W. Sergeant Snell approached through cloud and dropped three depth charges from 
just 20 feet, one hitting the conning tower and, when the explosions subsided, the bows of 
the U boat were sticking up out o f the water. More depth charges were dropped and it 
sank leaving debris in a large patch o f oü."^
Every newly commissioned U boat outbound from Norway for its first patrol had to pass 
through the so-called Northern Transit Area between Iceland and Shetland and the need to 
stretch the land-based air cover westwards to meet that from Iceland led to the develop­
ment of airfields for long range aircraft in the Outer Hebrides. In July 1942, 206 Squadron 
arrived at RAF Benbecula and re-equipped with American Flying Fortresses to begin a se­
ries o f  FLORA patrols which interlocked with PORT patrols being flown out o f Icelan d ." ^  
On 27 October 1942, Flying Officer Cowey o f 206 Squadron was escorting SC105 south o f 
Iceland when he sank U-627 and, on 15 January 1943, Fortress G /206 attacked U-632 
south o f Iceland but did no damage. Again south o f Iceland, on 3 February 1943, a 220 
Squadron Fortress sank U-265 and, on 9 February, a 206 Squadron Fortress escorting 
SCI 18 damaged U-614 which was shadowing the convoy."®
In February 1943, while ordinary long-range aircraft were available in greater numbers for 
the Bay o f Biscay, there was still just one squadron o f VLR Liberators. Bomber Command 
had all but rejected the Liberator, thus making it the only aircraft Coastal Command could 
hope to get in numbers, but now Coastal was up against both the US Navy and Air Force 
who needed aircraft for the Pacific. In its efforts to secure increased allocations o f aircraft
129 Terraine 1985 p. 411.
130 Ibid.
131 U-261 was on her first war patrol and had left Kiel on 8 /9 /42. Franks : 1995. Wynn : 1997.
132 AIR 41 48.
133 At 1030/9 Fortress Mk.HA L/206 FK195 on patrol in support o f SCI 18 sighted tlie destroyer Vimy with corvette 
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from America, Coastal even attempted subterfuge, suggesting that the aircraft should first 
be sent to Canada in an effort to disguise their eventual destination from the Americans. 
This idea was dropped as it would inevitably lead to trouble.
From its introduction with 59 Squadron in August 1942, the American B 17 
Fortress, like the Liberator a Bomber Command reject, proved effective on 
Long Range, though not Very Long Range, Coastal Command patrols.
Coastal Command patrols over the Northern Transit Area were sparse during early March, 
partly due to Iceland-based aircraft being preoccupied with convoy battles in mid-Atlantic 
and partly to 18 Group concentrating on anti-shipping sweeps along the Norwegian coast."® 
Patrols from Benbecula by 15 Group’s 206 Squadron continued and but only four o f the 24 
U boats known to have transited the Northern Transit Area during March 1943 were sighted. 
U-384 was sunk south-west of Iceland on 19 March by Fortress B/206. L/206 attacked a U 
boat unsuccessfully on 25 March and, at 1130/27 March, the same aircraft manned by a dif­
ferent crew depth-charged a U boat in 6054N 1525W. The U boat was seen to heel over to 
starboard, submerge, and then reappear bow high. More depth charges were dropped, and, as 
men could be seen scrambling out o f the conning tower, it went down. Flying Officer Sam­
uel reported, '...hke a dose o f Eno's*. U-169 had been outbound to join the Seewulf group 
and all 54 o f her crew were lost. At 1730/24 April, D /206 escorting ONS5 sighted U-710 at 
periscope depth in 6130N 201OW. Flying Officer Cowey wrote:
We were flying in clear conditions and saw the U boat fuUy surfaced som e ten miles away. We dived 
immediately to the attack, expecting the craft to crash-dive before w e reached it. However, it re­
mained on the surface and opened fire on us. This was something o f  a surprise, as at that time we 
had not heard o f  U boats behaving in this way. Fortunately we were not hit and were able to con­
tinue our attack. There was ample evidence o f  a successful kill My rear gunner saw the U boat rise 
out o f  the water vertically and then sink, leaving much debris and about 25 survivors in the water.
W e were unable to do anything about them as, by this time, the weather at out hom e base had closed 
in and we were diverted to Iceland as w e were also a little short o f  fuel.i®^
The ratio o f sightings to U boats traversing the Northern Transit Area improved in April,
134 a ir  41 48.
135 Ibid. p. 143.
136 Franks : 1995.
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18 sightings being made o f 21 boats known to have passed through, mainly by Hudsons 
from Iceland. Then, in May 1943, the U boat packs were withdrawn from the Atlantic, thus 
permitting an increase in patrols over the Northern Transit Area. R/206 sank U-417 south­
east o f Iceland on 11 June with all 47 hands, but the Fortress was forced to ditch after one 
o f her starboard engines was shot away. The first attempt at rescue o f its crew went badly 
wrong when an American Catalina from Iceland hit a wave while attempting a landing in 
very bad weather. The Americans’ dinghy drifted away, but food and water were dropped 
to the RAF dinghy on 14 June and the survivors in that were picked up by a 190 Squadron 
Catalina from Sullom Voe. The American dinghy was found two days later, but only one 
man survived when picked up by a US destroyer.
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As with other maritime operations in Northern Waters, Coastal Command’s war 
against U boats in the Northern Transit Area was almost wholly dependent on the 
availability of Scottish bases.
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U boats had begun sailing for the Atlantic in groups via the Northern Transit Area and the 
Bay of Biscay. The first group o f three, the Monsun Gruppe, was sighted in the Northern 
Transit Area by a Hudson from Iceland and two o f their number were sunk, one, U-194, 
by a 120 Squadron Liberator from Ulster. In response to the group sailings, new Coastal 
Command patrol patterns, CATSPAW 1 between Iceland and the Faroe Islands and 
CATSPAW 2 between Scotland and the Faroe Islands, concentrated on known passage 
routes. The loss o f two Monsun boats and the increase in air patrols between Iceland and 
Norway forced the cancellation o f further U boat sailings via the Northern Transit Area 
until the end o f July 1943."®
THE MOORINGS patrol area between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, instituted on 6 July 1943, 
was a refinement o f the CATSPAW l  patrol based on known sightings and it was planned that, 
in this area and when available, destroyers would cooperate with aircraft. THE MOORINGS 
was subdivided into six strips running north-west to south-east to which aircraft from Ice­
land or Scotland were allocated. The destroyers Onslow, Opportune, Obdurate and Orwell took 
part in Operation SF, the first joint operation in THE MOORINGS, between 10 July and 19 July 
1943, but no U boat was sighted."^
There were other sinkings in the North Western Approaches by Coastal Command aircraft 
based outwith Scotland, among them U-489 depth charged and sunk south o f the Faroe Is­
lands on 4 August 1943 by a Sunderland o f 423 Squadron from Lough Erne."® Late on 10 
February 1944 a Wellington o f 612 Squadron based at Limavady sighted U-545 west o f the 
Butt of Lewis and straddled her with depth charges. U-545, which had been part of the Igel 1 
Gruppe south-east o f Iceland, was heavily damaged in the attack and unable to move, so an­
other Igel 1 boat, U-714, took off her crew, then U-545 was scuttled."^
From mid-May 1944, as there had been a clear reduction in U boat activity in the Atlantic, 
and with D Day looming, much o f Coastal Command’s strength was concentrated in the 
southern North Sea, Channel and Biscay areas. Meanwhile, off Norway, a reconnaissance 
line o f 21 U boats, the Mitte Gruppe, was stationed against the possibility o f an Allied land­
ing. Only five o f the Mitte boats were equipped with the schnorchel breathing apparatus so 
the rest were highly vulnerable during the long summer daylight hou rs." ^
On the morning o f 16 May 1944, a 330 (Norwegian) Squadron Sunderland from Sullom 
Voe sank U-240 west o f  Kristiansund North. The aircraft was badly damaged by return 
fire, and one crewman was killed, but returned safely. Two days later, a 210 Squadron
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Catalina, also from Sullom Voe, sank U-241 west o f Stadlandet. Leucliars-based Mosqui­
toes and Woodhaven-based CataMnas o f 333 (Norwegian) Squadron were also operating 
against Mitte boats and U-668, one o f a pair o f outbound boats, was surprised on surface at 
0007/18 May by Catalina C/333. The aircraft was seriously damaged and one o f the blister 
gunners killed. Lieutenant Hartmann had to drive the sinking Catalina straight onto the 
beach on returning to Woodhaven. The U boat put in to Skjommenfjord the following 
day."® U-476 was damaged by a 210 Squadron Catalina on 18 May and had to be scuttled 
o ff Trondheim, her crew being picked up by V-990A^ Also on 24 May, a Sunderland o f  4 
OTU sank U-675 west o f Trondheim and, on 27 May, Liberator S /59 Squadron sank U- 
292 o ff Trondheim.145
Thirteen Mitte boats sailed between 8 and 10 June and, on 11 June, U-980 was sunk north­
west of Alesund by a Canso o f 162 Squadron RCAF."® Mosquito H /333 shot up and dam­
aged U-290 on 14 June, then, on 16 June, U-998 was damaged by rockets and cannon fire 
from the same Mosquito north-west o f Bergen. U-804 was sent to U-998^s assistance but 
was herself attacked by Mosquito R/333 which strafed the conning tower, injuring eight 
crewmen. U-804 and U-998 put into Bergen on 17 June. '^*  ^ On 24 June a 162 Squadron 
Canso engaged U-1225 on the surface north-west o f Bergen. Four depth charges straddled 
the boat and sank it but the aircraft was hit by return fire and forced to ditch."® Liberator 
N /86  from Tain sank U-317 on 26 June and Catalina C/333 attacked but missed U-478 
some 100 miles north o f Shetland on 28 June, just as Catalina Q /210 was damaging U-396 
some sixty miles to the north-west, forcing her to return to Bergen. V-478 was sunk north­
east o f the Faroes on the evening o f 30 June by Canso A /162 and Liberator E /86."^
Coastal Command’s success against the Mitte Gruppe led to the recall o f all but six U boats 
from this patrol. Eight o f the older type VII boats were laid up and their crews transferred 
to the new type XXI and XXIII boats.^ ®® By then, it was clear that the Allied advance in 
France would soon force U boats out o f their Biscay bases. As predicted, U boats began 
concentrating on Norwegian bases in September 1944 and operations were increasingly 
concentrated on coastal waters around Britain, particularly in focal points for shipping. 
The j'f/6»on’/j>^/-equipped U-247 heading for the Butt o f Lewis was one o f the first boats out.
143 Pof the Mitte Gruppe see The U boat War in the Atlantic HMSO vol. 3 pp. 55-56, 59 and 69. See also Padfield ; 1985 p. 
424. For 333 Squadron, see AIR 27 1731 and Wynn : 1998.
144 U-990 was sunk by a 59 Squadron Liberator west o f Trondheim on 5 June. Fifty-one survivors from both crews 
were picked up by V-5901. Wynn : 1998 p. 207. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 415.
145 XJ-675 and U-292 both carried crews o f 51 and all were lost Wynn : 1998. Roskill ; 1960 voL p. 261.
146 Flight Lieutenant Sherman was immediately awarded a DFC on his return to Wick, Two days later, again on patrol 
from Wick, his crew reported a U boat, then were never heard from again.
147 jJ-998 was in such a bad way that she had to be scrapped. AIR 27 1731. AIR 41 74. Wynn : 1997.
146 Two airmen had died by the time they were picked up by an HSL 21 hours later. Flight Lieutenant Homell was 
awarded a posthumous VC. The five survivors were awarded one DSO, two DFC and one DFM. Wynn : 1998.
149 Around 30 seamen were seen swimming, but ah 52 aboard U-478 were lost AIR 41 74. Wynn : 1998.
150 BdU KTB quoted In AIR 41 74.
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But passages were slow as, armed with excellent and early intelligence o f enemy move­
ments, Coastal Command responded by giving close air support to shipping in danger ar­
eas, flying patrols over areas where U boats were known to be operating and patrolling the 
Northern Transit Area which gave access to the Atlantic from Norway. From 27 June, all 
U boats on Mitte patrol, in the Northern Transit Area and off British shores were ordered 
to submerge by day and only schnorchelhy night, thus greatly slowing their progress.
To meet the increased U boat threat in the north, a gradual reinforcement o f 18 Group, 
which included the transfer o f Scottish airfields to Coastal Command, had began early in 
July 1944, with the arrival of 206 Squadron Liberators at Leuchars and detachments o f 59 
and 120 Liberators Squadrons at Tain. While some aircraft were subsequently transferred 
back to 15 and 19 Groups to deal with attempted U boat incursions to the South Western 
Approaches, Coastal Command’s U boat war would now principally be fought in the area 
bounded by Shetland, Iceland and Norway, and controlled from the Combined HQ at 
Pitreavie. And, in a move presaged by the patrols in THE MOORINGS in 1943, Western Ap­
proaches Command allocated surface Support Groups to Pitreavie to work with aircraft. 
By the end o f 1944, 18 Group had eight squadrons with 107 aircraft to cover the Northern 
Transit Area and inshore patrols around Scotland. For convoy escort duty and A /S patrols 
around Ireland and west o f the Hebrides, 15 Group had seven squadrons with a total of 
111 aircraft. And, with the largest volume o f ocean traffic by then restored to the South 
Western Approaches, 19 Group covering this area had lOVz squadrons with 147 aircraft.
[7-77/, inbound from Mitte duty, was unsuccessfully attacked off Bergen by Liberator 
Q /206 on 13 July, then, off Bergen at 0900/15 July, U-317 was attacked by Liberator 
E/206. Both aircraft and U boat were lost in this action at a total cost o f 60 lives. U-299 
was damaged by R/206 that same night, then Mosquito L/333 strafed and damaged U-994, 
again off Bergen and, on 18 July, K /333 damaged U-286 close inshore o ff Stadlandet. With 
the vulnerability of the Mitte boats all too clear, BdU bowed to the inevitable and began 
withdrawing the patrols. Three non-Mitte U boats, U-863, U-244 and U-865 were also dam­
aged by patrols from Scotland in July, the first two by 333 Squadron Mosquitoes from 
Leuchars, the latter by an 86 Squadron Liberator from Tain.
Unable in 1955 to give credit for its efficiency to Enigma decrypts, the staff history notes:
Considering that, during July, only 18 U  boats were at sea in N o. IB Group’s area, it speaks well for 
the efficiency o f  air patrol that ten o f  them were sighted and eight attacked resulting in one being 
sunk and six damaged sufficiently to com pel a return to harbour. Only one U  boat (U-8SS) cleared 
through into tire Atlantic.^®®
151 A daily run of 30-40 miles was average under schnorchel conditions. AIR 41 74 p. 19.
152 AIR 41 74 pp. 192-193.
153 Ibid. p. 55.
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Further reinforcements to 18 Group in August 1944 included 311 (Czech) Liberator 
Squadron moved to Tain, 422 and 423 Squadron Sunderlands to Sullom Voe along with a 
detachment of 202 Squadron’s Catalinas. The Wellingtons o f 407 Squadron moved to Wick 
while 162’s Cansos went to Iceland, and 58 Halifax Squadron moved to Stornoway. During 
August, some 4,373 hours were flown in the northern area, but only nine U boats were 
sighted, six were attacked and one was damaged. One aircraft. Mosquito E /333, was lost.
By 31 August, eight U boats had passed through the Northern Transit Area unscathed, and 
another 11 were then passing through. The schnorchel was proving its worth in open waters, 
particularly now that U boat crews were learning how to use it in relatively bad weather. 
Meanwhile, BdU’s response to the Normandy invasion had been a costly and demoralising 
failure for its increasingly inexperienced crews. Nineteen U boats were lost in the English 
Channel and 16 in the Bay of Biscay by the end of August when the Biscay bases, and 
Channel operations were abandoned."'^ But the schnorchel allowed BdU to place U boats 
close inshore off the Scottish coast, into the area patrolled jointly by Coastal’s aircraft and 
the Navy’s Support Groups under the Combined FIQ at Pitreavie.
T h e  S c h n o r c h e l  a n d  t h e  e n d  o f  S c o t l a n d ’s U  b o a t  W a r
Sufficient schnorchel boats were coming forward by the end o f August to mount patrols 
north o f the Minch, in the North Channel and in the Moray Firth."® First in this new series 
and one o f the first boats equipped with schnorchel, Kapitanleutnant von Matuschka’s U- 
482, reached the North Channel on 27 August 1944 and, at 1544/30, attacked the five-ship 
Loch Ewe section o f CU36 west o f Islay. The convoy had no air escort and, hit by a tor­
pedo, the American tanker Jacksonville (10,448T) with 14,300 tons o f petrol was instantly a 
mass o f flame."® An A /S sweep was mounted by Coastal Command and Force 33 from the 
Clyde led by the frigate Helmsdale with the destroyer Ambuscade and the corvettes Oxford 
Castle and Hurst Castle. Early on 1 September, Liberator Q /120 reported the dim outline o f 
a surfaced U boat in poor visibility off Islay. Force 33 closed the area and, at 0825/1, Hurst 
Castle was hit by an acoustic torpedo from U-482 and sank in just six minutes. One hun­
dred and five survivors were picked up by Helmsdale.'^ '^^
U-482 stayed west o f Islay and, at 0020/3, sank the Norwegian collier Ejordheim (4,115T) in 
ONS251, killing three o f her 38 crew."® At 0355/8 September lookouts in HMCS Dunver 
escorting FIXF305, sighted two flashes in the convoy. Once again, Matuschka had waited
154 Padfield ; 1995 p. 431.
155 The U boat War in The AtlanticHMSiO vol. 3 p. 80.
156 Two of her 78 crew survived and were landed at lisahally by the destroyer USS Toole. Rohwer : 1999. ADM 217 
685. ADM 199 1392. Information from Tlieron P. Snell.
157 AIR 41 74. ADM 217 685. ADM 199 1392. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999.
158 Ibid.
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until the convoy was at its most vulnerable while splitting into Loch Ewe and Nortli 
Channel sections before attacking. Hit by two homing torpedoes, the tanker Empire Heritage 
(15,702T) sank in minutes. The rescue ship Pinto (1,346T) stopped to pick survivors, but 
was herself torpedoed and sunk. U-482 got clear and was detected homeward bound on 11 
September."® Matuschka’s sinkings stirred up a hornet’s nest o f A /S activity in the North 
Channel and, early on 4 September, Sunderland H /330 had just left convoy UR134 off the 
Butt o f Lewis to return to Sullom Voe when it picked up a radar contact. The dim outline 
o f a surfaced U boat appeared, then the aircraft came under fire and the U boat, probably 
U-484 which followed U-482 into the North Channel, disappeared. On 9 September, the 
frigates Porchester Castle and Helmsdale found U-484 and attacked with squid and depth- 
charges until oil, wreckage and human remains surfaced at 1145/9."®
In the Northern Transit Area, 18 Group flew 8,526 hours during September, but U boat 
traffic was slight. Two U boats were lost and one damaged. U-867 was attacked by a 248 
Squadron Mosquito on 18 September, and probably damaged, as the next day she was 
caught on the surface off Stadlandet, apparently unable to dive, by a 224 Squadron Libera­
tor and appeared to scuttle."^ U-1228 was damaged by a 224 Squadron Liberator on 18 
September and U-855 disappeared, possibly having struck a mine in the Iceland-Faroe Is­
lands passage.
U boat pens at Bergen were attacked by Bomber Command on 4 and 28 October and four U 
boats were wrecked. U-1006, first reported by Coastal Command patrols north o f Shetland 
on 13 and 14 August while bound for the North Channel, was caught on the surface and 
sunk by the Canadian frigate Annan and EG6 west of Shetland on 16 October. U-1004 was 
strafed in Bergenfjord by Mosquito E /333 on 23 October, but escaped undamaged and, early 
on 29 October, two 311 Squadron Liberators wrecked U-1060 which had been run ashore 
during an attack by FAA aircraft the day before. U-1061 was heavily damaged in attacks by 
407 and 224 Squadron aircraft on 31 October. On 1 November, the British frigate Whittaker 
was damaged by a torpedo from U-483 north o f Malin Head."^ West of Shetland, a U boat 
was reported by Sunderland G /330 from Sullom Voe at 2157/24 November. EG17 was di-
159 One hundred and thirty-four died in the double sinking. This incident generated controversy when it was discov­
ered that Pinto had D /Fd a transmission from U-482 at 2259/7. Tliis had been reported to SO Escort Group C5 
Commander George Stephen RCNR in Dmvsr, but he omitted to pass this on to Western Approaches Command. 
When the attack took place, Stephen ordered a ‘Pineapple’ counter attack but Max Horton condemned this as un­
suitable, being designed to deal with a pack attack rather than an single U boat. Horton wanted Stephen sacked, but 
Commodore (D) George 'Shrimp' Simpson at Londonderry spoke up for him. U-482 is believed to have been lost 
in a deep minefield off the North Channel on or around 7 December 1944. ADM 1 16168. The Battle of The Atlantic 
and Signals Intelligence p. 450. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. See also Schofield ; 1968.
160 AIR 41 74 p. 86. ADM 199 1392. ADM 199 2062. The Battle ofThe Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 450-452.
161 AIR 41 74. Wynn ; 1998.
162 Wynn : 1998. The Battle of The Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 469.
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rected to the area and, at 0300/25, HMS Ascension sank U-322 with all her 52 crew."®
In an effort to deal with the Allied carriers sweeps that had been causing considerable dis­
ruption to German coastal convoys off Norway (see Chapter Six), BdU ordered U boats to 
Scapa in the hope o f sinking the carriers as they passed in or out. U-775 was sailed Bergen 
on 18 November and was ordered to Hoy Sound, but the 19" Escort Group were already 
on an A /S sweep of the area. The destroyer Bullen was seven miles north of Strathy Point 
at 0948/6 when a torpedo from U-775 broke her back."^ Assisted by Sunderland Y/201, 
Goodall, Loch Insh and Antigua swept along the coast and attacked a contact north of 
Tongue, bringing up splintered wood, wreckage and oil at 1130A/6. Initially thought to 
mark the end of U-775, it was discovered post-war that U-297 had also been ordered to the 
Hoy Channel only to blunder into the A /S sweep."®
The prefebrication of Loch class frigates, like Loch Insh (above) which was involved in the 
destruction of U-297 off Cape Wrath, was pioneered on the Clyde. A  specialist team of 30 
naval architects was installed in Glasgow and created designs based around 1,300 com pos­
ite parts which could be prepared outside the shipyards, thus easing the demand for yard 
space. The lead yard was John Brown’s at Clydebank and ship sections w ere prekibricated 
off site by, for example, Motherwell Bridge Engineering Ltd.
Cheap to produce, seaworthy and well-armed, these modern escorts w ere manpower 
efficient. This was welcom e as, from 1943, the Royal Navy, like the other services from 
1944, was coming up against a manpower shortage at all levels.
None of the 50 U boats passing through the Northern Transit Area in December 1944 
were sighted by Coastal Command. The only confirmed sighting in coastal waters cane on 
31 December. U-1021 had been ordered south to attack convoys in the Moray Firth and, at 
1030/11 January, Liberator A /224 sighted smoke and the wake o f a schnorchel north of 
Banff. The wake and smoke stopped as the aircraft turned to attack, so no attack could be
165 AIR 41 74 p. 103. Wynn ; 1997. The Battle of The Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 496.
164 Goodall dropped her whaler to pick up survivors, but it was swamped and two Goodall ratings and at least two of 
Bulletin survivors were lost. Four officers and 93 ratings survived. The Enquiry criticised disorganisation in Bullen, in 
particular the fact that, despite U boats being known to be in the area, all her officers with the exception of the Sub 
Lieutenant OOW were in the wardroom for a conference about a forthcoming inspection. The Enquiry also noted 
poor damage control and that injured men were abandoned below in the rush to abandon ship. ADM 1 18039.
165 U-775 escaped and returned to Bergen on 21 December. BdU listed U-297 as missing on 3 January 1945. Her wreck 
was found and identified by divers in May 2000. ADM 199 1392. Roskill : 1961 vol. 2 p. 164.
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made.i®® As the Coastal Command staff history notes ruefully:
The U boat war had gradually changed since August 1944 into a condition o f stalemate in the inshore 
operational areas and a state o f  frustration in the transit areas.. .Both sides had made technical ad­
vances which tended to cancel each other out. The U boats had adopted the schnorchel and possessed 
an efficient search receiver which together nullified the improved airborne radar and the increased 
concentration o f flying. Although the schnorchel undoubtedly lowered the capacity o f  U boats to sink 
ships, it was the ace of trumps against vkual and radar location except in flat calm weather.. .Sinking 
due air action dwindled to one in the last quarter o f 1944.^ ®^
Thanks to the schnorchel, U boats were, by late 1944, almost immune from detection while 
on passage and, when they reached their inshore billets off the British Isles, they were 
largely safe as long as they did not attack. Aircraft, once the prime weapon for sinking U 
boats, were, by then, acting as little more than scarecrows, ensuring that U boats stayed 
submerged. In January 1945, Naval Intelligence estimated that 32 U boats had passed 
through the Northern Transit Area outbound and 16 had made the passage inbound. 18 
Group aircraft flew 2,656 hours during the month, but there was only one genuine sighting 
when, on 11 January, Wellington P /172 homed in on a radar contact and Leigh Light illu­
minated a s c h n o r c h e l of the Hebrides in 5715N 1030W. The subsequent attack, carried 
out in bad visibility, was not a success.^®®
U-1172 was passing through the N orth Channel southbound for the St George’s Channel 
when, at 1300/15 January, she torpedoed the Norwegian tanker Spinanger (7,429T) and the 
escort carrier Thane with f^aunkonig acoustic torpedoes."® At 0846/16 the EG22 sloops Star­
ling, Peacock, Hart and Amethyst and the frigate Loch Craggie carried out 37 attacks, 13 of 
them with squid, on a contact west of Machrihanish. Some oil surfaced, though this was 
analysed as furnace oil."® U-1014 sailed Bergen on 18 January 1945 for the North Channel 
and was found on the bottom  off Lough Foyle by the frigate Loch Scavaig on 4 February. 
Loch Shitty Nyasaland and Papua joined the attack and a two-mile slick o f oil surfaced along 
with a German sailor’s cap, clothing and German forms."^ U-989 was depth charged and 
sunk north o f Shetland on 14 February by the EGIO frigates Bayntun, Braithwaite, Loch Dun- 
vegan and Loch EckA^ U-1019 was damaged by Wellington Q /304 some 130 miles west o f
166 AIR 41 74 p. 208. Wynn : 1997. The Battle of The Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 496. 1
167 AIR 41 74 p. 109. I
168 This was probably eidier U-1051 or U-1199, both o f wWch were outbound for patrols off the English coast from si 
which both failed to return. The other two boats then in tlie North Western Approaches, U-825 and U-1017, re-
ported no such attacks on return from patrol. AIR 41 74 p. 208. Wynn : 1998.
169 Three died in Spinanger mà. she was beached in Karnes Bay. Ten died in Thane wbida had a 30-foot hole in her star­
board quarter. U-1172 continued her patrol into the Irish Sea, sinking three ships including the SS Viksnes and the 
destroyer Manners, then was herself sunk in St George's Channel on 27 January 1945 by EG5. All 52 o f her crew 
were lost. ADM 199 1443. Loyd’s War Losses'vcA. 2. Drummond : 1960. Rohwer : 1999.
170 A further investigation o f the site was carried out by HMS Bentinck on 8 March and more depth charges and squid 
were fired, but no wreckage surfaced. It was thought that EG22 had sunk Matuschka's U-482, but recent research 
by Wynn and otliers disproves tliis. Ametlystvs«& to write her own chapter in Naval liistory with her role in die 
Yangtse Incident in 1949. ADM 1 17668. Wynn 1997.
171 All 48 in U-1014 were lost. ADM 199 1443.
172 Wynn : 1998.
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the Hebrides on 16 February, this being Coastal’s only U boat attack in February. U-309 
sailed Horten for the Moray Firth on 8 February and had just arrived there on 16 February 
when she was sunk with aU hands by the Canadian frigate St John o f  EG9 after attempting 
to attack WN74."® Bayntun and Loch Eck were in action again on 17 February, sinking U- 
1278 north o f Shetland.
The Icelandic Dettifoss (1,564T) was sunk o ff Corsewall Point at 0721/21 February and 12 
o f her passengers were lost. U-1064 had been spotted in the area the previous afternoon by 
an aircraft and EG19 attacked a contact nearby immediately after the sinking. Air attacks 
on schorchel sightings were carried out on the three following days but U~1064 got clear and 
was sent into the Atlantic on weather-reporting duty where, possibly due to the air attacks, 
her schnorchel gave constant trouble. "®
One feature o f this period was the first operational sailing o f the new Type XXIII coastal 
U boat. Streamlined and fitted with quiet ‘creeping’ motors, these Elektro boats were ex­
ceptionally difficult to detect submerged. Naval IntelUgence had been monitoring the de­
velopment o f the Type XXIII and its larger cousin, the Type XXI, since early summer 
1944, largely through decrypts o f messages between Berlin and Tokyo. More recently, in­
formation had come from Norway on trials being conducted there."® The Type XXIII U- 
2J24 operated undetected in the Firth o f Forth for much o f February before firing two 
torpedoes at a ship on the 18" of the month. The torpedoes failed to run and, having used 
up her only armament, U-2324 left patrol. On 25 February, the (1,317T) was sunk
off Eyemouth by C7-2J22 while Leith for London in FS1739.. From her 23 crew and three 
gunners, five, died."?
Also off the east coast, the Norwegian minesweeper Nordhav I I  was torpedoed and sunk 
off Montrose on 10 March by U-714A^ U-714 sank the Swedish Magne (1,226T) off 
Eyemouth on 14 March, but was herself sunk off St Abbs Head that afternoon. The new 
South African frigate Na/a/ sighted rafts and a lifeboat îtom  Magne and then made two at­
tacks on. a bottom ed contact in 111° St Abbs Head: 7 miles, bringing up large quantities of 
oil before contact was lost."®
The Admiralty believed there were six U boats around coast between the Tyne and the Clyde 
in mid-March and one, U-722 sank the steamer Inger Toft (2,190T) three miles south west o f
173 ADM 234 416. Wynn : 1998.
174 a d M  199 1443. The Battle of The Atlantic and Sigmh Intelligence pp. 541-543. Wynn: 1998.
175 Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1998. ADM 199 1443.
176 ADM 1 16848. Fadfield 1995 p.. 456.. RoskiUl 196.1 vol. 2.. p. 292..
177 Rohwer- : 1999. Lloyd’s War Losses, vol. 1. Baird : 1993. The Battle of The AtlanUc and Signals Intelligence p. 547.
178 Five men were lost and 17 survivors were picked up by the sweeper Syrian. The seven-ship Norwegian Mine- 
sweeping Flotilla had been operating from Dundee since late 1942 and was responsible for much o f die sweeping 
carried out off tlie east coast. Rohwer : 1999; Bârd Helle in Salmon (ed) : 1995 p. 79;
179 ADM 234 417. Baird : 1993.
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Neist Point, Skye, at 0920/16 March.i®° Late on 20 March 1945, an 86 Squadron Liberator 
dropped sonobuoys on a radar contact north o f Cape Wrath, then attacked unsuccessfully 
with two acoustic torpedoes. At about the same time, a lookout in the Canadian frigate Neii  ^
Glasgow  ^ in bright moonlight off InistrahuU sighted a schmrehel on a collision course. Three 
feet of the schnorchd was protruding above the surface partly obscured by a cloud of exhaust 
smoke and it struck N w  Glasgoiv on her port side immediately below the bridge. In U-1003 
water rose to knee-height in the control room before the flow could be stopped. Oberleut- 
nant Striibing bottomed Ü-1003, then surfaced at dusk on 22 March to charge batteries and 
replace the air in the boat, but approaching ships forced him to dive again. Soon afterwards, 
the pumps which had been running constantly since the collision failed and, with the batter­
ies exhausted, Striibing surfaced and ordered his crew to abandon.^^^
The 1»‘ Division, EG21, were patrolling the N orth Minch at 0918/27 March when Conn, 
the centre ship, obtained an Asdic contact. The echo was lost, regained, classified as fish, 
lost again, then regained. The sounder trace showed an object 220 feet long at 226 feet 
depth with the bottom clearly visible underneath and, at 1015/27, Conn attacked with 
hedgehog. The set missed and exploded on the bottom. Depth-charge attacks at 1046/27 
and 1104/27 and another hedgehog set at 1134/27 brought large quantities o f air and oil 
to the surface. Further attacks brought more wreckage including a German rubber dinghy 
and pieces o f flesh which were picked up for analysis. U-965 and her crew of 50 were all 
lost.^®2 That afternoon, at 1630/27, Byron, Fits^roy and Bedmill, the 2"^ Division of EG21, 
were off Loch Seaforth when Bedmill, the starboard wing ship, obtained an asdic contact 
and attacked with hedgehog. A stream o f small bubbles and oil was seen coming to the 
surface which continued for some hours. In all, five hedgehog attacks and 15 depth-charge 
attacks were made during the night and, by dawn, the oil slick extended for several miles, 
but no echo sounder trace or material wreckage were obtained. Further depth charge and 
squid attacks were made at the site on 1 April brought up some wreckage from U-7223^^
EG21 was escorting E N 83 through the Minch on 30 March when, at 1710/30, Rupert ob­
tained asdic contact off Lochinver and attacked with a 10 charge pattern. Once the contact 
was clear of the convoy, Rupert attacked again, this time with hedgehog. Two were heard to 
explode after four and five seconds, and the rest exploded on hitting the bottom seven 
seconds later. A small streak o f light was seen and oil bubbles surfaced. At 1808/30 Conn
180 The estimate o f six U boats was close to tlie tnitli: four were on patrol, three were passaging homewards and two 
were heading for the west coast o f Scotland. The U Boat m r  in the Atlantic HMSO diag. 28, The Battle of The Atlantic 
and Siÿtals Intelligence p. 559. Baird : 1995 p. 236. Rohwer : 1999.
181 Thirty one survivors were picked up 16 miles north o f  InistrahuU on 23 March by HMCS Thetford Mines. Eighteen 
died, including Striibing. Wynn : 1998. ADM 199 2056.
182 Also recovered were a locker lid, a German flag, a German jacket, an identity disc with the name Hans Fischer, a 
wooUen sock, a box o f matches made by Nitedals o f Oslo, a tin o f 100 Avus cigarettes, some cigars and packets of 
Orient cigarettes. ADM 1 17608. Wynn ; 1998. RosldU : 1961 vol. 2 p. 296.
183 AJi 4 4  crew aboard U-722 were lost. Five bodies later floated to the surface and were buried at Portree. Ibid.
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missed with another hedgehog set then, at 1849/30, Conn made a hedgehog attack which 
brought a large air bubble and much oil. Further attacks at 1440/31 and 1700/31 produced 
wreckage including a locker door, a tin o f Nescafe, two brushes and 11 photographs o f a U 
boat crew. U-1021 and her 43 crew were lost.^ ®'*
U-1206 was on the bottom  ten miles east o f Peterhead on 14 April while the forward heads 
were being repaired. An inboard valve was removed and, as the outboard one either had 
not been closed properly or was faulty, the U boat began to flood. Tanks were blown and 
all tubes fired to lighten the boat, and she surfaced long enough for the crew to abandon in 
four d i n g h i e s . T w o  days later, on the evening o f  16 Aprh, U-1274 sank the tanker MV 
Athdduke (8,9661] off Berwick and was then herself sunk by the destroyer Viceroy7^  ^On 20 
April the trawler Fthel Crawford (200T) was lost to one o f a field o f magnetic mines laid off 
the entrance to Loch Ryan by U-218 on 18 April. The first indication o f the sinking was 
the discovery o f floating fish boxes and a kitbag belonging to one o f the crew. Skipper 
Scales and his nine crew were all lost.
German minclaying o ff  Scotland all but ceased in March 1941, though U-218 did lay a field 
o f magnetic mines off Loch Ryan on 18 April 1945. The Ardrossan trawler Ethel Crawford 
was the only victim, sinking two days later with the loss of her ten crew.^®^
U-636 was sunk west o f the N orth Channel on 21 April by ships o f EG4 and, at 0729/23 
April, Liberator V /86 picked up a radar contact immediately on reaching its patrol area 
west o f  Shetland, but lost it after closing to within half a mile. A sonobuoy pattern was laid 
but neither it nor the torpedoes dropped indicated a positive result. U-396, on her way 
home from weather reporting duty, had however been destroyed.^®® A 120 Squadron Lib­
erator from Tain sank U-1017 west of the N orth Channel at 1650/29 A p r i l . A s  the war 
ended, several U boats were known to be making a bid to pass through the Kattegat and 
reach Norway. An 86 Squadron Liberator caught U-534 on the surface in the Kattegat on 5 
May 1945 and sank it, then another 86 Squadron aircraft sank the new Type XXI U-3523 
north east o f Skagen on 6 May.^^o
With Hitler dead, Donitz was appointed Führer on 1 May and immediately began negotia-
184 ADM 1 1.7608. Wynn : 1998.
185 Two o f the dinghies were spotted and the occupants landed at Aberdeen. Another dinghy witlt ten survivors and 
one dead rating was driven ashore twomiles south o f Buchan Ness lighthouse, where two o f  the ten who had sur­
vived thus far were drowned. Near Dunbuy Rocks, Captain Sclilitt and 12 o f his crew were picked up from die 
fourth dinghy by the Peterhead fisliing boat Reaper. ADM 199 2056.
186 pive died iaAtfoe/duke and 44 in U-1274. Vkerof^ attacks brought no immediate proof o f success, but she returned 
to the area eight days later and made further attacks on die bottomed contact which produced wreckage o f German 
origin, including, '...a dinghy container in which were stowed six dozen of good brandy, fortunately none of them 
broken.' ADM 199 2056, Wynn : 1998. Rohwer : 1999.
187 Rohwer : 1999. The Scotsman 23 April 1945. ADM 199 1443.
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tiens with the Allies. On 4 May he broadcast a surrender order to the U boats, though 
there was some doubt that all would receive it. Finally, at 0241 /5  May, the German sur­
render was signed at Eisenhower’s HQ in Reims. But the convoy system was still operating 
and, that evening, just after 2000/7, EN91 sailed Methil for Belfast as five merchantmen 
escorted by the trawlers Angle, Wolves and Leicester City. At 2250/7 the convoy was two 
miles south May Island when the Avondale Lark was hit by a torpedo. Three minutes later 
another torpedo hit the Norwegian Sneland I. Despite being unable to gain an Asdic con­
tact, Leicester City dropped a pattern o f depth charges to deter further attacks, then moved 
to pick up survivors from the stricken ships. Two died in Avondale Park. From Sneland 1, a 
survivor o f the SC7 disaster in 1940, seven died. Fifty-five survivors were landed at Methil. 
The torpedoes had come from U-2336 and Kapitanleutnant Emil Klusemeier told Allied 
investigators that he had not heard the surrender order transmitted three days earher.i^i
S c o t l a n d ’s G a t e w a y  - T h e  R i v e r  C l y d e
In 1933, with air attacks on British ports and not U boats or surface raiders seen as the prin­
cipal threat to supply, the Headlam Committee was established to consider requests from the 
Royal Navy and RAF that, in the event o f war, as much as 75% of shipping should be di­
verted away from east coast ports vulnerable to aircraft based in Germany or the Low Coun­
tries. The committee’s report presented in April 1937 was over-simplistic, but it did point to 
underused capacity both in the West coast ports and on the railways that served them .^^2
The River Clyde, and the principal ports o f Glasgow and Greenock, began preparing for 
war in August 1936 when, the provisional Port Emergency Committee was formed to coor­
dinate port operations in time o f  war.i^® Design work on the Clyde A /S boom, which 
would run from the Cloch Point to Dunoon, began in 1937. The boom may have been in­
stalled speedily at the outbreak o f war, but otherwise little had been done by September 
1939 to prepare Scotland’s m ost vital port for the demands o f war.
Clyde Navigation Trust, responsible for Glasgow and Clydebank, could boast 360 acres o f 
dock area with 12 miles o f quayage, seven 25/175 ton heavy-lift cranes, nine coaling cranes 
and hoists of at least 32 tons capacity and ninety 5-ton cargo cranes. There were thirty-two 
10-ton coahng cranes and three 35-ton coaling cranes privately owned within the port. And
191 JJ.2336 and returned to Keil on 14 May 1945. Not until October 1945, after BdU records had been examined, did it 
become apparent that U-2336 vjÿs responsible. Klusmeiet revealed that he had been in the vicinity o f the Isle o f 
May between 2000/7 and 0600/8 and tliat, after the attack, he circled the Isle o f May. This caused great consterna­
tion as his approach had apparentiy gone undetected by the indicator loops. Tlie loops to the north o f the Isle of 
May were controlled from the Fixed Defence Station on tine Isle o f May and those to the south were controlled 
from Canty Bay. While the records for Canty Bay had, by then, been destroyed, those for the Isle o f May revealed 
that U-2336 had indeed been detected passing eastwards over No.4 Loop at 0452/8 and N o.l3 Loop at 0516/8, but 
her passage had been ignored, or had gone unnoticed in tlie euphoria surrounding victory. ADM 199 139. Calvert 
MS IWM Department o f Documents ref. 84/36/1.
192 Merchant Shippingand The Demands of War. C. B. A. Behrens. HMSO 1978. p. 24.
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there were 71 acres o f transit sheds, 58 miles o f quayside railway, timber-handling facilities 
at Shieldhall, a 54,000-ton capacity granary at Meadowside, nine acres o f covered animal 
lairage at Merklands capable o f handling 250,000 head o f mainly catde per annum. Govan 
dry docks could handle vessels o f up to 880 feet LOA and 83 feet beam with a best depth 
over the sill at No. 3 Dock of more than 26 feet.
But the jewel in Glasgow’s crown was King George V Dock. Planned as one of a series of 
deep-water berths at Shieldhall, construction had begun in 1929, partly as a government- 
subsidised anti-unemployment measure and partly for large new merchant ships planned by 
Alfred Holt & Co. Building work had however been halted by the economic slump in 1931 
when only the half-mile east quay had been completed with sheds, sidings and 16 c r a n e s .  
While the dock was underused before the war, as Riddell writes '...th e  value o f its con­
struction was realised many times over with the outbreak o f the Second World War.’ 
Among King George V Dock’s many advantages was the fact that its transit sheds stood 
55 feet back from the quay edge, ideal for handling bulky military cargoes such as cased 
vehicles and aircraft, while, at the older Prince’s and Queen’s Docks, the sheds were just 
15 feet from the quay edge.^^®
On the face o f it impressive, nevertheless these facilities hid serious shortcomings apparent 
when small-scale diversions o f shipping from the east coast took place in September and 
October 1939.^^  ^ The Ministry o f Transport and others in mid-1940 painted a disturbing 
picture o f port facilities on the Clyde. The port o f Glasgow had developed, ‘by process o f 
accretion largely directed to immediate needs,’ and, as it was largely concerned in servicing 
industry in west central Scotland, road and rail links to the rest o f Britain were poor. There 
was only one adequate timber berth at Shieldhall and another was urgently required. Prin­
cipally, however, it was clear that the west side o f the 20-acre King George V Dock had to 
be completed speedily as it was the only dock on the Clyde capable of handling the largest 
ocean vessels. Liverpool’s Gladstone Dock offered similar accommodation on the west 
coast, as did Swansea Docks, but both were held by locks and therefore both vulnerable 
and less efficient.
At Greenock, controlled by the Greenock Harbour Trust, there were five berths for ships 
o f up to 6,000 tons with adequate shed accommodation. James W att Dock was, however, 
vulnerable as it was held only by a single caisson. Great Harbour had good berthing, but a 
critical shortage o f railway sidings. Rothesay Dock at Clydebank, principally used for scrap.
‘94T-CN 16 74/18.
195 Riddell : 1979 p. 257. Bird : 1963 pp. 83 et passim.
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iron ore and coal, was described as, ‘old and inadequate,’ and had weak cranes.
Headlam had envisaged the diversion o f 75% o f traffic from east coast ports to the west 
coast, but failed to adequately consider the transport problems this would pose. How, for 
example, were the 2,000,000 tons o f ore required annually at Middlesbrough to be moved 
across country, and what was to be done with refrigerated cargoes given that there was 
nowhere near enough cold storage accommodation on the west coast?^^^ Road transport 
into and out o f both Glasgow and Greenock harbours was described as ‘chaotic’ with a 
large number o f  small firms operating without coordination. In Glasgow, there were be­
lieved to be between 500 and 600 horse drawn vehicles and between 800 and 1,000 motor 
vehicles engaged in dock traffic, and, in July 1940, around 4,00 loads were being take out 
o f the docks daily. But already, goods handled by Glasgow docks had risen by 28.8% from 
6,189,158 tons in the year to 30 June 1939, to 7,975,141 in the year to 30 June 1940 with 
the largest proportion o f this increase being in iron, iron ore, steel and coal.^oo
Initial projections drawn up at the beginning o f July 1940, for iron ore, pig iron and steel 
landings in the Clyde and Mersey were:
________________ Cargo_____________ ____Port
Clyde
Ships
11
5
5
Total 21
Mersey 21
r
2
T qW 24
34,192 tons o f  steel.
13,841 tons o f  scrap ^ c l.  1 ship for Ardrossan).
36,257 tons o f pig iron_______ _
84,290 tons (17% of UK total)
39,041 tons o f steeL 
4,619 tons o f  scrap.
10,300 tons o f pig iron.
[ UKTot^ ! 134 j 496,260 tons of steel, scrap and pig iron, j
These figures were hastily revised on the diversion o f shipping away from the south coast. 
With much tonnage still unallocated, at the beginning o f August the new traffic estimates 
were:
Clyde 21
12
76,377 tons o f steel.
37,683 tons o f scrap (incl. 3 ships for Ardrossan).
5 30,577 tons o f pig iron
Total 32 144,637 tons (26% of UK total).
Mersey 43 102,375 tons o f steel.... . . . . 1 4,205 tons o f scrap.
2 10,361 tons o f pig iron.
46 116,941 tons (22% of UK total).
|_150 I 539,176 tons of steel, scrap and pig iron.
_  .J
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This increase in traffic shoreside would have to be largely moved by rail, and the LMS and 
LNER reported capacity for an additional 50 trains in and out o f Clydeside daily. Rail ac­
cess to parts o f  Glasgow harbour was unsatisfactory, however, and Ministry o f  Transport 
officials wrote that 500 additional motor vehicles were needed, even in 1940. In part, tliis 
was also due to the parlous state o f coastal shipping, which meant that high-value cargoes 
were increasingly being moved by road.^o^
Many of Glasgow and Greenock’s operational difficulties arose from the fact that, pre-war, 
much o f  their import trade arrived as part cargoes o f between 500 and 2,000 tons carried 
in liners working to a regular timetable. These cargoes were largely intended for use in 
Glasgow and central Scotland, within the economic distribution zone o f the port. Thus, by 
far the most serious shortage within Glasgow Harbour was in transit shed and warehouse 
accommodation. The existing facilities were adequate for pre-war conditions, but not for 
the new demands that would arise out o f the near total closure of ports in southern Eng­
land. Ministry of Transport civil servant Frank Pick wrote:
There is, for the size o f the port, exceedingly little warehouse accommodation. What sheds there are
single-storey buildings adapted for use as transit sheds.^ ®^
The Kelvin FlaU was considered as emergency accommodation, but it was so large that, if 
fuU, it would be too great a single risk. Already, by July 1940, the Ministry o f Food and other 
departments were competing for warehousing space, but the real need was to get goods 
cleared away from the ports, where they were vulnerable to attack, and into distribution cen­
tres.
Blackout was ever a problem as Ministry o f Shipping civil servant S.S. Wilson recalled:
But by die autumn o f 1940, the blackout restrictions were becoming increasingly irksome, and al­
though there were not yet heavy raids on the West Coast ports, night working was being constandy
interrupted — with consequent effect on the temper and morale o f those engaged on die docks.^ *^ **
The Air Ministry was insisting on a complete blackout on receipt of a ‘purple’ preliminary 
alert. The Clyde Navigation Trust pointed out that this was impossible as the alert often 
caught vessels in the act o f docking or undocking, or manoeuvring in the river, and, espe­
cially in a tidal harbour, these operations cannot simply be suspended. There had, accord­
ing to a report dated 25 November 1940, already been several close calls during dry- 
docking at Govan when the power had been cut without warning, and when ships had ar­
rived at berths only to find nobody there to take their lines. An RAF aerial survey before 
and after a trial alert on 18 January 1941 revealed:
MT 63 69.
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Blackout area under normal conditions extremely bad. After the warning, considerable lights were 
showing and [tram]car flashes visible at 12 miles. Dark area round Clydebank extremely bad, also 
river could be normally traced all the way, while riverside was lit up like a main thoroughfare in 
peacetime. Shipyards particularly bright. Area round Rothesay Dock particularly bright. King George 
V  Dock plainly visible, Princes Dock and Queens Dock showed considerable light.^os
On 21 March 1941,. following the first heavy raids on Clydeside, another aerial survey 
showed that the whole dock area could be clearly seen from 21 miles away at 10,000 feet. 
The city’s street layout, the glass roof o f St Enoch’s Station and the Corkerhill marshalling 
yards could be seen from 14 miles, and much light could be seen from transit sheds at the 
docks as the aircraft passed overhead. A measure of the general ineffectiveness o f the 
blackout, particularly over industrial areas expected to work around the clock, this problem 
was never fully resolved, though one partial solution lay in the STARFISH decoy sites being 
set in the hiUs behind Clydebank and Greenock.^o®
Another pressing problem that hampered port operations on Clydeside in 1940 was the 
disorganised state o f the labour market. Twenty-five stevedoring and master pottering 
firms operated in Glasgow and, while other major ports operated a voluntary registration 
system, here there was no organised method of getting dockworkers to where they were 
needed most. Indeed, the Ministry of Transport found that nobody knew how many dock­
workers were available. The unions reported that they had some 3,600 members, o f whom
2.800 worked on the docks. Employers’ records suggested that there were at least another
2.800 casually employed. At the time o f the investigation in July 1941, there was a growing 
shortage o f labour in the docks, largely due the call-up which was taking away the best 
men. Despite this, there were still about 250 dockers unemployed, ‘largely due to the 
clumsy and inadequate means o f recruiting daily labour.’ This situation was set to improve 
with compulsory registration, but immediate steps were taken to coordinate the, ‘ill- 
managed business,’ o f c a f l i n g - o n . ^ o ?
Recruitment was not the only labour-related problem to bedevil port operations on Clyde­
side in 1940. As Behrens writes:
In contradistinction to flie shipping industry, where industrial relations had always been unusually 
good, industrial relations in the port industry before the war had, in tlie main, been unusually diffi­
cult.^ ^®
On 8 August, with the invasion scare at its height. Port Emergency Committee Secretary 
Robert Tolerton wrote that:
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Dockets have not shown a general disposition to give improved output. Probability is that they are ruled 
by a small minority.^o^
A dogged resistance to the introduction o f new technology was allied to an equally stub­
born refusal to do away with restrictive working practices. Greenock was said to have a 
‘lamentable’ rate o f discharge, notably in sugar cargoes, and a comparison o f mean average 
discharge rates for full cargoes o f  grain, ore and scrap at Glasgow, Liverpool and on the 
Tyne between 1 June and 27 July 1940 painted a depressing picture;
j____ Gta
i  vessels
in
tons
_____Or
vessels
e
tons
Sera
vessels P , tons
Glasgow 1 8 ^1228 r ” f s 1259 3 483
Liverpool ! 14 1618 - - 2 608
.TZSe_____ [%_-..... - ___13__ 1472 - -
This thesis is not the place for a detailed consideration o f socio-political attitudes during 
the Second World War, but left-wing militancy held great sway in industrial areas o f Scot­
land, particularly on Clydeside, and fundamentally affected attitudes in the workplace. 
Scottish working class attitudes had been conditioned by the so-called Red Clydeside con­
frontation o f 1915 to 1922, the depression years, unemployment and events on the interna­
tional stage such as the Spanish Civil War.
As Britain went to war in 1939, the British Communist Party, which had considerable influ­
ence on Clydeside, was deeply divided. The Party had initially supported the war, but there 
were the small matters o f the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Red Army’s invasions of eastern Po­
land and Finland. Intent on its own predatory agenda, Moscow instructed the British party to 
take an anti-war line, despite the strong misgivings o f senior CP figures Hke Harry PoUitt and 
Willie Gallacher who remained doggedly anti-fascist. CP membership grew steadily, the So­
viet Union was held to be an egalitarian paradise and Stalin was portrayed as wise and kindly. 
These views persisted into 1941 when the Scottish Mineworkers Federation passed a motion 
praising the Soviet Union’s ‘policy o f peace’ and the Communist-led Apprentices Committee 
on Clydeside organised a series o f strikes which ended with a spontaneous return to work on 
14 March 1941, the day after the first heavy air raids on Clydeside.^^o
Anti-war sentiments and seemingly bizarre political naivete pervaded the attitudes o f the 
Left generally. The Labour Party had been strongly pacifist between the wars. Many on the 
Left were dismayed by the retreat from human values, others despaired o f the fact that a 
war would, they believed, long delay the institution o f a socialist state in Britain. Stafford 
Cripps, influential on the Labour Left, defended the Soviet invasion o f Poland and wrote
209 MT 65 200.
210 Jeffrey : 1996 pp. 176-177.
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in Tribune that the Soviet invasion o f Finland was, ‘a necessary defensive move’.^ i^ From its 
stronghold on Clydeside, the tiny Independent Labour Party remained committed to a 
‘stop the war’ hne, even after the German invasion o f the Soviet Union. As Calder writes:
.. .there is clear evidence that the Independent Labour Party’s virtual pacifism did not make its mem­
bers electoral pariahs. Even in April 1940, its candidate got a quarter o f the poll in Renfrew East, 
near Glasgow.^^^
The Scottish National Party too was opposed to the war, campaigning against conscription 
from 1937 (unless, o f course, it was carried out by a Scottish government). One o f its sen­
ior figures, academic Douglas Young, notable for his lack o f common sense, expressed 
himself willing to work with the enemy in the event o f Scotland making a hoped-for sepa­
rate peace with the Nazis. The SNP’s position held wide appeal as demonstrated by the 
result o f a by-election in Argyll in April 1940 when their candidate polled 37% o f the 
vote.213 For the Left, purist zealots apart, the war ceased to be imperialist and became a 
just crusade once Germany invaded the Soviet Union. In fairness, however, the Right was 
also deeply divided with many in the Scottish Conservative Party strongly pro-appeasement 
and some openly expressing pro-fascist sympathies, notably during the Perth and Kinross 
by-election in 1938. Several prominent Scottish politicians, landowners and industrialists 
aligned themselves with quasi-rehgious and extreme right organisations active in Scotland 
and opposed to the war.^i^
Matters on the port management side were scarcely less happy or efficient during 1940. It 
had been realised before the war that the ports were likely to form a bottleneck, not least 
because they were the focus o f so many different interests. In the case o f the Clyde, as else­
where, the Ministries o f Shipping, Transport, Home Security, Supply, Food, Works and La­
bour, the Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the War Office all sought to influence port opera­
tions formerly the province o f the Clyde Navigation Trust. The Port Emergency Committee, 
formed in an attempt to reconcile competing interests, were, as one report puts it:
.. .made ad hoc ftom persons who Were a bit flattered at being invited to represent a Government 
Department. Most had little idea o f the organisation o f which they now formed a part, and even less 
o f the other organisations impinging on the port.. .Some o f those in uniform were a bit tactless.^ ^®
Behrens writes o f both the breakdown o f the Port Emergency Committees and o f the con­
gestion that hampered west coast port operations in 1940, notably after heavy raids closed 
the Port o f London in early Septem ber.^ i^  Wilson agrees, but also points to the turf war
211 Ibid p. 79.
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that arose between the Ministries o f Transport and Shipping.^t? In the case o f the Clyde, 
Wilson could have added the complete lack o f cooperation between Glasgow and Green­
ock. Following a typically ChurchiUian intervention at the end o f 1940, Regional Port Di­
rectors were appointed, initially for the Clyde and Mersey, with all but dictatorial powers. 
Robert Letch (former Assistant General Manager of the Port of London initially sent north 
to organise overside discharge on the Clyde) was appointed Clyde Regional Port Director 
in January 1941 with responsibility for the whole river, Greenock included, and recorded:
. . .a  state o f  affaks worse even than in the other w est coast port areas, for in  the existing confusion it 
had proved impossible to distribute the ships diverted from the east coast ports in equitable propor­
tions and the Clyde had received a much heavier burden than either the Mersey or Bristol Channel.^i®
He wrote that the situation was exacerbated by Glasgow being a port designed mainly to 
serve the immediate area, and was thus lacking in essential storage facilities and transport 
links. Letch was a dynamic and effective figure and, rather than try to create order out o f 
existing chaos, in just three months he installed an entirely new port organisation and, by 
March 1941, was able to write that:
Glasgow is now  one o f  the two m ost important, ports in the country and is the importing and dis­
tributing centre for a large proportion o f  the vital needs o f  the country.^i^
The Clyde Navigation Trust only controlled navigation down river as far as Newark Castle 
at Port Glasgow and central to the efficiency o f Glasgow as a port would be the establish­
ment o f  a Clyde Anchorages scheme, which stretched from Newark Castle to the boom 
and included all the sea lochs, where convoys could assemble and from where vessels 
could be fed upriver to the docks in an organised fa s h io n .220
In September 1940 it had become apparent to FOIC Greenock, Admiral Bertram Watson, 
that facilities at the Tail o’ the Bank were already coming under severe strain as increasing 
numbers o f ships used Glasgow. A Naval anchorage had been established east o f Rosneath 
Patch and degaussing ranges were being set up along with new bunkering facilities. But the 
Lower Clyde was almost devoid o f organisation, there were not enough tugs, water boats, 
tenders, compass adjusters or medical facilities, berthing was disorganised and storing fa­
cilities were insufficient. Princes Pier at Greenock was in a poor state and there was almost 
no office or residential accommodation.
The rarely compatible demands o f cargo handling and trooping mean that the Clyde was 
changing from a port where ships simply called for convoy to being a convoy port, a repair 
port, an overside discharge port, an embarkation and disembarkation port and a salvage port.
217 PRO 30 92/2.
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Watson suggested, particularly in view o f the increasing use by the Navy and otlier services, 
that the Anchorages should be made a Naval port. Captain H. Digby-Beste, a retired Indian 
Navy officer, was appointed King’s Harbour Master in October 1940, though this had to be 
downgraded to Admiralty Berthing Officer when the request to make the place a Naval port 
was refused. In a report dated 12 March 1941, Digby-Beste wrote that, ‘The trouble has been 
that the increase o f continually outstripped the organisation and machinery necessary to cope 
with it,’ and offered these statistics as evidence.
July 1940 (12 days only) 1165
August 1940 2585
September 1940 51Ô9
October 1940 5658
November 1940 6807
December 1940 6076
January 1941 4828
February 1941 2454
March 1941 (12 days only) 1045
Thus, for the 237-day period to 12 March 1941, there had been a daUy average o f 152 ves­
sels in the Clyde A n c h o r a g e s .221 Behrens offers a comparative analysis o f monthly average 
port performance between April to June 1940 (prior to the fall o f France), and subsequent 
three-monthly periods to June 1941:
A (4-6 /40) B (7 - 9/40) (10-12/4(0 D (1 -3 /41) E (4 - 6/41)
‘000 net tons ‘000 net tons ‘000 net tons ‘000 net tons ‘000 net tons
Glasgow and Greenock 321.3' 371.7 421.0 401.0 395.7
Liverpool and Manchester 992.0 1 1,072.3 809.3 628.3 664.3
Swansea, Cardiff and Newport 227.6 1 190.3 171.7 123.7 iTl.O
Bristol 176.7 190.0 171.7 122.0 169.7
Total foreign trade tonnage in ÜK ports 2,822.3 2,313.7 1,995.3 2,183.0
Giving a percentage net variation on period A as follows:
A /B
Glasgow and Greenock +15.7
Liverpool and Manchester +8.1
Swansea, Cardiff and Newport -16.2
Bristol +7.8
Total foreign trade tonnage in UK ports -21.9
A /C
+ 3 1 .6  
' -18 .0 '
-24.4
- 35^ 9
A /D
+Ï4ÿ_
-36.7
-45^
I3Ô .9
-44.8
A /E
"+ë.2
" -4.0 ■i
In period A Clyde port facilities were heavily committed to the Norway campaign. In pe­
riod E, Liverpool’s performance was affected by heavy bombing. Yet the Clyde was the 
sole port facility to show a consistently higher performance on the period A i n d e x .222
Thanks to a remarkable, effective partnership between Regional Port Director Robert 
Letch, the Royal Navy, Clyde Navigation Trust and Trades Unions, by late 1941 Glasgow 
Docks were operating at much improved efficiency, handling 8.7 million tons o f cargo an-
221 T-CN 16 74/24.
222 Behrens op. cit. p. 147,
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nually, an increase o f 2.6 million tons (23.8%) on the 1939 figure.^^s Dock labour had been 
effectively organised and the west side o f King George V Dock was being completed, the 
facilities there including rail platforms for large-scale troop movements. With a minimum 
depth o f 32 feet at LWOST, King George V  Dock allowed very large vessels to dock in 
Glasgow and it was close to Renfrew Airfield, thus convenient for moving aircraft both in 
and out. Nearby, at Braehead and Deanside, 80 acre storage and distribution depots with 
four 500 foot by 100 foot transit sheds and 18 miles o f sidings were being constructed, the 
first such depots i n  B r i t a i n .224 Riddell writes that:
King George V  Dock and the surrounding area was quite r%htly claimed to be the most important
shipping accommodation in the country during the Second World War.225
The river was being widened at Meadowside, a new elevator was being installed at the 54,000 
ton capacity Meadowside Granary and coal-handUng capacity was being increased, particu­
larly at Rothesay Dock. In all, 48 new cranes were installed and 15 older cranes upgraded, £2 
million being spent on handling improvements alone in Glasgow during the war.
Downriver, tanker berthage at Dunglass was being extended westwards, much progress 
had been made with merchant ship anchorages in the Gareloch for vessels laid up or under 
repair, o ff Kilcreggan for ships awaiting orders or convoy, in Loch Long, for tankers and 
any overflow from Kilcreggan, in the Holy Loch for wiping and overside discharge, and 
off Rothesay and Port Bannatyne for salvage. Merchant ship anchorages and the Naval an­
chorage were run by the Naval Control Service operations room in 33 Barrhill Road by 
Digby-Beste and the NCSO, Captain J. M. Begg. Navy House in Clarence Street housed 
several departments including the Maintenance Captain, the Sea Transport Office, the 
Boom Defence Office and the Drafting Office. Admiral Watson’s headquarters was in 
HMS Orlando, Bagatelle, Eldon Street. 226
Princes Pier was being redeveloped with Naval offices and its landing facilities trebled .227 
Moorings for RAF flying boats, oiler barges and other small craft had been laid in Cardwell 
Bay, close to Admiralty Pier. Small boats had been requisitioned to form a ferry service, 
the storing of merchant ships had been systemised and a waterboat pool had been 
formed.228 Defensive armament o f merchant ships (DEMS) was administered from HMS 
Carrick at James Watt Dock, a Dome AA teacher had been set up inside St Andrews 
Church, Carnock Street, the ammunition ship Jacinth was moored at a safe distance off
223 Clyde Navigation Trust's revenue rose in line with increasing business, rising from £955,000 in 1939 to £1,255,216 
in 1942. Revenue for the year 1944-45 was £1,339,799, some 25% higher than in 1939 and, in 1945-46, revenue fell 
away by £156, 675. T-CN 6 5/6. D-CC 2 1/74.
224 The Port of Glasgow. Clyde Navigation Trust (1947).
225 Riddell : 1979 p. 257.
226 ADM 116 4539. MT 63 69.
227 T-CN 58/9.
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Princes Pier and the gunnery school firing ship Cardiff operated from either Greenock or 
Lamlash in practice areas east and south o f Arran. Degaussing ranges had been set up off 
Helensburgh Pier and o ff  Ardnadam^ with experimental stations at Stroul Bay in the Gare­
loch and south o f Portkil Point. A hydrophone station off Innellan had been set up to ana­
lyse underwater sound signatures and there were signals stations in Loch Long, at Limekiln 
Point and at Princes Pier.229
The Port Security Office was in the requisitioned Ferry Café at Gourock and tlie boom 
was controlled from Custom House in Greenock with boom defence vessels operating 
from Colintraive. The Clyde Extended Defence was controlled from an Observation Post 
was above the Cloch Light, there were controlled minefields at Colintraive and on either 
side o f Cumbrae, and A /S detection loops between Wemyss Bay and Toward Point. 
Overlooking the boom were gun batteries at Cloch Point and Castle Hill, Dunoon. Two 
4.7” quick-firers were mounted at Toward Point and Ardhallow Fort held two 6” guns and 
one 9.2” gun, though the latter was never fired as the concussion would have shattered 
windows over a wide area. The heavy anti-aircraft gunsites around the Tail o’ the Bank, 
light anti-aircraft batteries and searchlights were controlled from Gun Operations Room at 
Aikenhead House in Glasgow, Fighter cover was provided from RAF Prestwick and RAF 
Ayr, minewatching posts were set up, Coastwatchers perched on headlands and a network 
o f Observer Corps posts spread across central Scotland and Argyll.
In the Holy Loch, five moorings were laid for the Clyde Anchorages Emergency Port 
Scheme which began operating in September 1940 to provide additional cargo handling 
facilities. Large merchant ships moored off and transferred their cargoes, using their own 
derricks, to coasters for onward passage to other ports, or into barges for landing in the 
Clyde, a type o f working hitherto only practised extensively in the by then closed Port o f 
London. Thames barges, Dutch schyuts and 600 men were brought north by the London 
stevedoring firm Scruttons Ltd and the piers at Fairlie and Craigendoran were equipped 
with cranes to transfer smaller goods to railway trucks. Later, as the emphasis on the Clyde 
changed to trooping, much of Princes Pier was laid aside for handling large numbers of 
personnel and Admiralty Pier in Cardwell Bay was taken over for storing troopships.
The emergency port quickly proved highly efficient and, in April 1941, when the discharge 
rates elsewhere on the Clyde were averaging 560 tons per ship working day, at the emer­
gency po rt 760 tons per ship-working day were being handled. The size o f the emergency 
port operation was restricted by the number o f coasters available, never exceeding the five
229 For the frill establishment in the Clyde, see ADM 116 4539. T-CN 16 74/18. T-CN 16 74/24.
230 ADM 1 9851.
231 WO 166 2129. AIR 25 233.
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moorings laid in 1940, but some 1,885 vessels were handled and 2,056,830 tons o f cargo 
was transhipped along with more than 6,000,000 smaller packages o f mails, stores and 
equipment. The piers within the Clyde handled 289,931 tons o f cargo and more than
4.000.000 packages, thus giving a total o f 2,343,761 tons of cargo and more than
10.000.000 packages handled by the sc h e m e .2^ 2 Barges were also employed in carrying 
cargo both within Glasgow Docks, and between there and the Lower Clyde, some 580,516 
tons being moved in this way.2^5
Another scheme to reheve pressure on the established ports, first mooted in June 1940, 
was the construction o f deep-water ports, primarily intended for for military embarkation. 
Sites for N o.l Military Port at Faslane in the Gareloch and No. 2 Military Port at Cairn- 
ryan (left) had been selected by November 1940 and work began the following month. 
Construction was a purely military affair carried out by Royal Engineers with numerous 
ATS as clerks, cooks and drivers to save manpower. Faslane was close to the West High­
land Railway from which a 2% mile spur was laid. As the port would be handhng only out­
going traffic, this could be at a relatively steep downhill gradient o f 1 in 49, and thus 
shorter. At Cairnryan, a seven-mile extension from the Stranraer line was constructed.
The wharves at Faslane were 
designed to take 38 cranes from 
Southampton and London, and 31 
cranes for Cairnryan came from 
Parkeston Quay and London. Being 
export-only ports, there was no need 
for transit sheds or external storage 
areas at either site. When completed 
in 1942, Faslane had 3,000 feet of 
deep-water wharf, 900 feet o f No. 2 Military Port, Cairnryan.
lighterage wharf, MT wharfage and a berth for a 150-ton floating crane brought from 
Southampton. Cairnryan had 2,750 feet o f deep-water wharf and 1,360 feet o f hghterage 
wharf. Shandon Hydropathic Hotel was requisitioned for Faslane and additional camps 
were constructed to provide accommodation for 4,000 men at each site.
Faslane, with its higher level o f local back-up, was the busier of the two ports and large 
part of the tactical loading for TORCH, the 1942 Allied landings in North Africa, was han­
dled there. It was heavily involved in subsequent operations, notably HUSKY, the 1943
232 MT 63 193. MT 63 194. MT 63 195. Souvenir of the Cfyde Anchorages Emergency Port Scheme. Privately published by 
Scruttons Ltd in 1947. Behrens op. cit. pp. 134-135.
233 T-CN 74 17.
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landings in Sicily and, in 1944, before Overlord, the battleship Malaya was re-gunned there 
by the floating crane. And Faslane, with its powerful cranes, was in continuous demand for 
heavy lifts such as locomotives carried as deck cargo in ships which would then discharge 
the rest o f their cargo elsewhere. Tankers carrying up to 30 American aircraft at a time as 
deck cargo would unload them at Faslane before proceeding to oü berths. The aircraft 
were then taken by lighter to King George V Dock and towed along Old Renfrew Road to 
Renfrew Airport. There they joined other aircraft that had been landed direct at King 
George V Dock from freighters, were reassembled and flown o u t.234
Aside from essential supply convoys, the most vital cargoes to be handled in the Clyde 
were human. One o f the first large arrivals was BRACELET, 15,000 Anzac troops who 
landed at Greenock in June 1940. This was followed, later in June 1940, by the departure 
o f the first reinforcement WS convoy for the Middle East, a series that continued on a six­
weekly basis. Two large troop convoys arrived from Canada in late 1940. The siege o f 
Malta began in spring 1941 and, in April and May, three o f the Navy’s fast minelayers were 
loaded with vital supplies for the island. Also in May 1941, loading WS8C, the assault con­
voy for PUMA, the abortive landing on the Canary Islands, was badly interrupted by heavy 
air raids (see Chapter Five). September 1941. saw the loading o f the first convoys to the 
Soviet Union and, later that month, the departure of WS12 carrying the 1®' Armoured Di­
vision and other troops for CRUSADER, Auchinleck’s offensive in N orth Africa. This de­
parture involved three large store ships and nine liners with 20,000 troops who had arrived 
at Greenock in 55 trains.23®
CRUSADER failed, and the next sizeable departure from the Clyde in October, the 18^  ^
(East Anglian) Division, fared even worse, arriving in Singapore just before the Japanese. 
On 13 December 1941 Churchill arrived at Princes Pier to embark in HMS Duke of York 
for the first conference with the new American ally. As the war in N orth Africa intensified, 
so troop movements increased and the principal departures during 1942 were:
59,231 troops including die 5th Division and die 
Madagascar invasion force.
April ^  WS18 
May j  WS19
44j953 troops including the 2nd Division.
41,491 troops including the Sdi Armoured Division.
May WS19W 9,502 hfiddle East reinforcements in <2deen Mary.
May WS19X 60,285 troops including the 44di Division.
May i  WS19Y 
June j WS20
10,718 Middle East reinforcements m Queen Eliv;abeth.
54,386 troops including the 51st Division.
August 1 WS22 50,770 troops including the 56th Division.
Shying and the Demands HMSO 1978 g. 244.
234 Cameron : 1990 p. 68-72.
235 Yeo MS. IWM ref no 95/6/1.
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The fitting out o f the west side o f King George V Dock with transit sheds, cranes and sid­
ings was complete by early 1942.23® xhe new facilities soon proved their worth when, in 
April 1942, it was used to load Spitfires aboard the carrier USS Wasp for Operation CAL­
ENDAR, the flying o f 47 fighters into Malta. Wasp sailed on 14 April escorted by the battle- 
cruiser Renown and six destroyers and flew off her Spitfires at extreme range from Malta, 
but just 17 of them remained undamaged after two days on the beleaguered island. Wasp 
returned to the Clyde on 30 April along with the British carrier Eagle and, when the two 
ships sailed on 3 May for Operation BOWERY, they bore another 62 Spitfires for Malta.237
The best known Malta relief convoy, PEDESTAL, made up of 14 fast, modern merchantmen, 
sailed Greenock at 1800/7 August. The close escort comprised Nigeria, Kenya, Amas(on, Der­
went and Zetland. Argus, Sardonyx and Buxton, joined later by Victorious, Sirius, Foresight, Fuiy, 
Intrepid and Icarus from Scapa. Force H, the heavy escort, had sailed Scapa at 1600/3 as Nel­
son, Rodney, Ashanti, Tartar, Eskimo, Somali, Pathfinder and Quentin. Penn was delayed by boiler 
defects but caught up. Also to join the convoy were, from Freetown, Indomitable, Phoebe, Ea- 
forey, Ughtning and Lookout and, from Gibraltar, Eagle with escorting destroyers, the oilers 
Brown Ranger and Dingledale, and the tug Jaunty.
One of the most vital convoys to  sail from the Clyde was the PEDESTAL Malta 
relief operation in 1942. Inset, in one of the most famous images of the war, 
the tanker Ohio is towed into Grand Harbour. One of the few tankers with 
sufficient laden speed to  have a chance of reaching Malta, the Texaco-owned  
Ohio was taken over by a British and loaded at Dunglass before joining the 
rest of the PEDESTAL ships off Greenock on 3 1 July 1942. The convoy left the 
Clyde on the evening of 2 August and just five merchantmen, including the 
heavily damaged but indispensable Ohio reached Malta two weeks later. But 
it was just enough to save that beleagured island.
236 The cost of completing the dock was £192,000 for which, under the Civil Defence Act 1939, Clyde Navigation 
Trust qualified for a 65% grant. This was just one of many capital projects carried out in Glasgow docks during the 
war under government schemes or at the behest o f the Admiralty. In 1948, after the Admiralty had removed such 
plant as it needed for its own dockyards, the rest was sold off to the Trust at a knockdown price. T-CN 16 74/16.
237 Jeffrey : 1993 pp. 117-118. Cameron : 1990 p. 68.
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Despite this massive show of force, just five merchantmen reached Grand Harbour; Port 
Chalmers, Melbourne Star, Brisbane Star and Rochester Castle got in under their own steam and the 
tanker Ohio limped in, kept afloat by the destroyers Bramham and Penn. The cost to the Navy 
was heavy indeed with Eagle, Manchester, Cairo and Foresight sunk and Indomitable, Nigeria, 
Kenya, Ithuriel, Wolverine and Penn ah damaged. Thirteen FAA aircraft had been shot down and 
another 16 Sea Hurricanes had been lost with Eagle. The RAF had lost one Beaufighter and 
four Spitfires after the convoy came within range of Malta-based aircraft. More than 300 
men had died.^ ®®
BOLERO, the US build up in Britain, was initially dogged by American over-estimates o f 
the numbers o f troops that could be brought over and accommodated in Britain. The US 
Army wanted piers and docks allocated for their sole use and manned by so-caUed Docks 
(Negro) Battalions. No account had been taken o f the effect that the diversion o f shipping 
this would entail would have on other UK-bound traffic. One estimate put the consequent 
reduction in UK food and supply imports at 266,000 tons per month. This, and the need 
to make increased tonnage available for convoys for the Soviet Union, led to a reduction in 
US expectations. And, with dock space at a premium, the allocation o f piers solely for 
American use would not have been efficient. Major General John Lee led an American 
delegation to Britain in May 1942 proclaiming, much to the alarm of the Ministry of 
Transport, that shipments of vehicles would begin at the rate of 12,000 a month from July. 
It had to be pointed out to the Americans that there were nowhere near enough cranes 
available to handle that number o f cased vehicles, indeed the existing cranes were fully ex­
tended handling exports o f vehicles from Britain, then running at about 1,000 per month.
Canadian troop convoys had run since mid-1940 and inward movements of American 
troops to the Clyde began with the arrival o f the fully-laden Aquitania on 12 May 1942. 
The Americans went on to Northern Ireland where they relieved British garrison troops 
for service in North Africa. Large liners were unable to discharge at Belfast, so the GIs 
were transferred to the former pleasure steamers of the ‘Butterfly Fleet’ for onward pas­
sage to Northern Ireland, and their MT was driven to Stranraer from where it crossed by 
ferry. The Cnnaxàet Queen Mary sailed from New York on 11 May 1942 with 9,880 GIs and 
875 crew, the first time more than 10,000 had travelled aboard a single ship. She Queen 
Elis(abeth were joined by Nieuw Amsterdam and lie de France and all kept up a regular service, 
in between which ran mixed US and British convoys o f smaller ships. Queen Mary left New 
York on 2 August 1942 with 15,125 troops, the first time an entire US Division had been 
transported in a single ship. All the hners reduced their capacity in winter, the Queens carry­
ing around 10,000 troops. But the record for a single crossing was the 15,740 troops and
238 Smith : 1987. See also Roskill : 1956 pp. 302-308.
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943 crew who left New York in. Queen Mary on 23 July 1943 and arrived at Greenock on 30 
July still stands as the largest number o f people ever embarked on a single ocean crossing. 
Some 86 special trains were needed to clear the troops from Greenock.
TORCH, at the end of 1942, involved by far the largest tactical loading operation then car­
ried out. The logistical effort involved in assembling the assault and follow-up formations 
in west coast ports from the Bristol Channel to the Clyde was immense and, between 7 and 
26 November, some 373 troop train movements took place as follows;
Entraining Area Ports of embarkation
Clyde 1 Mersey i South Wales | Avonmouth
London 3 ! 4 i 2 ; -
Salisbury Plain 10 i 34 1 3 j 2
South o f England Ï1 i 9 -
West o f England 2 ; 1 -
South West England - 30 1 2
South East England 8 I 3 1 - ; 4
South Wales Ï ; 4 : - 1 1
East o f England 14 6 i 1 ; -Midlands 5 J .  1 5 j 4 . 2
Scotland and North o f  England 115 i 67 i 9 I 1Total 169 173 : 19 ; 12
j Source: Nock : 1971.
And, once the ships loading in the Mersey and Bristol Channel had completed, they 
steamed north to join convoys in the Clyde. At Greenock and Glasgow, loading started on 
27 September 1942 and supply ship saUings from the Clyde for Gibraltar had begun in 
mid-October. When the fast assault convoys KMF(A)1 and KM F(0)1 sailed on 25-26 Oc­
tober, they alone carried 31,000 men, 3,800 tons o f assault stores, 1,600 vehicles and 112 
guns. KMF2, the first follow-up convoy to leave the Clyde carried 36,500 men, 11,000 tons 
of stores, 1,600 vehicles and 70 guns. The second follow-up convoy comprised 33,000 
troops in 27 ships. Sailings on a smaller scale continued every 14 days into November, as 
did regular AT convoy arrivals o f US troops from America.
HUSKY, the 1943 invasion o f Sicily, the Clyde element of which involved 41,000 mainly Ca­
nadian troops brought to Clydeside in 96 trains and loaded aboard 63 ships, among them 17 
LSTs which loaded vehicles off specially constructed hards at Wemyss Bay. Total move­
ments through the Clyde in June 1943 alone amounted to 114,000 men and 86,000 tons of 
stores. Among the inward moves that month were 14,000 POWs from North Africa.
On 16 January 1944, a special meeting o f the Clyde Navigation Trustees had just one item 
on the agenda, ‘Berthing for Invasion Ships’. More land for open storage was to be taken 
up, the 4,500 workforce was to be augmented by ‘US coloured troops’ and three compa­
nies of Royal Engineers, ships awaiting repairs were to be cleared from berths and Glas­
gow’s tug fleet was to be kept ‘on top form’ in case any of them had to be withdrawn for 
invasion duty. Two tankers delivered aircraft to King George V Dock on 12 and 15 Febru­
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ary, another 74 aircraft were due there by Hghter from Faslane immediately afterwards and 
eight US troopships were to arrive at the dock on 20 and 21 February. South coast ports 
were closing to allow the assembly o f the invasion fleet, and an additional 12 arrivals 
monthly would have to be accepted in the Clyde. An emergency programme of conversion 
and fitting out o f ships for Normandy was also under way.23®
More than 250,000 personnel came to the Clyde in March and April 1944, some 75,000 of 
them British, the rest American. Such was the pressure on the railway system, many of 
these arrivals were moved south by coaster. On D Day itself. Queen Elit^abeth was disem­
barking GIs at the Tad o’ the Bank, but the Clyde played little direct part in the assault op­
eration, notable departures for Normandy being the battleship Rodney and the 1 0 ^^  Cruiser 
Squadron led by Belfast. Large-scale inward movements o f American troops ended with the 
arrival of 10,905 aboard the Queen Mary at Gourock on 23 March 1945 and, from July, US 
troop movements, by then outwards, moved to Southampton.
In 1947, Clyde Navigation Trust published the following statistics showing activity in Glas­
gow Docks (results for war years in blue):
To 30/6 GRT vessels Tons goods Revenue vessels (£) Revenue goods (£) Other revenue {{) Total revenue (£)
1938 15721920 7264775 338277 349167 325027 1012741
1939 15758478 6189184 329499 304246 322186 955932
 ^ 1940 16321741 7975141 300821 3393001 387233^ 1027354
1941 15201002 87443641 285975 398057 469743 1153775
1942 143317Î6" 7989315 258849 445884 550433'^ 1255216
1943 16051714 8797694 265207 469787 600070 1335064
1944 18140522 9219589 296634 478668 611673 1386775
1945 16233116 8949343 272705 462238 604885 1339799
1946 11253516 6226630 2554Ï0 371593 553121 1180124
 ^ Source: The Tort of Glasgow. Clyde Navigation Trust (1947) |
To this must be added the 2.34 million tons and 10 million packages handled by the Clyde 
Anchorages Emergency Port Scheme and at least 3.18 million tons o f military stores that 
passed through Glasgow and Greenock. A further half miUion tons o f various cargoes 
were handled by lighterage between the military port at Faslane and Glasgow. Thus the 
grand total for known non-oil cargoes handled in the Clyde comes to 57,695,446 tons, 
though this is incomplete as figures for non-military cargoes handled at Greenock do not 
appear to have survived. N or are there consolidated figures for the military ports, in par­
ticular Faslane, and nor are there figures for cargo handling at minor ports in the Clyde 
such as Ayr, Ardrossan and Irvine.240
Thus giving the following totals (including coastwise shipping) with comparative figures 
for the Mersey, as given by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board in 1946 shown in red:
239 T-CN 16 74/25.
240 por example, in 1936 Ayr was handling 1.6 million tons o f  cargo and the 40-acre Troon Harbour was 
handling almost 600,000 tons. Owen : 1939 p. 293 et passim.
147
North Western Approaches
T otal tonnage o f  vessels 1938-1946
Total cargo tonnage 1938-1946
Total tonnage o f vessels 1940-1945
112,001,731
"71,356,035
96,279,811
57,695,446
143,000,000
75,150,100T oW  catgq tonnage 1940-1945
And some 4.9 million movements o f military personnel took place on the Clyde, among 
the most significant outward movements being the 41,000 troops, mainly Canadian, who 
arrived at Greenock in 93 special trains and were embarked for HUSKY, the 1943 Sicily in­
vasion. But the largest single assemblage of shipping in the Clyde was ahead of TORCH, the 
1942 invasion o f North Africa, when 54 ships with 31,000 men, 3,800 tons o f stores, 1,600 
vehicles and 112 guns sailed Greenock on the night o f 25-26 October for the KMS2 as­
sault convoy (another 12 ships joined from Loch Ewe). KMS2 must not be seen in isola­
tion, as it was but one o f 11 major outward movements from the Clyde between 2 October 
and 1 November 1942 in support o f the assault phase of TORCH. Clyde pilots undertook 
over 200,000 pilotage operations, moving more than 500 miUion tons o f shipping. And the 
Clyde’s main shipbuilding concerns fulfilled 27,590 large contracts, building 1,549 naval 
vessels, 354 merchant ships and repairing 25,687 ships of various types. Eighteen small 
yards within the Clyde constructed 791 minor vessels.^^i
Placing the Clyde’s contribution in perspective invites comparison with the Mersey as here 
was another large west coast river port with distinct advantages over the Clyde. With a wet 
area of 658 acres as opposed to Glasgow’s 360 acres, and 38 miles o f lineal quayage as op­
posed to Glasgow’s 12 miles, the twin ports o f Liverpool and Birkenhead were very much 
larger. They had far better transit shed and warehouse capacity, they were considerably closer 
to the industrial heartland of Britain and they had better transport links. They were used to 
handling larger quantities of cargo than the Clyde and had excellent ship repair facilities in­
cluding 20 graving docks, one being the largest dry dock in Britain (though this is only an 
advantage when required for the largest ships).
But there were structural difficulties that favoured the Clyde. The tidal range at springs in the 
Mersey is 9 metres while at Greenock it is just 3 metres. Thus, port working in the Mersey 
was almost entirely dependent on enclosed docks held by gates only operable at half-tide and 
above. The Clyde may be narrow, but it was at least capable of aU-tide working for all but the 
largest vessels. And the Clyde also offered sheltered anchorages for overside discharge, not 
an option in the strong tidal streams of the Mersey.242
Liverpool was also far closer to enemy airfields in northern France and in heavy raids 
mainly concentrated between December 1940 and May 1941 harbour works were badly 
damaged and some 91 merchant vessels were sunk or seriously damaged. Following par-
241 T-CN 16 74/25. The Port of Glasgow. Clyde Navigation Trust (1947).
242 Owen : 1939 pp. 74 ,285, 293. Bird ; 1963 ch. 3.
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ticularly heavy raids in May 1941, thirteen ships had to be diverted away from Liverpool. 4^3 
Raid damage certainly caused havoc on Merseyside, but Regional Port Director J. Gibson 
Jarvie had been appointed in 1941 without suitable experience. This led to what Behrens 
euphemistically describes as the break down of ‘arrangements’ in the port and Gibson Jar- 
vie’s replacement by Robert Letch from the Clyde at the end o f 1942. While Mountfield 
refers to this only fleetingly in his authoritative account, Behrens alludes to obstruction, 
rivalries and intrigues, and to Gibson Jarvie’s inability to control the work force. Clearly, 
by 1942, Liverpool Docks were in d i s a r r a y . ^44
And there is some disagreement about the actual performance o f the Mersey. Mountfield 
and Hyde both give the tonnage o f non-oÜ cargo handled on the Mersey as 70 million tons 
and Ritchie-Noakes gives the figure for personnel passing through Liverpool as 4.7 mÜ- 
lion.245 Scarth offers the higher figure o f 75 milUon tons o f cargo and states that the Mer­
sey maintained ‘vital coastal traffic to the extent o f two and a half million tons per year.’
He cites no reference for the 7% variation in the overall cargo figure and nor does he make 
it clear whether the coastwise traffic figure represents tonnage o f ships or cargo, whether 
that is in addition to the 75 million tons or indeed whether that figure applies every y e a r . ^46 
In fact, according to the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, some 23 million tons GRT of 
coastwise shipping was handled by the port during the war in addition to 120 million tons 
o f ocean-going shipping. Scarth’s figures, along with the questionable assertion that ‘most 
o f the supplies’ for TORCH were sent from Merseyside, are quoted by Merseyside Maritime 
Museum who cite Behrens as the source, though no such figures are given therein. In fact, 
it would appear that the Museum’s figures are based on those in the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board’s Port A t  War (1947).
Yet incomplete and, in some respects, unreliable raw statistics such as are available for the 
Clyde and the Mersey are an untrustworthy measure o f relative performance (though they 
do highlight the need for a new study o f Britain’s ports in the Second World War). They 
take no account o f differences in the roles o f the two ports, in their infrastructure or in the 
types o f cargoes handled and for whom. The Clyde, for example, contributed much more 
from shipbuilding and, in particular, its integrated naval armaments industry. What can 
safely be deduced is that the two ports were o f broadly equal importance to the AlHed war 
effort. The Clyde showed a greater propensity to expand its activities, notably in the 1940- -j
41 period and again in 1943-44, albeit from a lower base. And there is evidence to suggest ,|
that the Mersey under-performed in the middle years o f the war. Î
I!
243 Behrens op. |
244 Ibid. p. 132-133. I
245 Mountfield : 1965 p. 174. Hyde : 1971 p. 179. j
246 Battle of the Atlantic 50'^  Anniversay (1943-1993). (Brodie Publishing 1993) p. 69. j
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Sc o t l a n d ’s R o l e  in  R e t r o s p e c t
Once Axis forces were established on the west coast of France, the South Western Ap­
proaches were effectively closed to Allied shipping and east and south coast ports were only 
able to operate at reduced capacity, if at all The North Western Approaches became the only 
means by which Atlantic supply convoys could reach the two principal west coast port com­
plexes in the Clyde and the Mersey. As a result, particularly in late 1940, it was the waters off 
the west coast o f Scotland that saw the most intense convoy battles of the Battle o f the At­
lantic. In October and November o f that year, with the U boat campaign in the North West­
ern Approaches at its most intense, defeat in the trade war was a real possibility.
But, at this, the only time when the U boats could realistically have forced issue on the At­
lantic route, and the when the Battle of the Atlantic was predominantly being fought off 
Scotland, the German effort proved unsustainable. There were, in late 1940, too few opera­
tional ocean-going U boats, and too few trained crews to man them. And. from early 1941, 
increasingly numerous surface escorts and aircraft operating from Scotland and Northern 
Ireland began forcing the U boats westwards into mid-Atlantic where shipping was less con­
centrated, convoys had greater room to manoeuvre in response to improving Allied intelli­
gence and where U boat operations were inevitably less efficient, not least because so much 
time and fuel was wasted on long passages to and from the operational area.
The close-escorting o f ocean convoys in late 1940 was the responsibility of destroyers, 
sloops and corvettes based at Greenock and, latterly, Londonderry. But it was apparent 
from the outset that, not only were there nowhere near enough escorts to go round, but 
there were also were fundamental shortcomings in the Navy’s anti-submarine tactics and 
training. Thus, one o f Scotland’s most vital contributions to victory in the Battle of the 
Atlantic lay in the escort group anti-submarine training establishments at Tobermory, 
Stornoway and Campbeltown.
Scotland made two other highly significant contributions in the battle to beat the U boat. 
First, there were the ‘pinches’ o f Enigma cypher intelligence by Naval forces based in Scot­
land. And secondly, Scotland provided vital bases for the Coastal Command aircraft, initially 
Sunderlands based at Oban, Islay and Scapa Flow, then Catalinas and finally VLR iandplanes 
operating from, for example, Tiree and Benbecula and, on the mainland, Tain. Ah these as­
sets came together to close the Atlantic Gap in 1943, and to beat j’^ /iorf/j^Z-equipped U boats 
once they returned to British and, in particular, Scottish, coastal waters in 1944-45.
Finally, the contribution o f the Clyde, as one o f the two principal British port complexes at 
the eastern end o f the Adantic supply chain, was fundamental to the Allied victory. Had 
the Clyde not offered port facilities capable o f rapid expansion and had it not operated
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with increasing efficiency, the remaining British ports still capable of operation could not 
have absorbed 8 million tons o f cargo per annum. And, even were that remotely possible, 
many o f these cargoes would have been landed far distant from where they were required, 
that is in the industrial belt o f Scotland. Also, as the next chapter will demonstrate, only 
the Clyde and the Mersey could have handled the troop movements, almost 5 million in 
either case, and supply convoys that supported the desert war including the decisive vic­
tory at El Alamein, that allowed major distant-water amphibious operations like TORCH, 
HUSKY and, ultimately, OVERLORD.
Put simply, while there could have been no Normandy invasion without the Clyde, it is 
also true that, without the Clyde, Britain could not have brought in the resources to con­
tinue the war beyond the early months o f 1941.
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SC O TL A N D ’S C O M B IN E D  O PER A TIO N S BASES
The Dunkirk evacuation ended on 4 June 1940 and, four days later, the last British and 
French troops withdrew from Norway. With the exception o f the Rock o f Gibraltar, the 
entire European littoral between the N orth Cape and the Adriatic was, by the end o f June, 
either in enemy hands or neutral. This left those planning to take a land war to the enemy 
with just two options. One was by disruptive operations by small teams of agents and 
saboteurs organised by the Special Operations Executive and MI6. But the only way in 
which the enemy could be fully engaged on land, and finally defeated, would be by am­
phibious operations in which all three services would co-operate fully.
Combined Operations as a science o f war was nothing new; the Greeks, the Romans and 
the Normans had all practised it. Serious reverses in the Seven Years War brought Pitt the 
Elder to power advocating a distant-water amphibious strategy and Wolfe's brilliant assault 
at Quebec in 1759 was a model o f the art. And, after the Boer War revealed grave short­
comings in the British Army, Admiral Fisher had incensed the generals with his assertion 
that, ‘The Regular Army should be regarded as a projectile to be fired by the Navy.’* More 
recently, in 1915, there had been the attempt to force the Dardanelles and take Constan­
tinople. Here, however, the Turks were expecting the assault, intelligence gathering was 
inadequate, planning was haphazard and hamstrung by meddlesome politicians, inept 
commanders dithered in the face o f determined opposition, troops were landed without 
equipment and, as a result, massacred.
But the Dardanelles concept was not intrinsically wrong-headed. It was driven by a need to 
take pressure off the Russians and, had it succeeded, as it came close to doing, it would 
also have eased pressure on the Western Front and shortened the war. The reasons for its 
failure lay in the manner o f its execution and two men who played key roles in that cam­
paign were Winston Churchill and the then Commodore Roger Keyes. Both were, in dif­
ferent ways, haunted by 1915, but they were to be heavily involved in Combined Opera-
* Fisher quoted in Padfield : 1993 p. 454.
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tlons in the Second World War.
Scotland played a central role in Combined Operations, providing training establishments 
and operational bases at which the landing techniques that would ultimately see the Allies 
ashore in Normandy were developed and perfected. Here, the establishment o f the Direc­
torate o f Combined Operations is examined and the significance o f the Combined Training 
Centre at Inveraray is considered for the first time, along with its operational history from 
the first tentative raids in 1941 to amphibious landings like TORCH, HUSKY and OVERLORD.
Combined Operations in the Second World War suffered an inauspicious genesis in Scan­
dinavia during 1939 and 1940. And it is there that this study o f Scotland's role must begin.
R i g h t  o f  P a s s a g e  -  S c a n d i n a v i a n  D e b a c l e
England and France bave demanded right of passage through Norwey and Sweden.
The Führer will act?-
In September 1939 the Soviet Union and Germany partitioned Poland along lines agreed in 
the Nazi-Soviet pact signed the previous month. A secret protocol to the agreement al­
lowed the Soviets to annexe Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by early October. Then, on 30 
November, following four days o f fabricated border incidents, the Red Army invaded 
Finland. The Finns fought back with fierce determination and Soviet losses in both men 
and materiel were heavy. Unwilling to pick a fight with the Soviet Union, Britain wavered in 
the face o f pressure to aid Finland. But the Finns* stand caught the imagination o f the 
world and, as in the Spanish Civil War, foreign volunteers joined the fight. The Lord Nuf­
field backed British Committee to Aid Finland opened recruiting offices in London and 
Glasgow.® A British company of 145 volunteers joined Hungarians, Belgians and French 
aboard the Meteor which sailed Leith on 3 March 1940 for Bergen.^
Limited, discreet military assistance was given, however, and intelligence officers went to 
Bergen to supervise the unloading o f 30 Gladiator fighters. RAF ground crew posing as 
employees of the Gloster Aircraft Co. flew from Perth to Stavanger by BOAC airliner. The 
crates ostensibly contained farm machinery as they had to pass through neutral Norway
2 Diary o f  General Franz Haider for 6 March 1940 quoted in Andenaes, Riste and Skodvin : 1966 p. 43.
3 Some 1,390 volunteers were interviewed, though many, hke the one-eyed marksman with a wooden leg, were hope­
lessly unfit. Tacit government approval was signalled by the involvement o f MI5 in weeding out communists and 
other 'undesirables'. Brooke : 1990.
4 After the Finnish-Soviet armistice in March 1940 there were 717 foreign volunteers serving, mainly with the Ostav» 
S m  (Tough Detachment), including 341 Hungarians and 158 British. Few had arrived in time to take part in military 
action. Many tried to get home via Norway and Scotland but were trapped by the German invasion. Others were 
stuck in Finland and Sweden and drifted home by circuitous routes, some via South Africa, others by air from Stock­
holm to Leuchars. Ibid. p. 38.
North Western Approaches
and Sweden, but they were too big for the Bergea-Oslo railway and had to be modiEed, a 
delicate task given their contents A
On 19 December 1939 the AUied Supreme War Council decided that, provided Norway 
and Sweden were prepared to offer free passage, a large British and French force would go 
to FinlandA But there was an all-too-obvious subtext: since September Churchill's Admi­
ralty had been pursuing a series o f what one historian called 'slapdash* plans to interdict 
Swedish iron ore shipments to Germany from Narvik and the Swedish port o f LuleaA Al­
lied plans were evolving into little more than an invasion o f Norway with the primary aim 
of severing the iron ore supply Une, thus perhaps forcing Germany to give up Poland and 
bringing about Hitler’s downfall. For the Allies, and Britain in particular, the same funda­
mentals applied as in the imposition o f naval blockade discussed in Chapter One - almost 
any attempt at a quick-Ex soluEon was preferable to facing the Wehrmacht where it was 
strongest, in a land war in condnental Europe.^ So, concurrenEy with their agonising over 
Swedish ore shipments, they were also examining ways in which Rumanian oil suppHes, 
arguably far more important to Germany, could be halted.®
On 5 February 1940 the Supreme War Council authorised British plans christened STRAT­
FORD and AVONMOUTH, Erst considered in Spring 1939, in which territorial units would 
occupy Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim, and a regular formation would land at Narvik 
then march overland to the ore fields at GalHvare and Luleâ.^® But the opération was con­
ditional on Scandinavian consent and planning was dogged by vacillation, so litde had been 
achieved by 1 March when the Finnish Minister in London told Foreign Secretary Lord 
Halifax that Allied help would arrive too late. Unsurprisingly, Norway and Sweden had re­
fused free passage to Allied troops and, on 4 March, the British Chiefs o f  Staff concluded 
that an operation to help Finland had become impracticable though, as Movements Officer 
Colonel H. E. Yeo records, troops movements to  the Clyde only really began after this 
conclusion had been reached and continued for another ten days.^^ To the relief o f many, 
the Finns signed a peace accord with the Soviets on 12 March and Allied forces earmarked
STlie MI(R) mission to Finland included Andrew Croft and Malcolm Munthe who would play a leading role in Special 
Operations Executive operations mounted from Scotland to Norway and who learnt much from the Finns about 
Arctic warfare. Cruickshank : 1986 p. 50.
«Brookes : 1977p. 18. RosfciU ; 1977 p. 97.
?A.J. P. Taylor: English Histoty 1914-1945 (CUP 1965) quoted in Calder : 1991 p. 91.
«Derry : 1952 p. 12, Brookes : 1977 p. 19. Moulton : 1966 p. 49.
« See British plans for economic wasfare against Germany -  The problem of Swedish iron ore. Prof. Patrick Salmon in The Journal of 
Contemporary History YCÀ. 16 (1981) pp. 53-71.
10 The 49th Infantry Division, a Territorial formation, would secure the ports and the 5th (Regular) Division, another 
two Territorial Divisions and six and a half squadrons o f RAF fighter aircraft would proceed via Trondheim to Swe­
den. Chamberlain, with an eye to the Committee to Aid Finland volunteers, told the Council tliat the regular troops 
going to Finland should go as Volunteers’ as, he averted, that would mean that the Soviet Union would not have to 
declare war on Britain and France. After many changes had been made, the plan was effectively abandoned on 14 
March. Salmon op. cit. Moulton : 1966 pp. 49-50. Gilbert : 1989 pp. 188-189. Lamb r 1993 p. 31. Derry : 1952 p. 13.
" See Yeo MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 95/6/1.
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for Scandinavia were stood down .12 Taking on the Soviet Union would have been foUy, 
though British policy was not solely driven by military considerations; peace feelers to 
Germany were being pursued through neutral governments, most notably Sweden.
An earUer incident had crystaUised AUied and Axis intentions towards Scandinavia. The 
Graf Spec supply ship A.ltmark was sighted off Norway on 14 February 1940 so the cruisers 
Penelope and A.rethusa and the destroyers Cossack, Maori, Sikh, Ivanhoe and Intrepid saUed Ro- 
syth that afternoon to release British POWs known to be aboard.'^ Altmark was tracked 
into Norwegian territorial waters by Leuchars-based Hudsons on 16 February and, at
2200/16, on Churchill's order, ; -----------  ---------------- -- --------
Captain Philip Vian in Cossack 
entered the fjord and, after a brief 
fire fight, released 299 British 
seam e n .N o rw a y  protested, but 
the action did much for the Ad­
miralty from where ChurchUl re­
newed his efforts to gain Cabinet 
approval for an expedition to stop 
the Swedish ore traffic. His biog­
rapher writes; Cossack at Leith with the released POWs from Aftmark.
Churchill wanted to go on with the plan to seize Narvik: 'Our real objective', he said, 'was, o f course, 
to secure possession of the Galbvare ore fields, which would certainly shorten the war and save great 
bloodshed later on.' Up till now, he added, Britain had, 'had assistance to Finland as "cover" for such 
a move on our part, but we had now lost this justification for intervention in Scandinavia.'’^
ChurchUl was not alone in casting warUke eyes towards Scandinavia. Prompted by Admiral 
Raeder, who wanted bases on the Atlantic seaboard, and banking on his pact with StaUn 
giving him a largely free hand in Scandinavia, Hitler began planning an invasion of Norway 
and Denmark in December 1939. Yet, as one staff officer wrote, 'Inasmuch as both Hitler 
and Jodi aUowed us to work in peace, I was under the impression that they were not firmly 
resolved to execute the o p e ra t io n .H it le r  beUeved that nothing should divert the 
Wehrmacht from a decisive strike into France and the Low Countries, but then came the 
Altmark incident and, suspicious o f British intentions. Hitler ordered intensified prépara­
is Chamberlain dispersed the STRATFORD force, including the Scots Guards ski battalion, as he believed that, should 
Hitler hear of it, this would provide him with an excuse to invade Norway. Chamberlain’s inadequacy as a strategist 
is clear, but both Churchill and Ironside, the CIGS, remained fixated on die iron ore traffic. Moulton : 1966 p. 57. 
Derry : 1952 p. 12.
Penelope had to drop out due to machinery problems.
14 ADM 199 280. ADM 199 281. AIR 28 459. See also Vian ; 1960 pp. 24-31. Wiggan : 1982 and Moulton 1966 pp. 52- 
55, though the latter wrongly gives the date as 16 April 1940.
15 Gilbert: 1989 p. 188.
1^  Admiral Theodor Krancke quoted in Kersaudy : 1990 p. 44. See also Roskill : 1977 p. 96-99 and Nuremberg Trial Pro­
ceedings vol. 3 for Friday, 7 December 1945.
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tiens for a premeptive strike at Denmark and Norway, now codenamed WESERÜBUNG. 
General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst was appointed to lead the assault and, on 29 February 
1940, the go-ahead was given for it to take place ahead o f the attack in the westd^ On 2 
April, Hitler ordered that WESERÜBUNG should begin on 9 April.
Churchill, meanwhile, was advocating mining Norwegian territorial waters to force ore 
shipments out into international waters and into the arms o f the Royal Navy. WILFRED, 
Churchill’s mining scheme, had little military value, but from 21 March he had an unex­
pected ally in French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud who seemed eager to cement his shaky 
domestic political position with resolute military action. Reynaud also believed that a Scan­
dinavian campaign would divert German attention from the Western Front, thus moving 
the focus o f the war away from France. The Supreme War Council on 28 March agreed 
that WILFRED should proceed on 4 April, though, to assuage public opinion at home and 
abroad, notably in the United States, it was to be preceded by a diplomatic warning to Oslo 
on 1 A p ril.M u d d led  planning and French chicanery brought a postponement until 8 
April, a fatal delay as events were to prove. But, on 4 April, a buoyant Chamberlain felt 
able to offer his infamous, banal reassurance tliat Hitler had 'missed the bus'.^®
Force WS comprising the minelayer Tepiot Bank escorted by Ingkjidd, I/ex, Isis and Imogen 
sailed Scapa on 5 April with a distant escort of Renomt, Glowworm, Gr^hound, Hyperion and 
Hero to lay mines off Stadlandet, The minelaying destroyers Hsk, Impulsive, Icarus and Imn- 
hoe escorted by H ar^, Hotspur, Havock and Hunter o f the 2""^  Flotilla followed as Force WV 
to lay mines off Vestfjord. A dummy field was also to be laid off Molde. Rodney, Valiant, 
Repulse, Sheffield, Penelope and ten destroyers sailed Scapa at 2015/7 as a covering force and 
Manchester, Southampton and five destroyers were nearby covering a Norwegian convoy. Be­
fore dawn on 8 April, 234 mines were laid inshore o ff Vestfjord, but RAF reconnaissance 
reports o f enemy heavy units at sea led to the cancellation o f the minelay o ff Stadlandet.
On 7 April, in anticipation o f a German reaction to WILFRED, remnants o f the STRATFORD 
force, now known as R4, assembled at Rosyth and G re e n o c k .A t Greenock, with orders to 
land at Trondheim and Narvik, were the 1®’ Scots Guards in the trooper Batoy and the Hal-
’7 Falkenhorst encountered the same problem that would confront Allied planners in April 1940: a chronic lack of 
intelligence about Norway, a country which had hitherto been o f little rnilitary significance. When he was appointed 
on 20 February, he left Hitler's office and, 'Once outside, I went into town and bought a Baedeker, a tourist guide, in 
order to find out what Norway was like... ' Ibid. pp. 44-45.
(«The warning, long winded and symptomatic o f  Allied disarray, is reproduced in Cowie : 1949 pp. 141-144. That the 
Supreme War Council, an unwelcome legacy of the First World War, had not met since 5 February, and before tliat 
since 1939, serves as a measure o f both Allied irresolution and French political instability. For an illuminating ac­
count o f the French political scene in 1940 see Ala stair Horne's To Lose A  Baffle - France 1940 (Macmillan 1969).
i^See British Strategy and Norway 1939-1940 paper by Prof. Patrick Salmon in Salmon (ed.) : 1995 pp. 3-14.
20 Brookes : 1977 pp 31-32. Roskill : 1954 pp. 156-158. Winton : 1986 p. 100.
2* Much o f the STRATFORD force had gone to France, thus a British force o f eight battalions, mostly ill-trained, poorly 
equipped Territorials, was being sent against a German force o f  six divisions (51 battalions). The Luftwaffe deployed
' ( i i ' j ' i l  i ' >\  c r k ’ r t f
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lamshke Battalion of the Yorks and Lancs Regiment in Chroby. Embarking in Devonshire, 
Berwick, York and Glasgow at Rosyth, and bound for Bergen and Stavanger, were the 1 /4  
Royal Lincolns, 1/4  King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and the 1 /8  Sherwood Forest- 
ers.22 The R4 troops were never intended as an assault force, it being assumed that they 
would make unopposed landings and garrison the ports, so they had, for example, no ar­
mour and no artillery.
Then a Coastal Command Hudson sighted a German naval squadron steaming north in the 
Skaggerak at 0805/7. Assuming they were only exercising, the aircrew did not report the 
ships until they landed at Leuchars at 1100/7A3 The Admiralty concluded that the German 
ships were heading for the North Atlantic. The Home Fleet sailed north-east from Scapa 
by 2015/7 and, just after 1200/8, the four cruisers assigned to Force R4 were ordered to 
'March Troops Ashore' and join the fleet. The Lincolnshires returned from the Rosyth 
sports field to find Berwick^s crew dumping their stores and weapons on the jetty. The 
Leicesters and Yorkshires were bundled ashore from Devonshire and York in under an hour, 
then watched the cruisers pass under the Forth Bridge with much o f their equipment.24 
The troops at Greenock were left without escort when the cruiser Aurora and six destroy­
ers were ordered to join the Fleet. The R4 plan had been abandoned, and with it the last 
chance to gain a secure foothold in Norway.
Glowworm had detached the previous evening to look for a man lost overboard and, at 
about 0815/8, encountered the cruiser Hipper w&iting to enter Narvik with troops. Glow­
worm was overwhelmed and sunk, but not before she had rammed Hipper and torn away 
150 feet o f her starboard bulge. Thirty-eight o f her crew survived.^s Glowworm’s enemy re­
ports faded at 0855/8 but were enough to persuade the Admiralty to send the destroyers o f 
Force WV to join Renown. Vestfjord and Narvik were thus left completely unprotected.^^ 
German warships were sighted in Oslo fjord and off Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger in 
the early hours o f 9 April. At 0337/9 Renown sighted the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau north o f Vestfjord and, in a brisk action, scored four damaging hits on Gneisenau 
before the German ships used their superior speed to escape. But German troopships had 
akeady swept past the Vestfjord minefield bound for Narvik and, at 0430/9, MI6 handed
over 1,000 aircraft for Wesentbung, 571 o f them JU52 transports, against which the pitifully small RAF contribution 
could make little impression. Jefkey ; 1992 p. 110. Brookes : 1977 pp. 21-22. Terraine : 1985 p. 115.
22 Winton : 1986 pp 102-103. Adams ; 1989 p. 13.
23 RoskiU blames the Admiralty for the delay, but the fault lay with the aircrew. Roskill : 1954 p. 159- AIR 28 459. AIR 
28 465. Derry : 1952 p. 28.
24 Believing tliat another surface fleet action was imminent, and thus demonstrating the outdatedness o f his strategic 
thinking, Churchill took it upon himself to order the R4 troops ashore. Quoting General Sir Ian Jacob, Roskill writes 
of the War Cabinet’s astonishment at the First Lord’s unilateral decision which was telephoned to Rosyth by the First 
Sea Lord. Neither Churchill nor Pound saw fit to consult or even inform C-in-C Home Fleet Admiral Forbes. Roskill 
: 1977 pp. 98-99. Jeffrey ; 1992 p. 114.
25 Moulton : 1966 pp. 76-77.
26RoskiU: 1954 p. 160.
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the Admkalty aa intercepted telegram from Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht to 
their Legation in Spain stating that the German Minister in Oslo, Kurt Brauer, had de­
manded the surrender of Norway. The surrender demand was refused.^^ At 0630/9 MI6 
told the British Chiefs of Staff that the Norwegian Government was evacuating Oslo.^»
The War Cabinet met at noon and learned that a small German force was ashore at Narvik. 
Churchill said that naval forces had been ordered to force their way into Narvik and Ber­
gen, but that Trondheim would be left until the situation clarified^® Then the assault on 
Bergen was cancelled as the British force would be too small to deal with two German 
cruisers reported there.^° Allied planning became ever more muddled and British com­
manders, following the uncertain lead given by both War Cabinet and Admiralty, changed 
tack on the most important objective three times in twelve hours. First Trondheim was the 
priority, then Narvik and Bergen, then Narvik alone - but worse was to follow. The Su­
preme War Council decided late on the 9*^  that two British battalions should sail for N or­
way that night. A further five battalions and French Alpine troops would sail within three 
days and four more battalions were to be ready within two weeks. Churchill pushed for 
these forces to be directed towards Narvik while others promoted Trondheim and Bergen. 
In the face o f disagreement, the Council dithered, ordering merely that the troops should 
be sent to Norwegian ports without specifying what these were to be.^^
That night the British Military Co-ordination Committee decided unilaterally that the Al­
lied forces available would be unable to  dislodge the Germans from more than one point 
on the Norwegian coast, and that the attack must be concentrated on Narvik. The Chiefs 
o f Staff were ordered to prepare an attack on Narvik, although they were also to examine 
the possibility o f  securing a foothold at Namsos and Aandalsnes with a view to mounting a 
pincer attack on Trondheim. Churchill, having driven this decision through in the face o f 
the Supreme War Council's hesitancy, appealed for the 'utmost expedition'. Late on 10 
April, the 1/4  Lincolns and the 1 /4  Yorkshires entrained at Dunfermline for the Clyde 
where, with little more than they stood up in, they embarked in Empress of Australia. Troop 
convoy N P l comprising Empress of Australia, Monarch of Bermuda and Reino del Pacifica was 
joined off Cape Wrath by Bafoy and Chrohy. Escorted by Manchester, Birmingham, Cairo and 
five destroyers, N P l was initially bound for Narvik, but, as minimal opposition was ex­
pected at Narvik, the force was then split with Chrohy and Empress of Australia making for
27ADM 116 4471 quoted in Gilbert ; 1989 p. 217.
2« MI3/6519 in PREM 1 419 quoted in Gilbert : 1989 p. 217
29 CAB 65 6 Minutes o f  War Cabinet No.85 at 1200/9 April 1940.
30 Recollections o f Eric Seal quoted in Gilbert r 1989 p. 219
31 CAB 99 3 Supreme War Council No.7 quoted in Gilbert : 1989 p. 221.
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Namsos with 146 Brigade. The assault on Trondheim was on .22
At dusk on 14 April, seamen and marines from Sheffield 2tXid Glasgow landed by destroy­
ers at Namsos, the first British force to land in Norway. They secured the quays and the 
road to Trondheim ahead of the arrival o f the troops from the Clyde. But Namsos harbour 
was too small for troopships, so when 146 Brigade arrived in Chrobty and Empress of Austra­
lia on 16 April, it had to be transhipped under air attack off LiUesjona, then brought to 
Namsos by destroyers. A further 300 tons o f equipment was lost in the process.^) French 
reinforcements arrived on 20 April and a week o f heavy fighting followed as General Carton 
de Wiart attacked south towards Trondheim. The Luftwaffe reduced Namsos to ruins, and 
de Wiart signalled that holding the town without air cover would be impossible.^'*
Meanwhile, on 14 April, another scratch force o f 680 marines and 45 officers had sailed 
Rosyth in Auckland, Black Swan, Flamingo and Bittern to land at Molde in support of a larger 
landing at Aandalsnes.^^ A gate drove the overloaded sloops into Invergordon and, by the 
time they sailed again on 16 April, they had been diverted to Andalsnes itself. They landed 
successfully the following night as the remaining elements o f R4, renamed SICKLEFORCE, 
were being loaded into the transport Orion and Galatea and Aretbusa at Rosyth. These 
troops were to follow the Marines into Andalsnes, then someone realised that Orion was 
too large to enter the harbour so the Territorials had to disembark again, this time in the 
pitch darkness and a gale, and board the cruisers Curacao and Carlisle. Colonel Dudley 
Clarke described the scene:
The hatches were off now and the scene below decks had become a sort o f storeman's infemo, with 
shadowy figures burrowing in the semi-darkness o f shaded lamps and torches. In the original haste to 
get o ff to  a quick start, goods o f every kind had been stowed in the holds in the order to which they 
arrived, with each following consignment piled in on top. N ow  reserves o f food and ammunition 
were mixed with unit equipment and skis for the Norwegians; bicycles and sappers' tools lay with 
medical provisions, while such thin^ as long-range wireless equipment as often as not was split be­
tween two holds. There was never a chance o f sorting this out in the dark and getting it into the ships 
in time, so the plan was being adopted o f  skimming the top layers from every hold and loading them 
in turn into each warship as she came alongside.^^
SICKLEFORCE sailed at 0700/17 and only when they were at sea did the full extent o f the
32 The rest o f N Pl continued north to Vestfjord and landed troops at Harstad. The planned assault on Narvik had to 
be abandoned due to deep snow and tlie fact that the ships had not been tactically loaded. Roskill : 1954 p. 190.
33 General Adrian Carton de Wiart wrote that; ‘The officers had little experience of handling men, although they had an 
able commander in Brigadier G. P. Phillips.’ In fairness, though, the Brigade could be excused a certain amount of 
confiisioru Movements Officer Colonel H. E. Yeo describes the chaos that attended their embarkation on 14 April:
One lot of MT drivers arrived &oxn Leith that morning, but before it embarked at KGV was ordered back to Rosyth.. .Plans 
were amalgunated, scrapped and then fresh plans erected for the same parties. Large liners could not get in, and troops 
taken in small lots off to them jhad] to go to Norway in warships so that these liners became floating hotels. Smaller liners 
(particularly tire three splendid Polish ships Chrobry, Baforf&oà Sobieskt} still went to and fro, till a stand-still set in on 27th 
April.
Yeo MS, IWM Dept, o f  Documents ref 95/6/1. Carton de Wiart : 1950 p. 168. Moulton : 1966 p. 168.
34 Carton de Wiart : 1950 p. 174.
35 This force was drawn mainly from the refitting Hood, Barham and Nelson. Also included was a searchlight regiment 
which, due to yet another shp-up, sailed without its searchlights. Winton : 1986 p. 111.
3«CIark: 1948. |
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chaos become apparent. Half a battalion had been left behind along with much of the 
communications equipment, all the range-finders and searchlights for the anti-aircraft guns, 
ail the mortar shells and most o f the vehicles. The brigade would land with one truck and 
three motorcycles. There were no maps o f Andalsnes, only three o f the officers had been in 
action and the men had received only the m ost cursory training, usually around 30 hours of 
evening courses. SICKLEFORCE began landing at 0300/19 with orders to move 60 miles 
inland from Andalsnes to Dombas, block the railway there, link up with Norwegian forces 
in the Lillehammer area and then attack north towards Trondheim - a tall order indeed for 
Brigadier Morgan's 1,000 ill-trained, poorly equipped Territorials. Even were SICKLEFORCE 
to reach all its objectives, it would be spread desperately thinly and would be at the mercy 
o f the Luftwaffe.
At Dombas, Morgan was told that marching on Trondheim would be suicidal, so SICKLE­
FORCE was deployed in waist-deep snow near Lillehammer railway station. More than a 
hundred men were captured and the survivors, along with three companies of Norwegian 
dragoons, retreated to make a stand at Tretten, 19 miles north of Lillehammer, but were 
again heavily defeated and the nine officers and 300 men who remained were evacuated to 
the coast. Meanwhile, like Namsos, the Luftwaffe was bombing Andalsnes almost daily.
Reinforcements for SICKLEFORCE were sent, notably on 22 April when Galatea, Sheffield, 
Glasgow and six destroyers sailed Rosyth with 2,200 men successfully landed the following 
day at Andalsnes and Molde. Another 1,600 men were carried across from Rosyth on 24 
April. What Morgan and de Wiart had not been told was that HAMMER, the direct naval 
assault on Trondheim, which they were to support, had been effectively abandoned on 19 
April largely because air cover could not be p r o v id e d .Galatea, Arethusa, Sheffield, Southamp­
ton, Somali, Mashona, Sikh, Wanderer, Walker and Tartar and the transports Ulster Prince and 
Ulster Monarch arrived off Andalsnes late on 30 April and, by 0200/1, around 2,200 men, 
survivors o f SICKLEFORCE and General Paget's 15’*^ Brigade were taken off. A similar 
number were taken o ff the folowing night by Manchester, Birmingham, the destroyers Ingle- 
field. Delight, Diana, Somali and Mashona?'^ Some 5,400 men o f de Wiart’s Namsos force were 
evacuated after dark on 2 May by three French ships, the cruisers Devonshire, York and Car­
lisle, the French destroyer Bison and four destroyers o f the 5’*’ Flotilla. Bison was bombed 
and sunk on the morning of 3 May and the destroyer Afridi took off her survivors. But that 
afternoon Afridi too was bombed and capsized with the loss o f 49 officers and men, 
around 30 Bison survivors and 13 men o f the Yorks and Lancs Regiment.'*®
37 Kersaudy : 1990 pp. 114-115. Roskill : 1954 p. 183.
38 Derry :1952 pp. 78-82.
39 RoskiU : 1954 : pp. 188-189. Kersaudy : 1990 p 179. Brookes : 1977 pp. 134-135 
4«Vian : 1960 pp. 47-49. RoskiU : 1954 : pp. 189-190.
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The wretched campaign in Norway dragged on until June 1940. O n 8 June the Group One 
evacuation convoy was escorted into Clyde with 15,000 troops.'** Valiant and a screen of 
destroyers had escorted the convoy to a point abeam of Shetland, then turned north to 
meet the following Group Two convoy comprising Oronscy, Ormonde, Arandora Star, Duchess 
of York, Royal Ulsterman, Ulster Prince and UIster Monarch escorted by Southampton, A rk  Royal 
and five destroyers which had sailed from Harstad on 8 June with 10,000 men. Unwittingly, 
however, the convoy was steaming right into the path o f Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and HipperA^ 
The German ships had earlier sunk Oil Pioneer, the trawler Juniper and the almost empty 
trooper Orama, then allowed the hospital ship Atlantis to proceed.
At 1545/8, some 300 miles
west o f Narvik, Scharnhorst 
sighted the carrier Glorious, 
which, deplorably, had been 
detached early for Scapa so if 
that her martinet Captain 
could court-martial his 
Commander (F). Valiant, 
some 250 miles away to the 
south-west, received the car­
rier’s signal reporting an 
enemy force shortly after
1600/8.'*^ Glorious and the destroyers Acasta and Ardent were sunk with the loss of 1,519 
lives; a disaster only marginally exceeded by the 1,523 believed lost with TitanicA R\xX. Acasta 
had torpedoed Scharnhorst, flooding her centre and starboard engine rooms and putting a 
turret out of action.'*^
Valiant learned o f the loss o f Orama from Atlantis on the morning o f 9 June, then hurried 
north to rendezvous with Group Two at 2200/9. But Scharnhorst had made for Trondheim 
to repair the damage inflicted by Acasta, otherwise she and Gneisenau could well have inter-
The entirely avoidable destruction of Glorious ranks as one of the 
w orst naval disasters of the war
41 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 371.
42 For the evacuation convoys see Brookes : 1977 pp. 171-172.
43 ADM 199 371.
44 Controversy has surrounded the loss of Glorious ever since. She was an unhappy ship and had detached to return to 
Scapa so that Captain D ’Oyly-Hughes could court-martial his Commander (F) with whom he had had a dispute over 
tactics. D ’Oyly-Hughes’ failure to fly off patrols is, at best, inexplicable and was probably linked to the dispute. The 
Admiralty had ignored warnings &om Bletchley Park that German heavy units were leaving the Baltic. It was alleged 
that the distress signal, also received by Devonshire was garbled, but it was clearly heard in Valiant. Admiral John Cun­
ningham in Devonshire was handed a complete copy of the signal, but his orders regarding safe conduct of the 
Norwegian Royal Family meant he was unable to respond. ADM 199 371. Winton : 1986 for the state o f  Glorious and 
the sinking. Smith : 1998 p. 56. Macintyre : 1971 pq>. 41-42. Roskill : 1960 pp. 69-70.
45 Derry gives the number o f lives lost in the three ships as 1,515, Roskill gives 1,470 but does not appear to include 
RAF aircrew lost, and the figure of 1,519 is the author’s to include those who died after being picked up. ADM 199 
363. ADM 199 371. Derry : 1952 p. 225. Roskill : 1977 pp. 107-108. Brookes : 1977 pp. 175-176.
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cepted Group Two ahead o f the rendezvous with Valiant. The carnage would have been 
appalling/'*
W i t s  a n d  L o w  C u n n i n g
Enterprises must beprepared with spedallp trained troops of the hunter class, who can develop a reign of ter­
rorfirst of all on the ’butcher and bolt’ policy. The passive resistance war, in which we have acquitted our­
selves so well, must come to an end. I  look to the Chiefs of Staff to propose me measuresfora vigorous enter­
prising and ceaseless offensive against the whole German occupied coastline.'^
Many eminent historians have discussed the failure in Norway, and most point to the 
Luftwaffe having established air superiority from the outset, thus countering British sea 
power/s Moulton cites a ‘national complacency’ that the strength o f the Royal Navy could 
make up for the known weakness o f the other two services and suggests that the root 
cause lay in the Inability o f the three services to understand the need for an integrated land, 
sea and air strategy/® Anotlier historian has lamented, 'From beginning to end the Allied 
operations in Norway...display an amateurishness and feebleness which to  this day can 
make the reader alternately blush and shiver/^o
Ultimately, though, the real lesson was that it is unwise to make mihtary commitments that 
cannot be followed through with sufficient force to ensure success. N ot is it prudent to 
signal one’s intentions to the enemy with such clarity as was offered by the British and 
French in 1939-40. And, in the conduct o f  the campaign, one need look no further than 
impatient politicians ignoring mihtary advice, divided command, muddled planning, inade­
quate intelHgence assessment and dissemination, contradictory orders and ill-trained troops 
being sent into action in an environment for which they had been neither prepared or 
equipped. AU this has to be set against the fact that the AUies had months in which to pre­
pare for their Scandinavian adventure. The lessons of GaUipoh and countless other cam­
paigns were having to be relearned.
During the momentous Norway debate on 8 May, which ushered ChurchiU into power. 
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes dehvered a devastating indictment of the campaign. The MP for 
Portsmouth and a national hero following his exploits in the First World War, Keyes was 
regarded as a speciaUst in Combined Operations. His ice was chiefly directed at the Admi­
ralty, and it is true that the Home Fleet was wrong-footed in the early stages. Sir Charles 
Forbes had to bear the sobriquet ‘Wrong-Way Charlie’ even if  much o f the blame did he
4« Winton : 1986 p. 183. Brookes ; 1977 p. 175.
47 Churchill minute o f 5 June 1940 quoted in Messenger ; 1985 pp. 26-28.
48 Notably Roskill : 1960 p. 62 et passim.
49 See Moulton : 1966 pp. 291-298.
50Terraine : 1985 p. 115.
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with Naval Intelligence, but the Navy had got the troops to where they were supposed to 
be, then brought them out again, all with minimal ait cover/*
There were some aspects of the Norway campaign from which the British could take com­
fort in June 1940. Independent Companies of 20 officers and 275 men had been formed as 
self-sufficient, ship-borne units in April 1940 to be taken to and from operations in their 
floating base. The five companies that reached Norway were told their mobility depended 
on requisitioning local craft and that they should, 'Use wits and low cunning'.52 They were 
to prevent the Germans occupying Bodo, Mo and Mosjoen. No. 5 Independent Company 
ambushed an enemy column near Mosjoen on 9 May.^^ Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Companies were 
involved in a fire fight on 22 May near Mo, but, by then the Germans had reached so far 
north that there was Httle for the Independent Companies to do and they returned to Scot­
land. '^*
The Independent Companies had promise, and, on 9 June, the War Office began seeking 
volunteers to form new Army Commandos.^^ Initially envisaged were operations 'o f the 
Zeebrugge type downwards' and irregular, cloak and dagger operations. While the Inde­
pendent Companies were trained to fight as individuals, Commandos were to operate as 
self-contained units.^^ The Independent Companies remained in being and 2 Commando 
was raised as a parachute unit with volunteers from all commands. 3 and 4 Commandos 
were raised from Southern Command, 5 and 6 Commandos from Western Command, 8 
Commando from the Household Division and 9 and 11 Commandos from Scottish Com­
mand.
Lieutenant General Alan Bourne, Adjutant General Royal Marines, was appointed Com­
mander (Raiding Operations) on 12 June and Captain L. E. H. Maund RN, Captain Nevill 
Garnons-Williams RN and Major Alan Hornby RA were appointed to his staff. Bourne was 
'double-hatted' as Director Combined Operations and Adjutant General and asked to re­
linquish the latter post, but Churchill appointed Keyes as DCO on 17 July, asking Bourne
5’ General Carton de Wiart recalled that, after teaching Scapa on 5 May and hastening to London, one o f his first visi­
tors was Roger Keyes who was gatliering evidence for his Commons speech and was under the impression that tile 
General felt let down by the Navy. Carton de Wiart assured him that the opposite was die case. Carton de Wiart ; 
1950 pp. 174-176.
52 Equipment included Arctic clothing, snowshoes, 30 days’ rations and five days’ emergency ration o f  pemmican. The 
companies were each given £4,000 in sterling and Norwegian currency to help then live off the land. Moulton : 1966 
p. 237. WO 106 1944.
53 The ambush was carried out in classic Pathan style. Eight Indian Army officers had been flown home to join tire 
Independent Companies at Gourock on 4 May. Moulton : 1966 fn. p. 237.
54 Messenger : 1985 p. 23 quoting Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Paterson. See also Adams : 1989 pp. 65-89.
55 Ibid. p. 26.
55 Ibid. pp. 26-28.
57 CAB 106 3. In October 1940 an attempt was made to reorganise these Commandos into Special Service Battalions 
within a Special Service Brigade, but this proved unweüdy and tire Commandos reverted to their former status.
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to coatkLue as his deputy/® Churchill was eager for raiding to begin and wrote to Keyes on 
25 July asking for four ampliibious raids employing between 5,000 and 10,000 men, the 
first to take place within three months/® But there were neither the men nor the ships to 
carry out the Prime Minister's request.
G r o w i n g  P a i n s
One of Bourne’s first concerns had been finding suitable bases for training the Army and 
the Navy in landing operations. South coast bases were vulnerable to air attack from occu­
pied France so, as Maund writes:
We had now to find a place as far distant as possible from attack but yet within the umbrella o f  some 
fighter organisation. It was finally decided that the only possible place was Inverary [sic]. Here the 
rains might fall almost contiauously, but it gave sheltered water and was, as it were, behind the de­
fences o f the Clyde.«®
The first reconnaissance of Inveraray had taken place on 6 July and the decision to set up a 
Combined Training Centre there had been reached by 10 July.*** There was some discussion 
over the name to be given to Inveraray, but, immediately on his appointment on 17 July, 
Keyes insisted on Quebec, a reference to the successful combined assault on the Heights o f 
Abraham in 1 7 5 9 .^ 2  ^  Combined Operations memorandum written just after Keyes’ ap­
pointment notes that Inveraray CTC;
.. .win be the training centre for Combined Operations on a large scale and the LCA and LCM 
carriers wiU be stationed there. In addition LCA, LCS and LCM not required for carriers will be 
housed two miles from Inveraray. It is intended to train as many Brigades o f the Army as pos­
sible in landing attacks beginning as soon as the carriers arrive at Inveraray.
9. The base and the landing craft carders will be under the command of Vice Admiral Hal-
lett.. .He will live ashore in Inveraray (Tigh-na-Rudha) and will have on his staff Naval and Mili­
tary staff officers for instructional purposes.
10 The base will consist o f the following:- The War Office is constructing a camp for 1200 men in 
Inveraray Park. The Admiralty is building a canteen at Inveraray for about 1500 men and a 
camp for 400 Naval ratings near the boatshed (see (d) below) 2 miles from Inveraray.. .A boat- 
shed, workshops and slipways for 60 LCA and LCS two miles south o f Inveraray. Also a tubu­
lar pier and a trot for the use o f craft. A  trot for LCM not hoisted in a carrier in Loch Gair.«3
Training began with 475 officers and men o f 3 Commando and 391 officers and men o f 8 
Commando on 11 October 1940. '^* Captain Peter Young commanding H Troop, 3 Com­
mando wrote;
58 Bourne interview quoted in Messenger : 1985 p. 32-34. See also The Keyes Papers vol. Ill, Paul G. Halpern (ed.), pp.
86-88 for the Directive to Bourne, a document drawn up in the heat o f the moment and one that was to cause no
end of trouble during Keyes’ tenure as DCO. j
59 Fergusson : 1961 p. 55. |
® Maund : 1949 p. 75. j
« D E F E 2  815. i
«2 Ibid. j
«3 DEPE 2 698.
64DEPE 2 814. DEFE 2 1317.
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On our first morning in Inveraray we were introduced to the Assault Landing Craft, Sir Roger Keyes bad 
succeeded in producing two o f  tliem. Armoured, and with a low silhouette, they could do about six knots - 
a big improvement on the crash-boats in which we had raided Guernsey. H ie Colonel soon had each troop 
in turn rushing in and out o f these craft like madmen. Before long thirty men, fuUy armed, could clear one 
and double up the beach to cover in about fifteen seconds. Night and day we trained - there was nothing 
else to dot The long treks over the craggy hills soon broke anyone who was not fit. It was a good way o f  
weeding out the unit.«5
An early recruit to Keyes’ staff was Commander Bill Fell, later to command the midget 
submarine flotilla that attacked the Fell wrote, ‘I had served under Sir Roger in the
Dover Patrol in War Î, when he was in his prime, and when we met in Glasgow I was 
shocked to see how old and ill he looked.’ After a landing exercise at Arisaig during which 
Keyes fell asleep in the heather and was ‘captured’ thus by the landing force, the two went 
on to Inveraray where;
.. .commando units were Kving in a swamp in shocking conditions, and doing long, boring training 
schemes. Here tliey had no weapons at all, no craft to work with, and no real plan to work to. This 
first visit to Inveraray was depressing and it was plain that the three services were not working to­
gether. In fact the RAF was conspicuous by its absence and the Navy was very thin on the ground.««
Fell’s first task was to get craft and men to Inveraray to form a Naval training unit to work 
with the army. O f  the 90 landing craft built, or in course of construction in February 1940, 
some 27 had been lost in Norway and France and just 19 completed craft remained.'*^ O r­
ders for another 74 landing craft o f various types were placed immediately and 136 Higgins 
Eureka boats were ordered from America as a stop-gap. Christened ‘R Boats’, these 
wooden vessels were far from ideal assault craft, but they could land 25 men at 12 knots 
onto a beach and get off again.**®
Clearly there would eventually be a cross-channel assault, but more immediate operations 
would involve landing limited forces anywhere on the coast o f Europe or in the Mediterra­
nean. R boats and landing craft were capable o f only short sea crossings on their own so, if 
military force was to be projected anywhere beyond a small portion o f the French coast, 
ships equipped to carry both landing craft and assault force would be needed. Three 18 
knot, 10,000 ton Glen liners, Glengyle, Gleneam and Gknroy were converted to Landing Ships 
Infantry (Large) capable o f landing a battalion-sized unit o f 850 troops by November 1940. 
The withdrawal o f a fourth Glen ship meant it would be impossible to carry an assault
«5 Young : 195& p. 23. Maund refers top these two LCAs having been brought to Inveraray fiom the Tyne via the Cale- |
donian Canal, and having been closely inspected by a German aircraft off Kinnakd Head. Maund : 1949 p. 106.
««Pell : 1966 pp. 72-73. I
«7 Naval Bevimno. 48 p. 443. The KyesPapersNoi. I ll p. 77. |
«« Fell writes that the Eurekas were, had boats, but better than nothing... ’ Fell ; 1966 p. 73. Maund : 1949 p. 63. |
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force o f two brigades, so the 3,000 ton Dutch passenger ships Queen Emma and Princess 
Beatrix were taken up, each o f which could land a half battalion/®
Maund had been impressed by Japanese assault landings in China where landing craft laden
•\s c  ,   ^ "
The Landing Ship (Sternchute) 
Princess iris, a converted cross­
channel train ferry, here being 
demonstrated to  the Prime Minis­
ter at Inveraray in 1941, was de­
signed to  carry light tanks in 
LCMs which could then be 
launched down a ramp in the 
stem . As with several of the early 
Combined Operations improvisa­
tions, she never saw operational 
service.
with vehicles, stores and men were launched from larger vessels. Two Harwich-Zeebrugge 
train ferries were taken up, renamed Iris and Daffodil after the Mersey ferries used at Zee­
brugge, and converted to carry landing craft launched down a slipway in the stern. Primar­
ily intended for landing vehicles and stores, these Landing Ships (Sternchute) had a range 
o f just 1,000 miles and were o f Httle use beyond cross-channel operations. Three Admiralty 
oilers were converted, the latter to carry 14 landing craft.^®
Operational craft based in the Glen ships were three flotillas of 12 LCAs, two LCMs and 
one fast launch, one flotilla to each ship. The two former train ferries each carried a flotilla 
of 13 LCMs and the Dutch ships each carried six LCAs, 4 LCMs and two fast launches. 
The Belgian cross-Channel ferries Prince Charles, Princess Josephine Charlotte, Princess Astrid, 
Prince Leopold, Prince Phillipe and Prince Albert were substantially if only partially successfully 
reconstructed, and fitted with davits for eight minor landing craft.^*
Fell brought the first converted Belgian ferries, Prince Charles and Prince Leopold, to Invera­
ray in the summer o f 1941. He wrote.
Living conditions were better than when I had last seen them, but it appeared to us simple sailors 
that the confusion in the minds o f  the three services ashore could never be straightened out. A big 
fleet o f ships now lay in Loch Fyne o ff Inveraray. It consisted o f liners between 12,000 and 20,000
«9 DEFE 2 698. Fergusson : 1961 p 41 and pp. 55-56. Naval Bevietv no.48 p. 443. Maund : 1949 p. 66.
79 The shallow-draught ‘Maracaibo’ oilers were Dewdale, Ennerdale and DermntdaU. Naval Rmew no.48 p. 443. Maund ; 
1949 p. 67.
7( Letter from Director o f Military Training to Scottish Command, 10 August 1940, in DEFE 2 814. For the Belgian 
steamers see Fell : 1966 pp. 74-78.
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tons. They had been converted to troopships and repair ships, motor transport carriers and assault 
sMps. Ideas for their use were not lacking, but they were conflicting, and changed so often, that co­
ordinated training never reached a practical stage. We did, however, embark one commando after 
another and with them gained experience in  handling our landing craft and in teaching the soldiers 
the elements o f boat work.
T h e  Ra i d i n g  P h a s e  - P a r t  1 
W o r k s h o p , C l a y m o r e  a n d  H e m i s p h e r e
Keyes and the Prime Minister first discussed WORKSHOP, a plan for an assault on Pantel- 
laria, in September 1940 and saw it as but the first of series of similar operations to take 
the Dodecanese Islands and perhaps knock Italy out of the war before the Germans could 
intervene. WORKSHOP envisaged 2,000 men o f 3, 7, 8 and 11 Commandos saihng from the 
Clyde as part of Malta convoy WS5(a), the assault ships leaving the convoy under the cover 
o f darkness to seize Pantellaria from its Italian garrison. Intensive training for WORKSHOP 
was carried out on Arran with 7 Commando at Lochranza, 9 Commando at Whiting Bay 
and 11 Commando at L a m l a s h . ^ 2  jp  November, Keyes’ son Geoffrey, a Captain in 11 
Commando, wrote to his father o f the difficulty o f keeping highly trained men motivated:
.. .the men are longng for a show .. .One troop has gone away for a boating holiday, and the rest are 
pretty jealous and excited. If we have to wait until January, w e wiU be a flop, for an absolute certainty. 
Men are asking to go back to their units so that they can go to the Middle East to fight. It is all dis­
appointing, so fix us up Pop.®5
The Chiefs o f Staff were unenthusiastic but, for several days at the beginning o f December, 
it appeared that WORKSHOP might take place and Commandos waited aboard ship in Lam- 
lash Bay. Keyes was at the Douglas Hotel in Brodick when, to his evident fury, the Cabinet 
effectively abandoned the operation on 17 December, the day before it was due to sail.*^ '*
As his son’s letter highlights, troops had trained on the promise, assiduously bolstered by 
Keyes, o f action and the cancellation o f WORKSHOP led to a  drop in morale. Training con­
tinued, in dreadful weather, but much o f the zeal had gone. Then, on 31 January, 7, 8 and 
11 Commandos sailed from Lamlash for the Middle East aboard the Glen ships, in part as 
a response to intelligence that a German invasion o f Greece or Turkey was imminent.*'^ 
Those left behind were particularly dispirited and, as Lovat notes, ‘I t appeared pretty hope­
less: good men went back to their regiments and morale at every level slumped accord-
72 Black Hackle — The Story of 11 (Scottish) Commando paper by Prof Graham Lappin.
73 Ibid. p. 8.
74 SeeThe Keyes Papers pp. 100-115 and 119-131 for WORKSHOP wliich was not, as Fergusson, Horan and others sug­
gest, abandoned because Stokas had arrived in Sicily (the airccaft did not arrive there until January 1941). It and con­
current plans to seize the Azores (BRISK) and the Canaries (SHRAPNEL) were killed off by First Sea Lord Dudley 
Pound, who disliked Keyes, and Naval C-in-C Mediterranean Sir Andrew Cunningham. The latter pointed out that 
his resources were already over-stretched and tliat he would be unable to maintain a garrison on Pantellaria. Chur­
chill always regretted having abandoned the operation, believing that many ships in the 1942 Mediterranean convoys 
could have been saved had an air base been available on Pantellaria.
75 Gilbert : 1989 p. 978 and fn. 2. Smith : 1998 p. 69. Decrypts from German railway Enigma showed the movement of  
Luftwaffe signals personnel into Bulgaria. Keyes was not privy to the ULTRA secret.
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ingly’, Keyes had lost his only completed assault ships and three o f his finest units/^
The Mediterranean had become the main theatre o f war and, with his best forces tied up 
there for the foreseeable future, Keyes was forced to look for targets nearer at hand where 
the short-range assault ships could operate. Norway was the obvious choice and several 
proposals were examined, among them CASTLE, a return in strength to Jossingfjord. What­
ever happened, an operation to Norway would have to wait until the assault ships Princess 
Beatrix and Queen Emma completed at the end o f February.
Operation CLAYMORE as approved by Churchill on 27 January 1941 involved four landings 
on the Lofoten Islands off Narvik to destroy fish oil factories which produced, amongst 
other things, what were beheved to be vital supplies o f vitamins. Trawlers and fish-carrying 
ships were to be sunk, though not local fishing craft, and Germans and Quislings were to 
be rounded up.2® Keyes was unenthusiastic about what he deemed a ‘side-show’, and the 
plan had been urged on the Prime Minister by SOE head Hugh Dalton who had his own 
agenda to pursue.?® But Norwegian Foreign Minister in London Tryggve Lie was ‘most en­
thusiastic’, particularly when told that the Norwegian communities would be provided with 
sugar, coffee and clothing.?®
05*00" E
rack ihart for the CLAYMORE for
The CLAYMORE naval force was under 
Commander Clifford Caslon and he and 
landing force commander Major General J. 
C. Haydon were in the destroyer Somali. 
Bedouin, Tartar, Eskimo and Legion escorted 
the landing ships Queen Emma with 250 
men o f 4 Commando under Lieutenant 
Colonel Dudley Lister and Princess Beatrix 
with 250 men o f 3 Commando under Lieu­
tenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater. Also 
in Princess Beatrix was a section o f 55 Field 
Company, Royal Engineers and an SOE 
party o f  62 Norwegian troops. The subma­
rine Sunjish sailed ahead o f the assault
7« Lovat : 1978 p. 190. The K^esPcpers'Ç^. 137-142. A CTC was established atKabretin die Great Bitter Lakes but the 
war in tlie Middle East turned against the British. 7 and 8 Commandos were disbanded after being badly mauled in 
Crete.
77DEFE 2 140.
78 Keyes and Tovey hoped that the CLAYMORE force would tempt enemy heavy units out from Norway, so Tovey put 
to sea with Nelson, King George V. Despite his feelings about the value o f CLAYMORE, Keyes wanted to command 
tiie landing force, but his offer was politely refused. The Kyes Pcpers-çç. 153-157.
79DEFE2140.
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force to act as a navigational beacon.^o Troops embarked at Gourock on 21 February and 
the force sailed for Scapa where practice landings were carried out in bad weather and a 
number of LCAs damaged. The force sailed Scapa at 0001/1 March, refuelled at the Faroe 
Islands then reached the Lofotens at 0000/4 March. It proceeded up Vestfjord, then di­
vided with Queen ^mma^ Somali^ Tartar and Bedouin making for Svolvaer and Princess Beatrix 
with "Eskimo and Eegion for Stamsund. According to a naval report.
The weather was ideal for our purpose, a slight sea and overcast sky which cleared at intervals and al­
lowed sights to be taken. This simplified the approach to Vest Fjord and, with the assistance o f Sun- 
fish's D /F  beacon transmission, the entrance was made as planned.®'
fig. 46
Svolvaer t a r m  map used in CLAYMORE
The following shipping was destroyed during CLAYMORE:
Sunk By _swj> TonsSomali Knbbs 1Tartar Hamburg j 9,870 ’
Tartar Felix 2,047 ;
Tartar Heumann ■ 1,079 j
Tartar Eilenau ] 1,404 ;
Tartar Paseÿes j 1,900 i
Tartar Rissen \ 250 :
Bedouin Mira (Not) 1 1152 1
Princess Beatrix Ando i 300 :
Princess Beatrix Groto i 200 :
Demolition Parties Bernhardt Scbulte^ e ! 1,500 1
Total j 20,002
Sources: D EFE 2 140 and W itthoft : 1971
80 Ibid.
81 ADM 234 380.
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Eighteen factories were destroyed along with 800,000 gallons o f oil, 225 prisoners were 
taken, and 314 Norwegian volunteers were embarked along with the British manager of 
Allen & Hanbury’s fish oil factory rescued from Brettesnes. Fourteen German sailors had 
been killed in the engagement between Somali and Krehhs; the only British casualty being an 
officer in 4 Commando who slipped and shot himself in the th igh .V aluab le  experience 
was gained and many lessons learned. One report describes the difficulties experienced by 
the LCAs heading for Henningsvaer directly into a head wind:
The effect o f the cold on tibis particular party gave the opportunity to Reuters correspondent Mr J. R.
N. Nixon, who happened to be on board this destroyer [Eskimo], o f recording afterwards that it had 
so intense that spray breaking over the boats froze as it fell on them. Commander Brunton o f Princess 
Beatrix wrote that when the men landed all their guns were frozen up, icicles hung from their caps 
and beards and the men were so stiff with cold that in the words o f an Officer they crawled out like 
sleepy flies. The Commander doubted whether they would have been able to fight and found it a 
clear case for some protection for LCAs in a head sea in such temperatures.®^
It was indeed fortunate that the landing was unopposed.
4
LCAs during CLAYMORE and 
(below, left) som e souvenirs.
CLAYMORE had, on the face o f it at least, been an 
operation with, ‘...an object mainly economic, partly 
political and only in a very remote degree military’.®'* 
A Norwegian historian has written that the British 
elation at the success o f CLAYMORE was not shared 
in Norway where the factories destroyed were the 
only source o f employment, and where the Germans 
exacted heavy reprisals following the raid. The N or­
wegian view, to some extent shared by the Norwe­
gian troops who had taken part, was that the raid
82 For narratives of CLAYMORE, see reports by Brigadier Haydon and Lt Col Parkes-Smith in DEFE 2 140, also Lovat 
: 1978 chapter 12 and Young : 1958 chapter 2.
83 DCO’s summary of CLAYMORE in DEFE 2 140.
84 DCO’s summary o f CLAYMORE in DEFE 2 140.
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had no military value and had done nothing to restrict the German capacity to wage war.®^
But CLAYMORE was no stunt as an unstated aim o f the operation was to capture German 
Enigma signalling equipment and intelligence. Documents found in the Harbour Control 
Office at Svolvaer included an appreciation o f the political situation in Norway by von 
Falkenhorst, information on German control over the Norwegian press and details o f 
powers o f arrest enjoyed by the Gestapo and Wehrmacht.®^ Commander Skipworth in Tar­
tar came in for criticism for sinking the tanker Hamburg before she could be boarded and 
searched. A party from Somali had, however, boarded Krehbs and found her wheelhouse 
wrecked with Oberleutnant Kup finger and a rating lying dead by the wheel. Caslon wrote 
that the party searched Kupfinger’s cabin and:
...all available documents, official and private, were removed and a locked box discovered in a locked 
drawer was also retrieved. This was later found to contain spare wheels for a cypher machine.. .There 
was no trace in the ship o f  the cypher machine itself.®^
The Prime Minister was undoubtedly aware o f the material recovered from Krehbs when he 
minuted Keyes on 16 March:
The unqualified success o f CLAYMORE says much for the care and skill with which it was planned, 
and the determination with which it was executed. Pray accept for yourself and pass to all concerned 
my warm congratulations on a very satisfactory operation.®®
A month later, 11 Unge Kompani men sailed Lerwick aboard the Norwegian destroyer Mans­
field for HEMISPHERE, the destruction o f a herring oil factory at 0ksfjord. The objective 
had been chosen by SOE as it had a large capacity and the Finnmark herring fishery, from 
which it drew its supplies, was about to start. HEMISPHERE, which was carried out on 8 
April, was a success, the only incident o f note concerning a Quisling who shot his wife by 
accident. Mansfield returned to Lerwick on 15 April, but the success o f the raid was marred 
by further tension between the British and the Norwegian government in exile who were 
not informed o f  the raid, not even as a courtesy after it had taken place.®^
PiLGRiM^s P r o g r e s s  - T h e  F a l l  o f  R o g e r  K e y e s
British troops were evacuated from Greece at the end o f April 1941 and, on 28 April, 
Enigma decrypts revealed that a German air and sea attack on Crete was imminent. The 
battle for Crete began on 20 May and 16,500 British troops were evacuated between 27 and 
29 May, leaving 13,000 to surrender. The loss o f Greece in April and Axis tactical superior­
ity in the Mediterranean compelled the British Chiefs o f Staff to consider the vulnerability
Amfmn Moland in Salmon (ed.) : 1995, chapter 15. See also Cookridge ; 1966 p. 528-529 and Baden-Powell : 1982.
88 Vansittart papers VNSTII 2/30, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge University.
8^  Report by Caslon in DEFE 2 140.
88This is not to su^pst tliat Keyes was ‘in on’ the Ultra Secret -  he was not. HS 2 224.
89 HS 2 224. Baden-Powell : 1982.
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of Gibraltar. The Spanish government had been under considerable pressure to allow 
German troops across its territory to attack the British colony which commanded the 
western gateway to the Mediterranean.
Demonstrating a wireless set 
at Inveraray in 1941. Roger 
Keyes peers over the Prime 
Minister’s shoulder on this, 
the last occasion on which 
Churchill and his old friend 
saw eye-to-eye.
The prospect o f losing Gibraltar led the War Cabinet to approve, on 24 April, a plan to 
seize the Spanish Canary Islands, an objective first promoted by Keyes eight months ear­
lier.^ At Las Palmas, the Canaries had the only facilities on any of the Atlantic islands re­
motely comparable to Gibraltar. The plan, christened PUMA, was to involve a force of 
12,000 men, its nucleus being the troops newly returned to Inveraray from CLAYMORE. 
Rehearsals were carried out in Loch Fyne and shipping was assembled. Loading o f the 29'^ 
Infantry Brigade, four battalions o f Royal Marines, four Commandos, a squadron of tanks 
and artillery began at Inveraray, Greenock and Troon early in May with a view to sailing on 
the Then the schedule was thrown into disarray by the Greenock Blitz and finally,
what Fergusson aptly describes as, ‘...the familiar and heart-breaking business of post­
ponement after postponement,’ began.^^
On 9 May Keyes lamented that PUMA would not sail until 22 May, and this was followed by 
further delays, each o f a month as the attack could only take place during a no-moon pe-
90 Gilbert : 1989 p. 1142 and fn. 
9> Maund : 1949 p. 108.
92 Colonel Yeo, Clyde Movements Officer, describes the difficulties experienced with WS8C, the PUMA convoy, thus; 
Cargo and MT for stores ships had to be loaded in on a pre-stowage plan with almost every commodity in a marked spot; 
troops on personnel ships had to be embarked on lines similar to those laid down for that prototype of embarkation officers, 
Noah; and finally the personnel ships had a mixed bag of landing rations, water tins, petrol, ammunition and other small gear 
to be put on in quantities varying with the number to embark. As these numbers themselves varied, vhilst some of the ships 
were embarking as far off as Inveraray (north) and Troon (south), and the Force HQ thought nothing of charging its tactical 
plans in the midst of the job, barge loads of equipment floated in all directions all the time... As soon as the work of recon­
ciling paper numbers to bodies got started, a series of air raids on Greenock started (5/6/7 May) that taroke the telephone 
system and cut the railway beyond Port Glasgow; all through the night of 6 May the Committee and Port staff sat round the 
table with details of train loads, ship allotments and unit compositions...while increasing evidence came in that the rail tables 
wouldn’t work since the lines were cut.
((.i.iu'i.! ovcrh-iit'^
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liod.^^ The forces allocated to PUMA grew to almost 20,000 with the addition o f the 36*
Infantry Brigade, the operation was rechristened PILGRIM and a new land force commander.
Lieutenant General Harold Alexander, was appointed. Finally, it was decided that PILGRIM 
would sail in September, but Alexander and Naval Force Commander designate Rear Ad­
miral Louis Hamilton, whose relations with Keyes had soured over the summer, felt 
strongly that a full-scale dress rehearsal was required. Thus was born Exercise LEAPFROG.^'*
Keyes wanted LEAPFROG held on Arran but Alexander and Hamilton insisted on sailing 
the force from Inveraray to Scapa and carrying out a landing there. It is a measure o f 
Keyes’ waning influence that he was overruled and the exercise did indeed take place at 
Scapa in bad weather on 1 0 -11  August 1941.^® LEAPFROG was a shambles and it was abun­
dantly clear that, as Fergusson writes, ‘Against a stubborn Spanish opposition there would 
have been a d isa s te r .L a n d in g s  were lamentably slow, beaches became clogged with 
stores, troops failed to move off inland and communications between ship and shore, and 
within the assault ships themselves, failed utterly.^^ Keyes wrote that the proceedings,
‘...disclosed a deplorable lack o f organisation to overcome the hazards and difficulties o f 
such a formidable enterprise.’^ ® Lieutenant W. S. Knight, a signaller with 229 Battery, 58 
Field Regiment RA, wrote that LEAPFROG: j
., .proved disastrous, with everything that could go wrong doing so. Landing craft were stuck on the j
shore with an ebb tide, wireless sets failed to function, motor vehicles got seawater in their engines Î
and failed to move, to mention just a few o f  the horrors. When it ended and we all got back to Inver­
aray the Director o f  Combined Operations, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, was most caustic about every­
thing. At a large post-mortem meeting he was scathing about our efforts and passed the comment
that we were nowhere near the quality o f  the previous generation whom he had led on the Zeebrugge |
raid in 1918, There were those present who, while admitting that there were obvious lessons to be j
learned, felt that a helpful and constructive criticism together with encouragement for the future :[
would have been infinitely preferable.'*'' |
Few of the deficiencies were actually Keyes’, or Combined Operations H Q ’s, fault. The j
Navy was preoccupied with the Battle o f the Atlantic and accorded Combined Operations i
low priority. Thus one o f the major shortcomings was the poor standard o f landing craft j
crews whom Keyes had long been recommending should be trained at Inveraray alongside i
the units they were to land. The Army, on the other hand, were less heavily extended and, :|
ias Keyes fairly pointed out, Alexander had had PILGRIM Force under his command for two I
months, yet had refused help from Combined Operations HQ. Hamilton and Alexander |
submitted a report on LEAPFROG direct to the Chiefs o f Staff^ by-passing Keyes, in which I
Yeo MS, IWM Department of Documents ref. 95/6/1 . Fergusson ; 1961 p. 79.
93 Letter Keyes to Churcliill 9 May 1941 in The Keyes Papers pp. 166-167.
94 Ibid. pp. 82-83,188-193.
95 Ibid. p. 191.
9* Fergusson ; 1961 p. 82.
97 Ibid. p. 82. Report on LEAPFROG in DEFE 2 869.
98 Keyes memorandum o f 19 August 1941 in DEFE 2 869.
99 Knight MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 97/7/1.
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they exonerated themselves and blamed Combined Operations for the deficiencies. Keyes, 
meanwhile, recommended that PILGRIM should be dropped in favour o f YORKER, a plan to 
capture S a r d in i a .A f t e r  refusing to accept a reduced directive in September, Keyes was 
replaced by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten whose revised role o f Adviser on Combined 
Operations reflected the nervousness o f the Chiefs o f Staff after the divisions that marked 
Keyes’ time.'®'
King George Vi’s visit to Invera- 
ray on 9 O ctober 19 4 1 v/as un­
doubtedly avYkward for Keyes 
(centre left) who had been sacked 
five days earlier. Vice Admiral 
Teddy Hallett (centre right) was 
appointed Vice Admiral Com­
bined Training on I September 
1940. N ext to Hallett is the Army 
Commandant at Inveraray, Briga­
dier Cyrus Greenslade. The pho­
tograph was taken outside Hal- 
let’s headquarters at Tigh na 
Rudha, then a Campbell dower 
house and now (2001 ) the Loch 
Fyne Hotel.
Mountbatten told Roskill that he inherited ‘absolutely nothing’ of value from his predeces­
sor, but this is self-serving n o n s e n s e . K e y e s ’ appointment may have been a mistake and 
evidence of a tendency displayed by both Churchill and Pound to appoint senior officers 
with reputations earned over 20 years before, but he had achieved a much against the 
odds.'®) At a time when mihtary hardware was in desperately short supply and subject to a 
range o f competing demands, Keyes had contrived to set up CTC Inveraray and other 
training estabhshments, improvise landing ships and craft, and recruit, train and equip ten 
Commandos. He estabhshed Combined Operations as a separate headquarters, organised a 
planning staff and mounted operations.
'90 In a Lees Knowles lecture given at Cambridge in 1943 and quoted in Aspinall-Oglander : 1951 pp. 380-409, Keyes 
castigated those who,
.. .organised a full scale rehearsal, but declined any assistance from the Directorate of Combined Operations or its Train­
ing Centre. A number of shocking miscarriages occurred in the direction and conduct of the exercise which took no ac­
count of the realities of modem war. Fortunately the operation never took place.. .The moral of this unfortunate episode 
is that it is not sufficient to train and temper and Amphibious Striking Force unless those who are to command, lacking 
practical experience, closely study former operations and make use of experience already gained.
'9' The intrigues that surrounded Keyes’ dismissal are discussed in the article Too Old or Too Bold -  The Removal Roger 
Keyes as Director of Combined Operations in Imperial War Museum Review no. 8 (1993) pp. 72-84. Undoubtedly Keyes’ ag­
gressiveness, tactlessness and immodesty were partly to blame, as were the terms of the Directive he inherited from 
Bourne. But as Fergusson writes, ‘Every hesitancy recalled for him the lost opportunities o f Gallipoli and the seized 
opportunity of Zeebrugge.’ Then there was the simmering discontent among both the Chiefs of Staff, still seething 
at Keyes’ criticism of them following defeat in Norway and France. And his fellow Admirals disliked the fact that, 
the First Sea Lord included, they were all technically outranked by him. Ultimately, however, the fault lay with 
Churchill who hastily appointed a friend as DCO without considering the implications. Fergusson : 1961 p. 84.
i92Roslrill; 1977 p. 111.
'93 Such appointments presupposed that no younger officers of such calibre were coming forward and thus had a de­
moralising effect on those passed over.
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C o m b i n e d  T r a i n i n g  ( N a v a l )
Keyes may have achieved a great deal but, such was his vanity, he had seen Combined O p­
erations as a private army that would become the means to take the war back into Europe, 
naturally under his command. Conveniently isolated from the Whitehall machine that he 
despised so openly, Inveraray was to be the base from where this amphibious force would 
reach out anywhere on the coast o f Europe and beyond. Mountbatten, with his revised Di­
rective, changed the emphasis to developing all-arms assault techniques, equipment and 
training that would see large formations ashore on enemy-held territory to stay. The train­
ing organisation was recast with this in mind.
PILGRIM was finally abandoned in October 1941, not least because it was apparent that the 
Spanish threat to Gibraltar had receded with the German invasion o f the Soviet Union. 
PILGRIM Force, augmented by the 1st Guards Brigade, moved to Largs. Maund writes.
Being the only trained Combined Operations force in the country, with m ost o f  the ships and most 
o f  the craft, it very naturally usurped, if  such a word can be used, the functions o f  the CTC and it was 
this force which discussed technique, tried it out and laid it down.'®*
But Combined Operations training had to be standardised and thus the syllabus had to re­
main the sole responsibility o f the CTCs. Command was centralised under Vice Admiral 
Theodore ‘Teddy’ Hallett and Major General James Drew who set up shop in HMS Warren, 
the Hollywood Hotel in Largs, where they were joined by Hamilton and Alexander.'®®
In February 1941, immediately prior to CLAYMORE, there had been some 20 LCMs and 36 
LCAs available, but the PILGRIM Force had left Inveraray for Largs with every available 
craft, even those allocated for training. When, in October 1941, Inveraray began training 
the 4* Division by brigades, only the LSI(L) Ettrick was available, and not a single landing 
craft. Folding army boats and naval cutters were pressed into service but, as Maund ac­
knowledges, ‘The training was not very realistic...’.'®®
Mountbatten, a naval ‘communicator’, made one o f his first tasks dealing with the signal-
LCAs on Loch Fyne. Early in the war, 
every landing craft was commanded by 
an officer. This was later reduced to 
one officer per sub-division of three 
LCAs. Crews then comprised a C ox­
swain, usually a Leading Seaman, a 
stoker to  look after the tw o V8 petrol 
engines and tw o seamen.
'94 Maund : 1949 p. 108.
195 Fergusson r 1961 p. 91.
'96 Maund : 1949 pp. 108-109.
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ling failures that had been so apparent during LEAPFROG. An inter-service signals commit­
tee that had been addressing the issue, was absorbed into Combined Operations HQ and 
became the new Combined Operations Signals Staff. One of the most pressing needs was 
for Beach Signallers and a school for Beach Signals Units o f one officer and 32 ratings 
opened at Inveraray on 1 November 1941. Four Beach Signals Units had completed train­
ing by 1 January 1942. Once again, the facilities at Inveraray were soon outgrown and, on 
26 April 1942, the Combined Signal School moved to Auchingate Camp, Ayr, then 
renamed HMS Dundonaldf^^
Commandos landing under 
smoke during an exercise 
at Inveraray in 1941. The 
Higgins R Boat being used 
here vyas an unsuccessful 
assault craft, not least be­
cause it was unarmoured 
and very noisy. Leading the 
practice assault is Major 
jack Churchill. N o relation 
of the Prime Minister, ‘Mad 
jack’ was nevertheless an­
other of those swashbuck­
ling characters for vdiom 
wars might have been in­
vented.
Demand for landing craft was far outstripping the capacity of British shipyards already 
fully committed to replacing losses incurred in the Battle of the Atlantic. Further, ideas for 
new types of landing craft, like the LST were coming forward from Inveraray and Largs. 
Clearly, only American yards could build the craft required so a Combined Operations 
Mission went to Washington in November 1941, but, by 6 December, just seven LST had 
been agreed under Lend-Lease. Then the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and, overnight, 
this figure increased to 400 landing craft o f various types. The British mission also visited 
Andrew Higgins, supplier o f the Eureka boats ordered in 1940, at New Orleans. Higgins 
was working on a design, based on a shallow-draught tug built for the Peruvian Govern­
ment, that would become the 50-foot LCM. Ten thousand of these were built and Maund 
describes them as, ‘...one o f the best minor landing craft ever built.’ The British mission 
ordered the first 250.'®®
'97 Auchingate Camp had been built pre-war and the accommodation was lavish by comparison with Inveraray. The 
can^ was centrally heated, there was running hot and cold water and a 725 seat cinema. It had a edacity of 1,720 
men 45 Warrant Officers and Sergeants. Expansion meant that 72 Nissen huts with a capacity o f 840 men were 
constructed on the adjacent golf course, but several were ‘blown away and deposited on the barrack square’ during a 
storm in the winter o f 1940-41. DEFE 2 814. DEFE 2 856. Fergusson : 1961 pp. 92-93.
'9* Maund : 1949 pp. 82-85. Fergusson : 1961 pp. 110-115. For the development of various types o f assault craft see 
Maund : 1949 Ch. 4. and Ladd ; 1976.
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Rear Admiral H. E. Horan was appointed Rear Admiral Landing Craft and Bases and Com­
modore Guy Warren was made Senior Officer Assault Ships and Craft. Both joined the 
staff at the Hollywood Hotel and, on 21 January 1942, a maintenance and training es­
tablishment, Dinosaur, opened at Troon with personnel based at nearby Dundonald, LCM 
training bases were established at Castle Toward, which became Brontosaurus, and Lam­
lash.
Despite the early shortages, however, hardware was never the greatest problem facing 
Combined Operations Headquarters. While for the Army and the RAF, combined opera­
tions represented a military science, for the Navy it was a specialised branch o f the service, 
and a uniquely unpopular one at that. The Joint Planners had begun considering a future 
invasion o f the continent in October 1941 and a month later the forecast requirement for 
trained landing craft crews by May 1943 had risen to 1,500 officers and 20,000 ratings. 
Combined Operations was responsible for landing craft crews though, by February 1942, 
just 5,200 men had been trained, and most o f those had only received basic instruction in 
craft handling. Then the demands o f the wider war meant that many o f these trained men 
were drafted to fill vacancies in the fleet and most were only too keen to go as Combined 
Operations was seen as a dead-end. Intakes o f active service ratings had aU but ended by 
July 1941, so crews were then drawn from the RNVR, the RN Patrol Service and hostili- 
ties-only ratings. From February 1942 a regular fortnightly draft brought of 12 officers and 
150 seamen from Northney, where they received basic training, to Quehac at Inveraray for 
training alongside the Army."®
An acute shortage o f officers led to the opening o f  a further training establishment at Lo- 
chailort in 1943.'" Candidates were drawn from hostilities-only ratings already selected for 
officer training in the RNVR, but their commissions were not applicable to general service. 
The peak requirement was around D Day and until the French ports fell into Allied hands 
and, by June 1944, some 5,500 RNVR officers, 500 RM officers, 43,500 naval ratings and 
12,500 RM ORs had been trained at the CTCs for landing craft service."^ This was in addi­
tion to beach personnel, maintenance staffs, hard parties and sundry other personnel which 
took the total involved to some 113,000 men and women."®
109 Also at Lamlash, based on HMS. Coronia, Royal.Marine Beach Battalions began training in May 1942. DEFE 2 856. 
Maund : 1949 pp. 103.
no Per Mars spring 1946 article entitled HMS Qusbscpp. 175-176. See also Maund : 1949 p. 101.
1" Naval Review no. XXXIII (1945) article entitled Some Naval Aspects of Combitted Training pp. 29-32.
112 Ibid. and Maund : 1949 p. 105.
113 Maund : 1949 p. 99. For background, see also Edwards : 1946.
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C o m b i n e d  T r a i n i n g  ( M i l i t a r y )
From its opening in October 1940, CTC Inveraray continued an unbroken programme of 
training until it reached a peak o f activity early in 1944 as preparations were made for 
OVERLORD. In addition to training Commandos in their unique amphibious role, the CTC 
trained Brigade groups in the assault role and other units in the ‘follow-up’ and ‘build-up’ 
roles. Port Operating Companies, squadrons o f the RAF Reghnent and RAF Servicing 
Commandos were also trained.
While Hallett and Drew at Largs had overall responsibility for Combined Training, CTC 
Inveraray was the responsibility o f an Army Commandant. The Army organisation was di­
vided into four wings namely a Brigade Group Wing, an Army Tank Wing, an RE Wing 
and an REME Wing. The Army Tank Wing and the RE Wing carried out their own train­
ing and, aside from the allocation of craft and shore facilities, and participation in exer­
cises, were independent o f the main Brigade Group Wing. The REME Wing, on the other 
hand, worked under the Brigade Group Wing."'* The Naval training staff at Inveraray op­
erated under a Captain RN responsible to the Commandant primarily to teach Army for­
mations how to work with the Navy. This was a quite separate estabUshment hom  Quebec 
which provided and maintained assault craft, and trained their crews."®
As Fergusson writes, in the early days, the RAF took the view that, ‘one bit o f air being 
pretty much like another bit o f air, there was nothing particularly tricky in supporting an 
amphibious operation.’"® Inter-service divisions were not easily broken down and one of 
the lessons of the Rl-conceived Dieppe landing in August 1942 was the need for massive 
fire support, not only from the sea, but also from the air. But not until the Alamein cam­
paign later in 1942 did true co-operation begin to develop.'" Even in 1944, the RAF pres­
ence at Inveraray was small, though co-operation had gone further than this suggests.
Seven camps to accommodate permanent staff and troops under training were laid out 
around Loch Fyne, the most northerly being Shira Camp which housed an 800-man battal­
ion, up to 250 other Brigade Group troops and was permanent home to the RASC Motor 
Boat Company. Castle Camp housed another battalion and other small units, Duke’s Camp 
accommodated Brigade Fleadquarters and Town Camp housed some 1,100 men and 
women including CTC administrative personnel, the transport pool, REME workshops and 
other facilities. A building programme initiated in mid-1941 increased capacity to 5,150 
ORs and included the new Avenue Camp built next to Town Camp to house the Army
H4DEFE 2 1318.
Per Mars pp. 175-176.
116 Fergusson : 1961 p. 82.
117 Terraine : 1985 p. 343-344 and 559-562.
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Tank Wing. Two requisitioned houses, Tigh na Rudha (Admiralty House), the CTC Head­
quarters, and Rudha na Craig, normally the home of the Duke of Argyll’s ailing sister, pro­
vided officers accommodation.
Two and a half miles south o f the town were Chamois and Kilbride Camps around the na­
val establishment at HMS Quebec with engineering workshops, boat slips and two steel 
piers. From 1942 several o f the 'lines’ in Town Camp were taken over by the Navy for ac­
commodating landing craft crews under training. But the pressure on accommodation dur­
ing training for the Normandy invasion was such that the old American passenger liners 
Northland and Southland were supplied under Lend-Lease as accommodation ships and 
moored offshore. Additional to the training staff, a small staff was maintained at each of 
the seven camps for maintenance and hand-overs.
S oalm  -  P o u r  I i r i h — t o  O œ  S t » t u t «  UlXe
Bpa* orflo*
to: Mnwl Canqi PzamtciM Omt J^EUbda* OMzg
fig . 5 3
Military camps around Inveraray in 1942 (not to  scale). MI5 wanted to declare 
Inveraray and other training areas in the w est of Scotland a Protected Area, 
thus barring public access. The area extended from Spean Bridge to  the Mull of 
Kintyre and included the Loch Lomond road to Arden, Helensburgh and the 
Isle of Arran. Keyes suggested this would merely draw attention to  the place, 
and imposing a permit system would be impossible, not least because so many 
Helensburgh residents travelled to work in Glasgow. So, in July 1941, most of 
Argyll and Bute was made a 'Controlled Area'. While no permits would be re­
quired to  go there, the Admiralty or W ar Office could close the area at a mo­
ment's notice. That summer, however, Teddy Hallett wanted the County 
Council to pass bye-laws that would stop ‘picknicking on parts of Loch Fyne- 
side, charabanc tours to  or near Inveraray, steamer trips to Inveraray and loi­
tering by visitors.’
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Brigade Groups were moved to Inveraray either by road, rail or ferry. Rail moves were to 
Arrochar or Dalmally, with vehicles arriving by rail going to D aim ally where there was a
ramp for unloading. Moves by ferry generally involved troops being taken to either Green­
ock, Ardrossan or Wemyss Bay by rail, and from there by sea.
Training facilities ashore in­
cluded a large lecture room in 
the Drill HaU which could seat 
150 and two smaller lecture 
rooms in the Drill Hall each fit­
ted with tiered seating and a 
model o f a section o f the Loch 
Fyne coastline. There was an­
other more basic lecture theatre 
in a hut next door which could 
seat 80 and the Main Cinema in 
Duke’s Camp could seat 750, 
though this was primarily a 
recreation facility. A Briefing 
Room in a Nissen hut in Duke’s 
Camp was equipped with two 
scale models o f the training 
areas. Four 25 foot scrambling towers on the golf course were intended to give troops con­
fidence before they were asked to climb down the side of a ship and, at the quarry behind 
the town, ropes were set up for practising cliff-scaling. Six wooden dummy LCAs and a 
concrete mock-up LCT complete with deck, ramp and water-splash were built beside the 
Main Cinema. At Dubh Locb field firing area there were another five dummy LCAs made 
o f scaffolding and canvas. Ladyfield field firing area was dotted with defence points and 
miles o f dannert wire, as were Hell’s Glen and Newton Bay.
Operational requirements meant that the number of ships and craft available for training at 
Inveraray varied constantly. There was endless competition between the Army and Navy 
for the use of craft and, in March 1942, and despite the desperate shortage o f trained 
crews, Inveraray’s naval wing were complaining that, ‘The lack o f craft for naval training 
classes has very seriously affected the training.’” ® The CTC could generally rely on there 
being one LSI(L) with 24 LCA, one LSI(S) with 18 LCA and one LST available for train­
ing, though this was subject to operational requirements. At its peak, in 1943, the resident
a
Duke’s and Castle Camps next to Inveraray Castle under 
construction in 1941.
118DEFE2 715.
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training flotilla comprised 104 craft, and this was generally made up o f 25 LCA or LCV, 
two flotillas o f LCT, one LCI(L), six LCS(M) and two LCA(HR), though again this could 
change due to training requirements elsewhere.” ^
The scale and type o f training offered at Inveraray varied somewhat with the resources 
available. In general terms, however, and as the Inveraray training manual has it, assault 
battalions were given training in:
(a) General knowledge o f what is involved in a combined operation.
(b) Marching personnel in embarking and disembarking from LSI.
(c) Infantry company groups in tire capture o f  the assault company objective.
(d) Infantry companies in the role o f reserve companies.
(e) Drivers in waterproofing and wading their vehicles, in embarking and disembarking from landing 
ships by day and by night
(f) The whole battalion in a battalion group assault.
Battalion officers and specialists should receive certain additional training.
Training films were used along with lectures using the models in the lecture rooms to give 
a general knowledge o f Combined Operations. AH marching personnel were then given 
‘LSI Drill’ involving both lectures and practical exercises. Troops would parade at Invera­
ray Pier for transport by drifter out to an LSI, then messing arrangements were concluded 
and a short talk on the landing was given over the ship’s address system. The LSI was then 
darkened and the procedure for boarding the LCAs was rehearsed, often in bad weather, 
with fully laden troops slipping on wet decks. It was found that, with a LSI(S) carrying six 
LCAs, to complete this routine with two companies would take a minimum of half a day. 
With an LSI(L) carrying 24 LCAs a battalion group could be trained in a day. Further prac­
tice in LSI Drill was given during each course as, wherever possible, aU landing exercises 
were started from an LSI.^^^
Training then moved on to battle driUs by company for opposed assault landings. First, 
officers and senior NCOs were given a demonstration on the beach models, then company 
groups were given a half day’s training in the mock-up LCAs. Practice landings from real 
LCAs followed over two and a half days, during which bangalore torpedoes, smoke bombs 
and smoke grenades were used, but not small-arms ammunition. A dryshod landing exer­
cise with all company group weapons and supported by artillery representing LCG(M)s and 
machine guns was then carried out at the mock-up LCAs. Following this, a wetshod com­
pany assault from landing craft was carried out at Newton Bay with full sea and air sup­
port. Finally, the company would return to the mock-up LCAs to correct any faults noted 
during the preceding exercises, they then reformed into Battalion Groups for a battalion- 
scale landing exercise, and finally into Brigade Groups for full-scale landings by day and
119DEFE2 713.
120 DEFE 2 1318.
121 Ib id .
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night. (See Appendix 1 for Admiralty chart no. 2382 Upper Loch Fyne giving the Inveraray 
beaches and training areas and notes on their use.)
Equally important to the success o f an assault landing were follow-up formations and these 
too trained at Inveraray. Here, in addition to a general understanding o f combined opera­
tions and embarking and disembarking from landing ships and craft, they were taught to 
pass across beaches, through transit areas to the assembly area and on to deployment for 
attack. The Inveraray training cycle for a follow-up brigade took eight working days:
Training
Lecture: General Aspects of Combined 
Operations^ _______ _ ____
FHm: Combined Operations.
Lecture: Naval Aspects (in two parts). 
Lecture : Military Aspects._________
Lecture: Combined Operations.
Lecture: The ^ ya l ~Navy.___
Fiïtti: Beach Organisation.__
Demonstration o f landing ships and
craft. ____________ ___ __
LSI Drill.
Time
% hr. '
% hr.
I V2 hrs. 
_ i hr.
' % hr. “
Remarks
Officer’s Cadre course.
Officer’s Cadre course.
Officer’s Cadre course.
Officer’s Cadre course.
Each Battalion.
ÿz hr .
IV4 hrs.
Each Battalion.
Each Battalion.
Each Battalion.
LCI(L) Drin.
LCA Drill.
Demonstration o f beach signs and 
personnel and vehicle transit areas.
1 hr. 
2Jirs.
2  hrs.
Scrambling nets and rope pulUng. 
Exercise NOCTURNE.
Each Battalion. Similar to the drill given to assault 
formations as above, but took into account that 
troops may have to disembark, not only into LCAs, 
but also into LCI(L)s and LCTs.___
Each Company. 
Each Company. 
Each Battalion.
Exercise STRACHUR. !..
Exercise FURNACE.
Exercise HARR.OW.
Driving on and off landing craft. Two V2 
days and 
one i%ht
Practice for drivers.
Each Battalion as time permitted. _
The object o f fids Battalion exercise was:
(a) To practice troops in embarking in an LSI in 
the dark.
(b) To practice disembarking in the dark.
(c) To practice landing on a prepared beach and 
_ passing through a transit area by night.
The object o f this Company exercise was:
(a) To practice each company in landing on a shal­
low beach.
(b) To carry out a field firing exercise after passing 
through transit and assembly areas.
(c) To particularly emphasise the need to take care 
o f weapons and equipment during a wet land­
ing where troops are to go into action shortly
 after hmc^g. _______________________
The object o f this Battalion exercise was:
(a) To practice embarking troops and vehicles 
from an LST.
(b) To practice landing on a prepared beach by 
day, passing through the transit areas and as­
sembling in the assembly area.
(c) To practice moving through the covering posi­
tion and subsequent deployment for attack.
Exercise witli siinüar objects to Exercise FURNACE,
but for three battalions operating together.
182
North Western Approaches
Lecture: handing Tables. 1 hr. Commanding Officer, Second-in-Command, Adju- ! 
tant and Intelligence Officer.
Lecture: Beach Organisation. \Vz hrs. Each Battalion’s officers. ‘
Lecture: handing Ships and Craft. % hr. Each Battalion’s officers. Lecture on aU types o f | 
ships and craft, including those not available at In- | 
veraray, but which were to be used in, for example, i 
O V E R L O R D .  ;
Model Démonstration: The Brigade 
Group in the Assault.
1 hr. Each Battalion’s officers. :
i
Lecture: Air Aspects of Combined Op- r  1 hr. Each Battalion’s officers. •
erations.
As the 4^' Division began training by brigades at Inveraray in October 1941, it was appar­
ent that there was not enough room to train both armoured formations and infantry bri­
gades. Alongside brontosaurus^ the LCM training base at Castle Toward, Nissen huts were 
constructed and the 6^  ^Armoured Division moved in to commence training. CTC Toward 
was commissioned on 1 June 1942. Newton Bay was too small to allow practice assaults by 
units larger than one battahon so, by April 1943, as training for OVERLORD gathered pace, 
CTC Toward had grown to include much o f the Ardlamont peninsula for advanced assault 
training. Sections o f the Atlantic Wall were replicated at Kilbride Bay and the exercise area, 
which included Portavadie and Glenan Bay, stretched almost into Tighnabruich and 
Kames. The area was evacuated o f civilians by 21 June 1943 and here, under hve firing 
conditions, brigade-sized units undertook the final stage o f their assault training. Inchmar- 
nock Island was also cleared o f civilians on 17 November 1943 so it could be used as a 
range by Royal Artillery Field Regiments firing from LCTs under way o f f  T i g h n a b r u a i c h .^22
On 7 June 1943 the 3'^ '^  Division, one o f the assault divisions for D-Day, began training at 
Inveraray, each brigade being given a three-week course, and were followed into Inveraray 
by the 3*^*^ Canadian Division, another D-Day assault formation. In 1944 CTC Inveraray 
comprised 370,000 acres o f land, with CTC Dundonald taking up another 6,000 acres 
around Ayr and Troon. At Glen Caladh in the Kyles of Bute a Beach Pilotage School ap­
propriately christened fames Cook was opened to improve pilotage skills which would en­
sure landing craft reached the correct b e a c h . ^^ 3 At Ardentinny on Loch Long a former For­
estry Camp became Armadillo where Beach Commandos were trained in breaching anti­
invasion o b s t a c l e s . 1 2 4  Qn Kintyre (9,344 acres) and Arran (960 acres) there were linked 
ranges used for naval bombardment practice. A 28,400 acre range at Anderside Hill was 
used for artillery practice and training pilots and observers in artillery co-operation.i^s
122 The Admiralty, as did many at Combined Operations HQ, thought die selection o f the isolated Ardlamont penin­
sula a ‘blunder’. It was litde used and both it and die Inchmamock range were closed in January 1944 to allow X  
craft midget submarines which were to act as navigational beacons on D-Day to use Ettrick Bay for training. DEFE 
2 1049. Maund : 1949 p. 109.
123 Fergusson : 1961 p. 183.
124 Ibid.
1 2 5 D E F E 2 1 1 1 7 .
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At the peak o f activity in 1943, the principal Combined Operations establishments in Scot­
land wered26
HMS Wamn The Hollywood Hotel, Largs. HQ of Rear Admiral Combined Operations. I 
RACO was responsible for the training and mounting operations like TORCH. j 
He was also responsible for the planning and organisation of large-scale com- I 
bined exercises. Warren also contained an Aircraft Recognition Section. j
Troon Harbour Operational and Training Headquarters of the LCT organisation. In 1943 some | 
30 LCTs were held for training and the course consisted of two weeks instruc- | 
tion, partly at Dundonald and partiy at sea, in ship-handling, beaching, flotilla ma- i 
noeuvres, gunnery etc. ;
HMS Dundonald and Dundonald Camp was used for an accommodation and instructional centre for |
HMS Dundonald II LCT crews, the Beach Organisation Course, the Beach Signals Course and tlie I 
Forward Observation Course. Beach Organisation courses trained officers in | 
movement control so they could act as Military Landing Officers ÇVlLOs). The | 
Beach Signals Course run by Dundonald II trained units firom the Army, Navy and j 
Marines in the signals organisation to be set up after a landing. The Forward Ob- i 
servation Course trained Gunnery Officers and NCOs in forward observation 1 
and bombardment. Royal Engineers courses in mine clearance and road work, \ 
tank training and RAF Instructors courses were mounted as required. |
HMS Brontosaurus Castle Toward, Dunoon. Working up base for LCT flotillas with also a repair and I 
maintenance establishment. Armoured units of the Army were trained in loading j 
and landing vehicles from LCTs. Included much of Ardlamont Peninsula as a j 
combined training area with replicas of sections of German coastal defences in | 
nortliem France. Inchmamock used as a gunnery range by gunners in LCTs fit- ! 
ing from Tighnabruich. |
CTC Inveraray and 
HMS Quebec
Base for the initial training of minor landing craft crew afloat, a course lasting 1 
four weeks and including aircraft recognition, weapon training and anti-gas j 
measures. Also combined training with Army units including full-scale battalion | 
exercises and landings and the training of repair and maintenance parties. RAF i 
Servicing Commandos, Air Formation Signri Units and RAF Regiment Anti- | 
akcraft Squadrons given assault training. Port Operating companies of the Royal j 
Engineers were trained in Loading and unloading ships, the discharge of stores, | 
and manhandling stores and vehicles onto beaches and into craft. |
Dodin House Special training courses for up to 200 navri personnel at a time who were spe- I 
cially trained and hardened for raiding. Aso used for basic assault training at i 
company level. I
HMS fames Cook Establishment at Glen Caladh for the training of landing craft officers in beach 1 
pilotage. The course lasted 16 days, half of which were spent in instruction i 
ashore, the other half in continuous training afloat. (Instruction in radio naviga- I 
tion aids was given as a separate course at HMS Nortbney, Hayling Island.) I
HMS Amadilh Centre for the initiai training of Naval Beach Commandos at former Forestry | 
Commission camp in Glenfinnart. On completion of their training. Beach Com- | 
mandos went to Dundonald vrhese they joined up with the Beach Group and j 
Beach Signallers for Beach Group training. i
HMS Pasco Establishment at Glenbranter House (prewar home of Sir Harry Lauder and a | 
former POW cage) for Advanced Signals Training for Landing Craft ratings and ! 
senior rates. i
HMS Louisburg 
HMS Stopford
Camp and dockyard facilities built at Rosneath by the US Navy under Lend- | 
Lease from March 1941. Originally to be used by USN escort groups which were j 
to have brought convoys right across the Atlantic. Never used as such and ! 
handed over to the RN as HMS Loulsbufg in 1941. Used for afloat training until | 
handed back to the Americans in August 1942 for TORCH. Used by both US I 
Navy and Army and by Combined Operations at intervals for the rest of the war. j 
Assembly and working up base at Bo’ness for LCT Flotillas constructed at yards I 
on the east coast, and on passage to the west coast. j
126DEFE2 714.
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T h e  R a i d i n g  P h a s e  - P a r t  2  
G a u n t l e t , A n k l e t  a n d  A r c h e r y
While CLAYMORE, the unopposed descent on the Lofoten Islands in March 1 9 4 1 , had little 
apparent military significance, the raid did convince Hitler that a British attack on Norway 
would follow BARBAROSSA, the German attack on the Soviet Union. He immediately or­
dered 1 6 0  coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries to N o r w a y . ^27 The British had indeed 
been considering a plan, codenamed DYNAMITE, for a landing by four divisions in the Sta­
vanger area with a view to closing the northern exit to the North Sea and breaking German 
lines o f communication in Norway. Lack o f resources meant that this never got beyond the 
planning stage, but the strategic picture changed radically following BARBAROSSA. 128
German forces invaded the Soviet Union on the night o f 21 June 1 9 4 1 . Churchill, with an 
eye to the new strategic position, advocated immediate British military reaction. ‘Now the 
enemy is busy in Russia,’ he said with customary vigour and, with an eye to the summer 
weather, ‘is the time to, “Make hell while the sun s h i n e s . ’” ^29 The political imperative was 
to give visible support, and one area where that could be done quickly was on the Soviet 
Union’s Arctic flank.
On 15 July 1941  Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov suggested to British Ambassador Staf­
ford Cripps that British and Soviet troops should occupy Spitzbergen and Bear Island with 
a view to eventually expelling German troops from northern N o r w a y . T h e  Norwegian 
authorities in London were enthusiastic and, on 2 7  July 1 9 4 2 , Admiral Vian sailed Scapa in 
Nigeria with Aurora^ Punjabi and Tartar to investigate. Arriving at Spitzbergen on 31 July, he 
found the coal mining settlements at Longyearbyen (Norwegian controlled) and Barents- 
burg (Soviet controlled) free o f German occupation though both the Norwegian and So­
viet administrators doubted that this would continue. He then sailed for Bear Island, mid­
way between Spitzbergen and Norway, where a party from Nigeria destroyed the weather 
station of value to the Germans.
Vian reported that the scheme to use Spitzbergen or Bear Island as a base was impractical as 
there were no suitable facilities o f any kind, and the fjords were, in any case, iced up for 
much of the year. The islands were well-nigh impossible to defend and the Admiralty, faced 
with the demands of Arctic convoys, was keen to curtail any responsibility for t h e m . ” 2
Ausjuhrungen desFiihrers auf dem Betghofam 12.3.41 ^tirhage (US National Archives T-312 reel 993 9186140 and T-77 
reel 1432 436.) and Abwehr report 15 March 1941 (T-77 reel 1027 2499058) quoted in From Neutrality to NATO - 
The Norwegian Armed Forces and Defense Policy 1905-1955 by David G. Tliomson.
128 Thompson op. cit. p. 224.
129 Gilbert : 1989 pp. 1122-1123.
130 DEFE 2 228.
131 ADM 199 730.
132 Vian : 1960 pp. 67-69. Roskill : 1954 p. 488.
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Canadian troops board­
ing Empress o f  Canada 
at Inveraray for Opera­
tion GAUNTLET
Thus, after a false start on 6 August when a force embarked in Empress of Canada at Glas­
gow and sailed to Inveraray for training, the idea of occupation was dropped in favour of 
evacuation and the destruction of coal mines on Spitzbergen to deny them to the enemy. 
Empress of Canada returned to Glasgow on 11 August and the troops disembarked. A 
smaller force of 46 officers and 599 ORs, mostly Canadian but including a detachment of 
36 Norwegians, re-embarked on 17 August and Empress sailed north the following day.”  ^
From Scapa, the liner was joined by Vian with Nigeria, Aurora, Icarus, Anthony and Antelope 
and, after refuelling at Hvalfjord, entered Gronfjord, Spitzbergen, at 0800/25 August to 
carry out G A U N T L E T .By the following day 1,969 Russian miners and their famiUes had 
been taken aboard and, escorted by Nigeria,
Icarus, Antelope and Anthony, Empress of Can­
ada sailed for Archangel where she disem­
barked her passengers and took on board 
192 Free French volunteers.” ® She returned 
to Spitzbergen, where demoHtions were all 
but complete, and, after embarking the 
Norwegian mining community o f 570 men,
195 women and children, 500 tons o f bag- The power station at Kongsfjord, which 
gage and 14 d o g , sailed for the Clyde
’33 According to a report by landing force commander, Canadian Brigadier Arthur E. Potts, loading of the expedition­
ary force was completed at Glasgow on 17 August though. There was some pilfering of stores by dockworkers at 
Glasgow...' DEFE 2 228.
134 ADM 199 730. Vian ; 1960 pp. 70-71.
135 Loading took place under a cloud of mutual suspicion, the Russians determined to take aboard a large quantity of 
stores that feU outwith the evacuation plan, even scrap metal. Many Russians looted their own stores and the Soviet 
Consul at Barentsburg got ever drunker until, during a conference with landing force commander Brigadier Potts, 
he passed out and had to be stretchered aboard covered with a sheet.DEFE 2 228. ADM 199 730.
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which she reached at 0200/7 September.” ®
Meanwhile, the Admiralty signalled Vian with intelligence that a German convoy was at the 
northern end of the Leads. Vian could not leave Empress of Canada unprotected by sending 
the destroyers, so he took Nigeria and Aurora and, at 0123/7, Nigeria's lookouts sighted two 
transports carrying the Mountain Division escorted by the former gunnery training 
ship Bremse and several smaller escorts. One ship passed down Nigerians side too close to be 
fired on, then there was a heavy crash. According to Vian, this was caused by Nigeria run­
ning down Bremse which sank with the loss of all but 37 of her crew. The troopships es­
caped and Vian's cruisers arrived Scapa on 10 August, Nigeria heavily damaged.” ^
During the summer o f 1941, as German troops advanced deep into the Soviet Union, Lon­
don and Washington were debating whether the Russians would be defeated before the 
United States entered the war. Arctic convoys were begun and, to take the pressure off the 
Red Army, British forces annexed Persia and its oil fields. In North Africa, Auchinleck was 
being nagged by the Prime Minister into an early offensive against strengthening Axis 
forces. Then, in September 1941, Churchill ordered the Chiefs o f Staff to start planning a 
landing by four divisions in Northern Norway. AJAX envisaged the seizing of Tromso as a 
naval base to cover the Arctic convoys, though it was also intended to give the impression :
o f a second front. The plan was killed off on 12 October when the Navy insisted that they 
must have land-based air cover.^ ®® 1
Commando raids into Norway had been suspended during the consideration o f AJAX so as S
to avoid drawing German reinforcements into an area where British forces would be oper- j
ating. But with the demise o f AJAX, raids could begin again. A number o f proposals were 
considered during October and early November 1941, among them ASCOT, a landing in 1
force in central Norway. On 17 November, however, this was dropped in favour of two j
smaller, simultaneous raids, one a return to the Lofoten Islands (ANKLET) and the other a j
landing on the islands of Vâgso and Maloy near Bergen in south-west Norway (ARCHERY). |i
The raids were to be carried out by Combined Operations with a significant input from j
SOE. ANKLET has been characterised as merely a diversionary attack to cover ARCHERY, j
but tlie Navy’s report on the operation offers a different interpretation:
136 Ibid. See also Yeo MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 95/6/1. :
137 Kemp su^ests that Nigeria may have hit a drifting Soviet mine. Vian : 1960 pp 71-73. Kemp 1993. !
138 Given the weakness o f tlie German garrison in Finnmark, AJAX might, as Thompson su^ests, have met with initial !
success. But the Navy’s reluctance is hardly remarkable given their losses at Crete in May 1941. Witliout adequate |
carrier- or land-based air cover, it is likely that the maintenance of a foothold at Tromso would have involved heavy :j
losses. The plan, in any case, depended on the intervention o f a large Norwegian Resistance Army which was tlien |
little more than a figment o f Churchill’s imagination. See Prvm Neutrality to NATO - The Norwegian Armed Forces and |
Defense Polity 1905-1955 by David Thompson p. 225. See also Salmon (ed.) : 1995 paper by Einar Grannes, p. 110, j
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'The inteation was to use Skjel^ofd. as a temporary anchorage and Kirke^ord as a temporary fuelling 
base for our forces operating against the enemy's lines of communication in North Norway as long 
as conditions render this possible.' A direct assault by 12 Commando was to be carried out on the 
towns of Reine and Moskenes, the village of Tind and the hamlet of Napp.^ ®^
And, in a memorandum written two weeks before the force sailed, the ANKLET naval 
commander. Rear Admiral Hamilton, wrote.
It is intended during the progress o f Operation ANKLET to inflict the maximum possible damage to 
tlie Norwegian fishing industry. This industry is force [sic] to supply much fish, fish oü and meal and 
essential vitamin products to Germany. The policy I intend to adopt is to destroy such fish oil facto­
ries as come my way, to capture or sink fish carriers and factory ships and sail such fishing boats as 
can make the passage back to the United Kingdom.” ®
Oddly, in view of the range of targets to be destroyed, Hamilton continues, ‘The above 
should have the effect of causing the least harm to the Norwegians and the most to the 
Germans.’
Prior to the arrival o f the ANKLET force, SOE intended that.
About six Norwegian fishing craft wiU proceed from the Shedands to penetrate the Qords from Bodo 
south to Raneni^ord with the object of destroying the navigational facUities in the inner leads. These 
operations will be timed to take place on the night previous to the arrival of Force J in Vest^ord.
Those fishing craft wiU subsequendy proceed to Reme.” ^
SOE suggestions for ANKLET included the destruction of ferries, rallying fishermen around 
Reine, ’to commit every form of nuisance and hindrance to the enemy...to provide guides 
and thugs for any operations the Force Commander may wish to undertake.' Navigation 
lights in the Leads and the observation post and the wireless station at Rost were to be de­
stroyed. After the arrival o f the ANKLET force, SOE planned to land a wireless operator at 
Hameroy to report on shipping m o v e m e n t s . ^ '* ^
Force J for ANKLET comprised the cruiser Arethusa, the destroyers Somali, Ashanti, Tartar 
and Matahele, the Hunt class destroyers Krakomak, Kugawiak, J^uimerton and Wheatland, the 
Norwegian corvettes Acanthus and Eglantine, the sweepers Hartier, Halcyon and Speedwell, the 
survey ship Scott, the tug Jaunty and the oilers Black Ranger and G ry Ranger. The assault 
force was made up o f 223 officers and men of 12 Commando and included 3 officers and 
62 ratings o f the Norwegian Navy and one British officer and two ORs all under the SOE 
banner, and six officers and 72 ORs o f the Norwegian Army. It was to be carried in Prince 
Albert and Princess Josephine Charlotte each o f which carried three LCAs, one LCS and four R 
boats. Gudrun Maersk carried supplies including 1,000 tons o f naval ammunition, 500 tons
139 ADM 116 4381 
140DEFE2 73. 
141ADM 116 4381. 
142HS2198.
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o f victuals, mooi'ings, camouflage and 50 tons o f supplies for the locals such as flour, 
chocolate and cigarettesd'^®
While ANKLET was not expected to meet heavy resistance, Vagso and Maloy islands were 
known to be defended. The ARCHERY force from 3 Commando was carried in the assault 
ships Prince Charles (Lieutenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater with 14 officers and 190 
ORs) and Prince Leopold (Major Jack Churchill with seven officers and 132 ORs and Lieu­
tenant R. A. Clement with two officers and 43 ORs). The force was led from the cruiser 
Lenya by Rear Admiral Harold Burrough with Brigadier Charles Haydon, Brigade HQ and a 
signal section. Captain R. A. Hooper with two officers and 64 ORs were aboard Kenya and 
Orihi, one o f four escort destroyers, carried a landing party o f one officer and 43 ORs. The 
balance o f the escort comprised Onslow, Offa and Chiddingfoldd^ The ANKLET force boarded 
Winchester Castle at Greenock on 12 December and sailed for Inveraray, anchoring in Loch ]
Fyne at 1300/13. The Advance H Q  and A, B, and E troops comprising 14 officers and 210 |
ORs were then transhipped to Prince Albert and the Rear HQ and C, D and F troops com- jjprising 10 officers and 176 ORs boarded Princess Josephine Charlotte. Also taken aboard Prince 
Albert were one officer and 10 naval ratings from the new Combined Operations Signal 
School at Inveraray to act as beach signal parties. The assault ships sailed for Scapa the 
following afternoon, but Princess Josephine Charlotte was forced to turn back due to engine 
trouble and was towed upriver to Plantation Quay for repair while Prince Albert continued 
north.
The ARCHERY force sailed down Loch Fyne aboard Prince Charles and Prince Leopold on the 
afternoon o f 19 December after a brief period o f training at Inveraray. They too were bound 
for Scapa where landing rehearsals were to be carried out by both forces, but the four days at 
Scapa were dogged by dreadful weather. The weather was still bad when the ARCHERY force 
left Scapa Flow at 2100/24 and Captain BiU Fell commanding Prince Charles wrote:
West of Orkney we ran into extremely heavy weather, which reduced our speed to 12 knots.. .The 
ship was labouring badly and the soldiers were once again reduced to a state of collapse.. .1 felt the 
ship could easily break her back and accordingly eased down to eight knots. Prince Leopold overtook us 
and, passing along our port beam, happened to roll towards us as we rolled towards her. We were 
able from our respective bridges to see down each other’s funnels to the furnaces below, and it was 
not a very pleasant sight.”®
Her fore ends filling due to strain on the huh. Prince Charles limped into SuUom Voe, the rest 
of the force following suit in search o f shelter. After a two-day delay which threw out the 
synchronised timetable for the two operations, the ARCHERY force saÜed again at
” 3 DEFE 2 73. ADM 116 4381. 
144 HS 2 225. ADM 234 380. 
” ®Fell: 1966 p. 84.
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1 4 0 0 / 2 6 . Ahead o f them, from Scapa on 23 December, had gone the submarine Tuna 
which was to act as a navigational beacon off Vâgsfjord.^'*^ Tuna commenced transmitting at 
0605/27 and, at 0739/27, the OOW  in Trince Charles sighted her conning t o w e r . Prince
Charles and Prince Teopold hove to in 
Hollevik Bay at 0840/27 and, in two 
minutes, sixteen fully-loaded land­
ing craft were waterborne and under 
way.^ '^  ^ Kenya and the destroyers 
bombarded batteries on Mâloy and 
Rugsundoy, though Rugsundoy bat­
tery returned fire on Kenya just be­
fore 0900/27. Brigadier Haydon 
called in RAF Hampdens to drop 
601b phosphorus smoke bombs 
ahead of the landing craft, but one 
fell short, causing 20 casualties in 
one LCA one of whom later died. 
One Hampden was shot down in 
flames close to Prince Teopold at 
0852/27. Three men were picked 
up, one conscious, but two died.^^ 
Maloy Battery o f four ex-Belgian 75 
mm field guns having been given 
what Young describes as ‘a severe 
plastering’ by Kenya, was swiftly 
taken by Group 3 under Churchill 
and, following his signal at 0920/27,
VAAGSO
TMt J O IN T S  
O f  A S S k u i r
0f i I 9
fig. 57
146 Ibid. p. 85.
147 Tuna carried an American observer. Lieutenant D. G. Irvine USN. Information from the Royal Navy Submarine 
Museum, HMS Dolphin.
148 ADM 234 380.
149 Young : 1958 p. 37. Fell ; 1966 p. 86.
150 The part played by RAF aircraft, which provided continuous cover for seven hours, was a model for later amphibi­
ous assaults. Aside from the initial wave o f Hampdens from Wick, Blenheims and Beaufighters from Wick and 
Sumburgh mounted sorties over the area during the day and carried out a bombing raid on Herdla airfield. The first 
sortie o f four Blenheims took off from Wick at 0657/27 and lost two 254 Squadron aircraft. One crashed soon af­
ter take off and one simply disappeared. The two survivors, both from 404 Squadron, returned to Wick at 1257/27. 
The second sortie by four 235 Squadron Beaufighters from Sumburgh drove off a JU88 over Vâgso, but was en­
gaged by Mel09s which shot one of their number down. The third sortie of three 236 Squadron Beaufighters dam­
aged an Mel 10 at 1255/27, but lost one aircraft, and the fourth sortie was uneventful. The final sortie by four 248 
Squadron Beaufighters took off from Sumburgh at 1321/27 and relieved the third at 1445/27. Ten minutes later it 
engaged a force o f three Mel 10s escorted by three Me 109s, claiming two destroyed. This sortie escorted the naval 
force out to sea and returned to Sumburgh at 1715/27. HS 2 225. DEFE 2 83. Fergusson : 1961 pp. 106-108.
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Onslow leading Oribi, under fire, through the narrows between Vâgso and Maloy. They 
moved up Ulvesund, landed a party of Commandos north of the town, then engaged 
the merchant ships Reimar Edzard Fritzen and Norma, the armed trawler Fohn and a 
former Dutch schuyt Eissmeer. And, as described in Chapter Four, under fire from the 
shore, Bletchley Park cypher specialists carried aboard Onlow boarded the armed 
trawler Fohn and retrieved two sackfuls of signals intelligence including tw o sets of 
Enigma bigram tables and five rotors.
Oribi and Onslow passed through taking Group 5 to land at North Vâgso at 1020/27.
Group 2 under Durnford Slater landed at the south end of Vâgso and, as they moved into 
the town, met stiff resistance from infantry in houses and snipers on the hillsides above. 
Casualties, as usual in street fighting, were heavy and Norwegian Captain Martin Linge was 
killed while attacking the German HQ in the Ulvesund Hotel.^^i Meanwhile, a half-troop 
under Captain Peter Young were crossing Ulvesund from Mâloy in an LCA, ordered by 
Churchill to help the main body in South Vâgso who were taking casualties. Their officers 
and NCOs killed or wounded, men had taken cover behind houses and the advance into 
the town had halted in the face o f determined opposition. At a hurried conference oppo­
site the burning Ulvesund Hotel Durnford Slater ordered Young to lead an advance 
through the warehouses between the road and the fjord. Young wrote:
•51 Sergeant Ruben Larsen reported that he, Private Vedaa and Linge landed from the LCA that had been hit by the 
smoke canister. Linge and Larsen took a party towards the German HQ, taking what Larsen described as 'consider­
able risks' in order to get there before the Germans could destroy documents and other valuable intelligence. Linge 
ordered his men to throw grenades and rushed the building. Larsen wrote;
Captain Linge was very keen on doing this, but he did not take into consideration that the troops did not like the idea at all. 
When we reached the hotel we discovered that there were still a lot of Germans there. We retreated and went round a comer 
where we stopped for a few seconds. Suddenly, without any warning, a bullet hit Captain Linge. I tried to get away when an­
other shot was fired, probably meant for me, which also hit him. I then took cover behind the entrance to the hotel. HS 2 
225.
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[Lieutenant] O ’Flaherty warned me to be 
careful how we crossed the open ground 
where lay the body o f  Sgt. Greear for 
there were snipers covering it from the 
hill higher up. I now began to realise that 
this was not going to be a picnic as was 
the Lofoten raid..
Young’s party took the building 
marked ‘Ammo Store’ on his map, a 
sanitised version of which appeared 
in his book Siorm From The Sea 
(Young : 1958), and moved on to the 
Red Warehouse where they got into 
a firelight with at least two Germans 
inside. Grenades were exchanged, 
but the Germans retreated to the 
upper floors. Lieutenant O ’Flaherty 
and Trooper Sherington attempted
J, O'nabartjr & Sharing*on «hot.• i ’ L/Opl. a n i ls  and Lawinton. 3 rd  Floor.X. Sgt. B u i^ s  and Tpr. Clark h i t .T. 3 Oaxaana takan.0. Daad Oaxaan s a ilo r ,# . Daad Oaxaan s a ilo r  and voundad Oaxaan ao ld lar. fig. 59
to rush the stairs but were injured by 
Germans firing from an inner room. 
Both men managed to stagger out, 
then petrol was thrown in and the warehouse set ahght. One German stuck his head out of 
a window and was immediately shot, another staggered out of the door, then fell dead. A 
grenade thrown at Durnford Slater’s party injured three men seriously, and Durnford Slater 
slightly.
Meanwhile, Onslow, Offa, Chiddinffold and Oribi had sunk or damaged Anhalt (5,870T), Kei- 
mar Edi^ard Frits(en (2,936T), Anita L. M. Russ (1,712T), Norma (2,258T), the schuit Eismeer 
(1,000T), a small coaster, 
two armed trawlers and a 
tug.^54 Canning factories and 
other smaller plants had 
been wrecked, the wireless 
station was destroyed, the 
Rodberghe telephone ex­
change was smashed, the 
Saternes Lighthouse mecha- 3 Commando troops ashore in South Vâgso
•52 Ibid.
•53 Ibid.
•54 Witthoft : 1971 pp. 222, 223, 313 and 333.
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nism was ruined and the telephone cable hut on Mâloy was burned as were petrol tanks 
and vehicles. Guns and ammunition were destroyed, the German barracks and Ulvesund 
Hotel were burned down and the road between North and South Vâgso was cratered.
The ARCHERY force, which sailed at 1600/27, had lost 20 dead and 57 wounded. About 
150 Germans were killed and 98 were captured, among them six German merchant navy 
officers, 36 merchant navy ratings and 15 Kreigsmarine raings. Four quislings were also 
taken. Seventy-seven Norwegian loyalists returned with the assault force. Two Heinkels 
bombed the ships as they left, one bomb bursting about 60 feet ahead o f Prince Charles, 
tripping her dynamos, but the ships reached Scapa 24 hours later without further inci-
dent.^55
And what o f ANKLET? Repairs effected. Princess Josephine Charlotte had rejoined at SuUom 
Voe on 22 December and the force sailed for the Lofoten Islands that afternoon. Once 
again. Princess Josephine Charlotte reported an unserviceable extractor pump and was ordered 
to return.^56 xhe submarine Tigris had sailed Scapa on 19 December for a position south of 
Rost Island where she was to act as navigational beacon. Her transmissions were heard 
shortly before midnight on Christmas Day and the assault force was at the rendezvous off 
Glâpen Light early on Boxing Day.^^^
The non-arrival of Princess Josephine Charlotte and the troops she carried led to a hurried re­
draft at sea with the attacks on Reine, Sorvaagen and Sund being amended. Prince Albert 
arrived off Reine at 0715/26 and lowered one LCM, two LCAs and one R boat for the at­
tack on the town. The LCM carried Lieutenant Colonel Harrison o f 12 Commando, Lieu- 
teant Commander Hugh Cartwright o f Prince Albert, troops and signallers to act as HQ 
craft. Each LCA carried half a troop o f 12 Commando with Norwegian forces personnel 
and the R boat held an SOE party o f Norwegians under Major W att Torrance, Close be­
hind was the corvette Eglantine ready to give covering fire.^ ^®
At 0815/27 the flotilla crept into the harbour and, while the LCS lay o ff to give covering 
fire, one LCA crossed to Andoy Island and the other two LCAs drew alongside the pier 
and disembarked troops. Complete surprise was achieved and, within 15 minutes, the tele­
phone exchange had been taken over and a sweep o f the town had revealed no Germans 
present. Andoy was likewise free o f enemy troops, so the telephone cable was cut and the 
Commandos withdrew. Meanwhile, escorted by Acanthus, two R boats with 23 men of 12 
Commando, ten Norwegian Commandos and the Naval Beach party o f one officer and
•55 HS 2 199. HS 2 225. DEFE 2 83. Young : 1958 pp. 54-57. Fell : 1966 pp. 92-94 and 96-97, 
•56 She had not gone fat and reached Scapa at 1733/22. DEFE 2 73. WO 218 28.
•57 DEFE 2 73.
•58 Cartwright’s and Torrance’s reports in DEFE 2 73.
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eight ratings had left Prince Albert for the village o f Sund which they rapidly secured^^^ Lo­
cals at Reine had told Torrance of a party o f German troops at Sorvâgen so Reine was se­
cured with a small garrison. The LCS and LCAs were then recalled to Prince Albert which 
proceeded to Sorvâgen where a half troop o f Commandos surrounded Glâpen Lighthouse,
The ANKLET force en­
tering KIrkefjord.
capturing eight Germans without a fight. The destroyer Bedouin had meanwhile landed a 
small party at the village o f Napp but discovered it clear of Germans.
Arethusa, Somali, Ashanti and Eskino swept up Vestfjord as far as Tranoy and captured the 
Norwegian coasters Kong Harald and Nordland and the German patrol trawler Geier. The 
latter was sunk by scuttling charge at 1345/26 after her crew of 4 officers and 13 ratings 
had been taken prisoner, and she had been successfully searched for Enigma material. The 
former two were sent into Reine with prize crews.
But the assault flotilla was clearly visible to Germans in Glâpen Lighthouse and they 
wasted no time in signalling its presence. The first enemy aircraft appeared on the morning 
of 26 December, passing over Lamerton off Sorvâgen, Prince Albert off Reine and the 
sweepers in Vestfjord. Another reconnaissance floatplane appeared shortly after noon the 
following day and dropped one bomb close to Arethusa.^ ^'^  The initial Luftwaffe response 
may have been weak, but that night Hamilton received news that, ‘the Germans were send­
ing considerable air reinforcements, including dive-bombers, to Bodo and North Norway. I 
therefore decided to leave during the coming day.’^ <^  ^The last troops left Reine at 1245/28
•59 WO 218 28.
160 Ibid.
•61 ADM 116 4318. DEFE 2 73.
•62 Ibid.
•63 The information was in two Admiralty signals sent at 1904/27 and 2256/27 and the Luftwaffe moves were assumed 
by Hamilton to be the result of ANKLET. See ANKLET — Narrative of Events in DEFE 2 73.
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Ashanti with the patrol trawler Geier alongside. As described in Chapter Four, Geler was 
another valuable source of Enigma intelligence, yielding a complete encypherment ma­
chine, the latest sets of bigram tables and other codebooks. This haul, along with the 
similar material taken during ARCHERY allowed Bletchley Park to read German surface 
ship signals for the rest of the war. Arguably at least, the real, lasting value of the raids 
to Norway in 1940-41 lay in these signals intelligence captures, though the historian 
should beware of any temptation to  overstate the importance of Enigma decrypts to  
the Allied conduct of the war at sea.
and the force sailed shortly afterwards, taking with them 29 German prisoners, six quis­
lings and 266 Norwegian volunteers.
The decision to leave was controversial, both among civilians who had committed them­
selves to the Allied cause and among the troops involved. Disgusted at what they saw as 
betrayal, 12 Commando Lieutenants Pinkney and Jeffries seized the cameras carried by re­
porters and threw them o v e r b o a r d . Churchill too was indignant at the seemingly precipi­
tate withdrawal, but the fault lay in the planning of an operation which sent vulnerable 
ships and men far into enemy territory without air cover. Too many ships had been lost to 
air attack during the first Norway operation, Dunkirk and Crete to risk a another such de­
bacle. Hamilton and Tovey were entirely correct in withdrawing.
Deeply flawed as it was, it would be wrong to characterise ANKLET as a fiasco. Hitler be­
came more than ever convinced, as a result o f the raids, that Norway was the ‘zone of des­
tiny’ for the entire war and reinforcements of men, aircraft and ships were sent there. One 
direct consequence was the ‘Channel Dash’ when Schamhorst, Gneisenau and Prini^  Eugen 
broke through the English Channel from Brest after Hitler ordered a concentration of 
every available German naval vessel, including the new battleship Tirpitn^ in Norway (see
>64 w o  218 28. 
i65Lovat: 1978 p. 227.
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Chief of Combined Operations Commodore Lord Mountbatten aboard Prinz Albert 
In Loch Fyne during preparations for BITING. That autumn, In nearby Loch Long,
Royal Marine canoeists trained for FRANKTON another operation to  occupied 
France In which the Scottish CTCs played a central role. The Inspiration behind this 
raid on German blockade runners In Bordeaux, came from Major Roger Courtney, 
w hose role In the affair has never received the attention It deserves. In 1940,
Courtney paddled out unobserved to the assault ship Qengyle off Inveraray and 
painted marks on her side to represent mines. Later, to  prove his point that canoes 
had an operational role, he paddled down Loch Fyne to Strachur, portaged to Loch 
Eck, paddled to the south end, then portaged across to  the Holy Loch where, still 
unseen, he left painted marks on the side of the depot ship Forth.
Chapter Six). He also ordered an anti-invasion patrol of six U-boats between the Hebrides 
and the Faroes, thus depleting the U boat force available for the Atlantic.^^^
For the Norwegians, however, ANKLET proved a bitter pill when German reprisals, denun­
ciations and arrests were visited on the Lofoten islanders. Commander Frank Stagg o f the 
SOE Scandinavian Section wrote;
The population had been told that the British force had com e to stay.. .All these people were hoping 
that the moment had at last com e when the fight would be taken up once more, although the major­
ity were rather sceptical as regards present operations developing. N one were, however, prepared for 
the news that the forces were to flee without even having tried to fight; therefore when the news 
came about retreat it did not cause only deep disappointment, but also indignation and fury. The 
general opinion was that once more propaganda had been successfully been achieved with nearly 100 
per cent security for the military, whereas the landing would once more bring upon the heads o f  the 
remaining population the horrors o f  German reprisals.
Combined Operations, meanwhile, wanted a swift return to Norway, so swift that Prince 
Charles was back in Loch Fyne late on 1 January 1942 to embark men of 6 Commando for 
KITBAG, a raid on coastal targets and shipping at Floro. Prince Charles left Inveraray on 5 
January and, after pausing in Yell Sound, Shetland, sailed for Norway escorted by Inglefteld, 
Intrepid, Wheatland and Eamerton. Owing to a poor landfall, the force arrived too late to at-
>66Roskill: 1977 p. 125.
>67 Minutes of Führer Naval conferences 29 December 1941, 12 January 1942 and 22 January 1942 in Brassey : 1948 
pp. 246-260. Also Wynn : 1998 p. 149.
168 RVPS report quoted in Cookridge ; 1966 p. 531
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tack shore targets at Floro. It did penetrate Hellefjord, but found it clear o f shipping and 
returned to Inveraray without engaging the enemy. Then it emerged that Combined Opera­
tions and SOE had used Norwegian personnel, including Linge Company commandos, 
without consulting Prime Minister Nygaardsvoid’s Norwegian government-in-exile. This 
caused much resentment but new Defence Minister Oscar Torp created the Forsvarets 
Overkommando (FO) in February 1942 and military liaison begin to improve. Also that 
month, SOE and the FO began working in closer harmony through the Anglo-Norwegian 
Collaboration Committee (ANCC).^^^
Large-scale raids to Norway ended with ANKLET and ARCHERY, but Inveraray played a 
central role in the planning and training for other important raids in 1942. Late in 1941, 
Air Ministry scientists identified a Wiirff>urg radar station at Bruneval near Le Havre, and 
proposed a raid to steal parts of the equipment for analysis. Combined Operations HQ 
came up with a plan for the 2"^ Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, a section o f 1«> Para­
chute Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, and an RAF Flight Sergeant Radar Mechanic to 
drop east of the installation, remove the equipment and make their way down to the beach 
from where they would be picked up by LCAs from Prins(^  Albert. Major John Frost and the 
BITING force o f 120 men undertook a short course at Inveraray before the raid was 
launched on the night o f 27 February 1942. The paratroopers successfully removed much 
of the apparatus under fire and took two prisoners, then made their way to the beach and 
the landing craft. Two were killed and seven w o u n d e d . ^ ^ o
On 17 January 1942, decrypts revealed that the new German battleship Tirpits^ had arrived 
at Trondheim. The threat to the Atlantic convoy routes was clear, but this could be signifi­
cantly reduced if the battleship was denied docking facilities in France. A raid on the N or­
mandie Dock at St Nazaire, the only facility on the French Atlantic coast capable o f taking 
Titpitf(^ had been considered during Keyes’ time as DCO when the threat was Tirpitt^ sister 
Bismarck, but had been abandoned as, to carry out worthwhile demolitions, the force would 
have to be several hundred strong and the shoals in the Loire estuary made a night ap­
proach by large vessels all but impossible.
Now the new danger posed by Tirpit^ meant that CHARIOT was born. Combined Opera­
tions originally planned a clear-cut operation to ram the outer caisson of the Normandie 
Dock with a destroyer fitted with a demolition charge. Her crew would then be taken off 
by another destroyer. The assault force o f 257 commandos was mainly drawn from 2 
Commando based at Ayr with the addition o f specialist demolition teams who trained for
169 See Thompson op. at. ch. 7 section entitled The Njgaardsm/d Government in Crisis and ch. 8 section entitled Commando
Raids and Special Operations 1942-43. Also Stafford : 1980 pp. 83-84.
I’o In September 1944, Frost would lead the defence o f Arnhem Bridge during Operation MARKET GARDEN. Frost ;
1980 pp. 37-55. Jones :1978 pp 302-321. Combined Operations In HitlePs War 'tsi Naval ReviewvoX. 48 1960 p. 440-453.
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the raid at Burntisland and Rosyth. But, while the initial CHARIOT concept was good, the 
plan grew rapidly to include a complex range o f secondary demolition targets in the dock 
area for which the assault force was neither sufficient nor adequately equipped. And, de­
spite the fact that the raid would be o f principal benefit to them, the Admiralty refused to 
allocate two destroyers, only reluctantly parting with the old, ex-American Campbeltown. A 
second destroyer was refused, so the parties assaulting secondary targets had to rely on 
inadequate motor launches.
Bomber Command was asked to soften up the defences just before the attack went in at 
0130/28 March, but the RAF commitment to Combined Operations in general, and CHAR­
IOT in particular, was less than wholehearted and the small raid that was mounted failed 
completely, though it did alert the d e fe n c e s .D e s p i t e  this, Campbeltown was successfully 
rammed into the caisson and blew up, putting the dock out o f action until 1948. But the 
secondary assaults by the parties from the MLs failed totally, all but three being sunk, most 
before landing troops. CHARIOT was a success in that its primary objective, the Normandie 
Dock, was out o f action and Tirpitt^ was thus confined to northern waters. This would, as 
seen in the following chapter, have a fundamental influence on Allied and Axis naval strat­
egy, but the raid had been a costly affair with 169 of the 611 who took part being killed 
and another 200 captured. Amid the euphoria at the destruction o f the dock and the din of 
propaganda that followed, alarm bells that should have warned against attacking well- 
defended ports with inadequate forces and insufficient tactical air support went unheard. 
This would have terrible consequences at D i e p p e .
Singapore had fallen on 15 February 1942 and Rangoon followed on 8 March. These disas­
ters in the Far East led to the revival o f a plan for the capture o f Vichy-held Madagascar 
which had been considered, then dropped in January 1942. Operation IRONCLAD, as it was 
known, was to be carried out by the 29* Infantry Brigade and 5 Commando supported by 
the 17* Infantry Brigade and the force sailed with WS17 from the Clyde in the assault 
ships Winchester Castle, Karanja, Keren and Sobieskt at the end of March. The landings began 
at dawn on 5 May and were a complete success.^?^
BITING, CHARIOT and IRONCLAD boosted confidence to a dangerous degree and, under 
pressure from Moscow, Washington and vocal left-wing elements at home advocating a 
second front to support Russia, Churchill ordered another operation. A large-scale landing
•71 Air Cliief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris took over at Bomber Command on 22 February 1942. Harris had little time for 
Combined Operations and was more concerned witli strategic bombing and securing the resources to win the war 
on his own. Tlie night after CHARIOT, 234 aircraft destroyed much o f Lubeck. Terratne : 1985 pp. 468-480. Dor- 
rian : 1998 pp. 112-115.
>72 Dorrian : 1998. Roskill : 1956 p. 168-173. Article entitled The Raid o h  StNa^aire in After The Battle magazine no. 59, 
1988. Horan op cit. For German reaction see Brassey : 1948 pp. 269-272.
>73 Fergusson : 1961 pp. 156-168.
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on Alderney was considered, then rejected when Harris refused RAF bomber support. The 
assault on Dieppe, initially codenamed RUTTER, had its genesis early in 1942 and a meeting 
just over two weeks after CHARIOT considered two alternative plans, one for landings on 
either side o f Dieppe and one for a frontal assault by, for the first time, troops from the 
regular army with commandos in support on the flanks. At a subsequent meeting on 25 
April, Mountbatten, who was in the chair, came down in favour o f the frontal assault.^ '^  ^
RUTTER was planned for 24 June 1942, but muddled planning and inadequate training led 
to a postponement until 8 July. Finally, on 7 July, with the assault ships fuUy loaded in the 
Solent, and commanders considering a further postponement due to bad weather, four 
German aircraft attacked the convoy. Two assault ships were hit, though the bombs passed 
through without exploding. The air raid and the bad weather led to the cancellation o f the 
assault, and the troops, who had been fully briefed, were d i s p e r s e d ,
But, even before RUTTER was formally abandoned, Mountbatten, who was eager to make 
good on his extravagant promise o f regular large-scale raids, was arguing for the operation 
to be r e m o u n t e d . 7^6 And Churchill was due in Moscow on 12 August when he would have 
to teU Stalin that there would be no second front in Europe in 1942. He needed to be able 
to sweeten this bitter pill and at least appear to be taking pressure off the Red Army so, on 
27 July, with American encouragement, the Dieppe operation was revived.^^^ Security had 
been compromised by loose talk from troops disembarked a month earlier and Montgom­
ery, originally to command RUTTER but now appointed to relieve Auchinleck in the desert, 
protested that it should be abandoned.^?^ He was ignored, then the already risky plan, now 
rechristened JUBILEE, was altered in two fundamental and ultimately fatal respects. First 
the aitrborne landing to silence gun batteries ahead of the assault was replaced by flank at­
tacks by Commandos, then the ait bombardment, which Montgomery had insisted on, was 
dropped. As the Navy refused to commit cruisers or battleships in the Channel, bombard­
ment would be restricted to the four-inch guns o f the eight escorting destroyers.
The story o f bloody, disastrous Dieppe Raid is well known and needs no recounting 
here.^®° O f 4,963 Canadians involved, 907 died and 1,874 were captured, and 586 returned 
wounded. British casualties were 226 killed and 475 missing or captured. Twenty-eight
>74 Roskill : 1954 pp. 239-243. Lovat : 1978 pp. 238-246. Lamb : 1993 pp. 171-172. Horan op cit.
>75 Ibid.
176 Prelude to Dieppe. Thoughts on Combined Operations Policy in The Raiding Period. Paper by Barry Hunt and David Schurman 
in Naval Warfare in The Twentieth Century. Gerald Jordan (ed.) (Crook Helm 1977)
>77 The British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the preparation for the Dieppe Raid, march—August 1942. Did Mountbatten really evade 
the Committee^ s authority? Henshawin War in Histoty vol. 1 no. 1 (1994).
>78 Lamb : 1993 p. 171.
>79 Ibid. Roskill ; 1954 p. 243 for naval forces.
>80 Lovat : 1978 has four chapters (15-18) on die Dieppe Raid, the last o f which is probably the best analysis o f why it 
went so badly wrong.
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December 1941
I HUSKY June-Jui^l943
Of B/iCBY
Amphibious raids and major landinngs mounted direct from Scotland during the Com­
bined Operations raiding phase and up to HUSKY, the Sicily invasion. This does not 
show landings like IRONCLAD, CHARIOT and JUBILEE mounted indirectly by, or heavily 
dependent on, Scottish based naval and land forces.
Churchill tanks were left behind, at least one in full working order, as were landing craft, 
radio sets and weapons.’®^ Despite the efforts o f Mountbatten and his apologists, and even 
with the benefit o f hindsight, Dieppe was an eminently avoidable disaster. The raid was 
never the dress rehearsal for OVERLORD it has since been passed off as, nor did it forestall 
a potentially disastrous disastrous foray into France in 1943. Churchill had decided to press 
for the abandonment o f American plans for cross-channel assault after RUTTER was aban­
doned, but before JUBILEE was l a u n c h e d . ^ ^ s  initiated on a whim to appease Stalin, it 
was badly planned, the lessons of previous operations were ignored and it was expected. 
The flotilla seen by enemy aircraft in July could only have had one purpose and the enemy
i«i Casualty figures from Roskill : 1954 pp. 247 and 250 and firom Dieppe 1942 article in After The Battle magazine no 5 
1974.
'•*2 Prelude to Dieppe. Thoughts on Combined Operations Polity in The Raiding Period. Paper by Barry Hunt and David Schurman 
in Naval Warfare in The Twentieth Century. Gerald Jordan (ed.) (Crook Helm 1977)
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was perfectly capable o f divining when and where such a raid might be mounted. Indeed, 
as Lovat writes, enemy troops were on special alert against possible landings during suit­
able tides between 10 and 19 August.^®®
But one o f the principal failings of JUBILEE lay in the fact that the wrong troops were used. 
While the established services were reluctant to release their best formations for raids. 
General McNaughton was eager to prove his 1st Canadian Army in the operation. The Ca­
nadians had not, however, been to Inveraray for assault training and many of the failings 
on the Dieppe beaches arose as a direct result.
T h e  M a i n  E v e n t  
T o r c h , H u s k y , T h e  R a t t l e  C o n f e r e n c e  a n d  O v e r l o r d .
A s you have been told, I  am here incognito — and that is something quite contraty to my usual habit. Ijust want to tell 
you that you are the luckiest bunch of guys in the world to have arrived herejust now. And, as you well know, not a 
God-darned son-of-a~hitch could have arrived butfor the N a^ and A ir Force who*ve brought you across safelg. You 
won’t have long to wait before you start to do what you came here for, and that is to kill Germans, h/fy only advice to 
you at this moment is thereforejust to go in and kill the bastards. Thank you.
General George Patton to US Army officers, Greenock, 28 January 1944.^ 84
For most of 1941 and, in particular, since BARBAROSSA in June, Churchill had been advo­
cating a risky invasion o f Norway under the codename JUPITER to take pressure off the 
Red Army. But the entry o f the United States into the war in December 1941, immediately 
prior to ANKLET and ARCHERY, changed everything. At the ARCADIA conference in Wash­
ington at Christmas 1941, Churchill secured American agreement for a ‘Germany first’ pol­
icy and the creation o f a Combined Chiefs o f Staff. He also floated JUPITER with the 
Americans but, much to the relief o f their British counterparts who were equally unenthu- 
siastic, the plan attracted no support. GYMNAST, a proposal for an invasion o f Vichy North 
Africa, was also discussed.
Stalin, meanwhile, continued to pressure for a second front and, as protracted discussions 
between the British and Americans ground on into 1942, two main options emerged. The 
Americans promoted ROUNDUP, a plan for an invasion of Europe in 1943 which would 
then allow concentration on the Pacific, and SLEDGEHAMMER, an emergency cross- 
Channel assault in 1942 should the situation in the Soviet Union deteriorate dangerously. 
And, as seen above, in scaled-down form, SLEDGEHAMMER became the catastrophic JUBI-
18Î Lovat : 1978 p. 478. At a Chequers dinner party shortly after Dieppe, and in Churchill’s presence, CIGS General Sir 
Alan Brooke clashed with Mountbatten, telling him that the planning for Dieppe had been aU wrong. The row sim­
mered on but was hushed up. In his Lees Knowles lecture given at Cambridge in 1943 and quoted in The Keyes 
Papers part III fn. 88, Keyes was unusually restrained in his comment on JUBILEE. He said:
This generation was taught afresh at Dieppe the lessons which were indelibly impressed on the memories o f all who wit­
nessed at Gallipoli, on 25 April 1915, the heroic but unsuccessful and costly efforts to capture in daylight a much less heav­
ily defended beach than that of Dieppe.
8^4 Patton quoted in Yeo MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 95/6/1.
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LEE, ostensibly at least a measure to reduce pressure on the Red Army.
There were not enough landing craft to m ount an attack in sufficient strength to have any 
bearing on events in Russia. On the other hand, supply lines to India and the Middle East 
would be considerably shortened were the whole North African coast to be in Allied 
hands. Malta would be saved and shipping would be released for BOLERO, the build up of 
American forces ahead o f the invasion o f France. The Americans viewed the possibility of 
German control o f West African ports with alarm, not least as this would threaten their 
eastern seaboard supply routes. Above all, though, Roosevelt wanted his inexperienced 
forces in action as soon as possible. Ignoring the advice o f military chiefs who believed, 
correctly as it turned out, that TORCH would make ROUNDUP impossible in 1943, Churchill 
and Roosevelt pushed the N orth African operation through in July 1942. Churchill per­
sisted with JUPITER into 1942 but, without American support, the plan was reduced to a 
deception to cover TORCH, the renamed GYMNAST. As discussed in Chapter 6, the threat 
to Norway was maintained as a series o f deception operations, naval operations and minor 
raids until OVERLORD in 1944.1®®
The Vichy authorities harboured deep resentment against the British for the sinking of 
French ships at Oran and Mers el Kebir in 1940, but Roosevelt in particular believed that 
they would offer minimal resistance to an American force. The British thought this naïve, 
though dressing British troops in American uniforms was considered, then rejected.i®® BO­
LERO movements of US troops to the Clyde had reached almost 82,000 by July and a fur­
ther 260,000 were expected by the time TORCH was launched.i®^
Three landings were planned and D-Day was set for 8 November. The all-American West­
ern Task Force would come direct from the United States to land on the Atlantic coast 
near Casablanca. An Eastern Naval Task Force o f British and American ships under Rear 
Admiral Harold Burrough would land 9,000 American troops followed up by two brigades 
o f the British 78‘*' Division and 1 and 6 Commandos to attack Algiers. Military Command 
o f the eastern assault was given to an American, Major General Charles Ryder.i®® The Cen­
tre Naval Task Force under Commodore Tom Troubridge was to land 18,500 men o f the 
18^', 26^, 39**' and 168**' US Regimental Combat Teams under Major General Lloyd Fre- 
dendall at Oran.*®®
The GIs had no experience o f amphibious operations, so the 168*** and the 26**' were
185 Lamb : 1993 pp. 166-168. Salmon (ed.) : 1995 papers on JUPITER by H. P. Willmott and Einar Grannes pp. 97-117. 
*86 Sainsbury 1976 p. 132.
187 MT 63 570.
188 Fergusson : 1961 p. 201.
185 The placing o f American ships and men under British naval command was done in the face o f bitter opposition 
from the anglophobic American C-in-C Admiral Ernest King who wanted priority for the Pacific
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brought to Inveraray, the 168**' arriving on 20 August and the 26*** on 22 September.*®** The 
standard assault brigade groups syllabus was followed, though, perhaps in an effort to 
make the GIs feel at home, the landing exercises were renamed BROADWAY, BRONX and 
MANHATTAN.*®* Despite this faintly patronising gesture, or perhaps even because o f it, 
there was little meeting of minds with CTC staff. According to Morrison, the 39***, ‘shoved 
off for the Mediterranean without having had a real landing rehearsal,’ and Captain Camp­
bell Edgar o f US Naval Transport Division II found Inveraray ‘not well suited for this type 
o f training,’ as the Argyllshire coastline had little in common with N orth Africa. He wrote 
that all the ships got out o f the exercises was badly needed experience in hoisting and low­
ering assault craft.*®2
Training in Scotland for TORCH culminated in MOSSTROOPER and FLAXMAN, dress re­
hearsals for the Centre and Eastern Task Forces. The schemes were, ‘to exercise fuUy all 
ships, units and RAF units taking part in the assault in Combined Operations,’ a veiled ref­
erence to TORCH, and the exercise orders refer to both the Centre and Eastern Task Forces 
as such. Special attention was to be paid to communications as, for the first time, British 
and American forces were to work together. Scotland was ‘hostile’ territory and Oban and 
Loch Gilp were heavily defended ports from which U-boats were attacking Allied convoys. 
‘Enemy’ aircraft, actually Lysanders, Ansons and Mustangs, were operating from ‘airfields’ 
at Dalmally and Tyndrum.
The MOSSTROOPER force was largely made up o f units that would form the Centre Task 
Force for TORCH. An armoured task force was to land on the west side o f the Gareloch, 
then seize airfields at Arrochar, Dalmally and Tyndrum before joining up with other forces 
attacking Oban. The 26**' RCT was to land at Minard and take Loch Gilp, reducing coastal 
artillery positions on the way. The 18*** RCT and a battalion of US Rangers was to land at 
Duror and march south to Oban, seizing a coastal battery at Port Appin on the way. The 
16*** RCT and an Armoured Task Force was to land at Kentallen and move inland to join 
up with the forces attacking Tyndrum and Dalmally. The enemy was believed to comprise 
two regiments o f infantry with battalions disposed at Dalmally, Loch Gilp and in the Ap­
pin area and a regimental HQ  at Oban which was ‘strongly defended’.
The FLAXMAN force was made up o f units destined for the Eastern Task Force for TORCH. 
It included the 11**' (British) Infantry Brigade which was to land between Toward Quay and
*50DEFE2 713.
*91 Ibid.
192 In fairness, the 39th only reached Belfast in Samuel Chase, Almaack and Leedslom on 6 October. There is also evi­
dence tliat many of die Americans, in particular their officers, were unwilling to learn, and attitude that began to 
change on die beaches o f North Africa. These were the last American formations to pass through Inveraray, though 
the 1st US Rangers also underwent training at the Commando Basic Training Centre, Achnacarry, and the Com­
bined Operations boatwork school at Dorlinn in 1942. DEFE 2 713. DEFE 2 714. Morrison : 1947 vol. 2 Operations 
in North African Waters p. 193.
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Port Lament, capture the supposed airfield at Blairmore, then march north to the Whistie- 
field Inn from where they were to be ready to link up with the American 39‘^  RCT which 
was to land at Ardno and march south to capture an airfield at Lochgoilhead. The 
meanwhile, was to land between Ardmarnock Bay and Kilfinan Bay and move north via 
Glendaruel, destroying coastal batteries on the way, then link up with the other assault 
troops and attack the ‘port’ o f Lachlan in Lachlan Bay. ‘Hostile’ forces consisted o f two 
battalions and artillery in the Lachlan area with detachments at Glendaruel and Strachur, 
another battalion near Dunoon and coastal defence batteries at Kilfinan and Lephinchapel. 
As in MOSSTROOPER, defending forces were provided by the British Division.^^^
Exercise Directors for MOSSTROOPER were Commodore Troubridge and American Lieu­
tenant General Hartle in the Headquarters Ship Largs, those for FLAXMAN were Rear Ad­
miral Burrough and British General K. A. N. Anderson in the Headquarters Ship hulolo. 
The two exercises were co-ordinated by Rear Admiral Harold BaiUie-Grohman at HMS 
Warren, Largs, and Major General James Drew at Inveraray. Both Eisenhower and Mount- 
batten visited Inveraray in the days following the exercises to assess results.^^^
MOSSTROOPER and FLAXMAN forces began landing at 0100/19 October though the original 
plans had been curtailed somewhat when it was realised that full-scale landings would re­
sult in an unacceptable attrition o f scarce landing craft and vehicles. Troops were to go 
ashore in a limited number o f landing craft for an assault exercise lasting around 12 hours. 
Every effort was to be made to safeguard equipment and only equipment and vehicles for 
which replacements were available were to be landed. The 26* RCT landing at Minard on 
Loch Fyne would take just eight trucks across the beach. Speed was not essential and the 
limitations caused by the lack o f vehicles, communications equipment and inadequate 
beaches had to be explained to the t r o o p s .
Morrison opines that the TORCH forces, British troops included, lacked adequate training 
in amphibious operations. He quotes the commanding officer o f the 3^  ^Battalion Landing 
Team of the 168* which took part in FLAXMAN as reporting that, ‘landing crews were 
somewhat confused,’ and that the exercise did more harm that good as different landing 
craft were used from those to be used in TORCH. In fairness, though, the Americans had 
much to learn about amphibious operations and both the tight TORCH schedule and the 
critical shortage o f equipment meant that training was always going to be inadequate. A 
great deal was being left to chance and the hope that the Vichy forces would offer only 
token resistance.
I93DEFE 2 204. 
194DEFE2 713. 
I9SDEFE2 204.
204
North Western Approaches
Alongside the considerable assemblage o f ships for the assault convoys, an even larger 
number of ships were gathering in the Clyde for the logistics convoys. The first advance 
convoy, K X l, of five ships and seven escorts sailed from the Clyde on 2 October. Troop 
and supply convoys during the assault phase of TORCH were as follows, with the assault 
convoys shown in red:
Convoy Composition 
and escort
Sailing
date
Departure
port
Due Gi­
braltar
Remarks
KXl Five ships and 
seven escorts
2/10/42 Clyde 14/10/42
'Ti71b742~“
Incl. three colliers and an A /S trawler 
group.
KX2 18 ships and 13 
escorts
18/10/42 Clyde Included five ammunition ships, three 
ships with cased aircraft and four tankers.
KX3 One ship and 
two escorts
19/10/42 Clyde 27/10/42 Personnel for Gibraltar only.
KX4A 20 ships and 
e i^ t  escorts
21/10/42 Clyde 4/11/42 Included three LSTs.
KMS(A)1
KMS(0)1
47 ships and 18 
escorts
22/10/42 lx3ch Ewe 
and Clyde
5/11/42
6/11/42
Included 39 MT/Store ships and the 
escort carrier A v e n ^ -  Algiers and Gran 
sections to divide west of Gibraltar.
KMS2 52 ships and 14 
escorts
25/10/42 Loch Ewe 
and Ctyde
10/11/42 Included 42 MT/Store ships.
KX4B Eight ships and 
two escorts
25/10/42 Milford
Haven
3/11/42 Included tugs, trawlers, four fuelling 
coasters and cased petrol ships. Slower 
ships sailed at 6 V2 knots to join with the 
7 V2 knot KX4A from the Clyde.
KMF(A)1
KMF(0)1
39 ships and 12 
escorts.
26/10/42 Clyde 6/11/42 Included HQ ships Bulok and Lar s^, the 
escort carrier Bifer And 31 LSI s. Sailed at 
11V2 knots, Algiers and Oran sections to 
divide west of Gibraltar.
KX5 32 ships and ten 
escorts
30/10/42 Clyde 10/11/42 Included 15 coasters, three tankers, five 
colliers and seven cased petrol ships. 
Included 13 personnel ships for Oran 
and Algiers. Sailed at 13 knots.
KMF2 18 ships and 
e i^ t  escorts
1/11/42 Clyde 10/11/42
In addition, warship movements began with the departure o f the carrier Furious and three 
destroyers from the Clyde on 20 October. Kodney and her escort sailed Scapa on 23 Octo­
ber and the carriers Argus and Dasher with the cruisers Jamaica and Delhi and four destroy­
ers left the Clyde on 27 October. On 30 October the main covering force comprising Duke 
of York, Nelson, Renown, Argonaut and eight destroyers sailed Scapa to be joined by Victori­
ous, Formidable and eight destroyers from the Clyde. Norfolk, Cumberland and five destroyers 
followed from Scapa on 31 October.
Movements for the assault phase involved 31,000 men, 3,800 tons o f assault stores, 1,600 
vehicles and 112 guns. The follow-up phase, which was largely loaded alongside the assault 
phase, involved 36,500 men, 11,000 tons o f stores, 1,600 vehicles and 70 guns. A gale on 
14-15 October stopped embarkation for one day and the Greenock war diary for 27 Octo­
ber laments:
During the last fortnight, the port facilities at Greenock have been severely strained. At times, all 
berths, including those in Loch Long and the Gareloch, have been occupied and both HM ships and 
merchant vessels have had to be diverted elsewhere. Ships o f KMFl, which were Combined Opera­
tions ships, had to remain in their exercise areas until the sailing o f KMSl made berths available in­
side the boom. The subsequent servicing o f KM Fl, in order to get them ready to sail for an opera­
tion in the short time available, put a heavy strain on the services o f the Clyde, particularly on the wa-
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ter boats and the boats o f the boat pool7^
And this was only the beginning — convoys to North Africa would run on a 14-day cycle 
throughout the winter and on through the build up and assault phase o f HUSKY, the inva­
sion o f Sicily the following summer.
On 4 November, while 
still 400 miles west of 
Gibraltar, the slow and 
fast assault convoys 
split into sections des­
tined for the landings 
at Oran and Algiers. 
Every ship had to pass 
through the Straits of 
Gibraltar in a precisely 
ordered sequence and 
some warships had to
enter harbour to refuel. The timetable for ships passing Europa Point was tight, some 340 
ships passing through in 32 hours. Neither the Germans nor the Vichy French correctly de­
duced the destination of shipping they knew was passing through the Straits, German intel- 
hgence believing this was another operation to relieve Malta, which, in a sense, it was. Axis 
thinking was influenced by 
Montgomery’s offensive at El 
Alamein which had begun on 
23 October. As a result, the 
initial landings passed off 
without interference from Axis 
air and naval forces which had 
been held in the central Medi­
terranean.
TORCH fast assault convoy KMFI outbound from the Clyde.
TORCH fast assault convoy KMFl outbound from the Clyde.
Rather than mount frontal attacks on Oran and Algiers, which were thought to be too 
heavily defended, troops would come ashore on either side o f these main ports and attack 
them from the landward side, the object being to secure their use for the Allies as quickly 
as possible. Not only was this a re-run o f JUBILEE, it also made sense o f FLAXMAN and
On 12 November 274 merchant ships were in the Clyde awaiting their place in the TORCH supply train and on 11 
December 70 ships and 21 escorts sailed the Clyde for North Africa as KMS5 and KMF5. ADM 199 419. See also 
Yeo MS, IWM Department of Documents ref. 95/6/1.
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MOSSTROOPER schemes as, once again, troops were to neutralise coastal artillery, capture 
ports and strike inland against airfields.
The landings began in the early hours o f 8 November. After a 4,500 mile passage, the 
Western Task Force landings around Casablanca spread over 200 miles o f Atlantic coast 
but met little r e s i s t a n c e . ^ ^ ?  The Eastern Task Force landings around Algiers were the most 
complex undertaken in TORCH, but met with little resistance, which is just as well as intel­
ligence on the state o f the beaches proved inadequate. One beach supposedly 2,000 yards 
long proved all but useless, yet avoidable congestion elsewhere in the sector led to MT 
ships being diverted to this beach. A detachment o f 1 Commando met friendly Vichy 
troops and was driven to capture Blida airfield only to find that Fleet Air Arm Martlets 
from Victorious had beaten them to it. Meanwhile, US Rangers who had scrambled ashore 
at Cape Matifu captured Maison Blanche airfield and RAF fighters were operating from 
there by 0900/8.
An attempted coup-de-main operation to capture Algiers by the Royal Navy destroyers Broke 
and Malcolm was repulsed by Vichy gunners. A similar operation to take Oran ahead o f the 
Central Task Force landings by the ex-American Coastguard cutters Hartland and Walnej 
was again beaten off by artillery, this time with heavy loss o f life. And, as Fergusson writes, 
‘At each of the three Oran landings, something went wrong.’ At the westmost beach, the 
second wave o f landing craft reached the beach ahead of the first. At Les Andalouses the 
26* RCT found that beach intelligence was again inadequate and did not reveal the pres­
ence o f a sandbar on which landing craft damaged their sterngear and inside which vehicles 
landed too soon were drowned. East o f Oran, at Arzew, rather than come ashore together, 
the initial wave of assault craft with the 16* and 18* RCTs arrived over a period of 20 
minutes. Then the beach became so clogged with men and equipment that the planned 
move inland fell hours behind schedule.
Algiers was surrendered to General Ryder at 1900/8 and the port was open for Allied 
shipping the following morning, one o f the early arrivals being Burrough’s flagship Bulolo. 
At Oran, where resistance had been stiffer and more prolonged, the harbour was littered 
with 25 sunken and scuttled ships and three scuttled floating d o c k s . A n  American Naval 
Base Unit of 94 officers and 779 enlisted men had trained at the American base at Ros- 
neath to clear and operate Oran, Arzew and Mers-el-Kebir and the avant port at Oran was
'5^Maund writes that die Americans, . .learnt by experience many lessons that they had been a bit too proud to learn 
from us.’ One such lesson was the need for a HQ Ship for each landing. Patton disregarded British advice to use a 
designated vessel for this purpose and searode in USS Augusta only to find himself being carried away from his com­
mand when Vichy cruisers appeared. He did not get ashore until 10 November. Maund 1949 p. 115. Morrison : 1947 
vol. 2 Operations in North African Waters pact 1. Fergusson ; 1961 pp. 206-208. Roskill : 1956 pp. 328-332.
198 Morrison : 1947 vol. 2 Operations in North African Waters p, 251.
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operational within hours o f its capture, although it took until 7 January 1943 to fully return 
the harbour to normal operationsA^^
On 28 October Churchill was shown an Ultra decrypt that described the German position 
as ‘grave’ and, by 3 November, Rommel was signalling that his forces faced ‘a desperate 
defeat’.200 On 5 November the Daily Mirror headline read, ‘Rommel Routed. Huns fleeing 
in disorder.’ What made TORCH different from previous Combined Operations was that, 
this time, the troops were going ashore to stay. As one writer put it:
TORCH did not involve a really large-scale landing. The resources for such were not in exis­
tence. . .The vastness o f Operation TORCH lay in the follow-up arrangements which were planned, af­
ter the capture o f Algiers, Oran and Casablanca, to pour ground and air forces into Nordi Africa to 
establish the Allies firmly on the southern Mediterranean coast and open that sea to shipping.^^
Two amphibious operations on the grand scale, one direct from the United States and one 
from Scotland, each involving the landing of more than 35,000 men had been successfully 
concluded and the Allies were firmly established ashore in Morocco and Tunisia. This was 
greatly encouraging, but TORCH succeeded to a large extent in spite o f itself. Had it not 
enjoyed total surprise, had it been mounted against sterner opposition, had the Mediterra­
nean been tidal, had it taken longer to get the ports operational, then it would have been a 
far more costly affair. As with JUBILEE before it, TORCH demonstrated that, while elite as­
sault units such as the British Commandos were well trained, there was a shortfall in am­
phibious assault training among regular forces. This would have implications for the CTCs 
on the Clyde and at Kabret. And Maund writes that among the lessons learned was the 
need for sufficient craft to unload the ships and an efficient organisation ashore to move 
men a materiel across the beaches. Navigational aids were too few in number and ineffec­
tive, beach intelligence was inadequate and an organisation to recover stranded landing 
craft was needed.^®^
The decision to go for TORCH meant that a cross-Channel invasion would be impossible in 
1943 and, on the face o f it at least, thus prolonged the war by a year. But TORCH also ex­
posed shortcomings in men and materiel that would, in all likelihood, have made a cross-
159 Construction o f the American base at Rosneath had begun in March 1941, nine months before die US entered the 
war. It was originally envisaged as an eastern terminus for USN destroyers escorting transatlantic convoys and an as­
sociated flying boat base was planned for Loch Ryan. Duplicate bases were also under construction at Lough Erne 
and Londonderry. Facilities at Rosneath included 4,750 feet o f deepwater berthing, four submarine slipways, work­
shops, a 200-bed hospital and accommodation for 4,500 officers and men. The facilities impressed FOIC Greenock 
who was astonished to see luxuries such as refrigerators and central heating in every hut. Prior to TORCH die Ros­
neath base had been used by Combined Operations for landing craft repair. It was handed back to the USN for 
SubRon 50, a squadron o f submarines which were to co-operate with die Royal Navy in the Atlantic. Associated 
with die base were two seven-mile fuel oil supply pipelines which connected with another American-built pipeline 
between Finnart and Old Kilpatrick serving die safe deep-water tanker berdi in Loch Long. Tliis, in turn connected 
with a British pipeline which ran alongside the Fordi and Clyde Canal between Old Kilpatrick and Grangemouth. 
Building the N aty’s Bases in World WarII (US Government Printing Office, 1947) vol. II pp. 68-71. ADM 199 419.
200 Lamb : 1991 p. 215.
201 London Gas t^te 22 March 1949.
202 Maund : 1949 p. 116.
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Channel assault in 1943 a disaster. In September 1942, even before the North African land­
ings had taken place, M ountbatten wrote that TORCH was already taking up more landing 
craft than Combined Operations could produce crews for, and that the standard of training 
o f those crews was, ‘not high enough for a tough and protracted a s s a u l t . ’^03 i t  would not be 
possible to train an adequate force for another assault before the summer o f 1943.
Roosevelt and Churchill may have been optimistic in their belief that Allied forces could 
mount the North African landings, clear Tunisia o f the enemy and recover in time for 
ROUNDUP in 1943. But the decision in favour o f TORCH was entirely correct, even if  it did 
commit the Allies to a Mediterranean strategy in 1943. The two leaders met for the SYM­
BOL conference at Casablanca in January 1943, Churchill still believing that the Germans 
could be pushed out o f N orth Africa early that year and that, as he had promised Stalin, 
ROUNDUP could go ahead that August or September. However, as Lamb writes, 
‘...Montgomery won an historic victory at Alamein, but bungled the aftermath.’^ o^  Chances 
to wipe out the Afrika Korps at Alamein and El Agheila were missed and they withdrew 
into Tunisia where they prolonged the N orth African war into May 1943. Even were the 
necessary assets available for ROUNDUP in 1943, this alone would have scuppered the plan.
Thus, the 48 divisions US planners believed necessary for a cross-Channel assault were not 
available in Britain, and disruption to the BOLERO shipping programme caused by TORCH 
had further aggravated the situation. There was only one way to go and that was further 
into the Mediterranean and, after protracted debate, HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, was fa­
voured. This decision, forced on the British and Americans by their limited amphibious 
capability, had two lasting effects; it poisoned relationships with the Soviet Union, who felt 
left in the lurch, and it cemented what would become known as the ‘Special Relation-
ship\205
Planning for HUSKY began in February 1943 and the final plan was agreed at a conference 
chaired by Eisenhower in Algiers in May. Shipping movements had however begun some 
weeks earlier when Troubridge in Bulolo left the Clyde with Force W for Egypt via the Cape 
o f Good Hope. Force W was to carry Major General Dempsey’s 13 Corps to land near 
Syracuse where they would be supported by the British Airborne Division.^o^ To the 
west, between Scicli and Licata, the US 5* Army was to land supported by their 82"'* Air­
borne and the British 30 Corps was to land in the middle o f the assault area, around Cape 
Passero.
The Canadian 1®' Division under Major General Guy Simmonds and 40 and 41 Comman-
203 Combined Operations in Hitler’s War by Rear Admiral H. E. Horan, part 2 in Naval Review vol. 49,1961, pp. 18-29.
204 Lamb : 1993 p. 215.
205 Sainsbury : 1976 pp. 167-171.
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dos under Colonel Robert Laycock were to sail from the Clyde to land on the Costa dell’ 
Ambra west of Cape Passero in a sector codenamed Bark West. The 1®' Canadian Infantry 
Brigade was already at Inveraray when the decision to mount HUSKY was taken. They were 
followed through the CTC by the 2"*^  and 3'** Brigades in February and March 1943 and 
then, with HUSKY planning at an advanced stage, the three Brigades returned to Inveraray 
in May for another short c o u r s e . T h e  HUSKY assault convoy from the Clyde, all bound 
for Bark West with the T ‘ Canadian Infantry Division, the T ' Canadian tank Brigade, 40 
and 41 Commandos and the 73'** AA Brigade Royal Artillery, were:
Cqnv^
mSlSA 
KMSISB 
KMSl 9
KMFl 8
KMF19
From
Clyde
Clyde
Clyde
Clyde
Clyde
Date
2076743
24/6/43
25/6/43
28/6/43
1/7/43
I Compositioii
8 kts I  Eight LST, one LSG, one petrol carrier.
8 kts 
7 kts
12 kts
12 kts
17 MT store sh^s, one LSG and joined Iç  seven LST A l g i e r s . ___
31 MT store ships, six LST, five petrol carriers and one collier, joined by nine 
MT store s h ^  for the Western Task Force fix>m A^i/œ.
One HQ ship {Hilary, Rear Admiral Phdip Vian), diree LST and eight
LSI.     _
Nine troop transports and one LSI. Joined by four troop transports for 
Western Task Force from A lg iers .____________ __________________
Three ships from KMSISB were sunk by U boats, but Vian’s force arrived off the assault 
area at 0100/10 July. There were some difficulties in getting ashore due to difficult sea 
conditions and the late arrival o f LCTs from Tripoh, but the landings met only token resis­
tance and the Canadians speedily secured Pachino airfield, their initial objective.^*
At 1000/28 June, as, further up the Clyde, KMFl 8 was preparing to sail, a remarkable 
gathering convened at HMS Warren, the Hollywood Hotel, in Largs for what was to be one 
of the seminal conferences o f the war. Codenamed RATTLE, it was originally intended as a 
course for staff officers ! 
likely to be involved in an I 
invasion of Europe. But 
OVERLORD planning was 
becoming muddled and in 
urgent need of clear 
direction, so Air Chief Mar­
shal Trafford Leigh- 
Mallory, AOC-in-C Fighter 
Command, suggested that 
the Commanders-in-Chief
designate should attend Fast assault convoy KMF 18 outbound from the Clyde for
^ HUSKY
A , #  # #  A
-4* - 5”
.
206 Fergusson : 1961 pp. 242-243.
207DEFE2 1317.
208 Roskill : 1960 The War at Sea vol. 3 part 1 p. 123 for the convoys and p. 132 for the assault.
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Mountbatten was in the chair and among the senior commanders present were General Sir 
Bernard Paget who commanded 21 Army Group, senior OVERLORD planner Lieutenant 
General Frederick Morgan, Leigh-Mallory, Air Vice Marshal Basil Embry, C-in-C Ports­
mouth Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Humfrey Gale of the 6* Airborne Division, Ma­
jor General Bernard Freyberg, Commanding General ETOUSA Lieutenant General Jacob 
Devers and General Andrew McNaughton from Canada. So eminent and numerous were 
those attending RATTLE, the conference was christened 'The Field o f the Cloth of Gold'. 
In all, there were 20 generals, 11 air marshals and air commodores, eight admirals and nu­
merous brigadiers, among them five Canadians and 15 Americans. Ever the showman, 
Mountbatten arranged for the delegates to visit Dundonald and the dummy HQ  ship ashore 
there and set up ‘the best possible beach landing demonstration at Troon.’ Having pre­
vailed upon Lord Lovat to bring all the latest German weapons captured by the Comman­
dos, he wrote ‘I understand they are prepared to lay on a demonstration o f these weapons 
with men dressed in captured German uniforms...
The agenda included discussion o f the German defensive system, naval aspects including 
the availability o f forces and navigational aids, air aspects including reconnaissance, soften­
ing up, assault craft requirements, the scales o f personnel, transport and equipment, the 
marshalling o f naval and air forces prior to D-Day; the training o f assault forces; the at­
tainment o f air superiority; the use o f airborne forces; the pros and cons o f a day or night 
assault, the neutralisation o f coastal batteries by naval and air bombardment, fire support, 
the follow-up phase, signals organisation, artificial harbours, the supply o f petrol and train­
ing requirements.^**)
The conference room had been the Hollywood Hotel swimming pool, the pool itself hav­
ing been floored over. It had a tin roof and, as the weather was very hot, the room quickly 
became thoroughly uncomfortable. The first day did not go well and there were many who 
thought OVERLORD impossible. But that evening, right on cue, KMF 18 steamed past Largs 
on its way to Sicily and McNaughton signalled his good wishes to the Canadian troops. 
Perhaps it was the sight o f the assault convoy escorted by Vian’s cruisers and destroyers 
that brought about the change, perhaps not, but on the second day a more positive atmos­
phere prevailed. It began to appear that OVERLORD was feasible and, in the ensuing three 
days, vital decisions were reached on a wide range o f issues fundamental to the operation.
Two crucial questions had to be answered — where should the assault go in and should it 
be in daylight or at night. Some wanted to go for the shortest sea crossing in the Pas de 
Calais, but Morgan, as COSSAC, argued cogently and ultimately decisively that the assault
209 DEFE 2 529.
210 Ibid.
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One item developed on the Clyde for what Fergusson aptly calls the ‘Combined Op­
erations Toy Cupboard’ was this operations room in the Combined Signals School at 
HMS Dundonald. This was a near replica of those aboard the British headquarters ships 
Bulolo and Largs and Mountbatten was keen to  show this off to the RATTLE delegates as 
the Americans in particular had been reluctant to accept the need for such designated 
vessels. During the TORCH landings, a furious Patton was borne away from the land­
ings he was supposed to  be commanding when the American flagship Augusta had to  
deal with a force of French cruisers.
Conferences like RATTLE w ere normally held in secure location, well away from the 
public gaze, so trailing a large contingent of senior Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals 
around Clydeside was, on the face of it, indiscreet. But, while conference was entirely 
genuine, it was also part of an elaborate deception plan. Operation TINDALL, designed 
to maintain the impression that the Allies w ere about to invade Norway.
must go in, ‘between the Cotentin Peninsula and Dieppe’. The soldiers, both British, 
American and Canadian, preferred a night assault, but Admiral Little insisted that the 
Navy, ‘could not guarantee to assemble the force off the beaches and get the men ashore 
in the right place in the dark.’ Once all the issues had been aired, a dawn attack came near­
est to meeting everyone’s needs. The fundamental decisions had been taken and, as Fer­
gusson writes;
In many ways, RATTLE was the summit o f  COHQ's achievement. It was at RATTLE that the final 
selection o f  the lodgement area was approved to the fuU satisfaction o f  those who, at that time, 
looked like bearing the personal responsibility for the greatest operation ever carried out.^* *
211 Fergusson ; 1961 p. 274. DEFE 2 529 and DEFE 2 530 for RATTLE and Morgan : 1950 p. 143 et passim.
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One of the lessons learned at Combined Operations 
from Exercise LEAPFROG onwards had been that landing 
craft w ere apt to land either at the wrong beach en­
tirely, or at the right beach, but late. In particular this 
had been a feature of the Dieppe landing in 1942. A 
Beach Pilotage School, fittingly called HMS James Cook, 
was opened that September at Glen Caladh in the Kyles 
of Bute to train what came to be known as Navigation 
Leaders. Craft like these LCNs w ere equipped with the 
best navigational equipment available including H^S sets 
normally fitted to heavy bombers.
Two weeks after RATTLE,
General Morgan presented his 
outline OVERLORD plan to the 
British Chiefs o f Staff and, on 4 
August, he sailed from Greenock 
in Queen Mary with the Prime 
Minister and the British 
delegation bound for the 
QUADRANT conference at Que­
bec where, broadly speaking, the 
plan was accepted by the Ameri­
cans. The plan evolved into one 
where there were two main task 
forces; an American Western 
Task Force and a British Eastern 
Task Force. The British Naval 
Task Force under Vian was to 
land the British 2"'* Army com­
manded by Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey consisting of three assault forces, G, J and S, 
and a follow-up force. Force L. Assault Force S under Rear Admiral G. J. Talbot in the 
Headquarters Ship iMrgs was to land the British 3*^  ^ Division comprising the 8*, 9* and 
185* Brigades, which had begun training at Inveraray in June 1943, with Commandos and 
Free French Fusiliers Marins on Sword Beach near Ouistreham at the eastern end of the in­
vasion area. This was considered the most vulnerable assault because o f its proximity to en­
emy shore batteries around Le Havre.^*^
While the existing combined training areas were working at full stretch, there was a need for 
beaches where landings could be practised on a much larger scale than in, for example. 
Loch Fyne. In Scotland, beaches similar to those of Normandy and capable o f handling a 
division-sized assault were found at Tarbat Ness, Culbin Sands and nearby at Burghead Bay. 
At Tarbat Ness some 900 residents were summarily ordered out o f the area by 1 December 
1943 when training for Force S and the 3*^'* Division com m enced.^*^ The official history 
states:
The training o f  this force was seriously handicapped by the restrictions in its assault training areas; 
not until the final exercise at the end o f  March, for example, could close support fire and the assault 
be practised at the same beach. Another great difficulty was the stormy winter weather o f  the Moray 
Firth, but this Rear Admiral Talbot subsequently considered ‘a blessing in disguise.’ Putting aside the
212 Operation Neptune — Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 reprinted by HMSO in 1994 section 17.
See also Roskill : 1960 The War at Sea vol. 3 part 2 pp. 22-23 and 44-45.
213ADM 116 4736.
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cancellation o f  exercises and the losses o f  craft and personnel the experience gained under these 
conditions stood them in good stead in the actual operation. Five full-scale exercises were carried out 
at Burghead, which, from a hydrographical point o f  view, closely resembled the beach which was to 
be assaulted in Normandy.***'*
Captain Gillies o f the 1®* Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers describes an assault ex­
ercise which began at Burghead Bay on 1 January 1944:
It was abundantly clear that our waiting period was com ing to an end. My thoughts were then inter­
rupted by the caU to start the assault and I threw m yself into the uninviting swell and struggled 
ashore, followed by my company. During the next three days o f  the exercise my clothes froze on me, 
but it illustrates our high state o f  fitness that I did not even get a cold.^*^
But Brigadier Lord Lovat offers a more pessimistic view:
N o. 4  Commando stepped up their training in street fighting. Then they went north on  an exercise in  
the Moray Firth with the 3rd Division, w hose 8th Brigade were to land before Robert D aw son on D  
Day. I sent Derek [Mills-Roberts] as an observer. They both gave gloomy accounts o f  hesitant and 
badly led troops.***®
During this period the combined staffs o f Force S and the Division were based at Cam­
eron Barracks, Inverness, though, in March, the planners moved to Aberlour House, Spey- 
side. Force S moved south to Portsmouth during April 1944.^*  ^ D Day was originally 
planned for 5 June 1944 and, led by the battleship Rodney and the cruiser Belfast, the East­
ern Bombardment Force sailed the Clyde three days earlier only to have to loiter in the 
Irish Sea after the invasion was delayed by 24 hours due to bad weather.^*^ On Sword 
Beach, the first wave o f 32 landing craft touched down at about 0730/6 June and the entire 
assault brigade was ashore by 0943/6, just 18 minutes behind schedule.^*^ The official his­
tory records that considerable opposition was encountered, particularly by the 2"'* Battal­
ion, the East Yorks Regiment, but Lovat suggests that progress by the 3'(* Division was less 
than impressive, the poor showing in the Moray Firth being repeated on the battlefield:
The 3rd Division, in  spite o f  the good record before Dunkirk under Monty, proved very sticky 
throughout the landing. They had becom e muscle-bound mentally and physically after four years 
training in the United Kingdom .220
At Inveraray and elsewhere on the Clyde, the period between HUSKY and OVERLORD had 
been one o f intense activity. The 3'^ '* (Canadian) Division, which landed on Juno Beach, 
had first formed up with its embryonic naval element in October 1942. Its reserve group, 
the 9* (Canadian) Infantry Brigade arrived at Inveraray in July 1943 and was followed that 
August and September by the 7* and 8* Brigades, the assault formations for Juno. On
214 Operation Neptune — Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 section 28.
215 Gillies MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 90/26/1.
2i6Lovat: 1978p. 295.
217 Fergusson : 1961 p. 324.
218 Operation Neptune — Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 sections 20, 39 and appendix F(2).
215 Roskill : 1960 The War at Sea vol. 3 part 2.
220 Lovat : 1978 p. 313 fn. See also Operation Neptune — Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 section 
55.
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Gold Beach, the westmost beach in the British sector, Force G  landed the 50* Division 
comprising the 6*, 231»‘ and 56* Infantry Brigades. Thia force had only formed on 1 
March 1944, when it began training at Inveraray, then moved south and carried out four 
brigade landing exercises in Studland Bay.™
-«4K &
Shortly before D Day,. 70 mamly British and American vessels assembled in the 
Firth of Lome. Codenamed CORNCOBS, these ancient ships w ere to  be scuttled to  
form the GOOSEBERRY breakwaters behind which the MULBERRY artificial har­
bours would operate. With the greatest distance to travel to  Normandy, and thus 
being among the first ships to  sail for the assault, sailing orders for the CORNCOBS 
had to  be issued at D-B They w ere already at sea when, at 0515/4 June, D-Day 
was postponed by 24 hours and d ie convoy was diverted to  anchor in Poole Bay.
The sinkir^ of the blockships, among them the redundant battleships Centurion and 
Courbet (French) was completed under enen^ fire and in p>oor weather by D+4
From a peak at the end o f  1943, Combined Training in the Clyde had begun to wind down 
as D  Day approached. One o f the first training areas to close was the Advanced Assault 
Training area at Kilbride with its copies o f German coastal defences. Culbin Sands, 
Burghead Bay and Tarbat Ness were all cleared o f unexploded ordnance by 24 May 1944 
and residents had returned within three weeks.
S c o t l a n d ’s  C o m b i n e d  O p e r a t i o n s  R o l e  i n  R e t r o s p e c t
For the disastrous 1940 campaign in Norway and, following defeat there and in France un­
til 1943, it was chiefly from Scotland, and the Clyde in particular, that Allied military power 
was projected into the European and African theatres o f war. And it was principally at 
training establishments in Scotland, most notably at Inveraray and elsewhere around the 
Clyde, that amphibious capabilities were developed both to see Allied armies ashore on a 
defended coastline and sustain them there.
221 Operation Neptune — handingy in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 section 28. Roskill : 1960 vol. 3 part 2 
pp. 22-23
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Scotland trained the troops and was the base for the first Combined Operations raids to 
Norway in Î94 Î, it was a Scottish-based and trained force that carried out the St Nazaire 
raid in 1942 and, later that year, it is no. coincidence that troops trained at Inveraray were 
the only successful element o f the ill-fated- Dieppe raid^ Training and rehearsals, for the 
largest and arguably most vital elements o f TOKGH, the first large-scale Allied amphibious 
landing o f the war, were conducted in  the Clyde and the Centre, and Eastern Task Forces 
sailed from there for the assault. In  1:943 it was from  the Clyde that a. large,, mainly Cana­
dian, task force sailed for HUSKY, the invasion o f Sicily. Much o f the British and Canadian 
force destined for OVEKLORD undertook initial assault training, at Inveraray and vital deci­
sions. affecting the. landings in Normandy-were taken a t a conference convened in Largs. At 
the end of 1943 and in  early 1944, one o f the three main British sector landing forces re­
hearsed its assault in the Moray Firth.
In June 194.4, as the Allies went ashore in Normandy, Inveraray was giving a course to 
Norwegian mountain troops and, in May 1945, it was giving jungle warfare courses to 
troops bound for the F ar East. Training continued until after VJ Day, then, in  October 
1945, the CTC ceased to function. O ver 130 battalions, among them  29 Canadian, and: six 
American had passed through Inveraray by mid-1944 and some 62,000= landing craft per­
sonnel had been trained, mostly on the Glyde.222 In all, at least 250,000 men and women 
had passed through Inveraray by the end o f the war.™= Clearing up the 37O=,000= acres at 
Inveraray, the 6,000 acres held by Dundonald, the 28,000 acre bom bardm ent range at 
Anderside Hill, n o t to m ention the 150,000 acre Commando Training Centre a t Achnaearry 
would take many m o n th s . 224
But perhaps, m ost impressive is that between 1939= and 194:5 movements, o f military per­
sonnel in and out of the Clyde totalled 4,963,072 and, in the peak period between 1942 and 
1945, some 2,775,70=3 tons o f military stores were handled.22s- I t  m ight be argued th a t these 
facilities eouid=, at least hr part, have been provided elsewhere. But the consequent loss o f 
shipping efficiency, as vast numbers of troops were ferried around" the world, would have 
fundamentally affected strategic decision-making and lengthened the war by years. So, 
without the facilities offered by the Clyde at a relatively safe distance from enemy-held ter­
ritory, none o f the major amphibious operations in the European and Mediterranean thea­
tres would" have been possible within anything approaching their historical timetable, in­
deed many could not have taken place at ah.
222 Fergusson : 1961 p. 324. Maund ; 1949 p. 105:
223 Infennation. &om.the Combined Opérations Museum, Inveraray. 
224DEFEZT117:.
225 YeG"MS, IWM Department o f Documents, ref. 95/6/1.
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Chat)ter Six
OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN WATERS BY 
SCOTTISH-BASED MARITIME FORCES 1941-1945
Norway’s long, deeply indented coastline and poor road and rail communications 
meant that German occupation forces there were heavily dependent on sea communi­
cations. Thus, they were vulnerable to Allied attempts to break their maritime supply 
lines using submarines, surface craft and aircraft.
The story o f the Mediterranean submarines o f the 8* and 10* Flotillas is well known. 
Less well documented are the Scottish 2"'*, 3^ "*, 7* and Flotillas. Operating from the 
Clyde and Tay, with forward bases at Lerwick and Falmouth, their boats disrupted 
German seaborne traffic o ff Norway and in the Bay of Biscay. They also patrolled 
north o f the Arctic Circle to cover Arctic convoys, sank U-boats and damaged heavy 
surface units.
From  SOE bases in Shetland, Norwegian-manned fishing boats and submarine chasers 
undertook clandestine m issions into Norwegian waters. Scottish-based submarines also 
played their part, closing the enemy coast at night to land personnel and supplies. And 
based in Lerwick were Norwegian and British MTBs which would hide in the Inner 
Leads, appear as if  from nowhere to attack a Germ an convoy, then dash for home.
But throughout the war, and in particular from the sailing o f the first Arctic convoy in 
August 1941, the primary concern remained the presence o f German heavy ships in 
N orthern W aters. Tirpitt^ that m ost potent example o f the concept o f a fleet in being, 
and her cohorts tied down many o f the m ost m odern ships of the Royal Navy at Scapa 
Flow when they were desperately needed in  the M editerranean and Far East. In  the lat­
ter stages o f the war pow erful carrier, groups o f the Royal Navy based at Scapa swept 
up the Norwegian coast to attack the Tirpits(  ^and coastal convoys.
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S c o t t i s h  S u b m a r i n e  F l o t i l l a s  E s t a b l i s h e d
During the 1930s, as British naval planners wrestled with conflicting strategic commit­
ments, political interference and forced economies, the surface warship was still seen as the 
ultimate weapon in naval warfare. In the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific theatres, 
submarines were principally viewed as the eyes and ears of the fleet, reporting on enemy 
surface ship movements either against the British east coast ports, the Atlantic trade routes 
or Singapore. But the submarine was not viewed as a vital weapon of war and the subma­
rine branch suffered to a disproportionate degree during the retrenchment o f the 1920 and 
1930s. The result was that, at the outbreak o f war, the submarine force was far too small, 
too much o f it like the H class was obsolete or inadequate, training and tactics were inade­
quate and there was a lack o f specialist building capacity to provide new tonnage.*
A powerful flotilla o f some o f the Navy’s most modern submarines was, as noted in Chap­
ter One, stationed at Dundee in August 1939 to close the gap at the Norway end o f the 
Montrose-Obrestad Patrol. Once Hudson aircraft became available in sufficient numbers 
at RAF Leuchars, the 2"^ Flotilla moved to Rosyth and, despite winter weather, undertook 
patrols off the Skaggerak and Fleligoland Bight to warn o f an enemy break-out from the 
Baltic. On. the afternoon of 20 November, Sturgeon scored, the first British submarine suc­
cess o f the war when she sank the A /S trawler Gaulieter Tehchow (428T) off Heligoland.^ 
On Boxing Day Seahorse sailed Rosyth for patrol off the Elbe, but nothing further was 
heard o f her.^ And, on 28 December, Triumph limped into Rosyth, heavily damaged after 
hitting a mine. Three more British submarines were lost in quick succession in the Heligo­
land Bight in January 1940.
For the submarine branch, it had no t been a good beginning. Salmon’s, Edward Bickford 
who had sunk U-36 and damaged the cruisers Teipt^g and Nürnberg and George Phillips o f 
the 6* Flotilla’s Ursula were celebrated as national heroes, but this was not enough to save 
FO(S) Admiral Bertram Watson who was made scapegoat for the poor state of the subma­
rine service and relieved on 22 December 1939. Mars writes that Watson was 'most dis-
* See British Submarine Policy 1918-1939 pApet by David Henty in Ranft etal : 1977.
2 Information from RN Submarine Museum. Rohwer : 1997. Witthoft : 1971 p. 263.
3 At 1318/7 (CET) the German I®' Minesweeping Flotilla attacked a contact in 5419N 0730E and their report states^
At 1318 a submarine was sighted and the alarm wa& given. The submarine's- location was obtained and nine 
depth charges dropped. Success not observed. Submarine noises were heard through the echo ranger and re­
volving directional hydrophones. Buoy was dropped. After the attack a further clear echo was obtained and 
three depth charges: dropped. U / anchored near the position, but heavyfog prevented further attack. She depth 
charges each of the double throws had been dropped on the located position o f die submarine, but no proof of 
success was obtained.
As no such attack was reported by any other submarine, this may well have been Seahorse, though die possibility re­
mains that she could have been caught in one o f the anti-submarine minefields in her patrol area on or around 30 
December. RN Submarine Museum. Evans : 1986 p. 205.
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tressed' as he felt that much o f the responsibility lay with Sir Charles Forbes. Hamstrung 
by restrictive rules of engagement, submarines were being ill-used as a reconnaissance arm 
of a Home Fleet unable to comprehend that there would be no repeat o f Jutland. And re­
porting enemy warship movements was, for older boats with inadequate wireless equip­
ment, all bu t impossible.'*
As the German invasion force made its way towards Norway on 8: April 1940, new FO(S) 
Max H orton read the runes better than his superiors and disposed 19 submarines off 
Denmark and southern Norway. First contact came when the Rosyth-based Polish subma­
rine Ort^l torpedoed the Rio de Janeiro (5,261T) o f the German 1®‘ Sea Transport Echelon 
o ff LiUesand at 1100/8 and Commander Jan Grudzinski watched men in Wehrmacht 
feldgrau being rescued by fishermen. The Germans told their rescuers were on their way to 
protect Bergen from British aggression but, caught between two super-powers, the supine 
Norwegian government took no action. ^  Reuters published news o f the sinking of RJo de 
Janeiro at 2030/8, but the Admiralty omitted to tell Sir Charles Forbes who, fooled by the 
temporary westerly course o f Hipper, headed north-west and away from the German inva­
sion force. Forbes was only told o f Or^eHs success at 2255/8.®
Meanwhile, at 1215/8 in the Skaggerak, the German tanker Posidonia (8,036T) scuttled 
when Trident from the 2"'* Flotilla out o f Rosyth, opened fire on her, and another Rosyth 
boat, Triton, missed Lutt^om, B/ücher and Emden with a salvo of ten torpedoes that evening. 
Triton surfaced to make a sighting report at 1915/8 and the cruisers Galatea and Arethma 
sailed Rosyth with 12 destroyers on an abortive mission to intercept the the German 
ships.^ And three Hudsons fitted with ASV m k.l radar took off from Leuchars at 1930/8 
but failed also to find them.® O ff Kristiansand at 1900/9, the Rosyth-based Truant S2tiak. the 
cruiser Karlsruhe. On 22 May 1940, with the Norwegian campaign at its height, submarine 
flotilla strength in Home Waters was:
Rosyth: 2”^  Flotilla with HMS ¥orth\ eight T class, one minelayer and the Polish Orr^l and W ilk. One 
o f tlie Ts and W ilk were in refit, the latter at Dundee.
Rosyth: 3®® Flotilla with HMS Maidstone and six S class boats.
Rosyth: 10* Flotilla with six boats, one o f which was in refit.
Btyth: 6*  Flotilla at HMS Fdfin with three S class and one minelayer in. commission and one U class 
in refit.
4 Forbes had been Jelficoe’s Flag Commander in Iron Duke, at Jutland. Rear Admiral Shrimp’ Simpson, no admirer o f | 
Forbes, writes o f the unreality of pre-war Fleet exercises and o f the latter’s blind faith in the big gun. Watson, a First
World War submariner, was 'charming' but not strong enough to stand up to Churchill, Pound and Forbes and was j
replaced by Max Horton. The Admiralty relented on the issue of retirement and Watson was a success as Flag Officer |
Greenock. Simpson r 1972 ch. 6. Mats r 1971 pp. 35-37. i
5 Ofxelh&d no gun and was thus compelled to sink the German ship with a torpedo. Ibid. p. 87. Roskill : 1954 p. 111. |
Derry : 1952 p.. 30. i
® HipperAnd her consorts were loitering ofFTrondheim before landing their troops early the following morning. j
7 Rowher : 1997. Information from the Royal Navy Submarine Museum I
® Air to Surface Vessel radar was then still in its infancy. AIR 28 465. 1
I
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Dundee: 9^  ^Flotilla at HMS Ambrose with two River class and four French boats including the mine­
layer Rubis.
Harwich: 3") Flotilla with HMS Cyclops and two L class boats.
Portsmouth: 5* Flotilla at HMS Dophin with 15 boats o f various classes.^
Clyde sailed Dundee on 4 June and, on 20 June, attacked Gneisenau, Hipper and Numberg as 
they left Trondheim, hitting Gneisenau with one torpedoJ® The German squadron returned 
to port and, as there were no suitable docking facilities in Norway, Home Fleet and subma­
rine dispositions were made to catch Gneisenau as she returned to Germany. But Gneisenau 
remained at Trondheim for a month, finally sailing on 24 July 1940. O ff Stavanger on 26 
July, the Dundee-based 
Thames fired at Gneisenau 
but hit one of her escorts, 
killing over 100 o f her 
crew. Thames failed to 
return to Dundee on 3 
August and was assumed 
lost in a German mine­
field.**
fig.7t
Lost while operating with the 9* Flotilla from Dundee, Thames 
was thought to have struck a German mine.
Other Scottish submarines lost during and after the Norway campaign included Thistle tor­
pedoed by U-4 off Skudesnes on 10 April and the Dundee-based Dutch 0-13 which was 
probably lost in a German minefield.*2 Salmon sailed Rosyth on 4 July, but failed to return. 
Shark sailed Rosyth to relieve Sealion off Skudesnes and was sunk by an enemy aircraft on 5 
July.*^ Spearftsh sailed Rosyth on 31 July, but was torpedoed and sunk by U-34A 0-22 sailed 
Dundee on 5 November to relieve Sturgeon off Lister and disappeared.*®
9 ADM 234 380.
10 Cfydis signal was received by the Admiralty at 0226/21 but it was also intercepted by the Germans who, believing 
that their counter attack had put Ctydi% wireless out o f action, thought there must be another submarine in the area. 
They were correct, albeit for the wrong reasons, as Porpoise had heard Code's enemy report at 0045/21 and, when it 
was not acknowledged, relayed it successfitUy. ADM 234 380. RN Submarine Museum. Blair : 1997 p. 171.
11 Lieutenant Commander Dunkerley and 61 crew were lost with Thames. Gneisenau was unfit for service until 18 De­
cember 1940. ADM 234 380. Rowher : 1997. Evans : 1986 pp. 241-244. RN Submarine Museum.
12 It has been suggested, by Rohwer and others, that 0-13 may have been rammed by the Polish Wilk at 0025/20 June. 
But, when Wilk returned to Dundee on 26 June, Boris Kamicki and his crew were adamant that they had rammed a 
boat fitted with a deck gun. 0-13 was not fitted with a gun. Rohwer : 1997. ADM 234 380.
13 Her crew were picked up by a German trawler. Evans : 1986 pp. 233-240. Roskill : 1954 pp 266-267. RN Submarine 
Museum.
I'* Rollmann surfaced and picked up Able Seaman Pester, a lookout and one of the first to reach the bridge when she 
surfaced. Evans : 1986 pp. 244-246. Jones : 1986 pp. 59-61.
13 The wreck of 0-22 was thscovercd off Lister in 1W3 and bore no apparent external damage, so it is possible that she 
succumbed to a technical problem. AH 46 aboard were lost. On 8 August, FO(S) Max Horton had written that he 
believed Ors^ el, Salmon and Shark were all lost to air attack, 0-13 to surface craft, Thames to air attack or mine and 
Narwhal to cause unknown. Post-war research however, suggests that On^ el, 0-13, Salmon and Thames all fell victim to 
mines and Horton was placing undue weight on enemy A /S capabilities. These minefields remained unknown to the 
Admiralty until U-370 (HMS Graph) was captured and her charts revealed their positions. ADM 234 380. Informa­
tion from Bram Otto, Holland.
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As the war moved into the Atlantic, patrols were m ounted off enemy-held Biscay ports. 
Cachalot laid mines south o f Penmarc’h on 19 August, then sank Ü-51 o ff Lorient.*® Tigris 
sank a trawler on 1 September, then Tuna sank both the Norwegian Tirrana (7,320T) off 
the Gironde on 22 September and the German Ostmark (1,280T) off Port Royan on 24 
September.*7 Taku damaged the tanker Gedania (8,923T) off Lorient.*® Talisman captured a 
tunny boat to be used to monitor U boat movements and, at 0830/15 December, Thunder­
bolt sank the Itahan submarine Tarantini o ff the Gironde and Tuna sank the tug Chassiron 
(172T) off the Gironde.*^
Dispositions in early 1940 had been influenced by the need to warn o f an invasion force 
breaking out o f the Skaggerak, but the dramatically altered strategic position that summer 
led to a reorganisation o f submarine flotillas. After Devonport, Pembroke Dock, even 
Queenstown (Cobh) had been considered as possible bases, Forth transferred from Rosyth 
to the Holy Loch for the 2"'* Flotilla, Cyclops was based at Rothesay for the 7* Flotilla, Tita­
nia was sent to Rosyth to replace Maidstone with the 3* Flotilla and Maidstone went to Scapa 
to act as a destroyer repair ship. Woolwich, which had been at Scapa, was released for duty 
in the Mediterranean. New dispositions around Scotland effective 8 September 1940 were 
thus:
Holy Loch; Flotilla depot ship Forth (Captain George Menzies) with escort vessel White Bear and 
Trident, Tribune, Tuna, Tigris, Talisman, Taku, Porpoise and Cachalot. Operational fiotUla for Biscay 
Patrol and Atlantic with forward base at Falmouth, Submarines doing trials and work-up were 
also attached,
Rothesay; 7* Flotilla depot sliip Cyclops (Captain Roderick Edwards) with escort vessels Breda and 
Alecto, submarines Oheron, Otway, H-28, Fl-31, H-32, H-33, H-34, H-44, H-49 and H-50, Dutch O- 
9 and 0-10, and Norweg^n B-1. Training and A /S  flotilla.
Rosyth; 3* Flotilla depot ship Titania (Captain H. M, C. lonides) with the Sealion, Sunfish, Snapper and 
Seawolf. Operational Flotilla North Sea.
Dundee, 9* Flotilla shore base Ambrose (Captain James Roper) with Clyde, Severn, T-23, Lr26, the 
Free French Rjtbis and the Dutch 0-21, 0-22, 0-23 and 0-24. Operational flotilla North Sea with 
forward base At Ambrose II, Lerwick, and A /S  training flotilla for the Home Fleet.
Forth and four ‘T ’s went to Halifax, in early 1941 to protect Atlantic convoys against enemy 
heavy ships, but returned to the Clyde in December 1941 when the 2»'* and 3* Flotillas 
were combined at the Holy Loch and sea training was transferred to HMS Eljin at Blyth. 
After acting as navigational beacons fo r the Western Task Force in TORCH, the American 
SubRon 50 boats were based at Rosneath. While flotilla strength was continually varied by
1® At 1415/16 August Flying Officer Ernest Baker in Sunderland H/210 escorting OA198 sighted U boat conning 
tower in 5635N 1255W. The Sunderland attacked with two depth charges which blew the U boat out o f tlie water 
and onto her side. A further attack was made with four 2501b bombs, then the U boat rolled over and sank trailing 
oil and bubbles. The akcraft alighted Oban 1849/16 and Baker was awarded the DFC. AIR 28 615. AIR 27 1298. 
ADM 199 371. ADM 234 380. Franks : 1995. Rohwer : 1997. Jones : 1986 pp. 67-71.
17 Rohwer 1 1997. RN Submarine Museum.
1» Ibid.
1® Tunde, victim was originally believed to have been the Ita (250T) but Rohwer identifies her as Chassiron. Ibid. See also 
Warren and Benson : 1953.
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refits and the demands o f other theatres, notably the Mediterranean, this organisation re­
mained in place for much o f the war.20
T h e  B i s m a r c k  B K E A K O u r  - M a y  1941
The Royal Navy had, since 1939, concentrated in northern waters against a possible break­
out into the Atlantic by German surface units. Wliile the Kreigsmarine could not contem­
plate a main fleet action along the lines o f Jutland in 1916, both British and German plan­
ners were ahve to the fact that the small but powerful German surface fleet could, if skill­
fully handled, be formed into effective task forces for operations against the Atlantic trade 
routes.
On 2 December 1940, amid indications that a German heavy unit was heading for the At­
lantic, the Rosyth- and Dundee-based submarines 0-21, Sturgeon, Sealion and Sunfish were 
positioned off Utsire, Utvaer and Stadlandet. But they were too late to intercept Hipper 
which broke through the Denmark Strait, reached Brest on 27 December, then sailed again 
on 1 February 1941 for the Sierra Leone convoy route. On 18 February 1941 Tigris sailed 
the Clyde to try to catch Hipper as she returned to Brest, but did not succeed.^* Hipper was 
joined at Brest on 22 March by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and North Sea submarine flotillas 
were denuded to form part o f a naval blockade, bu t Hipper sailed on 15 March and reached 
Keil via the Denmark Strait on 28 M a r c h .22
While Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were trapped in Brest, the new battleship Bismarck and Prinz 
Eugen were ready for operations in the Atlantic and despite this being a far weaker task 
force than originally envisaged, these two ships were sighted passing out o f the Baltic on 
the morning o f 19 May, though advance warning o f German movements had come from 
Swedish intelligence sources.^® The French submarine Minerve out o f Dundee missed the 
German squadron as it passed up the Norwegian coast, but, within two hours o f arrival at 
Bergen, it had been photographed by PRU Spitfires from Wick. From Scapa Flow, C-in-C 
Home Fleet Sir John Tovey began making dispositions to intercept the German ships if 
they made for the Atlantic. The cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, already patrolling the Den­
mark Strait were alerted. Hood and Prince of Wales sailed Scapa for Iceland to fuel and await 
developments, and the cruisers Arethusa, Birmingham and Manchester were ordered to fuel in 
Iceland then patrol the Iceland-Faroe Islands strait. The bulk of the Home Fleet including 
King George V  and the carrier Victorious remained at Scapa.
20 ADM 234 380. RN Submarine Museum. Roskill : 1954 p. 334.
21 Rohwer su^ests Tigris sank the coaster Jacobsen (523T) and the Guihenec (3,273T) in4448N 03t0W at 0245/19, but 
there is no record o f  this. Rohwer : 1997. ADM 234 380. Roskill : 1954 p. 390.
22 ADM 234 380. Roskill : 1954 ch. XVIII.
23 McLachlan : 1968 pp 146. Sebag- Montefiore : 2000 p. 200.
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The German ships’ departure for the N orth Atlantic late on 21 May went unseen for al­
most 24 hours until a 771 Squadron Maryland from Hatston in Orkney found them goneA^ 
Tovey sailed Scapa with the main body of the Home Fleet late on 22 May, Repulse was re­
called from convoy duty in the Clyde, and Hood and Prince of Wales were sent south of Ice­
land. The Geman attempt to break through the Denmark Strait unseen was foiled by the 
cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk, the latter sending a sighting report at 2032/23. Unknown to 
Admiral Wake-Walker in Norfolk, some of his signals were being intercepted, decrypted and 
retransmitted back to Bismarck less than two hours after original transmission. That eve­
ning, as Prin;  ^ Eugen escaped southwards, Bismarck rounded on Wake-Walker’s cruisers, 
then contact was lost for about six hours. Another sighting report from Suffolk was de­
crypted and retransmitted back to Bismarck at 0421/24, just over an hour before Hood and 
Prince of Wales made contact.^®
Hood was sunk, then Bismarck was lost, found by a Coastal Command Catalina, crippled by 
aircraft and finally sunk at 1037/27 after being cornered by Home Fleet ships from Scapa, 
Force H from Gibraltar and other ships including Rodney2^ Again, during this stage o f the 
operation, British signal traffic was intercepted and retransmitted back to the German bat­
tleship. This was discovered from Enigma decrypts detailed in a 4 July 1941 report by the 
Naval Section at Bletchley Park;
British activity during the first stages o f  this operation were known to  the Germans ficom decypher o f  
naval tactical signals.. .The second stage, the contacting o £ Bismark [sic] by air reconnaissance, was 
clear to  them from decyphered air traffic.^?
Ruhls and Tuna sailed the Clyde on 1 June, but missed Prin^ Eugen as she joined Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau in Brest where all three were damaged in air raids.^® Euts^pw was in Keil re­
pairing damage inflicted by Spearftsh during the Norwegian campaign. Also in the Baltic, 
and then the only German heavy units in full commission, were Hipper and the light cruis­
ers Emden and l^iprfgP
The oft-told story o f  the Bismarck operation, while it resulted in the loss o f Hood, had pro­
vided a graphic illustration o f  the insecurity o f  British naval signalling. And it had been 
principally naval forces based in Scotland that had brought about the final destruction o f 
the German ship, then arguably the most powerful warship in the Atlantic. But Bismarck
2*1 Lieutenant Goddard’s telegraphist was unable to raise anybody on the Coastal Command frequency, so passed his 
message to tlie Hatston Target Towing Flight on their frequency. Winton : 1988 p. 27. McLachlan : 1968 p. 149 
25 ADM 223 2.
2® See WinWaredi : 1998 for an account o f the Bismarck chase. See also paper on H W  by Paul Kemp in IWM Review 
no.4 1989 pp 96-102. Winton : 1988 p. 28-29. German account, signals and survivor's report o f  the action in Brassey 
: 1948 p. 201 et passim.
27 ADM 223 2.
28 Information from ex-Sous-Maitre Mechanicien Jean-Pierre Babin.
29 McLachlan : 1968 pp. 158-159. Roskill : 1954 p. 487. Schofield : 1977 pp. 10-11.
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had scarcely beea sunk when, the start o f BARBAROSSA, the German invasion o f the Soviet 
Union introduced new strategic imperatives to the naval war in the north, and new naval 
threat in the form of Bismarck’s sister, Tirpits .^
F i r s t  A r c t i c  C o n v o y s
The German invasion o f the Soviet Union was followed by an immediate, if  perhaps hasty, 
offer o f British assistance. Churchill proposed sending a task force to operate in the Arctic 
and, on 12 July 1941, Rear Admiral Vian flew to Moscow for discussions with the Soviet 
Navy. Vian recommended that no ships be sent, not least because there was no fighter 
cover, but that submarines should be considered. Tigris and Trident were recalled to the 
Clyde from Biscay Patrol and sent north to  Polyarnoe. In subsequent patrols o ff the North 
Cape, Tigris sank 1,397 tons o f shipping and Trident sank 15,403 tons and damaged one 
ship o f 4,713 tons.®®
Meanwhile, in a gesture o f  Allied solidarity, the carriers Furious and Victorious sailed Scapa 
on 23 July for Operation EF, attacks on German bases and shipping at Kirkenes, Petsamo 
and Varengefjord. The force was to fuel at Seidisfjord on 25 July, but that morning the de­
stroyer Achates was mined and 65 o f her crew killed. EF was delayed by 24 hours, then, just 
as the carrier strike was about to take o ff on the morning o f 30 July, the force was spotted 
by enemy aircraft. But the attack went ahead anyway, results were negligible and 16 aircraft 
were lost. Aptly described by Roskill as ‘unprofitable’, the operation was a costly set­
back.®*
The first Arctic convoy, DERVISH, sailed Liverpool on 12 August and was escorted to Bear 
Island by Victorious, Devonshire, Suffolk and three destroyers from Scapa. The Naval force 
then turned back to meet STRENGTH, a delivery o f Hurricanes aboard Argus which had 
sailed Scapa with Shropshire and three destroyers. DERVISH reached Archangel on 31 August 
and Argus flew off her Hurricanes on 7 September. By the end of 1941, 53 ships had 
reached north Russia and 34 had been brought back. None had been lost, despite weak 
escorts, and deliveries included 750 tanks, 800 aircraft and 1,400 vehicles.®^
German reaction had been muted but, on 17 December, a Naval Intelligence report clearly 
based on decrypts stated that a German ‘Admiral Commanding Northern Waters’ had been 
appointed, Luftwaffe reinforcements (II/K G 30 with the latest JU88 A4) for reconnais­
sance o f the ‘Scotland to East Iceland convoy route’ were about to arrive and a German
30 For these patrols by Tigris and Trident see Rohwer : 1997. Witthoft : 1971. ADM 234 380 . RN Submarine Museum. 
Kemp : 1993. Lamb : 1993 pp. 129-134.
31 Kemp : 1993. Roskill : 1954 p. 486.
32 Schofield ; 1977 p. 14.
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signals unit had moved north to KirkenesA® On 17 January 1942, decrypts revealed that the 
new battleship Tirpitii had reached Trondheim with four destroyers, though another de­
crypt on 19 January showed that these destroyers had left for Germany, so Tirpifti could 
only remain where she was. An air watch was kept on the ship as weather allowed.®** Fur­
ther decrypts revealed that Kondors o f 7/K G 40 reached north Norway at the end o f Janu­
ary 35
As Tuna and Unbending kept watch off Trondheim, convoys QP6 from Murmansk, PQ9 and 
PQIO from Hvalfjord and P Q ll  from Loch Ewe all got through unscathed.®® But then, in 
the famous ‘Channel Dash’, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinsi Eugen passed up the English 
Channel on the night o f 11-12 February with the intention of joining up with Tirpiti^ at 
Trondheim. The planned German concentration was diminished when Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau struck mines off Terschelling, though Admiral Scheer axsB Prin^ Eugen still posed a 
threat. ®7
QP7 sailed Murmansk on 12 February and, fearing a sortie by Tirpitf(^ Tovey sailed 
Hvalfjord at 0600/19 with King George V , Victorious, Berwick and seven destroyers. Enigma 
decrypts warned at 1020/20 that more German units were heading for Trondheim to ren­
dezvous with Tirpits^ and, sure enough at 1100/20, air reconnaissance found Prin^ Eugen, 
Admiral Scheer and five destroyers steaming north off Jutland.®® Trident and Minerve closed 
the entrance to Trondheim and, at 0551/23, Trident sighted the German cruisers and fired 
seven torpedoes, one o f which struck Eugen’s stern. Her rudder jammed, Prin^ Eugen 
reached Trondheim at 2200/23.®®
PQ12 and QP8 were due to sail, so Seawolf a.nd Junon sailed Lerwick to reinforce Minerve 
and off Trondheim.**® PQ12 was found by a 7/K G 40 XoWor near Jan Mayen Island
on 5 March and, at 1730/6, Tirpits^ was reported leaving Trondheim by Seawolf A  Tirpitsi 
passed between the convoys south o f Bear Island and, at 1630/7, one o f her destroyer es-
33 ADM 223 3.
34 Tirpit:(p commissioning trials and move to Wilhelmshaven had been monitored by Bletchley Park. Winton ; 1988 pp. 
54-56.
35 ADM 223 3.
35 Schofield ; 1977 app. 1. Roskill ; 1956 p. 116.
37 Gneisenau played no further part in the war and was stripped o f  her turrets for shore defence batteries in Norway and 
Holland. Brassey : 1948 p. 275.
38 Winton : 1988 p. 56.
39 Prim  ^Eugen's steering gear was wrecked beyond the scope o f the repair facilities at Trondheim, the centre shaft tun­
nel was split; the armoured deck and 20 transverse frames were badly distorted. Fuel and fresh water tanks were 
open to die sea. Nine men had been killed and 25 wounded. Emergency repairs were carried out and she left Trond­
heim for the Baltic on 16 May, but full repairs were not completed until January 1943. ADM 234 380. Rohwer : 
1997.
40 ADM 234 380.
41 Ibid. Information from the RN Submarine Museum.
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corts sank the QP8 straggler Isrfora.^^ Armed with Ultra intelligence o f the returning Tirpittf 
intentions, Tovey had reconnaissance sorties flown off Victorious and these found Tirpitr^ 
west o f the Lofoten Islands at 0802/9. But an attack by torpedo-carrying Albacores at 
0915/9 failed and reached Narvik that evening. Further decrypts showed that Tirpit^
was to return to Trondheim as soon as possible, so Seawolf, Sealion, Junon and Trident were 
stationed off the fjord and the Norwegian Uredd was hurrying north from Dundee. But, 
while Trident heard strong H E at 1549/13, the battleship got past the submarine patrols 
and reached Trondheim that night.**®
Hipper )o'med the German squadron in Trondheim on 21 March, the day after PQ13 sailed 
Iceland and QP9 left Murmansk, but there was no further German movement due to a 
shortage o f boiler fuel. The deisel-powered Admiral Scheer was sent north to Narvik to 
cover the iron ore convoys."*** PQ13 arrived Murmansk on 31 March having lost five out of 
19 merchantmen and QP9 reached Iceland unscathed.**® PQ14 sailed Reykjavik on 8 April 
and, on the same day. Rubis sailed Dundee to lay mines off Trondheim while Trident pa­
trolled off Fro Havet. The mines and submarine patrols yielded nothing and 16 of the 
PQ14 ships were forced to turn back due to weather damage. One was sunk and seven 
reached Murmansk on 19 April.
A close submarine watch on the German squadron in Trondheim was no longer possible 
due to long hours of dayhght so, for the PQ15/QP11 cycle. Minerve, Uredd and the Polish 
Jastr^ab took up patrol areas south o f Jan Mayen Island. Unison was also diverted from her 
patrol off Norway. Tirpitt^ and her consorts did not sail, however, and PQ15 arrived Mur­
mansk on 5 May after losing three ships. Q P ll  was heavily attacked by aircraft, destroyers 
and U-boats and, on 2 May, the escorts St Albans and Seagull depth-charged Jastrs^ab which 
had strayed 95 miles from her allotted area. Five ratings were killed and the survivors were 
taken off before Jastrs(ab was sunk.**®
*12 The one survivor picked up from I^bora was tlie subject o f Very great interest in Abwelir circles’ attempting to glean 
intelligence on the Arctic convoy cycle. ADM 223 3.
*13 Raeder briefed Hitler on Tirpit^ sortie the following evening. It was agreed tliat tlie Kreigsmarine should be more 
circumspect about using its heavy ships, that the Luftwaffe in Norway should be reinforced for attacks on British 
carriers, and that work on the carrier Graf Zeppelin should be accelerated. Apparently becoming aware o f the impor­
tance o f air power at sea and balanced naval forces. Hitler admitted that, 'Everything must be done toward the early 
formation o f a German task force composed o f the Tirpite  ^Scharnhorst, one aircraft carrier, two heavy cruisers and 
twelve to fourteen destroyers.' Graf Zeppelin was never completed, partly because there were no suitable aircraft to 
operate from her. Two German aircraft carriers were laid down and their on-off construction programme illustrates 
Hitler’s inability to take a decision on naval matters and stick to it. The Tirpitv^  sortie o f 6-13 March 1942 is described 
in Roskill : 1956 pp. 120-123. See also Schofield : 1977 p. 27, Winton : 1988 pp. 57-59 and ADM 234 380 for sub­
marine dispositions.
44 Raeder told Hitler on 16 April 1942 that the passage o f the Brest Squadron tiirough the Channel in February had 
consumed 20,000 tons o f oH and that reserve stocks amounted to 150,000 tons. Brassey : 1948 p. 274.
45 ADM 223 3.
45 The difficulty o f maintaining position in nortliern waters was blamed. Lieutenant Commander Romanowski had 
been unable to obtain any sights for six days. ADM 234 380. Schofield : 1977 p. 37.
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The fact that destroyers had attacked Q P ll  indicated that the Germans were about to base 
heavy units, in particular Tirpitf^ in north Norway. Air reconnaissance on 12 May showed 
Tirpit^ and Prin^ ~Eugen still in Trondheim, then, on 16 May, Lufiioiv was spotted 
northbound west o f the Skaw. Unbending sailed Lerwick at 1300/16 to intercept her off Ut- 
vaer, but she reached Vestfjord at 1700/25 after a roundabout passage. Earher, Prin;(^Eugen 
had been spotted steaming southbound from Trondheim. An attack by 14 Beauforts o f 86 
Squadron from Wick faded, though air dropped mines slowed her progress and she was 
located again off Karmoy at 1540/17. That evening. Coastal Command committed its most 
experienced units to its largest operation o f the war to date. Twelve 42 Squadron Beauforts 
left Leuchars at 1802/17 followed by another twelve 86 Squadron Beauforts from Wick at 
1813/17. Escort was provided by four Beaufighters and six Blenheims from Leuchars, and 
four Beaufighters and 13 Hudsons from Wick, Seven Beauforts and one Beaufighter were 
lost, but the strike failed.^?
PQ16 sailed on 21 May with Seamlf çixià Trident as part of the close escort to meet the in­
cipient threat o f enemy capitaal ships based in north Norway. Unbending, P-614, 0-10, P-46 
and Uredd sailed Lerwick for cover patrols but sighted nothing and the patrols were aban­
doned on 28 May.”^® There was much debate about the best position for escorting subma­
rines, not least because Trident and Seam lfh 2id lost the convoy repeatedly in fog, but the 
reaUty was that this was an idea that had been tried before in the N orth Atlantic and failed. 
Seamlf was too slow to deal with anything other than an attack from astern o f the convoy 
and submarines are useless close escorts; they lose tactical advantage and their presence 
hampers the escorts in counter-attacks on attacking U boats. It is hard to understand why 
Tovey and Horton persisted with this waste of resources for so long.
The PQ 17/Q P13 cycle was unable to sail until late June as much o f the Home Fleet was in 
the Mediterranean for HARPOON, an attempt to run a convoy to Malta. When PQ17 sailed 
Hvalfjord on 27 June, the close escort included P-614 and P-615. Submarine cover was 
provided by Ursula, Tribune, P-212, Sturgeon, Minerve, Unrivalled and Unshaken, which were 
carrying magnetic torpedoes specially for attacks on Tirpitt(P^ From Polyarnoe, Seawolf 
Trident to join the covering force, the latter after escorting QP13, which sailed on 26 
June, as far as 23°W.^^ The disaster that befell PQ17 is well known and needs no recount­
ing here other than to consider the part played by Scottish-based submarines.
Dispositions were initially made on the basis that the Tirpiri^ group would head north from 
the Lofotens to intercept PQ17 east o f Bear Island. But Tirpitf(  ^and Hipper ]oined Scheer at
47 Ashworth : 1992 p. 58.
48 ADM 234 380.
4® Convoys to Murmansk article in NavalBjevleivvol. XLV no. 4 (October 1957).
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Altenfjord on the morning o f 4 July, so Ursula  ^ Tribune, Seawolfz.nà Trident moved eastwards 
to the North Cape.^^
T---
□
Dispositions by submarines of the 3"* and 9*^  Flotillas from the Clyde and 
Tay for the PQ17 convoy operation.
the
Believing the German squadron was closing the convoy, Dudley Pound infamously ordered 
the escort to withdraw and, at 2124/4, the convoy to scatter. P-212, Sturgeon, Minerve, Unri­
valled and Unshaken had begun to move eastwards at 2000/4 but, after the convoy was or­
dered to scatter, submarines were placed along the Hkely track o f the ships heading for the 
Soviet coast. At 0700/5 a Luftwaffe aircraft reported the Home Fleet about 500 miles away 
from the scattered PQ17 and the Tirpitfs^^roM^ began putting to sea. Decrypts allowed the 
Admiralty to monitor the German ships’ progress and, at 1517/5, they were able to signal
50 ADM 199 1858.
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The 3"^  Submarine Flotilla early in 1942. Furthest from the camera is Unbroken which had a dis­
tinguished career with the 10'*' Flotilla in the Mediterranean. Centre is Graph, the former U-570 
captured by a Coastal Command Hudson south of Iceland on 27 August 1941. She arrived at the 
Holy Loch to  begin trials on 19 March 1942 and, that October, carried out a patrol off Finisterre, 
firing a salvo of torpedoes which narrowly missed her sister, U-333. Graph was also involved in 
Arctic patrols, covering the JWSI /RA51 series and missing German armed trawlers with torpe­
does off Trondheim on I January 1943. But there w ere constant problems with her engines and 
spares, not surprisingly, w ere hard to obtain. She hit the entrance to  Camperdown Dock, Dun­
dee, in June 1943 and misaligned her submerged foreplanes. Due for destruction in depth-charge 
tests. Graph was being towed bare-boat down the w est coast of Scotland in a gale on 20 March 
1944 when the tow  parted and she was wrecked on Islay. Outboard boat alongside the depot 
ship Forth, from where the photograph was taken, is Sturgeon which was transferred to  the Dutch 
Navy in 1943. Renamed Zeehond, she then operated with the 9'*’ Flotilla from Dundee.
Tovey that they would reach the western exit from Altenfjord at 1430/5. The Soviet sub­
marine K-21 attacked Tirpitn  ^and her consorts at 1700/5, and claimed two hits on the bat- 
tleship.52 Unrivalled sighted smoke at extreme range at 1912/5, but thought it came from a 
trawler and made no report. Unshaken also sighted the smoke and closed sufficiently to 
identify Tirpiti^ and Hipper close astern at 2013/5, but was put down by German air cover. 
Unshaken never got closer than 10 miles and her attempts to send a sighting report were 
interrupted by enemy aircraft. She could not complete her signal until 2157/5, just as the 
German squadron was ordered to return to Altenfjord.^^
Tirpitt^ had never been closer than 300 miles to the convoy but she had secured a major 
victory by inducing Pound to deliver the scattered merchantmen up to the Luftwaffe and U 
boats. Submarines were in the unusual position o f having every signal repeated to them, a
51 Convoys to Murmansk article in Nava/ Review vol. XLV no. 4 (October 1957).
52 Convoys to Murmansk article in Naval Review vol. XLV no. 4 (October 1957). Broome : 1972.
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them, a privilege not extended to even the close escort commander, and, when Pound gave 
his scatter order, it was apparent to them that Tirpitv  ^could be no nearer the convoy than 
200 miles.
Tirpitz, Hipper and 
Scheer sailing for 
ROSSEL5SPRUNG, the 
German sortie against 
PQI7.
There was still the possibility that the German ships would return south to Narvik, or even 
Trondheim. Hipper and Scheer could pass down the Leads and were thus beyond submarine 
attack, but Tirpitt^ would have to pass outside the Lofoten Islands. Sturgeon and Minerve 
were already homeward bound as, short o f fuel, they had been relieved on the patrol line 
off the North Cape. At 1157/6 FO(S) ordered them to keep a watch and watch patrol off 
the south entrance to Vestfjord.^ Neither boat sighted anything and when Minerve with­
drew for Dundee on 8 July, the German ships had reached Narvik. Sturgeon, meanwhile, 
narrowly missed intercepting Uutr^ow inbound for T r o n d h e im . 5^
The dark hours still too short for inshore patrols off Norway, so submarines were sent on 
anti-U boat patrols across the Northern Transit Area. Saracen sailed Lerwick for her first 
patrol midway between Iceland and Norway on 29 July where, at 2128/3 August, she 
sighted a surfacing U boat in 6248N 0012W and fired six torpedoes, one o f which hit U- 
335. One survivor was pulled aboard and Saracen landed her POW at Lerwick on 9 August, 
then returned to the Clyde.^ Sturgeon and Unshaken had sailed Lerwick on 4 August after 
decrypts indicated Uuts^w was about to leave Trondheim for home. The boats were posi­
tioned off Egeroy and Lister, but Uutn^w passed them close inshore in bad visibility early 
on 11 August. Both boats were then free to attack merchant shipping and, on 12 August, 
Sturgeon sank the Boltenhagen (3,335T). Unshaken attacked a convoy thirty minutes later and
53 Once again, the poor surfaced speed of British submarines was to blame for lJnshaken'% inability to attack. Unshaken 
was bombed after being forced to dive by enemy aircraft at 2247/5, then the destroyer Z-27 circled her position until 
2350/5 but did not mount an attack. ADM 234 380 pp. 140-142. ADM 199 1858.
54 Owing to the need to surface and charge batteries, and the almost non-existent hours of darkness in northern lari- 
tudes in summer, submarines were unable to operate close inshore within range of enemy airfields. Two boats would 
thus operate a watch and watch patrol allowing one to move offshore and charge. ADM 199 1858.
55 Sturgeon’s two inshore patrols, mounted with her crew exhausted after a long period in northern waters, were a re­
markable achievement and she came within two hours of finding herself in a position to attack LutS(ow.
56 Forty-three died in U-335. Jones : 1986 pp. 80-87. ADM 234 380.
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sank the George L. M. Russ (2,980T). Sturgeon and Unrivalled returned to Lerwick on 16 Au­
gust, the same day that air reconnaissance found Uutt^w alongside at Sw inem unde.^?
T h e  M e d i t e r r a n e a n  E f f e c t .
Desperate to keep the Soviet Union in the war, Churchill wanted the PQ 18/Q P14 cycle to 
sail in July 1942 but it had become imperative that a relief convoy be got through to Malta 
and the escort would have to be largely drawn from the same Home Fleet ships that would 
otherwise have covered the next Arctic convoy. The PEDESTAL convoy sailed the Clyde for 
Malta on 2 August 1942, so PQ18 was unable to sail Loch Ewe until 2 September. The 
close escort, including P-614 and P615, sailed on the same day to meet the convoy north of 
Iceland. Every available submarine was called on for this cycle; Tribune, Tigris, Unshaken 
and Uredd patrolled off Gimsostrommen, Gavlfjord and Andfjord and a covering force of 
Shakespeare, Unique and Unrivalled sailed Lerwick in 7 September for zones between the 
North Cape and the convoys. Five further submarines disposed to attack heavy units 
should they get past the patrol force were also ready to move north and join the covering 
force should that prove necessary. Rubis, in refit at Dundee, would be available to lay 
mines off the Lofotens in the path of a retreating enemy. Coastal Command mounted O p­
eration ORATOR to provide continuous cover for the convoy off north Norway, 210 
Squadron CataUnas flying 18-hour patrols from Invergordon that ended on Lake Lakhta in 
northern Russia, and Hampdens flying patrols from Soviet airfields.^» |
On 10 September, Unshaken and Tribune sighted heavy units too far off to attack and sur- j
faced once the coast was clear to pass a sighting report. Tigris sighted the German ships off I
Gavlfjord at 1340/10, but bright sunlight and glassy calm were the worst possible condi- |
tions for an attack and five torpedoes fired at long range missed.^^ Unshaken and Uredd also i
sighted the German squadron, but again too far o ff to attack. Horton ordered Uredd, Un- I
shaken, Tigris and Tribune north to join the covering f o r c e .® ^  While the reports from Tribune |
and Tigris mentioned Tirpit/^ it was still unclear which enemy ships were on the move, or
where they were going. Tirpit^ had not left Vestf)ord and the German squadron had com- |
prised Hipper, Admiral Scheer and Koln. They did not operate, as intended, against QP14 and
Rubis sailed Dundee on 10 September to lay mines across their probable return t r a c k . j
PQ18 lost 10 ships to air attack and three to U-boats, and the QP14 lost three merchant- I
57 ADM 234 380. Rohwer : 1997. Witthoft ; 1971 p. 232. j
58 Ashworth : 1992 p. 62. !
59 This proved to be the last occasion on which Allied submarines were in a position to attack the German heavy sliips -j
at sea. ADM 234 380. j
68 Uredcts patrol report in ADM 199 1852. !
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men, two destroyers and the oiler Grey RangerP- Submarine patrols o ff the North Cape 
were withdrawn on 20 September, though Tigris and Tribune were diverted to patrol off 
Andoy in case the enemy ships did appear, but sighted nothing and returned to Lerwick on 
1 October.^^
With longer hours o f darkness allowing sufficient time to surface run at night and charge 
batteries, normal submarine operations off Norway resumed after a short break to refit 
boats and rest crews. On 12 October, Uredd and Junon sailed Lerwick, Uredd for Stadlandet 
and Utvaer, and Junon for Trondheim. Junon claimed successful attacks on 16, 17 and 18 
O c t o b e r . O ff Vilnesfjord at 1548/18, Uredd hit the German hibau (3,713T) which was 
beached on Araldan Island from where salvage proved im p o ss ib le .Junon and Uredd re­
turned to Lerwick on 24 October and 28 October respectively. Meanwhile, the involve­
ment o f Home Fleet ships in TORCH precluded Arctic convoys in October, but independ­
ently routed ships had sailed in August and another 13 were to go in the moonless period 
between 28 October and 9 November.'’'^  Tuna and 0-15  sailed the Holy Loch and Dundee 
respectively on 23 October to provide cover off the North Cape.
On 24 October the Soviets reported that enemy radio traffic indicated a move by surface 
units was hkely, so the submarines, with time in hand, were diverted to patrol off Utvaer 
and Stadlandet for 48 hours, but saw nothing and were ordered north on 27 October. On 
26 October the Shetland Bus fishing boat Arthur had sailed Lunna Voe with human torpe­
does attached for TITLE, an unsuccessful attempt to sink or disable Tirpit^^’^ Hipper sortied 
from Altenfjord on 5 November to attack the Russia-bound independents, but her only 
success was the sinking of a tanker by one o f her escorting destroyers. Bletchley Park and 
the OIC had been following HippePs progress and, on 7 November, Tuna was ordered to 
Soroy to intercept her, but sighted nothing.
Trespasser iLtid Seadog came north from the Clyde to relieve Tuna and 0-15, and Uredd sailed 
Lerwick on 11 November, all three boats to cover the passage o f QP15, 28 merchantmen 
that had to be brought home before they were iced in. QP15 had a weak close escort of
61 Thirty-one mines were laid at 1040/19 September, and it was claimed tlrat the Norwegian SS Nordland (J65T) sank 
after detonating one o f these mines, but Rohwer found that Nordland was sunk by Junon on 19 October 1942. ADM 
199 1852. ADM 234 380. Information from the late ex-Sous-Maitre Mechanicien Jean-Pierre Babin. Rohwer : 1997
62 Roskül : 1960 p. 230. Schofield : 1977 App. 1 for losses.
63 ADM 199 1852.
64 Rohwer was unable to substantiate Junon’s claims in his research io t Allied Submarine Attacks oj World War 2. Rohwer : 
1997.
65 ADM 199 1852. ADM 234 380. Valvatne : 1954 pp. 49-50. Witthoft : 1971 p. 299. Rowher : 1997.66 Padfield su^ests that the break in Arctic convoys allowed Max Horton, the newly appointed C-in-C Western Ap­
proaches, to begin forming the Support Groups o f frigates and destroyers that would prove so successful in the final 
stages o f the U boat war. But the concept whicli dated firom tire time o f his predecessor. Admiral Noble. Padfield : 
1997 p. 327.
67 HS 2 235.
68 R.P. Raikes papers. IWM Department o f Documents ref no. 96/56/1.
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four corvettes, five minesweepers, the anti-aircraft ship Ulster Queen and a trawler. A 
planned reinforcement of the escort in the Barents Sea failed when storms scattered the 
convoy. Decrypts revealed that Hipper and Koln were preparing to sail Altenfjord and that 
U boats were in the Bear Island area, but they also revealed that Luftwaffe bomber units 
being sent from Norway to the Mediterranean so, denied air cover and reconnaissance, 
Hipper and Koln did not sail. Two QP15 ships were torpedoed by U boats near Bear Island 
and 26 reached Loch Ewe.
The PQ17 debacle had marked the nadir o f Allied fortunes in the Arctic, but the relative 
success o f PQ18, QP14 and Q PÎ5 was greeted with relief in London and Washington, not 
least because there was a considerable element of good luck involved on the Allied side. 
Only in their attacks on PQ17 had the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine achieved anying like 
the level of cooperation needed and the demands o f the Mediterranean, particularly after 
the success o f Operation TORCH led to a haemorrhaging of Luftwaffe strength to that 
theatre. Thus a large-scale amphibious operation launched largely from Scotland, namely 
TORCH, had combined with a major naval operation in northern waters to inflict what 
amounted to a double defeat on the Axis. As Roskül writes:
Though the Admiralty could not possibly have realised it at the time, we now know that the success 
achieved in the passage o f PQ18 and QP14 was, in a way, decisive. Never again did the enemy deploy 
such great air strength in the far north. Before the next pair o f convoys sailed, events in North Afeica 
had forced him to send south his entire bomber and torpedo striking forces o f Ju.88s and He. I l l  s.
Thus did a strategic success obtained thousands o f  miles away.. .have favourable repercussions inside 
the Arctic Circle.^^
T h e  B a t t l e  o f  t h e  B a r e n t s  S e a  a n d  T t k p h z  d i s a b l e d
After the enforced break during TORCH, Arctic convoys restarted with the new JW /RA 
series when JW51A sailed Loch Ewe on 15 December 1942 and Seanymph, Taurus, Torbcy 
and Sokol provided cover off the N orth Cape. Trespasser, Seadog, Unruly, Graph and 0-14 
saüed Lerwick on 20 December to cover JW51B which saüed Loch Ewe on 22 December. 
JW51B was joined, from Scapa, by the 17'^ * Destroyer Flotüla on Christmas Day and the 
cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica escorted by Opportune and Matchless had covered the passage o f 
JW51A to Kola and now returned to escort JW51B. Distant cover was provided by units of 
the Home Fleet from Scapa led by the battleship AnsonP
From decrypts, the Admiralty was aware that Tirpitr^ was unfit for operations, Numberg had 
replaced the refitting Scheer as guardship at Narvik and that the repaired Lut^oiv had joined 
Hipper, Koln and six destroyers in Altenfjord on 18 December. Ultra signals on 28 and 29
69 Roskill : 1956 p. 288.
70 ADM 199 77. ADM 234 380.
233
North W estern Approaches
December gave Rear Admiral Burnett in Sheffield the position of the ice edge as reported by 
U boats and the news that the Germans were expecting the convoy through the Bear Is­
land Channel. Hipper, Hutt(OW and six destroyers sailed on 30 December and Unruly sighted, 
but appears not to have reported, three dark shapes leaving Altenfjord at 0142/31.^* The 
subsequent failure o f the hesitantly led German heavy units at the Battle o f The Barents 
Sea was a disaster for the Kreigsmarine. For the loss of two escorts, JW51A, JW51B and 
RA51 all got through unscathed, Hipper hsid been heavily damaged by the cruisers Sheffield 
and Jamaica before escaping in a snowstorm and the destroyer Freidrich Eckholdt had been 
sunk. A planned Atlantic sortie by Lutf^oiv was cancelled, morale plummeted and Raeder 
was replaced by Donitz.^^
On 5 January 1943, as it was thought Tirpits^ was about to sail Trondheim, submarines re­
turning from the Arctic were diverted to Norway. Seadog and Unruly went to Vestfjord and 
Graph and Trespasser covered the northern exit from Trondheim. Unsparing was already on 
patrol off Utvaer and Uredd sailed Lerwick for Stadlandet on 6 January in case German 
heavy units in the Baltic sailed north as reinforcements. But, following the Barents Sea de­
bacle, a furious Hitler had ordered that the German heavy ships be scrapped. In February, 
the damaged Hipper and Koln made their way south to home ports unscathed despite an 
intensive effort to find them by Coastal Command Mosquitoes, Hampdens and Beaufight­
ers from Leuchars and Wick.73 When JW53 sailed Loch Ewe on 15 February, Luti^otn and 
two destroyers were at Altenfjord, Tirpits^ was at Trondheim, Hipper and Koln were in home 
ports and Scharfihorsl And Vrintj^Fugen were on the safe side o f the Kattegat. S cheer vjas refit­
ting at Wilhelmshaven and Nürnberg at Narvik was not a major threat. Seanymph, Sportsman, 
Simoom and Truculent sailed Lerwick for Altenfjord but saw nothing.74
Donitz prevailed on Hitler to withdraw his order that the entire German fleet should be 
scrapped, not least because this would have placed an intolerable and entirely unproductive 
burden on German shipyards already overstretched by the U boat building programme. 
Meanwhile, a concentration of Luftwaffe fighters in southern Norway, noticed by the Al­
lies on 6 March and similar to those that had presaged previous moves by heavy units, was 
taken to indicate a move by German warships was in the offing. Beaufighters o f 235 
Squadron from Wick began patrolling between Stavanger and Bergen and, by 7 March, it 
was known that Scharnhorst was moving north. Coastal Command reinforcements came 
north, then, early on 8 March, the pilot o f a BOAC flight from Sweden to Leuchars re­
ported large ships heading north in the Skaggerak. Sunderlands and Catalinas from SuUom
71 ADM 234 380. Winton : 1988 pp. 75-76.
72 ADM 234 369. Roskill : 1956 pp. 292-199.
73 AIR 41 48 PP. 347-350.
74 ADM 234 380.
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Voe covered RA53 and Beaufighters from Wick searched the Leads but Scharnhorst reached 
Narvik unmolested on 13 March.75 By 24 March 1943, Tripits^ Scharnhorst And their destroy­
ers had moved north to AltenfjordJ^
The Germans were expecting another Arctic convoy that spring, but the Royal Navy was 
preoccupied with the U boat war in the Atlantic and the Home Fleet was in the Mediterra­
nean for H U S K Y .77 These factors, combined with the German concentration in the north 
beyond the range of regular air reconnaissance, led to the suspension o f the Arctic con­
voys. Dangerous submarine patrols o ff the German bases in north Norway were no longer 
necessary but, with a powerful enemy surface force concentrated in Altenfjord evidently 
capable o f breaking out into the Atlantic, patrol zones were established between the Lofo­
tens and Spitsbergen. Stubborn and Severn sailed the Clyde on 1 April followed by USB Barb, 
one of the SubRon 50 fleet submarines from R o s n e a t h . 7 8  At 2105/7 April Tuna patrolling a 
line south-east from Jan Mayen Island sighted U-644 lying in wait for the next, non­
existent, Arctic convoy in 6938N 0540W and sank. Tuna unsuccessfully attacked two more 
U boats before she was relieved by Stubborn and returned to the Holy Loch on 22 April.79
As the ice edge receded, a new patrol in the Denmark Strait, involving mainly the Ameri­
can SubRon 50 boats from Rosneath, was instituted at the end o f April. In addition, an 
anti-U boat patrol was organised across the general track o f U boats outbound for the At­
lantic beyond the area covered by Coastal Command, though an RAF signal ordering a 
bombing restriction had been intercepted by B-Deinst and U boats had been warned.^o De­
spite this. Tuna missed a U boat with eight torpedoes on 30 May, then Truculent, which had
75 AIR 41 48 p. 344-345.
76 Brassey : 1948 Conferences for 1943, Ch. 1 Crisis in the German Na^.
77 For tlie 1943 Atlantic crisis see Gannon : 1998 and The Defiat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, Grove (ed) ; 1997 pp. 
90-97. ADM 234 380.
78 Barb, Herring Bkckpsh, Gurnard, Shad and Gunnel, had arrived at Rosneath on 25 November 1942 after acting as navi­
gation beacons for die TORCH Western Task Force. These boats formed Submarine Squadron 50 (SubRon 50) op­
erating under FO(S). They were assigned patrol areas in tlie Bay of Biscay where tliey intercepted blockade runners 
operating between Spanish and French Biscay ports- SubRon 50 boats carried out nine Biscay patrols before they 
were moved to patrols off Norway and returned to tlie US late in 1943. ADM 199 1859. ADM 234 380. Roscoe : 
1949. Rohwer : 1997.
79 The U boat patrol line was moved 50 miles north, but the BDU Norway KTB notes;
The U boats south o f Jan Mayen Island have been in this area since 24*** March. Since the enemy has [sic] at­
tacked in two cases at least \U-339 by Catalina on 26 March 1943 and U-302 by Tuna on 14 April 1943], he must 
suspect the convoy route Iceland - Murmansk to be patrolled off Jan Mayen Island. In spite o f this, it is tlie most 
suitable line for intercepting a PQ convoy. It is the only suitable position besides Bear Island where traffic con­
verges.
U boat Command was unaware of the loss o f U-644 and the sighting of U-2S1 untd 21 April, and even then the fate 
o f U-644 could only be guessed at. But this patrol was o f  great importance to the Germans as a shortage o f aviation 
fuel had led to a temporary cessation o f long range air reconnaissance in northern Arctic waters, as well as nottiiern 
European waters. ADM 234 380
80 ADM 199 1859.
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sailed Lerwick on 2 June, sank U-308 in 6428N 0309W on 4 June.^^
The Home Fleet was weakened during the summer o f 1943 by operations in the Mediter­
ranean, in particular HUSKY, though on 8 July Anson, Duke of Yark, Malaya, Furious, two 
cruiser squadrons, three destroyer flotillas along with a US task force comprising Alabama, 
South Dakota and the cruisers Augusta and Tuscaloosa carried out an sweep off Norway to 
divert German attention from the Sicily landings due on 10 July. The ships were not seen 
by Luftwaffe reconnaissance, so the deception failed. The operation was repeated at the 
end of July when Illustrious and Unicom also took part and Martlet fighters shot down five 
BV138s.®2 Meanwhile, on 11 September 1943, six submarines sailed Loch Cairnbawn, each 
with an X-craft midget submarine in tow for Operation SOURCE. Secured to the sides o f 
the X-craft were drop charges containing two tons o f torpex, then the most powerful ex­
plosive available, which were to be laid under Tirpitf^ Scharnhorst and JLutf(pu>, Scharnhorst had 
sailed on gunnery trials, but two X-craft attacked Titpitt^ early on 22 September. Enigma 
decrypts revealed that damage to Tirpitn  ^was serious, though it did not give exact details. 
Further decrypts in the ensuing months showed that many o f her crew had been sent on 
leave and that repairs would not be completed until March 1944 at the e a r h e s t . ^ 3
The commitment o f Alhed naval strength elsewhere also meant that dealing with enemy 
heavy unit movements off Norway fell to Coastal Command, yet, by their own admission, 
Coastal’s inexperience in anti-shipping strikes meant that they were far from successful.®^ 
The hght cruiser Numberg, o f little use in the Arctic, moved south from Narvik for the Bal­
tic at the end o f April 1943. She was spotted by a 540 Squadron Mosquito from Leuchars 
and Beaufighter strikes were mounted against her from Wick and N orth Coates on 1 May. 
Both strikes were intercepted by ME109s and FW190s and seven Beaufighters were shot 
down. No hits were scored on NumbergP
As fighter reinforcements reached Bodo and Bergen towards the end o f September, a 
southward move south by one o f the heavy units at Altenfjord was expected. Uutt^ow sailed 
on 24 September, and once her movements were known, the Home Fleet planned an op­
eration against her with the American carrier Ranger, but it was soon apparent that Ranger 
could not reach a flying-off position in time. Coastal Command was short o f aircraft, so it 
was decided to mount an operation with 12 Tarpons of 832 Squadron from the carrier Vic­
torious escorted by Coastal’s Beaufighters. JLuti^ oiu and five destroyers were sighted at
8* Surfacing 11 minutes after the attack, Tmcuknt found a large patch o f oil and wreckage. U-308 sailed Kiel on 29 May 
for her &st patrol and her 44 crew were all lost. The Germans attributed her loss to air attack while passing Iceland. 
Jones : 1986 pp. 136-141.
82 Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 338.
83 Information from RN Submarine Museum. Rosldll : 1961 pt. 1 pp 64-68. Mitchell : 1993.
84 AIR 41 48.
85 AIR 41 48 p 350 et passim.
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0624/27 off Kristiansund and 832 Squadron took off from Sumburgh to intercept her but 
did not sight their target. 'L.ute^ ptv avoided mines air-dropped on her expected route and 
reached Gdynia on 1 October.®**
Despite her having been disabled in SOURCE, at the end o f 1943 repairs to Tirpitei were 
progressing, albeit slowly, under the cover o f winter darkness and she remained a potent 
threat. The JW54A/RA54A and JW54B/RA54B convoy cycles sailed in November, en­
countering no enemy action, but these were the first Arctic convoys since March. Aside 
from SOURCE, movements of enemy surface units including ZITRONELLA had gone largely 
unchallenged by either the Royal Navy, or the RAF. At ranges in Loch Cairnbawn, Loch 
Striven and elsewhere. Bomber Command were having problems with HIGHBALL, an anti­
shipping version o f the bouncing bomb to be used against large warships including Tir~ 
In reviewing their contribution. Coastal Command concluded that, ‘The results o f air 
action against enemy major naval units...can hardly be called successful.’®® Scharnhorst had 
been forced to abort a passage to Norway in January 1943 on being spotted by Coastal 
Command aircraft, but only one ship had been damaged; F ut^w  in June 1941.
B a t t l e  o f  T h e  N o r t e i  C a p e
At the end o f 1943, Scharnhorst and the damaged Titpit^v/ese the only German heavy units 
left in the Arctic.®^ But the disabling o f Tirpits^ the departure southwards o f Lutf^ojv and the 
dissipation of Luftwaffe strength on the eastern front and in the Mediterranean had a dra­
matic effect on Alhed naval strategy. Arctic convoys could resume against a background of 
a much reduced surface and air threat and the Home Fleet could concentrate more on at­
tacking enemy shipping off Norway.^*) As if  to prove the point, Fraser sailed Scapa on 2 
October with Duke of York, Anson, USS Tuscaloosa, three British cruisers, ten British and US 
destroyers, and the American carrier Ranger for LEADER, an air strike on Bod© where de­
crypts had revealed there was a promising collection o f shipping. This was the first carrier 
attack o ff Norway since 1940.^^ Ranger t&Ached her flying-off position, 140 miles o ff Bod©, 
before dawn on 4 October. Twenty Dauntless dive bombers, 10 Avenger torpedo bombers 
and fighter escorts caught the enemy by surprise. Four ships were sunk and six vessels, 
among them the troopship Skramstad (4,3OOT), the mhitary storeship Ta Plata (8,056T) and
86 Ibid. p. 355 et passim.
87 Sweetman : 2000 p. 51.
88 AIR 41 48 p. 368.
89 Wtaton ; 1988 p. 78. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 355. 
w ADM 234 369. Roskill ; 1960 pt. 1 p. 69.
9* Rohwer and Hummelchen ; 1974 p. 359. Roskill : 1960 pt. 1 p. 102.
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Operation LEADER
the tanker Schleswig (10,243T), which Enigma had identified as northbound with fuel for 
Scharnhorst, had to be beached. Three aircraft were lost.®^
JW55A sailed Loch Ewe on 12 December 1943 and, on 18 December, decrypts revealed 
that the enemy knew a convoy was at sea. Patrol areas had been allocated to U boats, air 
reconnaissance had been ordered and Scharnhorst in Altenfjord had been brought to three 
hours notice. Donitz told Hitler that Scharnhorst and destroyers would attack the next con­
voy if a successful operation seemed assured.^® JW55B sailed Loch Ewe on 20 December 
and was sighted by a Luftwaffe Zenit meteorological flight at 1045/22. Luftwaffe signals 
about the convoy were decrypted and communicated to Fraser, who had taken the Home 
Fleet north from Scapa Flow to Iceland, by Ultra signal at 0146/23.
Meanwhile, RA55A was about to sail Kola Inlet with a close escort that included Belfast, 
Sheffield and Norfolk. Fraser sailed Iceland in Duke of York with Jamaica and four destroyers 
at 2200/23.^4 Over the ensuing 24 hours, he was provided with a stream of Enigma-based 
intelligence to the effect that Scharnhorst had come to three hours notice at 1300/22, that 
the Germans first suspected that the convoy was a landing force heading for Norway and 
that eight U-boats had been ordered to a patrol hne south-west o f Bear Island. An Ultra 
message to Fraser at 0130/26, based on decrypt of a 1527/25 signal from Admiral N orth­
ern Waters to Scharnhorst, stated, 'Most Immediate. OSTFRONT 1700/25/12.' This was fol­
lowed at 0217/26 by another Ultra signal that told Fraser the Admiralty beheved Scham- 
horst had sailed.^® Donitz had taken the bait.
Fraser ordered JW55B to turn north, clear o f what would be the battle zone, and at 
0834/26 Norfolk’s radar picked up Scharnhorst just over six miles west o f her. Intermittently 
engaged during the day by Burnett’s cruisers, Scharnhorst headed south, away from the con­
voy, but straight into the path o f Fraser’s battle group. Regular radar plots from Belfast
92 OIC Intelligence Summary in ADM 223 8. Roskill : 1960 pt. 1 p. 102.
93 Brassey : 1948 p. 374.
94 ADM 234 369.
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fig. 76
The Kreigsmarine went to  war with som e of the world’s fastest, most modern and best­
armed warships, not least among them the Scharnhorst (above), but they w ere too  few in 
number to be decisive. Hitler inherited a naval expansion programme in 1933, including 
early concepts for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which he expanded into what became 
known as the Z Plan. This was predicated on a possible war with Britain and France in 
1944, by which time it was hoped that the Kreigsmarine would be strong enough to meet 
the Royal Navy on something like equal terms, at least in the North Atlantic. But the Z 
Plan took insufficient account of in som e measure consequent British naval expansion and 
almost immediately came up against limits of production and inter-service rivalries.
Two German aircraft carriers w ere planned and one, the Graf Zeppelin, was launched in 
1938, but never completed. Naval aviation would have provided the Kreigsmarine with a 
more balanced fleet and would have made the Royal Navy more circumspect in engage­
ments such as that with Bismarck. Ultimately, Germany could not com pete with British, 
and later Allied, warship building capacity. And the crews of the ships she did deploy suf­
fered from a chronic lack of sea time in part due to fuel shortages and in part to the 
overwhelming superiority of the Royal Navy which forced the Kreigsmarine to  fall back on 
the ‘fleet in being" concept, even though this latter was effective in that it tied down a 
large part of the Royal Navy’s strength in Home Waters.
The destruction of Scharnhorst can be partly attributed to Enigma decrypts (using intelli­
gence gained by Scottish-based naval units), partly to the German battleship allowing her 
destroyer escorts to lose touch and partly to  poor shiphandling, but it was inexperience 
that allowed her to be taken completely by surprise.
allowed DuÆe of York to gain contact at 1617/26. Scharnhorst vj2lS taken completely by sur­
prise, her turrets trained fore and aft, and sank at 1945/26 after sustainiung at least thir­
teen 14” hit, around 12 hits from Burnett’s cruisers and eleven torpedo hits, a testament to 
the strength of her construction. Just 36 o f her company survived.’^
Tirpitn  ^ was repairing damage inflicted during SOURCE, but never again would there be a 
credible surface threat to the Arctic convoys. This was another victory for naval forces 
based in Scotland.
Winton : ml 988 pp. 80-81.
% Roskill : 1960 pt. 1 pp. 80-89.
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C a r r i e r  O p e r a t i o n s  a g a i n s t  T i r p i t z
Repairs to Tirpitt^ were the subject of close Allied interest, particularly when, on 3 March 
1944, an agent at Altenfjord reported the battleship test firing her main armament. On 15 
March the SIS agent reported Tirpit^ had undertaken sea trials and JW58 sailed Loch Ewe 
on 27 March. A decrypt on 1 April revealed that Tirpits(^  had delayed her full power trials by 
two days and would sail on 3 April. Fraser was by then aware that JW58 had been a suc­
cess, the escorts sinking four U boats and shooting down six aircraft, and the weather was 
favourable, so TUNGSTEN was set for 0530/3 April.
The Fleet Air Arm had trained for this operation at Loch Eriboll where a range represent­
ing Tirpitr^ berth in Kaafjord had been constructed and a full-scale rehearsal was con­
ducted on 28 March. Duke of York, Anson, Victorious, Belfast five destroyers sailed Scapa 
at noon on 30 March followed by Royalist, Sheffield, Jamaica, Furious, five destroyers and the 
escort carriers Searcher, Emperor, Pursuer and Fencer. Early on 3 April the first strike com­
prised 18 Barracuda bombers from Victorious and Furious with a close escort o f 20 Wildcats 
from Searcher and Pursuer, 16 Corsairs from Victorious as top cover and ten Hellcats from 
Emperor for flak suppression. The second strike force was made up of 24 Barracudas from 
Victorious and Furious with a similar escort. Seafires from Furious and Wildcats from Fencer 
flew GAPs over the force and Swordfish from provided A/S cover for the fleet.^®
Barracudas inbound for Op­
eration TUNGSTEN
The first attack at 0529/3 took Tirpitr^ by surprise as she was shortening in her cable. 
Fighters strafed her upper decks, nine bombs hit and another near miss caused hull dam­
age. Tirpitv  ^had begun to move back into her net defences when the second strike arrived
97 The attack on Tirpita^wzs originally scheduled for between 7 and 16 March, but Victorious virzs delayed in dockyard 
hands. Moore’s report in ADM 199 844.
98 Ibid.
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at 0630/3, and was partly obscured by smoke floats, but another four bombs hit. Fighters 
also strafed shipping in the fjord and set a tanker on fire. In Tirpitt^ 122 died and another 
316 men, including Kapitan Hans Meyer, were injured. Her upperworks were badly dam­
aged but most of the bombs had been dropped too low and failed to penetrate her vitals. 
She would be out of action for only three months. One Hellcat and three Barracudas were 
lost.^^
Sir Andrew Cunningham, who had 
taken over as First Sea Lord from 
the dying Dudley Pound on 15 Oc­
tober 1943, urged Fraser to repeat 
TUNGSTEN, hitting the enemy when 
he was already down. There followed 
an extraordinary spat between two of 
the Royal Navy’s senior flag officers. 
A ‘truculent and obstinate’ Fraser, 
correctly believing Tirpitt^ impervious 
to bombs then carried by the FAA, 
wished his carriers to revert to anti­
shipping sweeps off Norway and 
threatened to resign if ordered to 
carry out another attack. The two 
men had an uneasy relationship but, 
as Cunningham wrote, ‘wiser coun­
cils [sic] prevailed,’ and the carriers 
sailed Scapa on 21 April for PLANET, 
though the operation had to be can­
celled due to bad weather.^^o
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Following the cancellation of PLANET, the carriers 
attacked Bodo and a convoy off Sandhorn as above. 
Two ships w ere sunk for the loss of one Barracuda, 
two Corsairs, one Hellcat and one Wildcat
TIGER CLAW, another strike against Tirpit:^ by Victorious and Furious on 28 May failed due to 
bad weather, but the force moved south for a secondary operation, LOMBARD, on the eve­
ning of 1 June when a convoy reported by a Mosquito strike earlier in the day was attacked 
o ff Alesund. The ammunition ship Hans Feonhardt (4,174T) blew up and the freighter Flor­
ida (5,542T) and the escort Sperrhrecher 181 were set on fire.^°’
99 Ibid. Sweetman : 2000 pp. 58-73. Winton : 1988 p. 86-89.
'00 Roskill : 1977 p. 237-238.
'01 Winton : 1988 p. 90. Rohwer and Hummelchen ; 1974 p. 410.
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Victorious left for the Far East with Indomitable on 12 June and, two days later. Sir Flenry 
Moore succeeded Sir Bruce Fraser and C-in-C Home Fleetd°^ Anson and King George V  were 
refitting for the Pacific, so Moore was left with Duke of York and, from early July, the fleet 
carriers Indefatigable and Implacable. He also had the superannuated Furious and the escort 
carriers. And it was the escort carriers Striker and Fencer that sailed Scapa with Royalist, Shef­
field and six destroyers on 20 June to steam along the Arctic convoy route until close to 
known U boat concentration areas, then go into radio silence. Strikes were then flown off 
in the hope o f catching U boats on the surface. Nothing was sighted, so the force made a 
feint towards Norway hoping to be sighted by enemy aircraft. WANDERERS was intended 
to encourage the enemy to maintain a large force o f U boats in Norway and well away 
from the invasion area in the Channel, but the enemy failed to take much notice.^®^
On 14 July Moore sailed Scapa in Duke of York with Devonshire, Kent, Jamaica, Bellona, de­
stroyers and the 20*^ ' Escort Group to cover Formidable, Indefatigable and Furious as they car­
ried out MASCOT, an attack by 44 Barracudas, 18 Hellcats, 18 Corsairs and 12 Fireflies on 
Tirpit^. As Winton writes, there is evidence that B dienst was listening to the carrier wire­
less traffic and had warning o f a sweep. But an OP on a hilltop overlooking her anchorage 
gave Firpitr^ 15 minutes warning o f the attack and she was completely shrouded in smoke 
when the strike arrived overhead. No hits were obtained and two aircraft were lost.^ ®'*
JW59 was to sail Loch Ewe on 15 August and, three days earlier. Rear Admiral (Carriers)
Rhoderick McGrigor took his ships north from Scapa for OFFSPRING. Avengers laid mines 
off Storholm, a radar station was destroyed on Haro Island and Gossen airfield was at­
tacked. After OFFSPRING, McGrigor joined Moore with the main strength o f the Home 
Fleet to cover the passage o f JW59 and launch another strike against Tirpitr^ Decrypts had 
revealed that the damage inflicted on Tirpit\ in MASCOT had been minor and that she had 
carried out sea trials on 31 July and 1 August. Indefatigable, Formidable, Furious, Nabob and 
Trumpeter launched a series o f attacks, GOODW OOD I-IV, between 22 and 29 August involv­
ing up to 60 aircraft at a time, but only one bomb hit Tirpitr^ and that failed to explode.
And, while the ships were retiring after GOODW OOD I, U-354 sank the frigate Bickerton and 
badly damaged Nabob. But JW59 had a largely uneventful passage with the escort carriers 
able to keep the U boats in the Barents Sea at bay. Only the sloop Kite was lost to a tor­
pedo from U-344.^^^
1With the failure o f GOODW OOD, it was clear that the FAA could not bring heavy enough |
ordnance to bear to disable Tirpittr  ^ so she was left to the Lancasters o f Bomber Command 1
{102 Roskill : 1977 p. 254. j
10Î ADM 199 844. 1
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to deal with. On 15 September, in Operation PARAVANE, 27 Lancasters o f 9 and 617 
Squadrons took off from Yagodnik near Archangel. Twenty-one o f the aircraft carried 
12,0001b Tallboys and the others carried 4001b Mk. 2 mines. It was known that Tirpitrr^  
could be covered with smoke in 1 0  minutes but it was calculated that a surprise approach 
from the landward side would give the Germans only three minutes warning. Tirpitt^ was 
almost obscured by smoke when the Lancasters arrived, and only 16 Tallboys were 
dropped. No definite results could be seen, but one had passed through her foc'sle without 
exploding, then detonated below the waterline. PRU flights and SIS agents’ reports con­
firmed that she had been seriously damaged.
On 16 October, however, a decrypt disclosed that Tirpit^i had moved to a new berth off 
Hâkoy Island near Tromso. This brought her within range of Lancasters from Scotland and 
aircraft o f 9 and 617 Squadrons operating from Lossiemouth, Kinloss and Mültown finally 
sank her on 12 N o v em b er.B e tw een  1940 and 1944, either in harbour or at sea, the RAF 
and FAA had carried out 33 operations against Tirpitri involving over 700 a irc ra f t .A n d , 
for more than four years, numerous submarines, including the midget X-craft, and much of 
the Royal Navy’s modern warship strength had been tied down at Scapa Flow by the threat 
o f her wreaking havoc among Arctic or Atlantic convoys. As the OIC concluded:
Thus ended the A dm iral von Tirpitri [sic] just four years and two days after her completion. Through­
out the whole o f her career she neither sank nor damaged a single British warship. She did, however, 
succeed by her mere presence in Nortliem Waters in pinning down important British Naval forces 
during a critical period o f the war.^ °®
And, as with her ill-fated sister, once again her containment and eventual destruction had 
principally involved naval and air forces based in, or operating from, Scotland.
S e a b o r n e  S p e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  f r o m  S c o t l a n d
A G A IN ST TARGETS IN  N O RW A Y  
In 1939 responsibility for Special Operations was vested in three separate organisations; 
MI(R) at the War Office was responsible for guerrilla warfare. Section D o f the Secret In­
telligence Service (MI6 ) for espionage and Department EH at the Foreign Office for 
propaganda. These were reorganised into one body, the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE), in July 1940. Churchill, searching for gestures o f defiance that would impress, in 
particular America, with British determination to fight on, famously if  melodramatically 
charged SOE with setting Europe ablaze.
105 ADM 234 369. Schofield : 1977 pp, 127-128.
106 Sweetman : 2000 ch. 5. Bennett : 1986 pp. 108-110. Teriaine : 1985 p. 674 and f.n. 9.
107 Sweetman ; 2000 p. 161.
108 ADM 223 87.
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SOE’s Norwegian Section grew to become the Scandinavian Section in November 1940 
under Sir Charles Hambro. At first, as Thomson writes, SOE had a feeble grasp o f the 
realities o f occupation;
SOE inherited.. .a sense o f  unrealistic optimism regarding die prospects o f a general revolt against 
the Germans in Norway. With virtually no sources o f  information other than their own imaginations, 
British planners envisioned co-ordinated uprisings at key points early in 1941 aimed at overthrowing 
the occupation entirely, essentially unaided by Allied forces. At best the scheme was impractical; and 
at worst, it threatened to plunge die Norwegian people into a bloodbath for no worthwhile pur- 
pose.i®^
A steady stream of potential SOE recruits had begun arriving in Scotland within weeks of 
the Allied evacuation from Norway, small boats bringing patriotic Norwegians keen to 
continue the fight. Viking arrived at Aberdeen in August 1940 with Konrad Lindberg, Frit- 
jhof Petersen and Odd Starheim who were among SOE’s earliest recruits. Lindberg and 
Petersen were sent back to Norway in November 1940, but their indiscretion soon got 
them arrested. 1^0
In January 1941, with the code name CHEESE, Starheim was landed by the submarine Sun- 
fish to organise resistance around Kristiansand South. He monitored German oil stocks in 
Norway, a contact in Stavanger reported on German shipping and another recorded Luft­
waffe movements at Sola airfield. Messages from Starheim’s radio post at Flekkefjord be­
gan on 25 February and, on 10 June, a signal that German warships had passed up the 
coast referred to the Bismarck, though it was too late to be of value. The CHEESE mission 
sent around 100 messages in five months and, with the Gestapo closing in on his radio 
post, Starheim went to Oslo where a courier told him that the Soviet Union was to be in­
vaded on 29 June. Bearing what he believed was vital intelligence, Starheim escaped to 
Sweden on 27 June and was flown to L eu ch ars .S ta rh e im  returned to Norway on 3 Janu­
ary 1942 and, on 21 January, escaped from a German patrol by jumping from a window. 
On 15 March, he led a party that hijacked the coaster Galtesund and made for Aberdeen. 
After a prolonged search in thick weather, a Hudson from Leuchars found the ship at 
1315/16 and they secured in Aberdeen at 1230/17.
109 ~Prom Neutmlity to NATO - The Norwegian Armed Forces and Defense Foliy 1905-1955. Ph.D. dissertation by David G. 
Thomson, Department o f History, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA, 1996, p. 222.
110 Victims of SOE’s naivete, they were executed on 11 August 1941 .Cookridge : 1966 p. 508.
111 Starheim’s account o f the first CHEESE mission is in HS 2 150.
112 One o f Starheim’s party aboard Gatiesund was Einar Skinnarland Ccom Vermork. Information that the Germans had 
ordered a considerable increase in the production o f heavy water at the Norsk Hydro plant in Vermork had reached 
London six months earher, so Skinnarland, with his intimate knowledge o f the area, was a considerable find. He 
went to London and, with SOE Scandinavian Section Head Colonel John Wilson and Professor Leif Tronstad, be­
gan planning Operation GROUSE, the attempted destruction o f the heavy water plant at Rjukan. He volunteered 
to return to Norway to prepare for the parachuting in of a party o f four saboteurs and, after just 11 days training, he 
parachuted from a Hahfax over tlie Hardangervidda on 29 March. Less than diree weeks after disappearing, he was 
back at work and explained liis absence to tfie Germans as being due to illness. GROUSE failed when,die ghders 
carrying Commandos crashed in bad weadier. An account o f the second CHEESE mission is in HS 2 151.
244
North W estern Approaches
At 1540/16 August 1942 . , y
Starheim and Sergeant An- _ W  , ,  „ ,  AV < '
dreas Fasting (christened k o  5 c« -^266
^ , CHEESE 15/ 3//I2 1901! 15/ 3 /4 2  1930 rBISCUIT to Starheim’s >cxq 11 s .0 .2 . U R q E N T M O
CPIEESE) left Dundee e l e v e n  o f  i 5t h  k a n c h .
5JE HAVE CAPTURED A COAST SH IP OF 6 0 0  TOMS OFF EQERSUNDaboard the French subma-
rine Minerve to reconnoitre THE s h i p  h a k e s  ii i : n o t s .  we h a k e  f o r  A b e r d e e n ,  p l e a s e
GIVE AIRCRAFT ESCORT BECAUSE l'ÎE EXPECT ATTACK FROM QERHAN
the ground for CARHAMP- a i r c r a f t  to m o rro w  MORMiiiq.
TON, an SOE operation to
steal ships from one of the noTE b y  c o d e s ,  i d e n t i t y  c h e c k  q i v e n .
German convoys that an-
TP AT 2 0 .5 0  1 5 /3 /4 2  HO
chored for the night at the Starheim’s signal notifying SOE of the capture of the Gakesund, 
entrance to Flekkefjord. incident dramatised in the feature film The Heroes o f  Telemark.
They landed by folbot early on 20 August and Minerve returned inshore two days later to 
pick them up.^i^ CARHAMPTON proper began on 31 December 1942 when the whaler Bode 
left Aberdeen with a party o f 40 Norwegian Commandos and sailors led by Starheim. Bode 
reached the coast off Eigeroy on 2 January and the party established themselves in a de­
serted house at Televik.^^"  ^ The first hijack attempt having failed, another was made on a 
convoy on 11 January, but the Germans had been alerted by cut power and telephone Hnes 
and mittens and wire-cutters left behind during the first attempt, and had doubled sentries. 
The Norwegians got into a firelight with some very alert Germans and were fortunate to 
escape. Sixteen o f the CARHAMPTON party including Starheim took another coastal 
steamer, Tromsosund, in an attempted repeat o f the Galtesund escape, but German aircraft 
sank her and all aboard were lost. Another 19 o f the CARHAMPTON party headed for Aber­
deen in fishing boats, but steered an erratic course and made landfall at Redcar. Two oth­
ers escaped through Sweden.^i^
CARHAMPTON failed because o f poor planning and discipline, and better results could have 
been obtained at less cost by simply limpeting the ships.^^^ Earlier, after ARCHERY and A N ­
KLET in December 1941, it had become clear that this unwieldy and costly operations 
were, ‘neither worthwhile for the Allies nor welcomed by the local population who longed 
for liberation, but not large-scale disappointments with reprisals in their t r a i n . The Brit-
115 ADM 234 380.
114 Bofife set out to return to Aberdeen but struck a mine. Two of her 35 crew survived. Starheim's body came ashore 
near Goteborg in April 1943. Cruikshank : 1986 p. 109.
115 HS 7 178.
116 Cruikshank : 1986 pp. 107-113.
117 HS 7 178.
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ish had operated in Norway without reference to the Norwegian government in exile or the 
Norwegian military staff. A post-war Norwegian investigation concluded that;
The situation at the end o f  1941 was such that the British presumably were making plans affecting vi­
tal Norwegian interests, without the Norwegian authorities having any knowledge of, or influence on, 
the planning. Even more serious from the Norwegian perspective was the fact that several hundred 
Norwegians belonging to the so-called Linge Kompanie were directly under British command.^i®
The nascent Norwegian resistance, Milorg, bitterly resented that they and the government 
in exile were being kept in the dark about SOE operations in Norway, and Finge Kompanie 
Commandos had begun openly questioning their role.^ ^® This could not continue so, in 
December 1941, Norwegian Defence Minister Oscar Torp and Charles Hambro initiated 
the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee and Torp established a unified Norwegian 
High Command, the Forsvarets Overkommando.
The need for greater co-operation between SOE and Combined Operations had been rec­
ognised for some time and a joint policy paper was issued on 21 September 1942. First 
fruit of this new spirit o f cooperation was CARTOON, an ambitious January 1943 raid on 
Litlabo pyrites mine and associated harbour installations at Sagvâg.^^o November 1942, 
shortly after the Norwegian 30th MTB Flotilla had formed at Lerwick for operations in 
The Leads, a detachment o f Norwegian and British Commandos under Captain F. W. Fynn 
arrived at Voxter Camp as the Combined Operations North Force, Fynnforce for short.^^i 
The CARTOON force sailed Lerwick in seven Norwegian MTBs at 0800/23 January:
Lieutenant Knut Bogeberg
Lieutenant Ragnvald Tomber (Naval Force Commander)
Lieutenant Shaw (12 Commando)  _____
Lieutenant H Henriksen.
Major Francis Fynn (Military Force Commander)
Lieutenant Aksel Prebensen (2"4 in-command Naval Force) 
Major Ian Collins (Combined Operations HQ)
Lieutenant Hallet (12 Commando) _
Lieutenant Erling Madand 
Captain Harald Risnes 
j  Lieutenant Karl Hjellestad
Lieutenant Alv Andresen
Lieutenant A. Hâvik
12 men o f 12 Commando as 
Force D
14 men o f  12 Commando as 
Force C
13 men o f 12 Commando as j 
Force B *
12 men o f 12 Commando as |
Force A.   _ _ _ |
Minelaying and Commando I 
Reserve Force A2. I
Target 24 
Target 24
The Commandos transhipped for the assault. Forces C and D on 626 and Forces A and B 
and the A2 reserve, mainly British troops, on 627. These two MTBs took the lead with 
620, 631 and 625 following as cover to the south and east. 618 and 623 for the northern 
flank and a diversionary attack on a coastal battery at Marstenen.
118 Den norske regierings virksomhet IV.76 quoted in Thomson op cit.
119 Joachim Ronneberg, who was direcdy involved, describes relations between die Norwegians and SOE after AN­
KLET / ARCHERY and Linge’s deadi, as being at ‘boiling point’. Salmon (ed) : 1995 pp. 152-157.
120 Up-to-date information on the German dispositions in the area was essential so the Shedand Bus boats Gullbotg and 
Sjolmtsuess. sent to land men posing as fishermen. DEFE 2 616. Reynolds : 1998 p. 37.
121 DEFE 2 617.
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Sagvag harbour was sighted at midnight and, at 0011/24, 626 fired two torpedoes at the 
quay from 300-400 yards range. One hit rocks below the quay, the other missed. 626 
closed the quay and, under fire, Lieutenant Borrigsen went over the side with a rope along 
which troops reached the shore. 627 landed her troops on the north side o f the bay. The 
quay was cleared o f enemy troops, Commandos marched to Litlabo and demolitions were 
complete by 0230/24. The force had re-embarked by 0320/24 after destroying installations 
on the quay and the MTBs left to rendezvous with 625, 620 and 631. Meanwhile, 625 had 
laid mines on the east side o f Stord and 620 and 631 entered Leirvik harbour, set the 
steamer Use M. Russ ablaze and engaged shore positions. 618 and 623 had been heavily en­
gaged with the battery at Marstenen and set course for home, arriving Lerwick at 1200/24. 
The main force spHt at 0930/24 when 620 lost an engine due to battle damage, 626 and 
627 proceeding ahead to reach Lerwick 1600/24. The three remaining MTBs were punch­
ing into a southerly gale when a JU88 dived to attack. 631 returned fire and shot the Junk­
ers down. The last o f the CARTOON force reached Lerwick at 1 8 1 5 / 24.^^ 2
CARTOON had been well planned and was a notable success. The mine, which had pro­
duced 160,000 tons o f pyrites in 1942, was out o f action for a year, a ship had been gutted 
and sunk, shoreside facilities had been wrecked and a German watch post burned down. 
Three prisoners had been taken and a JU88 had been shot down and its crew killed. One 
Commando had been killed and two others injured along with eight naval personnel, one 
o f whom was seriously hurt. Three MTBs were damaged.
T h e  S h e t l a n d  B u s  a n d  Sp e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  1 9 4 2 -4 3
Many Norwegian fishermen had seized the opportunity to escape across the North Sea and 
several had been persuaded to return to Norway with agents and supplies. In a rare display 
of cooperation between the two organisations, in December 1940 MI6 officer Major L. H. 
Mitchell went to Shetland to establish a joint SOE/M I6 base. Base ME7, and six Norwe­
gian fishing boats manned by Norwegian volunteers were formed into the Shetland Naval 
Unit, better known as the Shetland Bus. Sadly, despite the fact that, between 1941 and 
1945 the Shetland base made 41 trips to Norway on behalf o f MI6, landing 37 agents and 
picking up 18, inter-departmental rivalry meant that;
In spite o f  repeated attempts, the SO E Norwegian Section never succeeded in establishing real c o ­
operation w ith  the SIS N orw egian  s e c t i o n . ^^ 4
122 Report by Major Collins in DEFE 2 617. Reynolds : 1998 pp. 37-38. Dakell-Job : 1992 pp. 54-55.
123 Ibid. This raid produced serious reprisals. Around 200 arrests were made by the Gestapo in Bergen including, for 
some reason, the entire membership o f a temperance society. Cookridge : 1966 pp. 544-545. See also Irvine : 1988. 
Dalzel-Job ; 1992. Ladd 1983 p. 48.
124 HS 7 178.
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In its first season o f winter sailings, between December 1940 and May 1941, Shetland Bus 
boats made 14 trips to take in 15 agents and pick up 18 along with 39 refugees. The 1941- 
42 winter season saw the boats make 40 trips, landing 43 agents and picking up nine along 
with 46 refugees. One hundred and twenty-nine tons o f stores were also carried that winter 
but, while enemy patrols were then still inefficient, there was no organisation to get the 
munitions and supplies away from the coast.
Following the CARHAMPTON failure, SOE elected to concentrate their efforts against tar­
gets, ‘o f real and present value to the e n e m y . ’^ 6^ Foremost amongst these was the Orkla 
Pyrites Mine at Trondelag in Northern Norway that in 1941, had produced 526,327 tons of 
pyrites used in the manufacture o f sulphuric acid. The plan, codenamed REDSHANK, was to 
destroy the generators and transformers at the Bârdshaug power station, thus disabling 
both the mine and the electric railway that carried the ore to Thamshavn for shipment. A 
party o f three saboteurs led by Lieutenant Peter Deinboll, whose father worked for the 
Orkla company, was drawn from the Linge Kompanie.
The REDSHANK party. Deinboll, Fenrik Per Getz and Sergeant Thorlief Grong, left Shet­
land in the Bus boat Harald (Skipper Per Blystad) on 17 April 1942 and carried out RED­
SHANK on 4 May. They broke in, overpowered the guard and laid their charges. Getz and 
Grong left on bicycles while DeinboU stayed behind to watch as a considerable explosion 
wrecked the power plant. After various misadventures, all three escaped to Sweden and 
were flown back to L e u c h a r s . ^^ 7
Meanwhile, on 21 April, Arne Vaerum (PENGUIN) and Emil Hvaal (ANCHOR) were landed 
near Nesvik from the Shetland Bus boat Olaf to destroy Luftwaffe installations at Sta­
v a n g e r .  ^ 28 The two men contacted a local Milorg group at Sotra but, on Sunday 26 April, 
they were betrayed by a Quisling while with Milorg leader Lars Telle at Televag, and an SS 
squad appeared. A fire fight ensued in which two SS officers and Vaerum died and Hvaal 
was taken alive, though severely wounded. In what became known as the Televag Reprisal, 
the entire community was destroyed and 260 men and boys between 16 and 65 were 
rounded up. Seventy-six o f them died in Sachsenhausen. Hvaal, Lars TeUe and another 18
125 Ibid. See also Howarth : 1991 and Thompson op. at. for the early liistory o f die Shedand Naval Unit.
126 HS 7 175.
127 HS 7 175. Cruickshank : 9186 pp. 192-193.
128 SOE case officer Malcolm Mnnthe wrote o f Hvaal;
He had litde English, which accounted for misunderstandings. He found liimself married to an English girl in 
England, and an Irish girl in Ireland during a short holiday there. I agreed to send him home - it seemed only 
fair that he should see again his Norwegian wife and children. Mundie ; 1954
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Norwegians previously arrested for attempting to escape to Scotland were taken to Bergen,
tortured, then e x e c u t e d d ^ 9
The success of REDSHANK led to further attacks on industrial targets accessible from the 
sea, the next being Glomfjord power station south o f Bodo which supplied electricity for 
Haugvik aluminium plant. Codenamed MUSKETOON, this raid was carried out by a party of 
ten Commandos and two Unge Kompanie men who were to land from the Free French sub­
marine Junon in Tennholmfjord, destroy the power station and escape overland to Sweden. 
Demohtion training was carried out at Fort William in August, then Junon went north from 
Dundee to Shetland for practice landings with the new ‘Cow Boat’. Bad weather meant 
there was only time to carry out one practice. But MUSKETOON got off to a muddled start 
when the Linge Kompanie men. Corporals Sverre Granlund and Erhng Magnus Djupredt, 
asked for a change of landing place as the planned route to the target passed through popu­
lated a r e a s . Captain Graeme Black commanding the landing party approached Lieutenant
An air reconnaissance 
photograph of Glomfjord 
The approach route from 
the Svartlsen was from 
the right of the photo­
graph. The pipeline 
breached by the Com­
mandos (highlighted on 
the original) can be seen 
behind the power station 
(centre left). Black’s party 
was captured at the foot 
of the valley beyond the 
Fykan Lake.
129 Further arrests were made in Bergen, Stavanger and Harlanger. Two SOE men, Erling Marthinson and Christian All, who had arrived on 8 April 1942 and set up the MALLARD radio transmitter near Bergen, were also betrayed 
by a quisling and executed at Trandum. This tragedy caused much resentment in Norway where it was felt that the 
civilian population was paying too high a price for SOE operations which either went wrong or produced meagre 
results. Kjeldstadli wrote;
The Norwegians blamed the British for acting arbitrarily, provoking terrible reprisals against civilians in 
Norway and making it difficult for the Norwegian Resistance to continue its work. Both the Norwegians and 
the British had underestimated their German adversary, the skill o f the German police, and the part played by 
the Norwegian quislings, informers and agents provocateurs. The consequences were soon felt; the Resistance 
suffered heavy losses, many Norwegian patriots were imprisoned, killed or had to leave the country. On the 
other hand the British said that the Norwegians must leam the hard lesson of security and that this could 
only be learnt in the bitter school of experience. At the end o f 1941 both SOE and Milorg realised that their 
work during eighteen months had almost been in vain. The Anglo-Norwegian controversy in London again 
became bitter and acrimonious.
Kjeldstadli : 1959 p. 326 et passim quoted in Cookridge ; 1966 pp 533-534. Cruickshank : 1986 pp. 176-177. Salmon et 
al\ 1995 p. 145.
130 Once again, Norwegians had been excluded from the planning and a poor route had been chosen. The U n^ Kompa­
nie men were only known to the rest o f the MUSKETOON party by their aliases Christiansen and Hogvold, this to
( (  o n t ’d  I A 11 l e a  I
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Querville o f Junon and the landing place was moved to Bjaerangsfjord, but the submarine 
would have to penetrate 40 miles up a fjord and the approach march would now involve 
crossing the Svartisen glacier.
Junon sailed Lerwick on 11 September and, at 0220/15, after putting a good charge in her 
batteries, commenced her long dived passage up Lyngvaerfjord, Ottvaerfjord and Skars- 
fjord to Bjaerangsfjord. At 1230/15 Querville bottomed the boat in Bjaerangsfjord to wait 
for darkness then surfaced at 2030/15 on a clear, calm night to find that numerous lights 
could be seen from houses along the shore. The Naval Staff History is heavily critical;
Captain Black's statement that his crew was well versed in the art of rigging the boats and disembark­
ing by night was not borne out in practice; one of the boats was useless as the inflation cock was 
missing while the second boat was eventually rigged by Junon's crew. The disembarkation took 55 
minutes.^ ^i
The party rowed up the fjord, hid the boat, then, after a difficult approach march, arrived 
at the power station on the night o f 18 September and attacked just after midnight on 
Monday, 21 September. Three men climbed the north side of the valley to place collar 
charges on the pipelines that fed the power station while the rest made for the main build­
ing and placed charges on the three 24,500 kV generators. Norwegian guards said there 
were no Germans present, but a German NCO appeared whom Granlund shot dead. The 
charges in the generator hall exploded 12 minutes after the Commandos left, then the col­
lar charges shattered the pipe lines and millions o f gallons of water crashed down onto the 
power station, bearing with it thousands o f tons o f r u b b l e . The Commando party be­
came split up in the darkness and Black and seven others ran into a party o f Germans. Af­
ter a firefight in which a German was killed and Djuprdet fatally wounded. Black’s party 
was surrounded and captured. Granlund, Guardsman John Fairclough, Sergeant Richard 
O'Brien and Private Fred Trigg escaped to Sweden and were flown into L e u c h a r s . T h e  
seven prisoners were taken to Oslo, Colditz and then Berlin. On 23 October, in Sachsen­
hausen, they were shot, the first victims o f the Kommando Befehiy^^
The power station was wrecked, but there had clearly been serious shortcomings because, 
yet again, British planners ignored local knowledge. The apparent condescension, actually a 
concern for security, behind the British assumption that only they could m ount an opera­
tion like MUSKETOON infuriated Norwegian commanders and politicians in London, but
protect their families should any o f the party be captured. Their part in the raid, under tlie auspices o f SOE, carried 
the codename Operation KNOTGRASS/UNICORN. DEFE 2 364, DEFE 2 365 and Schofield ; 1964.
«1 ADM 234 380.
152 Swiss engineer Gottfried Loertscher’s report on the destruction at Glomfjord reached London tlxrough an MI6 
channel and is summarised in DEFE 2 364.
153 Reports on tlie escapes, along with Granlund’s account o f the operation are in DEFE 2 364.
154 The fate o f the MUSKETOON prisoners is recorded in Schofield : 1964 and Stevens : 1949. Other sources on the 
raid include Cruickshank : 1986 pp 203-204 and Messenger : 1985.
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the planners had also failed to consult British mountaineering and demolitions experts. 
Then there was a mighty row when it was discovered that Junon had penetrated deep into 
enemy-held territory without anyone bothering to inform either the Admiralty or FO(S). It 
was also apparent that the Commandos were insufficiently fit and that Black carried brief­
ing photographs and drawings o f the target into Norway. The party was too large to pass 
unnoticed through enemy territory and a British explosives specialist said afterwards that 
the demolitions could have been carried out with a Lighter load o f exp losives.B rigad ier 
Robert Laycock wrote that the failure o f the seven to escape had been, 'mainly due to fa­
tigue and might have been avoided by more careful training and equipment.'^^^ The Naval 
Staff History concludes;
Admiralty criticism that this operation had been badly planned by Combined Operations Headquar­
ters was hotly countered by them, observing that the power station had been blown up extremely 
thoroughly and four of the party had escaped to Sweden. They did agree however that, in future, the 
necessity of training and checking details of equipment should be stressed.^ ^^
KESTREL, in which Per Getz and Thorleif Grong were taken by the Shetland Bus boat A k -  
sel (Skipper Bard Grotle) to destroy ore installations at Fosdalen in Trondelâg in early Oc­
tober, resulted in severe reprisals in Trondheim, Grane and Nordland. Thirty-five civilians, 
none with resistance connections, were shot. But GRANARD, a return to the Orkla Mines 
raided in REDSHANK eight months earlier, by a party comprising Lieutenant Per DeinboU 
and Sergeants Pedersen and Saettem sailed Shetland in the fishing boat Aksel on 6 Decem­
ber 1942, was a success. Deinboll's father gave them the latest intelligence on the security 
arrangements and the plan to burn the loading tower was abandoned in favour o f sinking a 
ship. The Nordfahrt (5,000T) arrived on 26 February 1943 and the three stole a boat, at­
tached limpets then escaped to Swden. Nordfahrt was heavily damaged and beached. 
Getz, Grong and Sverre Granlund were among the SEAGULL I party that sailed Lerwick on 
5 February 1943 in the Norwegian submarine Uredd to raid the Sulitjelma mines only to be
lost in a German m i n e f i e l d . ^ 3 9
Shetland Bus boats were initiaUy Norwegian fishing boats untU, after five were lost in the 
1942-43 season, they were deemed too dangerous and were replaced in October 1943 by 
three US-buUt submarine chasers. The table o f Shetland base results for 1941 to 1945 as 
below shows the drop in successful operations in 1942-43, and the dramatic rise in effi­
ciency afforded by the new submarine chasers. And from 1941, when there were just two
155 The photographs and drawings were supplied by Glenfield & Kennedy Ltd o f Kilmarnock. After tlie war, it was 
discovered that the MUSKETOON party had been spotted on the Svartisen by a German topographical party who 
were able to follow a trail o f easily identifiable items such as Senior Service cigarette packets across the glacier. But 
the Germans failed to alert the GlomQotd garrison to the approaching threat. Schofield ; 1964.
156 Laycock letter 10 November 1942. DEFE 2 364.
157 ADM 234 380.
158 Thompson op. at. p. 261. Cruickshank : 1988 pp. 192-197. Cookridge : 1966 p. 545.
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SOE transmitters in Norway, until May 1945 when there were 69, a total o f 8,720 messages 
were received from SOE agents in Norway, principally at the SOE Belhaven House listen­
ing station near Dunbar. Such was the scale o f the SOE network in Norway by 1944, in 
that year alone some 3,668 radio messages were sent to Norway and 2,878 were received 
from there.^40 Most o f the latter concerned German shipping movements and played a vital 
part in the Allied anti-shipping offensive mounted, as detailed below, in 1943-45.
Season
T 94Ï-42 '
1942-43
1943-44
1944-45
Trips made Agents
landed
40
40
43
34
19
41'
80 87
Total 194 190
Agents 
picjced up
9    .1'l i '
30
54
Refugees 
picked up
46
14
20 '
251
331
Stores I 
landed I
129
36% j 
Ï83 ' j
384% j
Seaborne special operations by submarine and Shetland Bus boats from Scotland were all 
part of the wider resistance and sabotage strategy in Norway. And, taken as a whole, this 
strategy was highly successful in that it helped disrupt enemy shipping movements off 
Norway, it caused damage to vital targets ashore and it helped to maintain the perception 
of a looming Allied military threat to Norway, thus tying down a large Axis garrison. By 
and large these operations were sensible, well planned and well executed, and they were 
carried out at relatively small cost. And, unlike in other less inherently stable theatres, the 
Allied support for the Norwegian resistance movement did not result in post-war schisms 
and political instability.
A n t i - s h i p p i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  b y  S c o t t i s h -b a s e d  N a v a l  a n d  A i r  
F o r c e s  o f f  N o r w a y  a n d  t h e  V u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  G e r m a n  C o a s t ­
w i s e  S h i p p i n g
Road and rail communications the length o f Norway were limited, the only sure way to 
travel being by sea. As a Coastal Command from 1943 report states succinctly, ‘The en­
emy’s whole existence in Norway depended on their seaborne s u p p l i e s . I n  the far north, 
the war on the Russo-Finnish border between the Axis and the Red Army had, in 1943 and 
1944, developed into something o f a stalemate. But it was o f vital importance to both sides 
as vital supplies were brought, albeit at great cost, to the Soviet Union via the Arctic route 
while the Wehrmacht sought to take Murmansk and the entrance to the Kola Inlet. On 9 
June 1944, three days after D Day, the Red Army began a strategic offensive against the 
Germans and their Finnish allies in the north. As in the 1939-40 Winter War, the Finns 
inflicted grievous losses on the Red Army, but the writing was on the wall and, on 19 Sep-
«9 HS 1 175.
140 HS 7 178.
>4» AIR 41 74 p. 125.
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tember 1944, a Russo-Fintiish armistice was signed. But there were still some 220,000 
German troops on Finnish, Norwegian and Soviet territory in the far north and, in Octo­
ber, the Soviets began an offensive that drove the Wehrmacht over the Norwegian frontier 
into the Finnmark.
Another often forgotten factor that had a fundamental bearing on land and sea strategy in 
the far north was the position of Sweden. Given its geographical position, Sweden had lit­
tle option in 1940 but to take a pro-German stance, concluding a transit agreement that 
allowed the Wehrmacht the use o f Swedish railways and German ships the use of Swedish 
territorial waters. In 1941 a complete Wehrmacht division had been granted passage from 
Oslo across Swedish territory to Finland, and reinforcement and supply o f Axis forces in 
the far north was carried out via this route until 1944. The trade in iron ore with Germany 
that had so exercised Churchill’s Admiralty in 1940 continued unabated. In 1941 some
600,000 tons was supplied, in 1943 1.8 million t o n s . '^‘^2
As long as the Swedish port o f Lulea and the Gulf o f Bothnia remained ice-free, much of 
this traffic passed out of Allied reach. After Stalingrad, however, the war was clearly going 
against the Axis so, like Finland, Sweden began repositioning itself towards the Allies. In 
1944, while still happy to continue supplies o f ore, she withdrew the traffic concessions 
and seaborne shipments to and from northern Norway, including iron ore, now had to fol­
low the Norwegian coastal route. This brought them in range o f Allied MTBs, submarines 
and aircraft operating from S c o t l a n d .
Usually around eight German convoys were at sea off south-west Norway daily, one in 
each direction between Kristiansand South and Stavanger, between Stavanger and Bergen, 
between Bergen and Aalesund and between Aalesund and Trondheim. Admiralty OIC in­
telligence about enemy shipping movements was good and the convoys had already begun 
crossing open water, such as that between Kristiansand South and Stavanger, in darkness.
Until 1943, largely for political reasons but also so as not to waste valuable vessels, aircraft i
and weaponry, there had been a restriction on attacking unescorted ships off Norway o f |
Iunder 1,500 tons. I
Allied strategy before and immediately after D Day favoured encouraging the Wehrmacht 1
to withdraw troops from Norway into the battle in mainland Europe but, the failed Sep­
tember 1944 MARKET GARDEN airborne assault in Holland presaged further Allied re­
verses. Allied strategy changed to bottling up as many German troops in Norway as possi- |Ible and, despite a protest from the Norwegian government-in-exile in London, on 10 Oc- j
142 Kersaudy : 1990 p. 226.
143 For Swedish position, see Salmon etal :1995 pp. 201-204 and 206-207.
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tober 1944 SHAEF stated that all shipping in Norwegian waters was liable to attack without 
warningd'*'^ Then, after the setback in the Ardennes in December 1944, the Allies became 
increasingly anxious lest the 330,000 Germans in Norway form the basis o f a Vestung Nor- 
mgen last stand which would be difficult and costly to break. Allied concerns also extended 
to the need to keep the Soviet Union out o f Scandinavia, in particular Norway and Den­
mark.
MTB A N TI-SH IPPIN G  OPERATIONS 
South o f Bergen on 1 October 1941 Lieutenant Per Daniels en and the crew o f MTB 56 
cast o ff from the Norwegian destroyer Draug which had towed them across from Scapa 
and moved into the Leads. Hidden by camouflage netting and bushes, the MTB waited un­
til the night o f 3 October when Daniels en sank the tanker Borgnj (3,015T) which was 
bound for Bergen with Luftwaffe aviation fuel. '^ s^ Danielsen and other Norwegian officers 
had been advocating The Leads as a hunting ground for MTBs. The operation by 56 had 
proved their point and, in November 1942, eight Fairmile D class MTBs arrived at Lerwick 
to form the 3Qi'i (Norwegian) FlotiUa.^ '**^
MTB operations were best undertaken during longer winter nights when they could ap­
proach the Norwegian coast in relative safety, slowing and fitting external silencers as they 
passed the outer islands. Piloted in through narrow, undefended passages by men with lo­
cal knowledge, the boats went straight to a ‘lurking place’, often a creek on one o f the off­
shore islands, where they could He beneath camouflage nets while crewmen or Fynnforce 
commandos landed to watch for approaching German ships. But the need to operate in 
winter brought its own hazards and, while MTBs were not permitted to leave Lerwick in 
anything above a Force 4, nothing could be done once an operation was under way. Many 
boats suffered damage and aU had to be specially s t r e n g t h e n e d . ^ ^ ?  Fairmile Ds had a range 
of 500 miles at maximum revolutions and even the shortest round trip to Norway from 
Lerwick was around 400 miles. On most patrols extra petrol had to be carried in cans on 
deck and, on longer operations, this could amount to 4,000 gallons in addition to the 5,000 
gallons in the boat’s main tanks.
Naval Review Yol XXXIII pp. 276-277
145 Reynolds : 1998 pp. 29-31.
146 The soil’ Flotilla was renamed the 54**> Flotilla, a nominal change under the Coastal Forces reorganisation wliich 
came into effect on 1 October 1944. DEFE 2 616. Lambert and Ross : 1990. Irvine : 1988 pp. 115-124. Reynolds : 
1998 pp. 31-32.
147 619 and two others returned to Lerwick on 27 December 1942 after being caught in a storm. A Royal Navy report 
quoted in Irvine : 1988 p. 131 states, ‘. . .that all tire boats returned safe and sound on 27* December says a lot for 
the boats and their commanders. It is now certain that these hulls are seawortliy enough, which lends weight to the 
argument that it was wise to strengthen them, even if  it means the loss o f a little speed.’
i4s Reynolds : 1998 pp. 35-36. See also Lambert and Ross : 1990 p. 90 et passim for details of the Fairmile D  class.
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t^ iwHini  miifsi
MTBs of the N orw e­
gian Flotilla on opera­
tions from Shetland. 
Fairmile D class MTBs 
were christened ‘Dog 
Boats’ after the war­
time phonetic for the 
letter D. The camou­
flage scheme was de­
signed specially for the 
Norwegian fjords.
6/P, 626 and 631 sailed Lerwick on 22 November 1942 for the flotilla’s first operation. No 
targets were found off Stord and Bomlo and they returned to Lerwick after passing at high 
speed through Haugesund Harbour. There followed a series of anti-shipping operations 
jointly carried out with Fynnforce commandos. VPl sailed Lerwick at 0815/26 November,
618 with seven Commandos to make for Floro and 620 and 623 with a 12-man party were 
to patrol Askvold. 631 carried Captain Fynn and six ORs for Bommelofjord. The inshore 
navigation hghts were lit, so the 620 and 623 had no difficulty in entering the Askvold har­
bour, a German convoy assembly port, where they torpedoed two ships totalling 12,000 
tons. The other MTBs lay under camouflage for two days but found no targets and all 
boats returned to Lerwick on 29 November.
619 and 627 sailed Lerwick at 1330/22 February 1943 for Sognefjord and Operation 
CRACKERS. 619 picked up an agent off Krakhellehavn and laid mines in Krakhellesund, 
then, at 0500/23, the boats moved to a lurking place on the western side of Gjeitero Is­
land. A party of Commandos went to the German coastwatching post at Tungodden but 
found it deserted, damage from when it had been shelled by 631 and 626 on 20 January 
still clearly v i s i b l e .A n o th e r  party reconnoitred Kletten watchpost overlooking Stensund 
and returned to the MTBs to plan simultaneous assaults on the Kletten post and the Ger­
man billet in a Quisling’s house in Stensund. But a storm made it impossible to get ashore, 
so the operation was abandoned. The force 12 gale continued until 28 February and food 
began to run out. An attempt to return to Lerwick was made on 1 March, but huge seas 
forced the boats to turn back. Finally, after a rough passage, the boats reached Lerwick at 
1830/3, nine days after they left.^^i
149 Fynn’s report on VPl in DEFE 2 616.
150 Two Germans in the post on that occasion had been killed. DEFE 2 616.
151 Waggett’s report in DEFE 2 617. Herlofsen’s report in DEFE 2 616. See also Irvine : 1988 p. 195.
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Mines were laid o ff Olaskjaer on 6 March, then 619 and 631 sailed Lerwick at 1 2 3 0 /1 2  
March 1943 for OMNIBUS. They made landfall at Skorpen and were secured under camou­
flage by 0 1 0 0 /1 3 . On 14 March, an OP overlooking Floro Harbour reported a destroyer 
and two merchantmen and, that night, the MTBs raced into the harbour dropped mines 
and 619 torpedoed the German Optima (1,249'IJ. 631 missed a larger vessel, one o f her 
torpedoes hitting the quay below a German gun position, then ran onto rocks below a 
German battery and had to be hurriedly abandoned into 6193^'^ Bressay Light was shown, a 
searchlight was shone skywards from Ness o f Sound, then a Spitfire gave d/P a course for 
Lerwick where she secured at 1400/16.^^3
618 and 627 left Lerwick at 0610/22 March for ROUNDABOUT, an attack on enemy ship­
ping at Dragsund. At 0120/23 the MTBs landed their Commandos at Dragsund, two of 
whom were to open a lifting bridge to allow the boats to pass through, but the bridge party 
found the power to the lifting mechanism switched off. As they went to find the bridge 
keeper, they ran into two German sentries, one of whom was killed. More Germans were 
heard approaching, so the bridge party retired and the MTBs withdrew, arriving Lerwick at 
1 6 2 5 /2 3 AM
On 11 April, 626 sailed Lerwick for Skorpen to pick up Leif Larsen and the crew of the 
Shetland Bus boat Bergholm which had landed three agents and four tons of supplies at 
Traena, before being sunk by two enemy aircraft. After a brush with a Quisling fishing 
skipper, they were picked up from their smallboat by another skipper who took the seven 
survivors to Skorpen from where they were picked up by 6263 '^^ 626’s next mission, on 24 
April, was to Karmoy. The plan was for Sub Lieutenant Joe Godwin and six men to use 
canoes to attach the limpets to German vessels in Karmsund or Kopervik. The MTB sent 
to recover Godwin’s party from Urter Island on 9 May missed the island in thick fog. An­
other rendezvous was attempted, but the island was deserted. The party had been on the 
island by 9 May after sinking a minesweeper in Kopervik, but had been betrayed by a N or­
wegian informer. Godwin and four men were shot on 2 February 1945, the other two died 
in Belsen.^56
620 and 633 unsuccessfully attacked a convoy in the Leads on 1 May, then, on 4 June, after 
lurking for two days outside Bergen, 626 and 620 attacked a convoy. 626 sank the German
152 Norwegians who had visited 631 while she was in her lurking place had brought newspapers and magazines aboard 
which were left lying around, many with the names o f those who had given them on die cover. And a Norwegian 
rating left behind a letter from his family. OMNIBUS report in DEFE 2 617. Reynolds : 1998 p. 39.
153 The Admiralty signalled, ‘Bring to the officers, crews and base personnel of 54* Flotilla their Lordships congratula­
tions on the recendy carried out operation in the Norwegian Qords.' DEFE 2 617. Reynolds ; 1998 p. 39. I r ^ e  : 
1988 p. 137-139. Rohwer and Hummelchen ; 1974 p. 308.
154 DEFE 2 616.
155 Howarth : 1991 ch. 14. Irvine : 1988 p. 139.
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Altenfels (8,132T), which was carrying 8,000 tons o f iron ore, then both MTBs came under 
fire from the escort, M-468^ and shore batteries. The German vessel was damaged, but two 
men were killed in 620 and several were wounded.^®?
Driven by a heady mixture o f aggression and optimism, MTB operations continued into 
the almost continuous daylight o f summer 1943, far beyond the limits o f prudence, MTB 
345 was an experimental 55-foot boat sent to Lerwick for specific missions where her 
small size would be an advantage. But she had very limited range so, for her second mis­
sion sailing Lerwick on 24 July, 620 refuelled her o ff the Norwegian coast. But they were 
spotted by a coastal lookout station and, while 620 returned to Lerwick, 345 lurked at 
Aspo Island north o f Bergen until a German party attacked the boat from the shore on 28 
July. The boat was captured and her crew was taken to Bergen for interrogation. Despite 
the fact that they were in uniform, and despite the fact that Kriegsmarine officers thought 
they should be treated as POWs, Lieutenant Alv Andresen and his crew were shot on 30 
July. The bodies were taken out to sea, attached to depth charges and thrown over the 
side.^^^
Later that summer Lerwick-based MTBs began a series o f SOE anti-shipping operations 
codenamed VESTIGE, For VESTIGE I, Corporal Harald Svindseth, Sergeant Ragnar Ulstein 
and Corporal Nils Fjeld were landed with kayaks and limpet mines near Gulen on the night 
o f 3-4 September. On 23 September Svindseth limpeted the Hertmut (2,713T) which was 
beached with a large hole where the two limpets had exploded next to each other. The 
party was picked up by MTB on 16 November, For VESTIGE III, the only other successful 
operation in this series. Corporals Synnes and Hoel were landed by MTB on the night o f 9- 
10 September and planted six limpets on the collier Jantt^e Frentf^n (6,582T) at Alesund. 
Two exploded prematurely and the remaining four mines were removed by the Germans, 
despite their having been fitted with anti-tamper devices, and the collier was. repaired at 
Bergen. The VESTIGE III party were picked up at Skorpen on 17 November by a Shetland 
Bus submarine chaser.^^^
S c o t t i s h - b a s e d  C o a s t a l  C o m m a n d  A n t i - s h i p p i n g  S t r i k e s  1943-44
Operation HUSKY, the Allied invasion o f Sicily, was due to 10 July 1943 and, on the first of 
that month, as one of the myriad deception schemes devised to divert German attention 
away from Sicily, six rocket-armed Beaufighters o f 235 Squadron, four Beaufighters o f 404
156 Irvine : 1988 pp. 139-141. Dalzell-Job : 1992 pp. 55-57.
157 Report by Lieutenant Patrick Dalzell-Job in DEFE 2 616. Irvine ; 1988 p. 141. Reynolds ; 1998 p.39. Witthoft :
1971.
158 The shooting o f 345^ & crew was cited as a war crime in the case of Donitz at die Nuremberg trials. Numbetg Trial 
PtveeedingsYol. 13, Friday, 10 May 1946, morning session. See also Reynolds : 1998 : pp. 41-42.
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Coastal Command Beaufighters operating against 
shipping the Norwegian Leads.
Squadron and two Mosquitoes of 
333 Squadron arrived at RAF Sum- 
burgh in Shetland for anti-shipping 
operations off Norway. The plan 
was for 333 Squadron’s Mosquitoes, 
manned by Norwegians, to fly re­
connaissance missions and the 
Beaufighters would then take off 
and strike at any enemy shipping 
sighted by the Mosquitoes. In the 
event, the Mosquito reconnaissance 
proved o f httle value and the 
Beaufighters began flying ROVER patrols along with torpedo-armed Hampdens of 489 
Squadron. In the first operation on 4 July, despite heavy flak and the attentions o f two 
ME109s, a 4,000 ton merchant vessel was rocketed and set on fire near Stadlandet. One 
aircraft was lost. The second operation on 10 July saw a merchantman strafed, and again 
one aircraft was lost. On 17 July, in the third operation, eight Beaufighters attacked a con­
voy near Bergen and sank one o f the escorts, the trawler UJ17053^
Coastal Command anti-shipping sorties to Norway continued through August 1943, 
though at a reduced rate and with no positive result, not least because 455 and 489 Squad­
rons were under instruction to husband torpedoes which were in short supply. Meanwhile, 
MTB operations had been extended north to Trondheim by towing the boats part o f the 
way across. On 10-11 September, 618 and 627 torpedoed Ociç. Anke  (3,81 IT) in Trondheim- 
fjord. On 22 October 1943, 653, 686, 688 and 699 {686 and 699 were from the British 58'* 
Flotilla) shelled and sank the coaster Kilstraum north o f Trondheim. Fighters attacked the 
MTBs as they headed out to sea, setting 699 on fire, killing one man and injuring five. 699 
was abandoned into 688 which survived another attack and reached Lerwick safely.^^^
Wick-based Hampdens attacked a convoy off Lister early on 16 September and sank the 
Norwegian Grat^ella (2,137T). Tanker movements attracted particular Allied attention, one 
example being the Schleswig which sailed Kiel on 21 September 1943 bound for north N or­
way with fuel for Firpita  ^ and Schamhorst newly returned from Operation ZITRONELLA, an 
attack on Allied positions on Spitsbergen. Schleswi^s movements were tracked both by
159 SOE anti-shipping operations in HS 7 175 and HS 2 208.
160 AIR 41 48 p. 277.
161 On 22 November an explosion took place aboard 686 which was alongside the Norwegian 626 at the Anglo- 
Scottish Quay, Lerwick. Four British and one Norwegian were killed immediately and another three died later. Both 
boats burned furiously and were sunk where they were by gunfire. Irvine : 1988 p. 142
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Coastal Command, by agents ashore and by Enigma decrypts until she reached Bodo on 28 
September. There she was heavily damaged by aircraft from the carrier USS Banger operat­
ing with the Home Fleet from S c a p a . ^^ 2
Then, on 30 September, 404 Squadron Beaufighters attacked a convoy off Stadlandet, 
rocketing a destroying the Norwegian Sanct Svithun (1,376T). Anti-shipping sorties to N or­
way fell from 102 in September to 49 in October 1943, largely due to aircraft being with­
drawn for anti-U boat operations in the Northern Transit Area, but rose again to 116 in 
November, 18 attacks being made and two small ships sunk. The principal change in N o­
vember, after the experiments o f July to September, was Coastal Command’s commitment 
to operations off Norway with the formation o f the Wick Strike Wing of torpedo 
Beaufighters, or, as they were universally known, Torbeaus, o f 144 Squadron with 404 
Squadron’s cannon-armed Beaufighters for flak suppression.
Two days later, on 24 November 1943, Coastal Command submitted proposals for attack­
ing shipping off Norway which referred to a Ministry o f Economic Warfare paper that de­
scribed Norway as Germany’s heaviest merchant marine commitment which then involved
600,000 tons o f s h ip p i n g .W h i l e  southbound shipping principally carried iron ore and 
fish products, northbound convoys carried supplies and reinforcements for German troops 
fighting the Red Army in northern Norway.
One o f the main objectives for the Strike Wing was that it should operate more closely 
with MTBs from Lerwick and submarines from Dundee, in particular since the X-craft at­
tack in September 1943 had disabled Tirpits^  ^ thus releasing 9^  ^ Flotilla submarines for anti­
shipping work. The first Wick Strike Wing operation had already taken place on 22 N o­
vember when six 144 Squadron Torbeaus escorted by eight 404 Squadron aircraft attacked 
a convoy off Stadlandet. The Norwegian Gol (985T) and Kari 'Louise (800T) were damaged, 
one Torbeau ditching on the way home with engine failure. This operation illustrated the 
potential of coordinated anti-shipping operations off Norway when, that afternoon, at 
1417/22, the Norwegian submarine Lia attacked the same convoy and sank Arcturus 
(1,651T). Two days later, Lia sank the MV Lisstrom (928T) off Bredsund.^^'*
December 1943 saw 121 sorties by Wick Wing during which 32 attacks were made and five Iaircraft lost, all without tangible result. The 9^  ^ Flotilla submarines fared better with the |
Dutch 0-15  attacking a convoy inside Skudesnesfjord on 26 December and claiming hits i
on three ships, though an escort reported two torpedoes that missed. Lieutenant Pim I
Kiepe recalled that the boat escaped only after taking, ‘a good hammering from the es- |
162 ADM 223 8. Wintoix ; 1988 p. 77-78. Rohwer and Hunnunelchen : 1974 p. 359. Witthoft : 1971 pp. 296 and 332.
163 AIR 41 48 p. 282. ADM 223 8.
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The attack by 144 Squadron Torbeaus on the convoy off Stadlandet on 
22 November 1943 which left tw o ships damaged. The convoy was 
attacked again that afternoon by the Norwegian submarine Ula and the 
German freighter Arcturus was sunk. By early 1944 the combined effect 
of Coastal Command, FAA, MTB and submarine attacks was forcing 
German convoys off south-west Norway to take refuge in fjords during 
the hours of daylight, thus greatly hampering their shipping operations.
cort’.^ 5^ U/a, Seadog and Liking sailed Dundee for patrol at 0900/23 December and, on 28 
December, Via unsuccessfully attacked the Norwegian steamer Fan (3,000T) off Skudesnes. 
At about the same time, Seadog sank the German Oldenburg (8,537T) off Stadlandet with 
two torpedoes. On 2 January, Seadog unsuccessfully attacked a three-ship convoy with two 
escorts off S ta d la n d e t .Seanjmph made a rendezvous south of Bodo to transfer o f per­
sonnel and stores to a fishing vessel.^^^ Seadog attacked another convoy without success on 
3 January and Sceptre was ineffectively depth-charged after missing a convoy with torpedoes 
off Foldafjord on 4 January.
January 1944 brought better results for the Strike Wing, 186 sorties being flown and 65 
attacks being made. Four ships were sunk and two damaged for the loss o f five aircraft. On 
14 January Wick Wing struck at two convoys off Lister, sinking the German Wittekind 
(4,029T) but losing three aircraft after the Wing was attacked by seven ME109s. Mean­
while, 489 Squadron from Leuchars, newly returned to operations after converting to 
Beaufighters, attacked another convoy, sinking the Enterios (5,179T). Both the ships sunk 
had been carrying iron ore, part o f the 111,000 tons shipped to Germany by the Norwegian 
coastal route in January. Then, on 20 January, Beaufighters from Wick sank the Emsland
164 ADM 199 1851. Valvatne ; 1954 pp. 111-119.
165 Rohwer ; 1997. Kiepe MS, IWM Dept of Docs ref. 96/6/1.
166 was assumed that the E.msland (5,170T) was sunk in this attack but Rohwer found that she was struck by an air- 
launched torpedo at 1130/20 January 1944 west o f Stadlandet and beached near Ervik. There is also a claim that, in 
this attack, Seadog sank the ex-Dutch torpedo boat K-2, but this vessel was damaged by an air-launched torpedo on 9 
October 1944 off Egersund and became a wreck. It seems that Seado^ % attack on 2 January 1944 must have been 
the detonation that V-5308 reported north o f Stadlandet on that day. Rohwer : 1997. Witthoft : 1971 p. 313. RN 
Submarine Museum.
167 RN Submarine Museum.
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(5,170T) off Stadlandet and 489 Squadron from Leuchars attacked a convoy off Egersund, 
sinking the minelayer Skagerack I  (1,281T) and damaging the Susanna (810T). Beaufighters 
and Mosquitoes from Wick and Leuchars were in action again on 26 January, damaging 
shipping off Stadlandet.
On 1 February the Wick Wing attacked a convoy off Stadlandet and, despite heavy flak, 
sank the escort trawler UJ-1702 (500T) and damaged Lalencia (3,096T).^‘^  ^ Seadog also at­
tacked this convoy at 1150/1, but missed. On 5 February Sceptre torpedoed the beached 
wreck of the Emsland at Stadlandet, MTBs 618 and 619 engaged a patrol vessel in Sognes- 
joen and left it on fire and Radbod (4,354T) was sunk in air attack at Selbervik. Taku sank 
the collier Bheinhausen (6,298T) in Skudesnesfjord on 7 February, Stubborn attacked a seven- 
ship convoy off Namsos on 11 February, sinking one ship and damaging two others, and 
Taku sank Harm Frit^en (4,818T) off Skudesnes on 12 February. Stubborn attacked a convoy 
of five ships and five escorts off Namsos on 13 February; her torpedoes missed and she 
was heavily counter-attacked by the escort, but escaped. That same evening, off Stavanger,
Taku sank Hans Bombofen (2,130T) 
and, off Hustadvikka, MTBs 627 and 
632 sank Irma (1,392T) and Henry 
(634T). Ula left Lerwick on 16 Febru­
ary, attacking convoys off Lister on 20 
and 25 February without success. On 
1 March Seanymph missed a 5,000 ton 
merchantman off Bodo then, on 2 
March, Venturer sank Thor (2,526T) off 
Stadlandet and, on 3 March, the 
steamer Levante reported being missed 
by torpedoes, actually fired by Se­
anymph, off Bodo.
By March 1944 the 489 and 455 
Squadron Beaufighters and 333 Squad­
ron Mosquitoes had formed the 
Leuchars Strike Wing and both it and 
the Wick Wing flew 309 sorties that 
month. On 5 March 489 Squadron 
Beaufighters attacked a convoy three
On patrol w est of Namsos on 11 February 1944, 
Stubborn attacked a convoy, sinking the Makki 
Faulbaums (I.907T) and damaging the Felix D 
(2,047T). Two days later, at 1155/13, she missed 
a southbound convoy of five ships and five es­
corts with six torpedoes. The escorts NO-12, V- 
5 7 1 5  and M- I5I  conterattacked and Stubborn 
was badly damaged by more than 70 depth 
charges and forced down to  540 feet, 200 feet 
below her test depth. She was eventually able to  
surface but was trapped on the surfece perilously 
close to enemy territory. Home Fleet destroyers 
sailed to  bring her in and she secured alongside 
Duke o f  York at Scapa. She was towed to Green­
ock by M usketeer and Scourge arriving, as seen 
here, on 25 Februarv 1944.
168 Rohwer : 1997. RN Submarine Museum.
169 Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 384. Witthoft p.354
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miles west of Lindesnes and sank one of the escorts. On 6 March the Leuchars Wing at­
tacked a 16-ship convoy off Obrestad and sank the Kabe (994T). Sceptre arrived off Kya 
Light on 2 March 1944 and, at 0913/3, sighted an HE115 seaplane approaching. Air pa­
trols often heralded the arrival o f a convoy and, sure enough, four merchantmen and five 
escorts appeared. Two torpedoes fired at 250 yards range passed under the convoy. Sceptre 
tried to attack another convoy at 1405/6, then ran into fishing nets that were cleared with 
difficulty. Early on 7 March Sceptre sighted minesweepers and a Heinkel operating ahead of 
a southbound convoy, penetrated the escort screen and, at 1115/7, sank the Uppe 
(8,340T). unsuccessfully attacked convoys on 12 and 13 March, then arrived Lerwick
on the afternoon of 16 March. On 22 March Syrtis on patrol off Bodo sank the Narvik by 
gunfire, then disappeared, probably lost in the German offshore minefield. Beaufighters of 
the Leuchars Wing on a ROVER on 23 March sank the Norwegian Byfylke (898T). On 24 
March Taku missed the tanker Moshill (5,3221’) off Namsos, sank the Nordnorge (340T) 
off Stadlandet and Terrapin damaged the tanker Worth (6,256T) and the aircraft catapult 
ship Schwabenland off Flekkefjord.
R/} d  i -X -Ar />Jr ¥-V- 44  ^ a£// a.
r
4 A m  1944
At the end o f March, Coastal 
Command and submarines 
mounted a combined search 
for the Monterosa (13,882T) 
which was southbound off 
Norway after acting as depot 
ship during repairs to Tirpitr  ^
following the X-craft raid. 
An intelligence source, 
probably SOE’s coastwatch­
ing service, placed her off 
Narvik at 0800/25, then she 
was reported off Skorpen at 
0900/29 but a Beaufighter 
strike from Wick that eve­
ning failed to find her.
Mosquitoes o f 544 and 333 Squadrons found the ship in Grimstadfjord at 1145/30, then 
tracked her south. Wick Wing took off at 1700/30 and, despite a strong escort of three 
minesweepers, nine ME109s and FW190s, five MEllOs, two Arados and one BV138, the 
18 Beaufighters heavily damaged Monterosa for the loss o f two aircraft. That night, at 
0010/31, 489 Squadron Beaufighters from Leuchars attacked her, causing further damage.
fig. 85
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/
At 0 6 15/4 April 1944 Ula torpedoed the valuable German tanker 
III (7,603T) as It passed Stadlandet (above). Two days later she 
torpedoed the German transport Wesergau (l,923T) which was 
beached but became a total loss and was scrapped in situ.
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then she was sighted approaching Kristiansand South by a 333 Squadron Mosquito at 
0825/31. Monterosa finally reached Aarhus on 6  April.^’o
On 10 April Venturer and Taku sailed Lerwick to penetrate the Skaggerak mine barrier and 
attack enemy shipping between southern Norway and Germany. But Taku hit a mine and 
was lucky to survive heavily damaged. She returned to Lerwick and Venturer was diverted 
north to patrol off Egersund. She missed a northbound merchantman early on 15 April, 
but sank the Freidrichshafen (1,923T) that evening, then went deep as two escorts counter­
attacked. Venturer secxxted at Lerwick on the evening o f 18 April having been relieved off 
Egersund by the Norwegian Ula. At 0645/19 Ula, about four miles o ff Kvitingsoy Light, 
torpedoed and sank U-974. On 22 April she sank the Bahia (4,117T), then returned, on 27 
April, to Dundee.i '^ 2
C a r r ie r  Sw e e p s  o f f  N o r w a y  in  1944
Submarine anti-shipping patrols off the Norwegian coast closed for the summer at the end 
o f April 1944, Ula, Unshaken and Satyr the last boats to withdraw to Dundee before 
beginning anti-U boat patrols in the Northern Transit Area particularly directed against 
Mitte Gruppe boats. MTB operations from Lerwick also ended in March and the Norwegian 
boats moved to Great Yarmouth for operations in the lead-up to D-Day.^^a Much of 
Coastal Command’s anti-shipping strength in Scotland was also withdrawn to the south for 
D-Day. But the last Arctic convoy cycle, JW /RA58, had sailed in March so air operations 
continued with Home Fleet carrier groups not required for convoy operations.
There was, however, a subtext to these carrier sweeps off Norway that had nothing to do 
with Tirpits^ and coastal shipping, and of which Fraser was unaware when he clashed with 
Cunningham. Playing on German paranoia about an Allied invasion o f Norway, British 
deception planners had, since 1941, been mounting a series o f feints towards Scandinavia 
as cover for real operations elsewhere. The first. Operation HARDBOILED, involved a no­
tional assault on Stavanger in 1942 by a force then training at Inveraray, but actually des­
tined for IRONCLAD, the landing at Diego Suarez on 5 May. SOLO I later in 1942, and a 
cover for TORCH, was again designed to convince the enemy that the troops concentrated 
in the Clyde were destined for Norway. Double agents controlled by the Twenty Commit­
tee reported that snow chains were being provided, Lascar seamen on the Clyde were being 
offered bonuses to sail north o f 60° north and that troops were being trained in mountain 
warfare. And, as seen above with the arrival o f the first Coastal Command strike wing air-
™ AIR 41 48 p. 506.
171 ADM 234 380. ADM 199 1813. Rohwer : 1997.
172 ADM 199 1851. Wynn : 1998. Rohwer : 1997.
263 II
North Western Approaches
craft at Wick in July 1943, at the time of HUSKY, TINDALL suggested that the Allies were 
about to land at Stavangerd^'i
As part o f the deception plans surrounding 
OVERLORD, FORTITUDE NORTH posited 
another landing in Norway in summer 1944 
so that the Germans would be encouraged 
to maintain a large garrison there rather than 
reinforce their land forces in the main thea­
tre. Shipping was concentrated at Methil in 
the hope that a Luftwaffe reconnaissance 
aircraft would spot it. Dummy aircraft were 
set up on airfields like Montrose, Peterhead 
and Forres and a largely non-existent British 
Fourth Army under GOC Scottish 
Command, General Thorne, began filling 
the ether with bogus radio messages. Few of 
those involved in the invasion exercises at 
Burghead early in 1944 (see ch. 5 above) 
were aware that the 3^*^ Division and Force S
were playing their part in FORTITUDE NORTH. A much-inflated version o f military move­
ments in Scotland was being transmitted to German mihtary intelhgence by double-agents 
hke GARBO, Spaniard Juan Pujol.'^^
The difficulties of operating carrier aircraft in northern waters were illustrated when a 
force of escort carriers under Rear Admiral Bissett in Royalist had sailed Scapa at 0900/13 
April 1944. PITCHBOWL ONE on 14 April was to have been an attack on shipping between 
Utvaer and Svino Island, and PITCHBOWL TWO the following day was to have seen further 
anti-shipping attacks between Hvidingso Island and Egero. And the carrier strikes were to 
have been carried out alongside Wick Strike Wing Beaufighters, but the whole operation 
had to be cancelled due to bad w e a t h e r . T h e  same fate befell PLANET, though the carri­
ers did undertake a secondary operation, RIDGE ABLE, an attack on shipping at Bodo and 
in the Leads to the south early on 26 April. Two Barracudas and fighters penetrated into 
Bodo harbour where they hit a large merchantman. Two strikes attacked a convoy off
#
Dummy aircraft at Forres for Operation 
FO R TITU D E N O R T H
173 Reynolds : 1998 pp. 104-105.
174 See Howard : 1990 and Wheadey : 1980.
175 For FORTITUDE NORTH see Hesketh : 1999 and in particular ch.s. VII, VIII, XVIII and XIX, and Howard 
1992. See also Pujol and West ; 1985 for the GARBO network.
176 ADM 199 844.
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Sandhorn and direct hits were claimed on the first and third merchantmen and one of the 
escorts. The iron ore carrying Itauri (6,838T) and Lotte Leonhardt (4,167T) were sunk. One 
Barracuda, two Corsairs, one Hellcat and one Wildcat were lost and one aircraft crashed on 
landing on Emperor, killing the pilot. ^ 7?
CROQUET and HOOPS began when a Home Fleet force commanded by Captain H. V. 
Grace in Berwick with the carriers Furious and Searcher escorted by Savage, Wit^rd, Wakeful, 
Algonquin, Piorun and Blyskawica sailed Scapa at 2230/3 May 1944. The strike comprised 18 
Barracudas from 8  Wing in Furious escorted by 20 Wildcats from Searcher began taking off 
at 0642/6 to search for enemy shipping between the village o f Bud and Smolen Island. A 
two-ship convoy with three escorts was sighted north-east of Bud at 0801/6 and, while 
Wildcats went in to smother flak, four Barracudas, three armed with bombs and one with a 
torpedo, attacked. The torpedo-carrying Barracuda was shot down, but after torpedoing 
the larger ship. The rest o f the strike force attacked another convoy o f a freighter, a tanker 
and a coaster and three escorts west o f Kristiansand at 0808/6. The Wildcats were unable 
to silence heavy flak from the escorts, some having to shoot down one o f two BV138 air­
craft orbiting the convoy, so the Barracudas had a difficult time during their attack and one 
was shot down. The tanker Saarburg (7,913T) sank after being hit by two torpedoes and the 
ore Almora (2,522T) sank after being bombed,
The CROQUET force turned for home after the last aircraft were recovered at 0944/6, but 
Berwick and Searcher detached off Noup Head to join the HOOPS force o f Royalist, Jamaica, 
Striker, Emperor and six destroyers which sailed Scapa at 0600/7. The plan was, once again, 
to attack shipping off Bud and two flights o f 800 Squadron Hellcats began taking off from 
Emperor at 0730/8. Escorted by 882 Squadron Wildcats, they sighted first two trawlers 
which they left alone, then a passenger steamer with the Norwegian flag prominently 
painted on her sides which opened fire on the strike force. Lieutenant Commander Hall 
was about to order an attack, when a convoy of five merchantmen and escorts was sighted 
off Kristiansand. The convoy was attacked but not hit and two Wildcats were shot down. 
The force was returning to the carriers when, about 15 miles offshore, it was bounced by 
six enemy fighters. Two ME109s and one FW190 were shot down.
After making landfall at Gossen Island and failing to sight any shipping, the second strike, 
HOOPS D O G , went south, shot down two BV138s caught in the act of taking off, then 
bombed oil tanks near Alesund and a herring oil factory at Fosnavâg before strafing a ship 
off Alesund. Two aircraft were lost.^^^ HOOPS was the first time the Hellcat had been used
177 Ibid.
178 ADM 199 844. Naval Review yoL XXXIII p. 183. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 410
179 ADM 199 844.
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as a fighter-bomber and this accounted for the poor marksmanship o f 800 and 804 Squad­
rons. POTLUCK, the next carrier operation sailed Scapa at 1730/12 May as Sheffield, Royalist, 
Emperor, Searcher, Onslow, Obedient, Ursa, Wakeful, Piorun and Blyskawica. Bombing practice 
was planned for that evening at Stackskerry but this had to be abandoned due to insuffi­
cient wind and a heavy swell. Thus, most o f the pilots had only dropped two bombs, one 
during training at Hatston on 5 May and one during HOOPS three days later.
The POTLUCK ABLE strike on 14 May attacked shipping and aircraft off Rorvik and Stad­
landet, claiming four enemy aircraft destroyed, escort vessels strafed and a direct hit on a 
merchantman. Sub Lieutenant Holloway returned to Striker vjith undercarriage damage and 
baled out. He was seen clear o f his parachute harness in the water, but was dead when 
found by Wakeful. At 1757/14 six HE115 seaplanes appeared, their approach not seen on 
radar due to rain clutter, and made ‘half-hearted attacks’ on the carrier group. Hellcats, 
Wildcats and Sea Hurricanes were scrambled but the Heinkels escaped in cloud towards 
Trondheim. POTLUCK BAKER began taking off at 0400/15, but weather conditions along 
the coast were poor and no shipping was sighted. Two armed trawlers were strafed and set 
on fire and the fish oil factory at Fosnavâg was bombed again. Two aircraft received flak 
damage, but all returned safely. Meanwhile, at the same time, a Home Fleet force under Sir 
Henry Moore in Anson with Victorious and Furious had launched Operation BRAWN, a strike 
against Tirpitv  ^at Altenfjord which had to abort due to cloud cover over the target.
Carrier sweeps off Norway generally 
involved minelaying missions in the Leads 
by Avengers from escort carriers and 
fighter and fighter-bomber strikes by 
Seafires and Fireflies from fleet carriers. 
Home Fleet carriers led by Implacable 
undertook a sweep in the Bodo area 
between 26 and 28 September 1944, and 
while Avengers laid mines, fighters at­
tacked a six-ship convoy off Lodingen 
(left) and sank a seaplane tender (over­
leaf top). U -1060  was driven ashore dur­
ing this sweep and destroyed tw o days 
later by Coastal Command. One result of 
these sweeps was that U boats were 
stationed off Scapa to catch the carriers 
as they put to sea. But the principal out­
com e was that German shipping and, 
notably, U boat traffic, was unable to  
move in daylight.
180 Ibid.
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A i r  a n d  S e a  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  w i n t e r  1944-45
Submarine operations off Norway recommenced with the shortening daylight hours in Au­
gust 1944, Satyr attacking a convoy off Skudesnes on 20 August without success. Coastal 
Command operations over the Bay of Biscay and the southern North Sea had been much 
reduced by late August 1944 and, on 1 September, 235 and 248 Mosquito squadrons and 
144 and 404 Beaufighter squadrons formed a new Strike Wing at Banff for anti-shipping 
operations off Norway. The Banff Wing, in September the sole strike force in 18 Group, 
was responsible for the coast o f south-west Norway from Kristiansand South to Aalesund, 
but, the only reconnaissance aircraft available were from the 333 (Norwegian) Squadron 
Mosquito flight at Leuchars. As the AHB narrative states;
These were quite invaluable as the pilots knew well the maze o f  ^ords and islets which made the lo­
cation o f  shipping so difficult along this indented and precipitous coastline. They were consequently 
almost worked o ff  their feet and it was largely through their daily flights that any strike action could 
be planned.1®'
Submarines, carrier-based aircraft and 16 and 18 Groups, Coastal Command, carried out 
the following effective attacks off south-west Norway in September 1944 (naval attacks in 
blue);
'81 AIR 41 74 p. 117.
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"bate Vessel F lag l Sunk (tons) | Darn’d (tons) Sqdn/Ship Position
8 /9 Coaster He»g/o Du 195 236, 254, 455, SW Norway
J _______________......................... 48911/9 'Floating Dock Ger Bergen
SS Kong Oscar II Nor 941 Bergen
SS Sien Nor 1464 X-24 Bergen
M426 Ge 750 236,254, 455, O ff Kristian­
M462 Ge 750 489 sand South
Coaster Vang Nor 678 Venturer O ff Lister
 ^ 12/9 VPS307 1 Ge 260 Aircraft from O ff Stadlandet
VP3103 Ge 260 Furious and
VP5105 Ge 260 Tmmpeter
SS Ostland Ge 5^74^
Ï4 /9 VP1608 Ge 144, 404, 235, O ff Kristian­
MV Iris Ge 3,323 1 248 sand South
19/9 MV lynx Nor 1,367 1 144, 404, 235 Sognefjord
MV Tyrifford Nor 3,080 i
20/9 Coaster Ve/a Nor 1,184 Sceptre Off Egersund
L __________ M132 Ge L 685 Sceptre} 21/9 Coaster Vangsnes Nor 191 r 144,404, 235, Off Lister
Coaster Vygia Nor 104 2481 Fishing vessel Nor 75 i
1 24/9 NB02 1“ Ge 168 1 ^ : Hjeltfjord
! Coaster Storesund Nor 563i1 Tanker Kjiute Nelson Nor 5,749 Minefield laid Egeroyi MV C/dtv Hugo Stinnes I Ge 5,295 by !
UJ1106 Ge 447 Rjéis I
UJ1715 Ge 489 J
28/9 NK02 Ge 80 248 1 Off Kristian-
_ ____________________________ ; .................... _ i sand Southj Total 17 ships 7 Ships r
1 (19,942 tons) (11,649 tons)
To sink 11 ships totalling just 7,024 tons Coastal Command aircraft had flown 443 sorties 
during September with 154 aircraft actually carrying out attacks. The kill rate was poor but, 
aside from inexperienced aircrew, a serious problem to beset Strike Wing operations off 
Norway in 1943 and 1944 was assembling a large formation o f aircraft at a precise location 
after the long flight across the N orth Sea, particularly as anti-shipping strikes were gener­
ally carried out at either first or last light. German convoys were generally small but power­
fully escorted, and were increasingly passing vulnerable stretches o f coastline in the dark 
and taking refuge in secluded fjord anchorages during the day. Squadrons in training at 
RAF Drem in East Lothian had developed the DREM attack, a variation on the Pathfinder 
tactic used by Bomber Command in which, just before dawn, a rendezvous over the target 
area would be illuminated by flares.
Another critical problem for Coastal Command off southern Norway was the total absence 
in 1943 and early 1944, o f fighter escort. There were only three short stretches where 
German convoys had to cross open water outside The Leads, thus exposing themselves to 
attack, the most profitable o f these being between Stavanger and The Naze. N ot surpris­
ingly, this too was where Luftwaffe fighter strength was concentrated. Beaufighters could
182 Ibid. pp. 118 and 125.
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not be sent unescorted against single-engined fighters such as ME109s and FWT90s unless 
the 333 Squadron Mosquitoes on reconnaissance reported cloud cover in which the strike 
aircraft could hide. On 12 December 1943, for example, 110,000 tons o f German shipping 
was known to be at sea between Haugesund and Kristiansand South, and Beaufighters 
were available at Wick and Leuchars but, as there was no cloud cover, no attack could be 
made. Representations were made to Fighter Command for the allocation o f Spitfire Vs 
and Mustangs with long range tanks, but just 28 fighter sorties were flown in support of 
443 strike sorties off Norway in September 1944. Pitifully few fighters were made available 
until early 1945 and this resulted in a high loss rate among 18 Group strike aircraft.^®^
The first DREM operation began at 0417/9 October when a Warwick o f 281 ASR Squadron 
took off from Banff. At 0610/9 this aircraft dropped seven flares, 17 flame floats and 50 
drift lights in a three-mile radius circle o ff Skudesnesfjord. Meanwhile, eight 404 Squadron 
Beaufighters, ten 144 Squadron Beaufighters and eight cannon-armed Mosquitoes o f 235 
Squadron had left Banff between 0456/9 and 0529/9 and they formed up on the flares at 
0630/9. As dawn broke the Wing wavehopped south for 30 minutes, then sighted a convoy 
o f five merchantmen and six escorts off Egersund. While three Mosquitoes circled over­
head as fighter cover, cannon-armed Mosquites and Beaufighters attacked the escorts and 
merchantmen, then rocket armed Beaufighters took on the leading escorts and merchant­
men and finally four Torbeaus attacked the two largest merchantmen. Despite intense flak, 
the strike was over and all aircraft were on course for Banff in under five minutes. Rudolf 
Oldendorff (1,953T) and the escort UJ1711 (485T) were sunk and Sarp (1,116T) was seri­
ously damaged. After the action, Coastal Command noted that;
...it  will be seen that the continual thought, training and exercise tliat had been given to Wing opera­
tions since early in 1944 had not altered the basic conception which was to smother, put off aim or 
otherwise neutralize the intense flak put up from a convoy by a first wave o f cannon fire followed 
immediately by SP  so as to allow the torpedo carriers a relatively unmolested run in. In narrow fjords 
or other places where torpedoes could not be used, RP was the main weapon and the cannon ele­
ment was increased so as to blast a temporary respite in which carefiiUy aimed shallow RP attacks 
could be made. Each element had to be timed to the split second...
Thus Coastal Command, and the Banff Strike Wing in particular, maintained its anti­
shipping strikes off Norway until the end of the war. And, as evidence o f greater coopera­
tion between forces operating from Scotland, Coastal Command had also begun mining 
The Leads to force enemy shipping out into open water where they could be attacked by 
submarines and MTBs. Meanwhile, its involvement in D Day at an end, the Norwegian 54‘^  
MTB Flotilla had returned to Lerwick at the end o f September 1944 and recommenced 
operations a week later. By January 1945 Admiralty Intelligence summaries were conclud­
ing that, ‘Increased alarm on account o f MTB attacks,’ had led to convoys being sailed with
183 AIR 41 48 p. 282.
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stronger escorts. But air attack by day was still considered a greater threat to the convoys 
than MTB attack.
On 8  October, 712 and 722 drove the coaster Freikoll (236T) ashore near Floro.i®'  ^ On 1 
November 712 and 709 sank the patrol boats 1^-5525 and V-5531 in Sognefjord. 688 and 
627 attacked a convoy in Sognefjord on 13 November, but the two merchantmen evaded 
the torpedoes. One escort, UJ-1430, was hit and the other two were engaged in a fire- 
fight.i®5 On 27 November 713 and 623 unsuccessfully attacked patrol boats off Sognefjord 
and 7 /7  sank the Welheim (5,455) bound Bergen for A a l e s u n d .653 and 7 /7  crossed to 
Norway on 6  December and, at about midnight, sank the DitmarKoel (4,479T) in Korsfjor- 
den.i^^ Three pairs o f MTBs sailed Lerwick on 23 December, 722 and 712 sinking the 
minesweeper M-489 in Bommlofjord then shelling a coastwatching station nearby and 7 /7  
and 627 sinking the small tanker Buvi off F r o s j o e n . ^ s s  On 6  January, 722 sank the Dora
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The track chart for Operation VP79 described overleaf shows a classic ‘lurking’ operation 
in which the tw o MTBs ran in through the Leads to  wait, in this case for tw o hours at 
Ekilso, then dash out at high speed to  attack enemy shipping before escaping by another 
narrow channel.
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Ffitf(en (6 8 8 8 T) with her cargo o f iron ore and 709 damaged the Nikolaifleet (5,158T). This 
convoy was attacked again off Sognefjord early on 9 January and Nikolaifleet and Viola 
(991T), both ore carriers, were sunkd*^ On the evening o f 31 January, 717 and 715 missed 
M381 but sank M-382 south o f Trondheim (see chart on previous page). M-381 was sunk 
when 717 returned to the area twelve days later^^o
7/7, 715 and 711 were lurking west of Karmoy on 12 March when a convoy appeared and 
711 sank the 5,000 ton liner Early on 30 March two German patrol vessels were
shelled in Bommelofjord by 7 /7  and 716. VP-5532 was hit repeatedly and driven ashore, 
the other was damaged but escaped. As they withdrew, the MTBs shelled a coastwatching 
post on Slottero.^^^ \K7ith the end o f the war clearly imminent, 711, 723, 713 and 719 left 
Lerwick early on 25 April. Enemy movements by this time were almost non-existent, so 
713 and 719 sighted nothing. On 26 April, however, 711 and 723 were west o f Karmoy 
when a U boat surfaced close by. Both boats fired torpedoes, but missed, then the MTBs 
opened fire and and 711 dropped four depth charges, badly damaging the U boat which 
was last seen limping towards the shore and on fire. The MTBs left when a German patrol 
boat appeared and U-637 hmped into S t a v a n g e r .
F in a l  s u b m a r in e  p a t r o l s
On 14 October, Viking sank the Standard (1,286T) near Bodo. At 2233/21 October, Sceptre 
attacked a large convoy off Lister, sinking the escort U /- /111 (510T). Venturer sailed D un­
dee on 2 November to patrol o ff Andoy and carry out Operation HANGMAN, the landing 
o f stores for SOE’s coastwatching service. She was submerged off Andoy at 0839A/11 
when the OOW  sighted a U boat conning tower. Lieutenant Launders fired four torpedoes 
at 0845A/11 and, 90 seconds later, there was a loud explosion followed by breaking-up 
noises and a smaller explosion as the U boat’s batteries exploded. Venturer \\iiA sunk U-771 
which had sailed Hammerfest on 14 October to attack JW61, but without success. All 51 
aboard the U boat were lost. HANGMAN was carried out that night and Venturer returned to 
Lerwick on 24 November and Dundee on 26 November.
Venturer and PMhis sailed Dundee on 13 December, Venturer for an uneventful patrol o ff 
Egersund between 18 and 26 December, and Pathis to lay mines o ff Stavanger. During the 
minelay she had to dodge a convoy o f barges which passed about a cable astern o f her, but, 
on 21 December, a convoy consisting o f five merchantmen, one U boat and six escorts
189 Witthoft: 1971 p. 313. 
i®8 Reynolds : 1998 p. 115.
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Detail from Venturer's track chart covering the sinking of L/-77 / and Operation HANGMAN
steamed into the minefield. The escorts UJ-1113 (830T), UJ-1116 (830T), the minesweeper 
K-402 (1271} and the supply ship V^eichselland (5,1901} were all sunk.^ '^*
Utsira sailed Dundee on 6  January 1945 and sank the patrol vessel 1^-6408 off Namsos on 
the 16*h.i95 attacked three ships and four escorts off Skudesnes at 2342/22 Janu­
ary, sinking the Stockholm (6181}. And, on 9 February, it was Venturer carried out one 
o f the most noteworthy submarine attacks o f the war, the only known occasion when a 
submerged submarine has sunk another submerged boat. Faint but increasing HE was 
heard from 0932/9 then a periscope was sighted on the hydrophone bearing and course 
was altered to intercept. The periscope was sighted again at 1115/9. The U boat was plot­
ted by Asdic and Lieutenant Launders was assisted by a generous view of its periscope at 
1122/9. At 1212/9, Launders brought Venturer onto a firing course and fired four torpe-
Rubis secured Dundee on 24/12/44. On her return Rubis was in urgent need o f a complete refit, but she was not 
taken in hand as the refit would take at least six mondas.
9th Submarine Flotilla Monthly Letter dated 4 February 1945 (from RN Submarine Museum). ADM 234 380. 
Rohwer : 1997. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 486.
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does set to run at 40 feet. Two 
minutes later U-864 exploded and 
sank in 6046N 0435E with all 73 
hands. Venturer surfaced and found a 
large patch of oil and wreckage.
Utsira sailed Lerwick on 29 March 
1945 for patrol off Frohavet. On the 
morning o f 5 April Lieutenant Val­
vatne tried to attack a tanker but 
could not get close. That evening, off Folia, he attacked a four-ship convoy escorted by 10 
armed trawlers and sank Torridal (1,381T). Utsira broke surface on firing due to a faulty vent 
but a counter attack by the escorts did no damage. Once again, it was becoming dangerous 
to operate close inshore patrols off Norway due to the limited dark hours. On this patrol, 
which ended when Utsira returned to Lerwick on 16 April, 75% of her time in the danger 
area was spent submerged.^^^
At 0730/11 April, detected a U boat off Bergen and, at 0753/11, Lieutenant Rox­
burgh fired a salvo of eight torpedoes. Two minutes later an explosion was heard and Rox­
burgh saw the U boat hit amidships. A column of brown smoke rose 500 feet and, from 
the unexpectedly large explosion, Roxburgh considered that he must have hit some high- 
explosive in the U boat. Tapir hsid destroyed U-486d^^ 7 apfr was relieved by Venturer on 14 
April 1945 and, amid rumours that Printi Uugen was about to make a dash for northern wa­
ters, Venturer and Vame were ordered to patrol Egersund and Lister respectively and other 
submarines were brought to short notice for sea. But nothing materiaUsed and Venturer, by 
then the last Alhed submarine off Norway, was recalled on 25 April.
O p e r a t io n s  in  N o r t h e r n  W a t e r s  in  R e t r o s p e c t
Prior to the German invasion o f Norway and Denmark in April 1940, the Royal Navy op­
erating from the Clyde, Scapa and Rosyth was principally concerned with blockading the 
northern exit to the North Sea and thus protecting the Atlantic convoys from German sur­
face warships and raiders, then still seen as a greater threat than U boats. From mid-1940, 
and with the Atlantic hfehne under growing U boat threat and Western Approaches Com­
mand placing increasing emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, the Scottish-based surface
ADM 199 1813. ADM 234 380. Jones : 1986 p. 187-197. Information from ex-Leading Stoker Albert Hamilton. 
ADM 199 1852. 9* Submarine Flotilla Monthly Letters dated 4 April and 4 May 1945.
ADM 234 380. Jones : 1986 pp. 211-215. Wynn ; 1997.
ADM 234 380. 9* Submarine Flotilla Monthly Letter (from RN Submarine Museum).
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ships and submarines of the Home Fleet were principally concerned in the containment o f 
enemy capital ships based in Norway.
This commitment became all the more vital once the Arctic convoy route opened late in 
1941, the Arctic convoys themselves being a Home Fleet responsibility quite distinct from 
the Atlantic convoys for which Western Approaches was responsible. O f the 40 outbound 
PQ and JW convoys that sailed to the Soviet Union, 27 (67%) sailed from either Scapa 
Flow, the Clyde or Loch Ewe and o f the 37 inbound QP and RA convoys, 27 (73%) sailed 
to Scotland. In terms o f actual numbers o f merchant ships sailed, 646 sailed from Scotland 
(77% of the total) and 592 returned (80% of the total). Most o f the P Q /Q P  cycles were 
principally to and from Iceland and these convoys were heavily dependent on feeder con­
voys to and from Scotland, in particular Loch Ewe. That the percentage o f the total num­
ber of ships sailed appears disproprtionately high reflects the fact that the larger JW /RA 
convoys sailed almost exclusively to and from Scotland.^oo
At least in the early days, when the Royal Navy was at its weakest, the Germans were able 
to bring such a potent threat to bear in the Arctic, both in terms o f surface ships, U boats 
and air power. Yet their performance was notably poor, their strategy was ill-considered 
and their command structure disjointed, thus they failed to break this strategically impor­
tant and highly symbolic supply route.
The winter ore trade from Sweden via Narvik that had so exercised Churchill’s Admiralty 
in 1939-40 continued to be a factor in naval strategy in northern waters, as did other 
coastal traffic off Norway. But, with the writing on the wall for Germany following the 
Axis defeat at Stalingrad and with American pressure on Stockholm growing, it was an­
nounced on 23 September 1943 that ore exports would be reduced from 10 million tons in 
1943 to 7 milhon tons in 1944 and that ball-bearing exports would be cut from 45 million 
kronor to 21 million kronor .201 Also passing along the convoy route through the Norwe­
gian Leads were supply and reinforcement convoys for German garrison troops, for the 
Kriegsmarine units in the northern fjords, for the Luftwaffe in northern Norway and for 
the Wehrmacht fighting the Red Army in the far north.
Until 1943, alhed attacks on this traffic were necessrily hmited by either a lack o f assets in 
theatre, or by the primary need to contain enemy heavy naval units. But from late 1943 
onwards, with the formation o f the Coastal Command Strike Wings, the start o f MTB op- 
erstions off Norway and the release o f submarines and carrier groups which had been 
principally concerned in fighting through the Arctic convoys, sinkings on the coastal route
200 Schofield : 1977. Browning : 1996. Campbell & McIntyre : 1958. Rohwer : 1999. Smith : 1975. Various ADM series 
files.
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off Norway increased dramatically. Between June 1940 and May 1941 just 12 vessels in 
convoy totalling 16,434 tons had been sunk off Norway and two had been damaged, all of 
them either by submarine-laid mine or by submarine torpedo. The picture for June 1944 to 
May 1945, as seen in the chart below, is radically different and shows clearly how, off
Norway as elsewhere along the enemy-held coasthne, the RAF had become the most effec­
tive ship-killers.
Non U-boat sinkings ( 144 vessels) by Allied forces off Norway
June 1944 - May 1945 as tonnage by cause
Surface Vessels' 
10%
fig. 92
Submarines 
9%
O f 144 ships totalling 307,125 tons known to have been sunk on the Norwegian coastal 
route in the last year o f the war, 93 were the result o f attacks by Scottish-based Coastal 
Command aircraft of, 24 were sunk by carrier-based aircraft of the Home Fleet operating 
from Scapa Flow, 14 were sunk by MTBs operating from Lerwick and 13 were sunk by 
submarines based on the Clyde and at Dundee.
In addition, 58 ships totalling 162,844 tons were seriously damaged, 47 o f them in air at­
tacks. A chart of total effective attacks on ships in convoy in the 1944-45 period, demon­
strating a steadily rising monthly trend, is given overleaf.
In the case of Norway, it must be stressed that the German garrison, Luftwaffe and 
Kreigsmarine were all entirely dependent on coastwise shipping, road and raü communica­
tions being poor or non-existent. Thus, with the possible exception of the seaborne supply 
effort mounted to support Axis forces in North Africa in 1941-43, the Norwegian convoys 
remained the largest single commitment o f Axis merchant shipping.
And in the June 1940 to May 1941 period period, not one U boat had been sunk off N or­
way. But in the June 1944 to May 1945 period some 14 were sunk, six by Coastal Com­
mand, four in a Bomber Command raid on U boat pens at Bergen in October 1944, three
201 The Economic Blockade. History of the Second World War Civil Series, W. N. Medlicott. HMSO 1952-1959.
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Effective attacks on Germ an shipping off N orw ay from  June 1944.
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by Allied submarines and one by carrier aircraft. Another three U boats were seriously 
damaged, two by Coastal Command and one by MTB. All o f the Allied forces concerned 
were operating from Scotland.
Further adding to Axis difficulties were seaborne special operations mounted from Scot­
land by SOE and MI6  against shipping, harbours and coastal installations in Norway. 
While these were generally on a small scale, they added considerably to the overall impres­
sion given by Combined Operations and strategic deception operations described in Chap­
ter Five, and by larger-scale naval operations described above, that the Allies retained an 
interest in land operations in Norway. This played on known German paranoia about the 
vulnerability of Norway and helped to ensure that a large garrison was maintained there. 
And, even had the German High Command accepted that Norway was, from 1944 on, a 
strategic side-show, attempts to transfer the 350,000 troops found there in 1945 to the 
eastern front or western Europe would have been rendered all but impossible by the qual­
ity of Allied intelligence and their consequent ability to deploy naval and air assets against 
shipping off Norway to good effect.
By and large, from late 1942 onwards, Allied maritime operations in northern waters were 
intelligently handled and strategically effective. But this has to be set against the fact that 
Axis naval and air operations in the same theatre were ineptly managed from the outset, 
not least because o f the irreconcilable strategic imperatives that arose out o f Hitler's deci­
sion to invade the Soviet Union without first knocking Britain and her Royal Navy out of 
the war. At the time in 1941-1942 when the Axis were in the ascendancy and should have, 
for example, broken the Arctic supply route to the Soviet Union, they did not. The loss of 
the Arctic route would not have brought about the defeat of the Soviet Union, but it
276
North Western Approaches
would have had major political and symboHc consequences and prolonged the war, so the 
German failure here was serious.
The aptly named Operation JUDGEMENT on 4 and 5 May 1945 was the last Home Fleet op­
eration of the war. Norfolk (Vice-Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor), Searcher, Queen. Trumpeter, 
Diadem, Opportune, Zambesi, Carysfort, Scourge and Savage sailed Rosyth on I May to strike at 
the U-boat Arctic flotilla base at Kilbotn near Harstadt in Vestfjord. Twenty-eight Wildcats 
and 17 Avengers attacked the depot ship Black Watch  (5,035T) and U-711 (Kapitanleutnant 
Hans-Günther Lange) lying alongside. Both w ere sunk as above. A tanker was also claimed as 
sunk and an AA ship damaged for the loss of tw o aircraft. Type VIIC U-711 was the last U 
boat sunk by the Fleet Air Arm in the war; 32 of her crew died and 11 survived.
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Chapter Seven
A p p a r e n t l y  T h e  W a r  I s O v e r
On 5 May 1945 Spitfires o f 603 Squadron staged an early victory fly-past over Edinburgh. 
The German surrender was signed at SHAEF HQ, Reims, at 0241/7 May and that after­
noon the squadron ORB records laconically, ‘Apparently the war is over.’^  That evening, as 
victory bonfires were ht and celebrations began, and as described in Chapter Four, V-2336 
sank the Avondale Park and Sneland 1 in the Forth. On 8  May Swedish radio reported that 
A hied envoys had reached Oslo and, on 10 May, in accordance with the Reims surrender 
terms, Kapitanleutnant Kruger’s party flew into Drem with charts o f German minefields, 
swept channels into Norwegian ports and U-boat dispositions.
The last outbound Arctic convoy, JW67, sailed the Clyde on 12 May still under war condi­
tions in case there was a U boat commander keen to fight. U-boats in the North Atlantic 
and northern North Sea had been ordered to surface, fly a black flag and take one of two 
routes into Loch EriboU so as to arrive between sunrise and three hours before sunset.^ On 
9 May, a surfaced U-boat not showing a black flag was attacked west of Shetland. lJ-2326 
had unsuccessfully attacked a convoy off 
Arbroath late on 23 April, returned to Stavanger 
for reloads, then sailed again on 4 May to patrol 
off the Forth. She received the surrender order at 
2115/9 but, understandably keen to reach home,
Oberleutnant Jobst ignored the order to proceed 
to Loch EriboU and set course north to Peter­
head, then east for Kiel. Two aircraft passed over 
and, on both occasions, Jobst pretended he could 
not read their signals. Finally, at 1030/12, a 206 
Squadron Liberator dropped a bomb alongside 
and, from 60 miles off the Danish coast, the 
abruptly compliant Jobst was told to steer west 
and was escorted into Dundee at 0930/14.3 Fur-
ê
U-2326 at Dundee
> AIR 27 2080.
2 Ibid.
3 ADM 199 139. ADM 1 17761.
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ther north, on 16 May, the Norwegian destroyer Stord on passage to Narvik met a convoy 
of 15 U-boats heading down Vestfjord to a rendezvous with EG9 which had detached 
from JW67 to escort them to Loch EriboU.
On 11 May, Crown Prince O laf and Norwegian Government Ministers sailed Rosyth in the 
minelayer Ariadne and reached Oslo two days later. General Andrew Thorne wrote;
Everyone who had a boat or could get into someone else's did so and came out to cheer him and the 
squadron. The only one who didn't appreciate it was the German naval officer pilot who came on 
board off lista  Lighthouse. It must have been very humiliating for his feelings to see the real joy and 
gladness in the faces o f the people.^
The Norwegian Brigade reached Tromso on 26 May to take control o f north Norway 
where Soviet troops were proving difficult to dislodge from territory they had taken from 
the Wehrmacht. British warships and American troops were sent to the area and the Sovi­
ets withdrew. New battle-Unes were being drawn.^
Sy n t h e s i s
This thesis set out to consider aspects o f Scotland’s operational role in the Second World 
War at sea, and this on the basis that maritime and Scottish historians aUke had, hitherto, 
been neglectful of this period in Scotland’s past. But some might argue that the lack o f in­
terest shown by historians is down to Uttle o f consequence having happened in or around 
Scotland, or involving forces based in Scotland, so let us first consider the evidence, cohe­
sively studied in this thesis for the first time, that proves otherwise.
In analysing Scotland’s role, some might advocate counter-factual scenarios to imagine 
how things might have turned out had circumstances been different. And it is true that 
such debate can occasionaUy help recapture the uncertainties that surround military deci­
sion making. But this process generally involves speculation about an individual’s or a 
group’s thought processes, so counter-factuals are often flawed, if not actually inane, and, 
as H. P. WiUmott writes in characteristically blunt fashion:
There are some historians who, it would seem, cannot put pen to paper without subtracting from the 
sum o f human knowledge. I have always experienced too many difficulties trying to understand what 
did happen to worry myself about imaginary scenarios.^
So these concluding remarks will confine themselves to the facts and let the evidence speak 
for itself.
4 U boat surrenders at Loch EriboU, Scapa Flow and Kyle o f Lochalsh included U-244, U-255, U-293, U-516, U-668, 
0-716, 0-764, 0-802, 0-826, 0-956, 0-997, 0-1009, 0-1010, 0-1058, 0-1105, 0-1109, LT-/i(?5. ADM 199 2056.
5 One o£ Ariadne’s escorts was the cruiser Devonshire which had brought King Haakon, his family and much o f his gov­
ernment out o f Norway to Scotland in 1940. On 5 June 1945 Devonshire escorted Flaakon into Oslo aboard the 
cruiser Norfolk, Scotsman 14 May 1945. Roskill : 1961 pp. 263-264. See also Russell ; 1987.
<5 Ibid.
7 WiUmott in Battle of The Atlantic 1939A5 — Anniversary International Naval Conference Howarth & Law (eds) 1994 Ch.
9 The Organisations, The Admiralty and the Western Approaches.
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At the outset, ftom its strategically vital position controlling the northern passages, Scot­
land played a principal role in the ‘blockade’ o f Germany as Chamberlain’s policy o f ap­
peasement was translated into military strategy. While the English Channel might easily be 
closed, Scotland’s naval bases at Rosyth, Scapa Flow, Loch Ewe and in the Clyde were all 
heavily involved in the effort to shut off the northern passages to German warships and 
merchantmen. The Northern Mine Barrage was footed on Scotland and air patrols in sup­
port of the blockade were mounted from Scottish air bases at Leuchars, Invergordon, Hat­
ton and Oban. Fundamentally flawed the blockade may have been, but it was only possible 
to conduct this strategy from Scottish bases.
The Royal Navy’s Home Fleet based at Scapa Flow and Rosyth on the outbreak o f war was 
ill-equipped to meet the challenges o f a new trade war in the Atlantic, the protection o f the 
Empire and the containment o f a modern, albeit small, enemy surface fleet. Having spent 
the inter-war years as a pawn in the greater game of politicians seeking unworkable disar­
mament treaties and under constant pressure from the Treasury, the assets needed to fight 
a trade war simply did not exist. However, while the Battle o f the Atlantic, reduced to its 
barest essentials, was a tonnage war, it was never quite the near run thing described by 
some.
The late winter o f 1940-41, when virtually all shipping making for British ports was funnel- 
ing through the N orth Channel, was the only critical period when the Kreigsmarine and 
Luftwaffe could have forced the issue on the N orth Atlantic supply route. While the 
Kreigsmarine may have regarded the Atlantic battle as war-decisive, the eyes o f Hitler and 
the German high command were fixed on the east and Operation BARBAROSSA. The loss 
o f Graf Spee, Blucher and Bismarck by mid-1941, the damaging o f other ships and the non- 
appearance o f its planned aircraft carriers, all but ended the Kreigsmarine’s ambitions for 
an Atlantic strategy involving capital ships. And Donitz started the war with a pitifully 
small force o f U-boats, too few for the sustained effort necessary to put a stranglehold on 
the N orth Western Approaches. Further, Luftwaffe cooperation was negligible when it was 
needed most, a portent o f Axis failures in northern waters later in the war. Thus, in the 
winter of 1940-41, while the maritime war was principally being played out off Scotland, 
and largely on the Allied side by naval and ait forces operating from Scotland, the Royal 
Navy managed not to lose the battle but the Kriegsmarine neglected to win it.
From mid-1941, the combined effects o f British technological advances and cryptanalytical 
success. Allied shipbuilding capacity and improved ship management along with the in­
creased availability of escort vessels and aircraft manned by properly trained crews and the 
growing support o f the United States ensured that the U-boats never stood a chance. Scot­
tish-based naval and seaborne commando units played a leading role in the securing of
280
North Western Approaches
Enigma encypherment machine intelligence that played a vital role in beating the U boats 
from 1941 onwards. But the winter o f 1940-41 had demonstrated the inadequacy o f British 
counter-measures to meet the U boat threat and one o f the Scotland’s principal contribu­
tions to Allied victory in the trade war came from the Western Approaches escort group 
sea training establishments at Tobermory and Stornoway, along with the anti-submarine 
training schools on the Clyde, in particular at Campbeltown, Some 1,139 escort vessel 
crews worked up at Tobermory alone and, without in any way belittling the training work 
o f the Western Approaches Tactical Unit at Liverpool and sea training establishments 
elsewhere modelled on Tobermory, the sea training o f so many escort vessels was a unique 
and ultimately vital Scottish achievement. Then, from mid 1942, Coastal Command long- 
range aircraft operating from Scotland played a key role in closing the Atlantic Gap and the 
final defeat of the U boats.
Scotland’s other major involvement in the maritime trade war lay in the contribution o f the 
port complex and shipbuilding yards on the Clyde. The port of Glasgow and the other fa­
cilities on the river formed one o f two principal eastern termini for the Atlantic supply 
chain, Liverpool and the Mersey being the other. The ability of the Clyde to absorb steadily 
increasing volumes o f traffic was essential to the Allied cause, as was the success o f Scot­
tish-based sea and air forces in fighting the coastal convoys around the north of Scotland 
to east coast ports reopened in late 1940. The securing o f the trade route, the increasing 
commitment o f the United States once Lend-Lease passed in March 1941 and the entry of 
the Soviet Union into the war that June meant that, from the middle o f that year, British 
military power could again be projected around the world, albeit in a small way at first.
Following defeat in Scandinavia and France in 1940, it was to Scotland, and, in particular 
the Clyde, that the Royal Navy, Army and RAF turned to develop the inter-service coop­
eration and amphibious warfare capability that would be central to future operations. And 
it was from the Clyde that amphibious expeditions reached out to Scandinavia, Africa, the 
Indian Ocean and the Middle East during 1941 and 1942. Further, troops prepared on the 
Clyde for other significant operations at, for example, Bruneval, St Nazaire and Dieppe. 
Then, at the end of 1942, the first large-scale AUied invasion force trained in Scotland and 
sailed from the Clyde to North Africa. The TORCH force was followed out o f the Clyde in 
1943 by a substantial element o f the Sicily invasion force, and it was amphibious warfare 
techniques developed on the Clyde that were to see Allied land forces successfully ashore 
in every theatre of war, most notably Normandy.
In northern waters, AUied warships and submarines operating from Scottish bases, princi- 
paUy Scapa Flow, Loch Ewe, the Clyde and Dundee, were ultimately able to secure the 
Arctic convoy route to the Soviet Union against Axis heavy naval units, U boats and the
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Luftwaffe. Hugely costly, Dudley Pound’s ‘most unsound operation’ was nevertheless a 
pohtical imperative entirely justified in that it cemented a thoroughly shaky coahtion with, 
when it was conceived, Britain’s only confirmed ally. The vast majority o f sailings for the 
Soviet Union departed from Scotland, mainly from Loch Ewe and the Clyde. And, while 
Bismarck, Tirpitt(  ^and their consorts exercised a powerful influence on Allied maritime strat­
egy in the north, on occasion with tragic consequences, it is one of the ironies o f war that 
they also probably saved a considerable portion o f the Royal Navy from the same fate as 
befell Prince of Wales and Pjipulse.
The bleak expanse of Loch Ewe was the starting point for most Arctic convoys about which, on 
18 April 1942, First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound wrote that. T he whole thing is a most un­
sound operation with the dice loaded against us in every direction.’ But the need to  get these 
convoys through dictated much Allied naval strategy both in northern waters and elsewhere. And 
it is at least arguable that the Kriegsmarine did the Allies in general, and the Royal Navy in par­
ticular, a considerable favour by maintaining their capital ship threat in northern waters. Had this 
not been so, it is highly likely that Churchill would have forced the Admiralty to  strip the Home 
Fleet for the Pacific in late 1941, and there is no reason to assume that, with little or no air 
cover, they would have fared any better than Repulse and Prince o f  Wales.
The Kreigsmarine could avoid the costly development of an amphibious capabihty and air­
craft carriers, but the Scandinavian theatre was the one place where it remained vital for 
them to maintain an effective surface-ship trade protection capability. Yet from 1941 on­
wards, and especially from 1943, Allied naval and air forces operating from Scotland con­
ducted an increasingly effective offensive against Axis merchant shipping off Norway. This 
greatly hampered German land, sea and air operations in the Scandinavian theatre. It also 
slowed the passage of ore supplies to Germany from Sweden, not least because, by late 
1944, German convoys off Norway were unable to move in daylight for fear o f attack.
Then, as the war drew to a close, Scottish-based Allied naval operations off Norway, 
along with deception schemes aimed at that country from Scotland, helped to ensure that 
some 350,000 Axis troops were still there in May 1945, not having played a role in the 
main European battlefield. While this may not have materially affected the outcome, or
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perhaps even the length o f the war, it certainly reduced the casualty rate on both sides A 
And more importantly in the longer term, the inability of the Wehrmacht to draw down 
reinforcements from Norway through Denmark allowed Montgomery’s 2T ‘ Army Group 
to race north from the Elbe to Wismar on the Baltic in just two days at the beginning of 
May 1945, thus forestalling by a matter o f hours a Red Army occupation o f Schleswig Hol­
stein and Denmark.
We have already discussed in the introduction to this thesis the paucity o f academic study 
and published material on the subject o f Scotland’s wartime experience. So why then, with 
all this evidence o f Scotland’s key role in maritime events during the Second World War, 
have historians shown hitherto so little interest in this and the wider study o f Scotland’s 
wartime experience?
A n d  T h e  F u t u r e . ..
This thesis has demonstrated that Scotland played a pivotal role in maritime operations 
throughout the Second World War, but this first study of just one aspect of Scotland’s 
wartime history must not be the last. And one o f the most frustrating aspects o f this study 
has been the vast amount o f excellent material that has had to be left out. I first began re­
searching this subject ten years ago, in 1990, when the history o f wartime Britain was still 
heavily larded with mawkish sentimentalism, in no small measure the result of a tendency 
to believe in one’s own propaganda. Now, perhaps, is the optimal time to begin serious 
work on the period.
Many aspects o f wartime Scotland invite further study: transport, port operations, industry, 
agriculture, politics, industrial relations, propaganda and the media to name but a few. A 
sound, film and image archive would be an attractive proposition and there is a clear need 
to determine what documentary resources are available, and where. This study has also 
highlighted other issues such as the need for a comprehensive study o f British port opera­
tions in wartime, not least in respect o f Liverpool.
But one pressing need is for a well-directed survey o f the archaeology o f the Second World 
War in Scotland. Some work has been done by the Royal Commission on Ancient and His­
torical Monuments, the Fortress Study Group and others, but too many wartime sites are 
being swept away or allowed to decay without being recorded or their importance being 
assessed. A prime example o f this is at Inveraray where, during the life o f this project, the 
wartime Wrennery at Dalchenna House was razed to the ground by Argyll Estates for quite 
the oddest of reasons. And, north o f Dundee, a POW camp with important wall murals has 
only recently been demolished. Just a few of the many other sites worthy of study are the
8 For the liberation o f Norway and the problems that arose from it, not least what to do with the 350,000 Germans, see
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Among the many important, yet ne­
glected, of Scotland’s wartime sites 
are the Combined Training Centres 
around the Clyde. Much remains to  
be recorded, not least the three LST 
hards (left) and the camp at HMS 
Quebec pictured from the roof of the 
sickbay in 1945 (below left) and the 
same view in 2000 (below right). The 
large Recreation Hall in the middle 
distance is a notable survivor, as are 
several other brick buildings.
naval establishments at Rosyth, Greenock, Dundee, Lerwick, Campbeltown, Ardrishaig, 
Fort William and the torpedo range in Loch Long along with its associated camp site. Then 
there are the combined training sites at Rosneath, Dundonald, Castle Toward, Largs, Tigh- 
nabruaich, Lochailort and Burghead. And then there are important airfields such as Prest­
wick, Benbecula, Tiree, Wick, Lossiemouth, Banff, Drem and Turnhouse.
It is just as well that Scotland’s seaward defences were never tested in anger. Two scenarios 
appear to have influenced planning. One was the notion that a large German invasion 
force could somehow be transported unseen across the North Sea to land on the east 
coast. The other was the equally absurd premise that Scotland would still be resisting after 
England had been subdued following a cross-Channel invasion. Elaborate and wholly asi­
nine plans were drawn up for the defence o f northern Glasgow in the event of the enemy 
having reached the south bank o f the Clyde. Few seem to have stopped to consider the 
harsh reality that it would all have been over long, long before the Wehrmacht reached 
Carter Bar, never mind Govan.^
Plans for the defence of Scotland may have bordered on the ludicrous, but they involved a 
large portion o f the population in, for example, the Home Guard, Glasgow’s twelve battal-
Salmon (ed.) : 1995 Ch. 22 for a paper by Sir Peter Thome, the son of General Andrew Thome. 
9 D-TC 8/10 83 to D-TC 8/10 86.
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ions alone mustering some 23,000 men. 
So this aspect of Scotland’s wartime his­
tory must also be worthy o f serious aca­
demic study.
And what o f the Luftwaffe? In popular 
mythology, the numerous air attacks on 
Scotland have been reduced to the so- 
called Clydebank Blitz. This thesis has 
gone some way to redressing the balance 
by examining raids on shipping and 
coastal towns, but a study o f the full ex­
tent of aerial activity over Scotland is long 
overdue.
&
GOC Scottish Command General Andrew 
Thorne and officer cadets armed with fire- 
work-tipped arrows during an anti-invasion 
exercise at Musselburgh in 1941.
The North Western Approaches thesis has shone new light into a neglected corner o f Scottish 
20^ *^  century history. But there is a great deal still to be done.
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13555 Transport for Merchant Navy personndi on shore leave in Orkney. j
14981 Labour disputes at John Brown Shipbuilders. j
15090 Lifeboat crews - responsibilities in tlie event o f invasion. j
15100 Pilotage in the Firth o f Forth - Methil and Burntisland 1942-43. J
15478 Loss o f HM submarines Vandal eeaà Unfamed - Boards o f Enquiry.
15549 Rescue Tug Service.
16009 Letter to Flag Officer Greenock re Subsistence trials 1944,
------- 1615016168
Loss o f HMS Rockingham September 1944.
Loss o f Empire Heritage and rescue ship Pinto - Board of Enquiry.
16464 Acquisition o f helicopters for Fleet Air Arm anti-submarine work 1942-44.
16848 U boat shelters in Norway and production o f Types XXI and XXIII - info ex secret sources.
16873 Loss o f HMS Breda - Board o f Enquiry.
16908 Mines in the Clyde - injuries during dredging operations.
------- 1712617347
Advisability o f using Greek crews - recent mutinies and unrest 1944.______ ___________________ ___
Arming o f RNLI Lifeboat crews.
17423 Royal Naval air stations in the Highlands and Islands. Post-war policy.
17608 21st Escort Group 1944-45. Bridge logs and reports to C-in-C Western Approaches.
17661 U-2326 surrendered at Dundee - interrogation o f Captain,
17668 Sinking of UA82 -  information from German records.
18039 Loss o f HMS Bullen - Board o f Enquiry.
18096 HMS Iron Duke 1945.
18193 Loch Lathaich working up base.
18915 Report on sinking o£ Athenia.
19038 Derequisitioning o f Perth Ice Rink 1945.
53 109405 HMS Jetvis October 1939,
109897 HMS Nelwn December 1939.
107660 HMS Barham December 1939.
108641 HMS Fame August 1939.
116 Admiralty and Secretariat Cases.
3831 Scapa Flow Photo index.
3876 Proposals for the defence of the Scottish coast 1935-39.
4052 Yachts requisitioned.
4121 HM sliips. Auxiliaries and Allied submarine losses 1939-40.
4295 Censorship in the area north o f the Caledonian Canal. 1
4381 Operation ANKLET.
4509 Operation GRAPH - refloating HMS Graph.
4539 Greenock Memoranda.
4548 HMS Graph - model and experiments.
4591 HM Naval Base Rosneath - transfer to tlie US Navy.
4736 Torpedo research and Coastal Forces, Greenock 1941-44.
5432 Protected Areas including Inveraray 1941-45.
5790 Scapa Flow Photo Index,
178 Secretariat cases.
194 Loss o f HMS Oxley.
195 Loss o f oiler Birchol.
226 Loss o f R.J. Cullen etc. in 1942.
246 Loss o f Empress of Britain.
249 Loss o f minelayer Port Napier.
250 HMS Dundee - grave error in being abandoned too soon (pic).
186 Files on Naval Control o f Shipping,
798 Naval Operations during the Norway Campaign 1940.
799 Naval Operations in Home Waters September 1939 to April 1940.
805 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors.
806 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors.
807 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors.
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808 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors.
809 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors.
189 Torpedo and anti-submarine school reports.
142 History o f net defence - photographs oiAmndora Star 1940.
176 Technical History o f A /S  weapons.
195 85-97 Rosyth Dockyard.
2195-2326 War Diary Summaries.
199
2130-2148
1-5
Survivors reports (Merchant vessels).
Convoy system introduction and organisation.
6
7
East Coast convoys - policy, routes and discipline 1939-41. 
East Coast convoys - assembly and routing 1939-41.
13 EN and WN convoy reports 1940-41.
14 WN convoys 1941.
15 EN and WN convoys 1940-41.
16 EN and WN convoys 1940-41.
20-40 Various convoy reports, mainly coastal, including FN, FS, OA, TM, MT etc.
43 EN and WN convoy reports 1941-42,
45 EN and WN convoy reports 1941-42. j
49 HX convoy reports 1940. j
51 HX convoy reports including HX72.
55 HX and SC convoy reports 1940-42.
59 SC convoy reports including SC ll.
66 Anti-aircraft defence o f ports and naval establishments 1939-40.
74 Enemy air attacks on HM ships and Merchant vessels.
75 Enemy air attacks on HM ships and Merchant vessels.
76 Enemy air attacks on HM ships and Merchant vessels.
77 JW and RA convoys.
80-84 British and Allied ships sunk.
92 Various convoy reports.
99 - 103 Enemy air attacks in home waters. (Photographs CN 1/32-1/34)
121 Convoy reports and attacks on U boats \J-31, U-32. (Good source)
122 Attacks on U boats U-63.
123 Attacks on U boats U-33.
126 Attacks on U boats XJ-27.
127 Attacks on U boats XJA7.
128 Attacks on U boats U-35.
139 U-2336 (sinking o i Avondale Park and Sneland 1 in May 1945).
139 Anti-U boat war - final stages 1945.
140 Loss oiA tlm ia.
------- 141 Enemy submarine attacks on merships 1939-40.142 Enemy submarine attacks on merships 1939-41.
143 Enemy submarine atUicks on merships 1939-41.
144 Enemy submarine attacks on merships 1939-41.
145 Enemy submarine attacks on mersliips 1939-41.
158 Loss o f HMS Rqyal Oak.
172 Enemy air attacks on merships 1942-43.
173 Enemy air attacks on mersliips 1942-43.
174 Enemy air attacks on merships 1942-43.
197 Anti-U boat operations 1945.
198 Anti-U boat operations 1945.
199 Anti-U boat operations 1945.
203 Anti-U boat operations 1945.
220 HM and merships - reports o f loss by mining 1939-41,
221 HM and merships - reports o f loss by mining 1941-44.
233 Operation RANKIN B (Norway).
234 Operation RANKIN B (Norway).
246 HM submarine patrol reports 1945.
247 HM submarine patrol reports 1945.
248 HM submarine patrol reports 1945-46.
249 HM submarine patrol reportsl944-45.
250 HM submarine patrol reports 1944-45.
251 Minelaying by enemy aircraft in coastal waters.
252 Minelaying by enemy aircraft in coastal waters.
270 Operations by Norwegian Coastal Forces, 1943-45.
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277 Submarine flotilla organisation (3rd and 7th flotillas), training, policy, patrols etc 1939-41.
278 Losses and damage to HM submarines 1939-41.
279 Submarine flotilla orj^iisation (3rd and 7th flotillas).
280 Altmark - interception and boarding.
281 Altmark ~ interception and boarding.
285 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41.
286 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41.
288 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41,
292 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41.
294 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41.
300 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41.
311 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41.
362 C-in-C Rosytli War Diary 1939.
363 C-in-C Rosytli War Diary 1940-41. (See re Norway and Forth Fhced Defences)
364 Aberdeen, Methil, Dundee War Diaries from 1/2/40.
365 Leith, Peterhead, Invergordon War Diaries from 1/2/40.
371 Western Approaches War Diary 1940.
372 Western Approaches War Diary 1940.
373 Vice Admiral Submarines War Diary 1939-40.
377 Aultbea, Stornoway, Scapa, Shetland War Diaries, 28/12/39-1940.
397 Orkney and Shetland War Diaries 1941.
400 Dundee, Admiral Submarines War Diaries 1941.
401 Rosyth, Methil, Aberdeen, Peterhead and Lerwick War Diaries 1941.
412 Peterhead, Invergordon War Diaries 1941.
418 Aberdeen, Dundee and Blyth War Diaries 1942.
419 Scotland and Northern England War Diaries 1942.
423 Western Approaches War Diary 1942.
450 Operations to enemy occupied Norway 1940-41.
482 Military Operations (Norway) 1940.
483 Military Operations (Norway) 1940.
529 Operation TORCH.
531 Naval operations off Norway 1944. i
557 Start o f series on Convoy Reports. |
614 Free French units with Royal Navy. j
627 Admiral Submarines War Diary 1943. i
631 Western Approaches War Diary 1943. |
637 Operation TORCH. |
, 646 Invergordon, Orkney/Shetland, Rosyth and Glasgow War Diaries 1942.
654 Nortli Atlantic Command War Diary 1939-40. (Gibraltar; Admiral Dudley Norflij j
658 Western Approaches War Diary 1941.
659 Western Approaches War Diary 1941.
684 HX Convoy Reports.
690 Rescue Tug Service reports 1941.
730 Operation GAUNTLET - Spitsbergen 1941 - Report of Proceedings.
770 Various Home Areas War Diaries 1943.
771 Various Home Areas War Diaries 1943.
111 Losses o f British warsliips, auxiliaries and small vessels 1940-41.
844 Naval Air operations off Norway 1944.
866-71 Operation TORCH.
--- - --- 807852
Polish units widi Royal Navy - administration. 
' Opération TORCH.
854 Operation TORCH.
885 Home Commands memoranda etc.
899 Submarine patrol reports, various 1940-45.
904 Operation TORCH - reports and war diary.
997 Norwegian Coastal Forces, Lerwick -  operations, 1945.
1050 Glasgow War Diary.
1051 Various Home Commands War Diaries.
1081 Western Approaches convoy schedules 1942.
1097 9 til Submarine Flotilla patrol reports including Rubis and Minerve.
1118 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42.
1120 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42.
1128 Attacks on U boats; U-651.
1129 Operation GRAPH and other submarine reports.
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1139 U-2326 surrender at Dundee.
1150-55 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42.
1167-1172 Enemy mining and minesweeping 1939-45.
1173-1176 Enemy air attacks in home waters.
1180 Enemy air attacks in home waters - coastal convoys 1941.
1181 Enemy air attacks in home waters - coastal convoys 1941.
1205 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42.
1237-1239 Rescue Tug service 1940-41.
1340-48 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42.
1391 Various Home Areas War Diaries 1944.
1392 Western Approaches War Diary 1944. j
1443 Western Approaches War Diary 1945. i
1444 Various Home Areas War Diaries 1945.
1707 Convoy HX72 Reports.
1729 HMS Western Is/es, Tobermory. 1
1793-1803 Rear Admiral Scapa (including Lyness).
1813 HMS PfAA/wpatrol reports.
1827 HMS Graph patrol reports.
1838 HMS Jg/yr patrol reports. I
1842 HMS Sterlet pntrol reports.
1846 HMS faku  patrol reports.
Ï851 Norwegian submarine patrol reports 1940-44 including U/a, Uredd.
1852 Norwegian submarine patrol reports 1940-44 including Ula, Uredd.
1853 Polish submarines patrol reports 1940-44.
1855 Dutch submarine patrol reports 1940-44 including Dolftjn, Zeehond.
Ï856 Dutch submarine patrol reports 1940-44 including Doljyn, Zeehond.
1857 French submarine patrol reports 1940 including Antiope, Achille, Sfax.
1858 French submarine patrol reports 1940 m.àaâk^Antiope, Achille, Sfax.
1859 US submarine patrol reports 1942-43 including Barb, Blackfish, Gunnell.
1877 HMS Clyde patrol reports.
1878 FIMS Severn patrol reports.
1879 Dutch submarine patrol reports including 0-23, 0-24.
1881 Various submarine patrol reports.
1887 Loss o f Empress of Britain.
1893-1903 Rear Admiral Scapa (Lyness).
1904 Rescue tugs and Naval establishments at I'hurso and Scrabster.
1890 Midget submarine patrol reports.
1905-14 Daily state reports by Admiral Submarines.
1921 Various Dutch and US submarine patrol reports 1940-45.
1939 Daily Operations Reports 1939.
1976 Start o f series on U boat attacks on convoys. (1976 for SC3,1977 for HX79)
2030 HMS Satyr paxxdl report.
2032-56 Series on U boat incidents 1939-45.
2057 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (9/39-12/40)
2058 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/41-12/41)
2059 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/42-12/42)
2060 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/43-12/43)
2061 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/44-12/44)
2062 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/45-12/45)
2073 Start o f series of monthly Admiralty Trade Division Reports.
2149-2154 Rescue ships.
2158-2163 Survivors reports (Merchant vessels).
2165 Rescue tugs.
205 First Sea Lord papers.
11 Batde o f the Atlantic Committee minutes 18/4/41 - 26/7/41.
21 Special studies - convoy system ex 1939.
23 Battle of the Atlantic Committee minutes 2 /9 /41 - 30/6/42.
59 First Sea Lord Records Index,
217 ' î Western Approaches Station Records incl. rescue ships and convoy reports from 1942.
686 Residual Material on Western Approaches.
695 Residual Material on Western Approaches.
696 Residual Material on Western Approaches
223 Naval Intelligence reports 1939-47 including Ultra.
2 Information derived by the Germans from decyphered British signals.
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15 Ultra - weekly U boat sitreps 20/12/41 - 28/6/43. |
16 Ultra - U boat appreciations and convoy battles 12/41 -11/43. ;
36 Signals connected with the sinking o f the Schamhorst, j
88 Special study - special intelligence in Battle of the Atlantic.
152 XJ-570 capture and technical surveys.
172 Ultra - weekly U boat sitreps 20 /3 /44  - 10/9/44.
234 332 Battle Summary - Norway April to June 1940.
333 Battle Summary - Norway April to June 1940.
369 Battle Summary - Arctic Convoys 1941 to 1945.
372 Naval Staff History - Home Waters and the Atlantic April 1940 to December 1941.
380 Naval Staff History - Submarines in Home, Northern and Atlantic Waters.
239 Royal Navy reference books.
150 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Scapa Flow and Kirkwall 1940-41.
162 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Clyde 1941-44.
166 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Aberdeen 1940.
167 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Firth o f Tay 1940-42.
169 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Aultbea, Loch Ewe.
170 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Buckie, Lossiemouth and Macduff.
171 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Peterhead.
172 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Lerwick.
296 Chart Z48 - Scapa Defences 1941.
297 Chart Z48 - Scapa Defences 1943.
304 Chart Z46 - North Sea minefields.
350 Lessons learned from Dieppe operation.
358 U -S70/H m  Graph. 1
AIR Senes
2 2720 Typex coding machine - offer to RN. |
10 4038 Air Stations in the UK. j
4039 Air Stations in tlie UK. j
15 Coastal Command. j
171 Intelligence report on Ï/KG 40 Condor operations in NW Approaches. j
178 Convoy protection in Western Approaches 7/40-9/41.
184 Proposed Area Combined HQ, Orkney, 5/40-8/40.
185 Division o f Western Approaches into two commands.
186 A /S operations — Air co-operation widi Admiral commanding Orkney and Shetland 1/40-11/40.
202 Operation DUCK -  bombardment o f Stavanger Sola airfield 4/40.
205-209 Operations to Norway 1940.
320 STARFISH policy.
413 Landing o f enemy aircraft at Dyce 5/43-7/43.
^  656 Training exercises with HM ships from Tobermory 5/42.
670 Flying boat bases in Shedand 11/38-8/40.
------- 676682
Air-Sea Rescue 8/40-7/44.
Operations Room at SuHom Voe — photos taken 2/46.
694-701 RAF Tiree diary and log 12/40 — 9/45.
16 Fighter Command.
127 Defence o f die Firth o f Forth 7/39-11/39.
------- 128150“
Defence o f die Firth o f Forth 10/39- 4/40.
Scapa Flow Defences — policy 11/39-1/40.
155 Establisliment o f Fighter Sector at Wick 11/39.
------- 156 “ 189
Establisliment o f Fighter Sector at Wick 11/39.
Defence o f Scapa Flow 9/39-3/42.
578 Formation o f 14 Group 5/40-11/40.
689 Defence o f Scapa Flow 12/40-12/44.
915 13 Group Wick 1944-46.
19 176 Air Defence o f Great Britain Plans.
207 Air warning system and defence measures.
20 1027 Directorate o f Naval Co-operation.
1050 Operation ARCHERY.
1079 Nordi-west Scodand and outer isles -  extension o f radar cover.
1091-94 HIGHBALL trials.
1322 HIGHBALL proposed operations. 
Air stations in the UK.7585
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7586 Air stations in the UK.
25 Group Operations Record Books.
232 1 13 Group Operational Record Book 1939-40.
233 13 Group Operational Record Book. January 1941- December 1943.
234 13 Group Operational Record Book January 1944-46.
235-242 13 Group Operational Record Book Supplements.
250 14 Group Operational Record Book 1/40-7/43.
251 14 Group Operational Record Book Appendices 1/40-7/42.
252 14 Group Operational Record Book Appendices August -  December 1942.
253 14 Group Operational Record Book Appendices January -  July 1943.
380 18 Group Operational Record Book 9/39 — 12/43.
381 18 Group Operational Record Book 1/44 -1 2 /4 4 .
382 18 Group Operational Record Book 1/45 ~  12/45.
383-452 18 Group Operational Record Book Appendices.
27 Squadron Operational Record Books.
441 43 Squadron Operational Record Book 1940.
442 43 Squadron Operational Record Book 1941.
592 65 Squadron Operational Record Book.
624 72 Squadron Operational Record Book.
866 I l l  Squadron Operational Record Book.
969 141 Squadron Operational Record Book.
1293 209 Squadron Operational Record Book.
1294 209 Squadron Operational Record Book.
1298 210 Squadron Operational Record Book.
1731 333 Squadron Operational Record Book.
1732 333 Squadron Operational Record Book.
2073 602 Squadron Operational Record Book to 12/39.
2074 602 Squadron Operational Record Book to 12/40.
2079 603 Squadron Operational Record Book to 12/43.
2080 603 Squadron Operational Record Book to 8/45.
2081 603 Squadron Operational Record Book Appendices.
2102 609 Squadron Operational Record Book.
2130 618 Squadron Operational Record Book.
2265 929 Barrage Balloon Squadron Operational Record Book (Queensfetry).
2266 929 Barrage Balloon Squadron Operational Record Book (Queensfetry).
2294 948 Barrage Balloon Squadron Operational Record Book (Rosyth).
28 Station Operations Record Books.
49 RAF Banff Operational Record Book 1944-1945.
181 RAF Dallachy Operational Record Book 9/44-11/45.
182 RAF Dallachy Operational Record Book Appendices 9/44-11/45.
219 RAF Drem Operational Record Book 1939-1945.
220 RAF Drem Operational Record Book 1939-1945.
289 RAF Fraserburgh Operational Record Book 12/44-6/45.
328 RAF Greenock Operational Record Book 9/40-7/45.
397 RAF Invergordon Operational Record Book 8/39-6/41.
398-402 RAF Invergordon Operational Record Book 8/39-6/41 Appendices.
440 RAF Lossiemoutli Operational Record Book 1945-1946.
459 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 8/38-12/40.
460 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/41-12/41.
461 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/42-12/42.
462 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/43-12/43.
463 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/44-12/44.
464 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/45-12/45.
465 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 10/39-4/40.
466 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 5/40-12/40.
467 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 1/41-12/41.
468 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 1/42-12/42.
469 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 1/43-1/44.
1 470 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices (photographs) 10/39-5/40.
471 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices (photographs) 6/40-1/44.
615 RAF Oban Operational Record Book 9/39-12/42.
616 RAF Oban Operational Record Book 1/43-11/45.
617 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 10/39-6/40.
618 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 7/40-12/40.
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619 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 1/41-12/41.
620 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 1/42-12/42.
621 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 1/43-4/45.
712 RAF Skeabrae Operational Record Book.
775 RAF Sullom Voe Operational Record Book 1/40-12/43.
776 RAF Sullom Voe Operational Record Book 1/44-12/45.
777-781 RAF SuUom Voe Operational Record Book Appendices.
782 RAF Sumburgh Operational Record Book 5/40-9/45.
783-786 RAF Sumburgh Operational Record Book Appendices (786 Anti-U boat reports).
^ 804 RAF Tain Operational Record Book 11/41-2/46.
848 RAF Tiree Operational Record Book 11/41-8/44.
849 RAF Tiree Operational Record Book 9/44-5/46.
850 RAF Tiree Operational Record Book Appendices 4/42-3/44.
861 RAF Turnhouse Operational Record Book 8/36-12/42.
862 RAF Turnhouse Operational Record Book 1/43-12/45.
863-865 RAF Turnhouse Operational Record Book Appendices.
915-917 RAF Wick Fighter Sector HQ Operational Record Book 1939-1945.
9Ï8-940 RAF Wick Fighter Sector HQ Operational Record Book Appendices.
941-944 RAF Wick Fighter Sector HQ Operational Record Book (photographs) 1939-1944.
29 Operational Record Books o f  miscellaneous units such as OTUs.
570 13 Flying Training School Drem Operational Record Book.
683 56 Operational Training Unit RAF TeaHng Operational Record Book.
684 58 Operational Training Unit Operational Record Book.
696 132 Operational Training Unit Operational Record Book.
41 48 The RAF in the Maritime War (Atlantic and Home Waters) Tlie Offensive Phase 1942-44.
73 The RAF in the Maritime War (Atlantic and Home Waters) The Defensive Phase 1939-41.
74 The RAF in the Maritime War (Atlantic and Home Waters) The Victorious Phase 1944-45.
50 166 602 Sq. Combat reports.
167 603 Sq. Combat reports.
WO Series
106 1812 Operations to capture Narvik 11/4/40.
128 28 12 Commando War Diary 1940-41.
166 114-139 Scottish Command War Diaries.
135 RA Scottish Command HQ 1941.
136 RE Scottish Command HQ 1941.
1708 506 Coast Regiment RA.
1743 543 Coast Regiment RA.
7163 543 Coast Regiment RA 1942.
2127 3«) AA Division War Diary 1939.
2128 3'^  AA Division War Diary 1940.
2129 3“* AA Division War Diary 1941.
---- - 7514 “ 2591™ '
147 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA.
321 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, Bahnore Road, Glasgow 5/40-3/41.
1025 155 Brigade.
1026 155 Brigade.
1155 Glasgow and District HQ 1939-40.
1198 Edinburgh Area HQ 9/39-12/41.
1199 Edinburgh Area HQ ftom 1/42.
------— 1204 Glasgow and District HQ 1941.1205 RASC Glasgow HQ 1941.
1255 Ayr sub-area HQ 1940-41,
1259 Angus sub-area 1940-41.
1274 Clyde sub-area HQ 1941.
1284 Fife sub-area HQ 10/40-12/41.
1288 Gareloch CRE 1940-41.
1302 Lothian sub-area HQ 3/41-12/41.
1310 Perth sub-area.
2058 Forth Fixed Defences.
3261 417 Searchlight Battery RA.
3552 Fortress Companies Renftewsliire 1939-40.
3553 Fortress Companies Renftewshire 1939-40.
3745 276 Field Coy RE 1939.
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3746 RE Movement Control, Glasgow 9/41-12/41.
4054 91 Bomb Disposal Section RE.
4055 92 Bomb Disposal Section RE.
4056 93 Bomb Disposal Section RE.
6698 Edinburgh Area HQ/Polish forces.
6698 Exercises and defences.
6699 Edinburgh Area HQ/Polish forces.
6699 Exercises and defences.
6701 Glasgow HQ 1942.
6716 Angus sub-area 1942,
6717 Argyll sub-area HQ 1942.
6718 Ayr sub-area HQ 1942.
6732 Clyde sub-area HQ 1942.
6740 Fife sub-area HQ 1942.
6759 Lothian sub-area 1942.
6777 Stranraer sub-area HQ 1942.
6833 West o f Scotland District HQ 1942.
4125 13 (HD) Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders 1941 (Dunbartonshire 1941).
4126 14 (HD) Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders 1941 (Renfrewshire 1941).
4363 4 King’s Own Scottish Borderers.
4364 5 King's Own Scottish Borderers.
6884 Faroe Islands garrison 1942.
199 Flome Headquarters series.
807 Polish Forces
2175 Defence of aerodromes.
2676 Defence o f ports against minelaying.
2677 Glasgow air raids.
2680 Flame barrage at sea.
2712 Decoy sites 1940-43.
2772 Faslane defences.
2805 Defence o f die Fordi and Clyde Canal.
2878 Bullion defence Royal Bank o f Scodand.
2879 Anti-invasion measures.
208 Directorate o f Military Intelligence -  includes reports on POWs.
4117 Information ex POWs 1939-40.
257 War Diaries Ships Signals Section.
7 Sliip Signals Section HMS Dundonald II etc 1943-45.
11 Ship Signals Section HMS Dundonald II modified 1944-45.
HS Series
i 2 Special Operations Executive series.
\
1
3...
Operation FORTITUDE.
W /T stations in Norway and PWE operatives. 
Air operations missions and supply drops.
6 Air operations missions and supply drops.
130 Shetland Bus and Operation BALDER (USAF Liberator ops, Leuchars to Stockliohn.)
Ï36 Televaag Reprisals as a result o f ANCHOR and PENGUIN 1942.
150
151
Operation CHEESE. 
Operation CHEESE.
194 Operation GRANARD.
Ï98
199
T 0 2  ™
203
Operation ANKLET. 
Operation ANKLET. 
Operation TITLE 1942-Î943.
Operation TITLE 1942-1943.
208 Operation VESTIGE 1943-1944.
209 Operation VESTIGE 1943-1944.
1 ! 2 1 0 Operation VESTIGE 1943-1944.
i"...... 224 i 225
Operation CLAYMORE. 
Operation ARCHERY.
t 235 
r  ' 240 "
1 243" '
Shedand Bus operations.
Shetland Bus operations.
Operation VESTIGE 1943-1944^ ....... ...................... ............ ......... ...........................
246 Honours and decorations for Norwegian agents 1942-1945.i ! 247 Honours and decorations for Norwegian agents 1942-1945.
294
North W estern Approaches
248 1 Honours and decorations for Norwegian agents 1942-1945.
252 Statistics on Shetland Bus and other SOE operations.
 ^ 253 Operation RUBBLE 19^-1942.
258 Stockholm-Scotland air service 1944-1945.
270 Stockliolm-Scotland air service 1944-1945.
1 7 175 SOE Norwegian Section War Diary appendices.
------- 174178........
SOE Norwegian Section War Diary maps to appendices._______________
SÔE Norwegian Section evaluations 1940-1945.
DEFE Series
1 Postal and Telegraph Censorship Dept.
134 Rudolf Hess.
303 Censorship in Scotland.
310 Censorship in Scotland.
311 Censorship in Scotland.
312 Censorship in Scotland.
2 Combined Operations HQ records.
73 Operation ANKLET.
------- 7480
Operation ANKLET - photographs. 
Operation ARCHERY.
81 Operation ARCHERY.
82 Operation ARCHERY - photographs.
^ 83 Operation ARCHERY - narrative.
140 Operation CLAYMORE.
141 Operation CLAYMORE.
142 Operation CLAYMORE.
204 Exercises FLAXMAN and MOSSTROOPER.
228 Exercises FLAXMAN, MOSSTROOPER and Operation GAUNTLET.
269 Operations Orders - Operation HUSKY.
364 Operation MUSKETOON.
365 Operation MUSKETOON.
529 RATTLE Conference.
530 RATTLE Conference.
597 Operation TORCH - Naval Commanders' Reports.
602 Operation TORCH - Naval Commanders' Reports.
616 Operation VP.
617 Operation VP.
698 Keyes correspondence and early history o f Combined Operations.
713 Establishments, ships etc - monthly progress reports.
714 Establishments, sltips etc - montlily progress reports.
715 Establishments, sltips etc - monthly progress reports.
716 Establishments, ships etc - montlily progress reports.
814 Visit o f King to Combined Training Centre Inveraray on 9/10/41.
815 Inveraray Combined Training Centre.
816 Inveraray Combined Training Centre.
817 Inveraray Combined Training Centre.
834 Conversions o i  Queen Emma and Princes Beatrix.
856 Appledore and Dundonald Comb. Trg, Centre and Beach Experimental Establishment.
869 Navigational Unit, Inveraray.
900 Transfer to USN of Rosneath base.
929 Naval Beach Commandos.
934 Beachmasters; selection etc.
961 RN Beach Commandos.
1049 Combined Training Areas (Castle Toward).
1101 Pilotage Patties.
1111 Pilotage Parties.
1117 Combined Training Areas (UK).
1118 Combined Training Areas (UK) - maps.
1152 Pilotage Parties.
1317 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - units trained 1940-41.
1318 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - organisation 1940-44.
1319 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - précis o f lectures.
1320 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - précis o f lectures.
1321 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - Instructors course.
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1322 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - training 52(L) Division.
1323 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - training 52(L) Division.
1324 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - training 50(N) Division.
1777 Operation TORCH - Naval Landing Parties.
1778 Operation TORCH - Naval Landing Parties.
1778 Operation TORCH - reports. ■
1780 Operation TORCH - reports.
INF Series
1 162 Proposed Scottish Programme.
188 Regional censorship.
264 Daily Reports 1940.
267 Rumours o f invasion 1940.
268 Rumours o f parachute landings 1940.
269 Secret weapons 1940.
282 Home Intelligence reports 1941-45.
284 Reports on home morale 1942-43.
292 Weekly Home Intelligence Reports 1940-44.
293 Special reports.
294 Public meetings.
308 Glasgow Information Committee 1940-43.
315 Regional censorship 1940-41.
844 Censorship re air raids.
845 Censorship re air raids.
846 Censorsliip re air raid casualties.
887 Evacuation o f coastal towns.
912 Rudolf Hess.
HO Series
198 139-140 STARFISH.
198 Daily raid summaries 10/39 - 4/42.
211 UXBs in Clydebank 1941.
212 UXBs in Glasgow 7-8/4/41.
213 UXBs in Greenock 12-13/7/40.
199 — 197198
Aberdeen - poor casualty handling during raid on 12/7/40. 
Western District air raid incidents 6/40-9/41.
199 Aberdeen raids 29/6/40 - 4/11/40.
205 Kincardine air raid incidents to 7 /8 /40, Orkney 2-3/8/40, Pitlochry 3-4/8/40.
201 Glasgow 18/9/40.
202 Edinburgh 7/10/40.
203 Dunfermline 4 /1 1 / 40.
204 Air raids 5/11/40.
205 Clydebank raids 3/41.
206 Leitli raid 8/4/41,
207 Glasgow raids 7 /4 /41-8/5/41.
208 Kilmarnock raid 6 /5/41.
410 Regional Commissioner’s Monthly Reports.
428 Regon 11 air raid incidents 5/42-1/43.
429 Chief Constable’s Reports 12/4/40-27/9/40.
482 Rudolf Hess.
202 1-10 Daily and Weekly reports.
203
■■'205™
1-16
™241
Daily Reports, 
Shelters.
207 1087 Reorganisation o f Civil Defence personnel.
1088 Air raid shelters including Dundee.
1089 Clydeside raids and salvage in Edinburgh.
1090 Gallowgate Tunnel Shelter.
-------------------- 1091 Paisley deep shelter at Oakshaw Hill.
CAB series
65 War Cabinet Minutes.
6 Cabinet minutes 1940
99 3 Allied Supreme War Council 1939-40.
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BT series
261 Awards for gallantry at sea.
10 Gallantry Awards 1935-41.
11 Gallantry Awards 1941-43.
12 Gallantry Awards 1942-44.
13 Gallantry Awards 1944-46. ________  . -  ____  _
MT series
40 60 Operation TORCH cargo tonnage allocated.
61 Operation TORCH cargo tonnage allocated.
62 TORCH and BACKBONE cargo tonnage allocated.
130 Rescue sliips — history by Lt Cdr Martyn RNVR.
59 19 Operation BOLERO 1943-44.
63 169 Overside discharge (Forth).
193 Overside discharge o f cargo -  Clyde 1940.
194 Overside discharge o f  cargo — Clyde 1940-44.
1 195 Overside discharge o f cargo — Clyde 1944-46.
200 Port Operations (Clyde) 1940 -  report.
202 Port Operations (Forth) 1940 — report.
204 Port Operations (Faslane) ~  report.
303 Operation BOLERO 1942-45.
274 Loch Ewe -  use as a convoy assembly anchorage 1941-44.
492 Ore shipments from Narvik.
570 Operation BOLERO schedules.
3389 Personal effects from SS Athenia — war risks insurance.
PRO series
[ 30 92/2 S. S. Wilson paper on port organisation in 1940-41.
r 20 Section on Ultra material.
SC O TTISH  R E C O R D  O F F IC E
AD57 19 Death Sentence in wartime. !
30-34 Various wartime measures. j
AF43 465 Dept of Agriculture and Fisheries Memoranda. ;
AF56 1278 Control o f fish supplies in wartime,
1281 Clyde Fishermen in the event o f war.
1285 Laying up o f near water trawlers and their purchase by the Admiralty.
1287 Laying up o f near water trawlers and tlieir purcliase by the Admiralty.
AF62 1339 Decorations for Fishermen 1940-54.
1342 Decorations for Fishermen 1940-54.
1343 Decorations for Fishermen 1940-54.
1344 Decorations for Fishermen 1940-54.
2179 Damage to fisliing boats and gear 1930-42.
2181 Agriculture and Fisheries Officers reports on damage to boate and gear 1932-51.
—------------ 2212/6 Dumping o f explosives and destruction o f mines.2223 Warnings and damage to ships - mines left over from WWl.
------ - ------- 2228/1" 2228 /2" '
Gunfiring affecting^fishing in the Forth 1940. 
Gunfiring affecting fishing in the Forth 1941-49.
2233 Rifle and machine gun range at Fort George 1930-49.
2234 Black Dog rifle range 1931-41.
2235 Cape Wrath Bombardment Range.
2237/2 Bombing and Firing Practice Areas 1939-52.
2240 Admiralty Exercise Areas Orkney and Shetland 1942-61.
2409 Aerial gunnery ranges at Leuchars and St Andrews Bay.
2411 Bombing practice Moray Firth 1938-40.
2412 Bombing practice Moray Firth 1940-44.
2413 ARP for merships and fishing vessels.
—— --------- 2425-292632
Arming o f fishing vessels.
Clearance o f wrecks from fisliing grounds.
DD12 496 Rosyth and Port Edgar post-war future.
IG D 2 2 9 /1 110-116 Leith Dock Commission Directors' Minute Books.
GD229/2 159-231 Leith Dock Commission Port Registers 1939-1945.
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GD229/11 4 Leitlî Dock Commission - Damages to Works 1930-1949.
GD229/14 31 Leith Dock Commission ARP.
HH36 3 Air Raids.
—---------- — 5 Air Raids.6 Air Raids.
13 Air Raids.
HH41 453/1 Scottish Regalia.
453/2 Scottish Regalia
HH45 121 Conscientious Objectors.
159 Scottish Office War Diary reports.
HH50 1 Clydebank air raid damage and casualties.
2 Clydebank air raid damage and casualties.
3 Haddington and Clydebank ait raid damage and casualties.
4 Clydebank air raid damage and casualties.
5 Rosyth air raid damage and casualties.
6 Athenia.
7 Scottish Office ARP Circulars.
20 Scottish Home and Health Dept. War Diary Reports 1939-40.
48 Evacuation.
63 Conscientious Objector tribunals.
64-65 Civil Defence.
66-67 Disposal o f dead in wartime. |
79 Land for Civil Defence purposes. |
83-90 Government War Book, Hospital scheme. j
104 Evacuation - survey o f sending and receiving areas.
r  91-103 Series o f files on the Clydeside raids. |
106 Emergency wireless broadcast |
107 Aged and infirm. j
109 Evacuation leaflet ‘^ ^y  and How*. j
115 CW  Defence Training Officer conferences. j
116 Mental services.
117 Mental services.
118 Montrose Royal Asylum air raid damage and casualties.
119 Protected Areas - removal o f persons contravening Defence Regulation 13.
120 Protected Areas including Orkney and Shetland.
121 Protected Areas including Orkney and Shetland.122 Protected Areas including Orkney and Shetland.
123 Protected Areas including Orkney and Shetland.
126-127 Burial o f dead in wartime.
128-135 Regional Commissioners reports.
136-143 VE and VJ Days.
159 War Diary 1939-40.
160 Record o f missiles dropped Districts 1-4.
— - ---,—- --- 161162
Records o f missiles dropped District 5.
Records o f missiles dropped in cities and large burghs.
163 Plots o f missiles dropped.
164 Plots o f objects dropped.
165 Bomb census reports.
199 Prestwick.
202 Regional Commissioners.
HH51 1-2/004 Evacuation.
11 Medical Stores.
13 Record o f civilians killed.
16 Honours to Civil Defence personnel, particularly Clydeside.
HH52 25-34 Police circulars.
HH55 650-652 Billeting in Orkney.
HH57 989 Admission to civil prisons o f German and Italian POWs sentenced by military court.
990 Admission to civil prisons o f Polish prisoners sentenced by military court.
991 Admission to civil prisons o f US prisoners sentenced by military court.
992 Conscientious Objectors imprisoned 1941-1943.
995-7 Military Detention Centre, Barlinnie.
115 Escapes from military detention.
1025 Prisons - Indian Seamen employed by the Clan Line.
1026 Prisons - Indian Seamen employed by the General Steamship Navigation Co.
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1030-3 Prisons.
1057 Colonial Prisoners Removal Act 1884. Prisoners removed to colonies.
MD6 various Territorial Army Minutes.
MD7 27 County of Fife Territorial Army Minute Book.
MDÎ1 11-27 Various Territorial Army Minutes.
A B E R D E E N  CITY  A N D  C O U N T Y  A RCH IV ES
CE87 4/41 1 Customs and Excise Aberdeen - Depositions o f Wrecks. ,
HR/1 1/4 Alexander Hall & Co., Minutes o f Board Meetings. :
1/5 Alexander HaH & Co., Minutes o f Board Meetings. ‘20/2 56 Aberdeen Harbour Commission, Minutes o f Meetings 1939-40. ;
57 Aberdeen Harbour Commission, Minutes o f Meetings 1940-41. '
58 Aberdeen Flarbour Commission, Minutes o f Meetings 1941-42. ]
____59____ Aberdeen Harbour Commission, Minutes o f Meetings 1942-43. j
D U N D E E  CITY  ARCH IV ES
CE70 1/68 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Letter Book (Collector to Board 1940). |
CE70 ' 2/159 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Letter Book (Board to Collector 1930-1957). ;
CE70 4/80 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Books 1939-43. j
4/81 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Book 1940.
4/82 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Book Ï941. \
4/83 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Book 1942-1943. |
4 /84 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Book 1944-1945. î
4/163 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Pier Head Book Tayport 1938-67. \
___ A /1 22 Dundee Harbour ARP Organisation - General. 1
26 Dundee Harbour ARP Organisation - HARPO Journal 1940-45. |
28 Dundee Harbour ARP Organisation - Decontamination. 1
D /2 11 Dundee Submarine Base 1908-14. Miscellaneous papers. |
Dundee Harbour Trust Wharf Books 1939-45 (not indexed) ;
E D IN B U R G H  C E N TR A L LIBRARY
YDA1844 939 Diary o f Chas Boog Watson, ARP Warden. j
YDA2410 B21271 Leith at War - File o f press cuttings etc. 1
N A T IO N A L  LIBRARY, E D IN B U R G H
ACC 4303 Barnton Fire-fighters minute book. |
6174 7 Polish Workshop Coy 1940-47. |
8802 115-118 R.J.B. Sellar Home Guard Papers. 1
MS 3816-22 Home Guard in Scodand. |
Microfilm files o f The Scotsman. |
Hard copy files o f the Edinburgh Evening News. |
STR A TH C LY D E ARCH IV ES
AGN 1818 List o f bombs dropped in Glasgow.
CO 1/61 15-17 ARP warden’s logbook, Lanarkshire.
CO 2 /3 /4 65 Start o f series on ARP etc. in Renfrewshire.
73 Bombs on Renfrew.
G 1 3/44 Athenia Disaster Fund.
D-AP6 15 Details o f damaged properties in Glasgow.
D-AP8
D-CC2
14
1/74
Map o f damaged areas in Glasgow.
Glasgow City Council Financial Accounts 1945-1946.
b -C D l Air raid casualties 3/41-1/42.
D-CD 7 1-3 Registers o f dead.
D -C D 8 Photograph album - Clydebank dead.
D-CD 9/9 20 Incidents in Marine Division 7/40-43.
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I
21 Incidents in Marine Division 13-14/3/41.
22 Additional Reports.
26 Incidents in Southern Division.
28 Incidents in Eastern Division.
30-33 Incidents in Maryhill Division.
35-36 Incidents in Maryhill Division outwith air-raids.
37-38 Incidents in Central Division.
39-40 Incidents in Govan Division.
21-35 General on casualty services.
5-9 Anti-gas measures.
4 ARP for animals.
D-TC 8/10 r 61-62 Evacuation.
74 Co-ordination o f action to meet heavy attacks.
75 Lessons from heavy raids.
76 Lighting restrictions.
83-4 Invasion defences and invasion committees.
85-6 Key Points.
79 Co-operation with employers.
87 Public lighting restrictions.
90 ~1 Reports on air raid incidents etc.
96 Special reports including HMS Sussex and other incidents on 18/9/40.
114 Awards for gallantry.
115 Requisitioning o f Barrowland.
116 Mortuary Service.
144 ARP Service HQ and training centre at 6 Beech Ave.
148 War damage claims.
158 Raid spotters.
175-6 Rescue service reports - raids.
179 Rescue services.
191-2 Salvage o f valuables.
Clyde River Patrol, letter & photographs 5 /2 /93 per Mrs McAughtrie Hakewill.
T-CN 6/5 6 Clyde Navigation Trust Annual Report 1942.
T-CN16/74 14 Clyde Navigation Trust ARP.
15 Clyde Anchorages
16 Monthly imports
17 Dumb Barges
18 Battle o f the Atlantic.
22 Short sea shipping control.
24 Admiralty Berthing Officer, Greenock.
25 Berthing for invasion ships.
T-CN 19 555 General photograph Glasgow Harbour including Manipur.
609/1 Photo^taph Athenia sailing Glasgow 1935.
656/2 Photographs o f gas exjslosion damage aboard HMS Fi/i at No.3 Graving Dock.
657/1-13 Photographs HMS Sussex at Yorkltill and UXB at Rothesay Dock 1941.
658 General area photographs o f Glasgow Harbour 1943.
T-CN 58 87-93 Series o f Greenock Harbour Trust minutes.
TD 554/4 Material relating to Kelvindale and Kelvinside.
575/4/5 Staff duties at Browrtiie and Murray.
1129/1-4 Records o f 22nd Ward Kelvinside ARP.
1226 Tickets, menus and otlier memorabilia hom Athenia,
G L A SG O W  R O O M , M IT C H E L L  LIBRARY, G LA SG O W
Microfilm files o f tlie Glasgow Herald.
Microfilm files o f the Daily Record.
G LA SG O W  U N IV E R SIT Y  D E P T . O F  BU SINESS R E C O R D S
UGD 3 Denny Shipbuilders.
49 Scottish Coal and Iron Masters Federation.
55 J.M. Campbell Shipowners.
131/1 Ellerman Shipowners re City of Benares and City of Adelaide.
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151 Butter’s Cranes.
176 Clyde Shipping Co. (Tug and Sliipowners).
223 Lithgow Sliipbuilders.
266 Yarrow Shipbuilders.
299 Redpath Dorman Long/Colville's Ironworks.
D E P A R T M E N T  O F  D O C U M E N T S , IM PER IA L W AR M USEUM , L O N D O N . 
Surgeon Lieutenant Commander H. M. Balfour. MS reference no. 95/23/1 
Lieutenant P. Calvert MS reference no. 84/36/1.
Colonel LI, S. Gillies. MS reference no. 90/26/1.
Lieutenant Commander Pirn Keipe RNN. MS reference no. 96/6/1.
Second Lieutenant W, S. Knight MS reference no. 97/7/1.
ColonelH. E. Yeo. MS reference no. 95/6/1.
N A T IO N A L  A R CH IV ES A N D  R E C O R D S A D M IN IS T R A T IO N ,
W A S H IN G T O N
Information from POW  survivors U-1003 sunk in North Western Approaches 20/3/45,
Held by the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, USA. Record 
Group 38, Subject File 1942-1945, OP16Z (from Algiers to British N ID /1 PW), British Final 
Reports, Box 2.
Information from POW  survivors 11-1206lost in diving accident offPeterhead 14/4/45,
National Archives and Records Adnoinistration, Wasliington, USA. Record Group 38, Subject 
File 1942-1945, OP16Z (from Algiers to British NID/1 PW), British Final Reports, Box 2.
Records Relating to U-boat Warfare 1939 - 1945, Guide to the M icrofilmed Records o f the 
German Navy. A guide produced by Timothy Mulligan at the National Archives and Re­
cords Administration, Washington, in 1985.
US NA V A L H IST O R IC A L  C E N T E R , W A S H IN G T O N
The U-47*s Scapa Flow Undertaking. Monograph by Wagner Fuerbringer held by US Naval 
Operations Arcliive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (Microreel T-47).
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-106 attack on Zealandic 17/1/41, Translated into English and 
held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR 
BoxT-78)
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-26 First patrol 16/9/39. Translated into English and held by 
US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T- 
81)
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-28 attack on Sliedrecht 16-17/11/39, Translated into English 
and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. 
(GNR Box T-82)
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-30 First patrol 16/9/39. Translated into English and held by 
US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T- 
81)
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-31 First patrol 16/9/39. Translated into English and held by 
US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T- 
81)
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Wat Diary (KTB) Summary U-34 First patrol 16/9/39, Translated into English and held by 
US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington, (GNR Box T- 
81)
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-35 First patrol 16/9/39, Translated into English and held by 
US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T- 
81)
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-48 attack on City o f Benares 17/9/40. Translated into Eng­
lish and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washing­
ton. (GNR Box T-78)
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-94 attack on Florian 20/1/41. Translated into English and 
held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Wasliington. (GNR 
BoxT-81)
War Diary (KTB) Summary U-96 attack on Almeda Star 17/4/41. Translated into English 
and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. 
(GNRBoxT-82)
M AP C O L L E C T IO N , N A T IO N A L  LIBRARY O F  SC O TLA N D  
Admiralty Fleet Charts - Searched Channels-.
F 0154 A2 - Loch Ewe.
F 0177 A2 - St Abbs Head to Aberdeen.
F 0178 A2 - Aberdeen to Banff.
F 0179 A2 - Peterhead to the Pentland Firth.
F 0180 A3 - Orkney Islands.
F 0181 A2 - Thurso Bay to the North Minch.
F 0183 A2 - Western Approaches to the Firth of Clyde.
F 0188 A2 - The River Forth.
F 0300 Al - North Sea Gridded Chart
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IWO
AMC
ARP
Asdic
ASV 
B deinst
BDO
BdU
BDV
Bletchley Park
BOAC
BST
CAP
Captain (D)
Captain (S)
CCO
CET
C-in-C
C-in-C (HP)
C-in-C (WA)
COHQ
COPP
COSSAC
CP
CTC
DA
DCO
Decrypt
D/F
DNI
Doppler
EG
EN
Enigma
First Watch Officer (i.e. First Lieutenant) aboard a U-boat.
Armed Merchant Cruiser.
Air Raid Precautions.
Sliipbome sound-ranging device that could determine the range and bearing of a 
submerged contact.
Air-to-Surface-Vessel radar. (See also LRASV)
Abbreviation for Funkbeobachtungdeinst, the German radio interception and 
cryptanalysis service.
Boom Defence Officer.
Abbreviation for Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, the German C-in-C U-boats, but 
also commonly used to refer to U boat Headquarters.
Boom Defence Vessel.
Buckinghamshire mansion which was the HQ of the Government Code and Cypher 
School, the British cryptanalysis service.
British Overseas Airways Corporation.
British Summer Time.
Combat Air Patrol.
Captain of a destroyer flotilla.
Captain of a submarine flotilla.
Chief of Combined Operations.
Central European Time.
Commander-in-Chief.
Commander-in-Chief (Home Fleet).
Commander-in-Cliief Western Approaches.
Combined Operations Headquarters.
Combined Operations Pilotage Party.
Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander.
Communist Party.
Combined Training Centre.
Director Angle. Used by submarines in calculating an attack solution.
Director, Combined Operations.
A decyphered message.
Direction Finding by establishing the bearing of a station transmitting a radio signal. By 
triangulating two or more bearings on the same signal, it is possible to calculate the 
position from which it is being transmitted.
Director of Naval Intelligence.
In Asdic, the observed effect of the changing wavelength of sound waves reflected 
from a moving submerged object, i.e. a U-boat.
Escort Group.
Series code for coastal convoys firom Methil to the Clyde.
The German Scliltissel M encryption machine, the naval version being the Marine 
FunkscWussel Machine M. The term was also used by the British to refer to encrypted 
texts that emanated from the machine.
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ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, US Army.
FAA Fleet Air Arm.
Flak An abbreviation for the German Flugzeugabwehrkanone or anti-aircraft gun. Used by
both sides to refer to anti-aircraft gunfire.
FN Series code for coastal convoys fiom the Thames to Methil.
FO Forsvarets Overkommando. Norwegian High Command.
FO(S) Flag Officer (Submarines)
FS Series code for coastal convoys from Methil to the Thames.
GMT Greenwich Mean Time.
GOC General Officer Commanding.
Gruppe Group (i.e. of U-boats).
HaS Airborne radar sets also fitted to LCN.
HA High Angle. Often used to describe anti-aircraft or dual-purpose armament.
HE Hydrophone effect.
HE High explosive.
HEl 11 Heinkel 111 bomber,
HE115 Heinkel 115 seaplane.
Hedgehog. Ahead-throwing anti-submarine multiple mortar that fired depth charges 250 yards in
front of an escort vessel, tlius closing the gap between the loss of an Asdic echo at 
close range and the normal method of fitting depth charges over the stem. (See also 
Squid)
HMT His Majesty’s Trawler.
HN Series code for convoys from Bergen to Methil that ran until 9 April 1940.
HSL High-speed launch.
HX Series code for inbound convoys from North America.
HXF Series code for fast inbound convoys from Canada.
JU8 8  Junkers 8 8  bomber.
JW Series code for convoys outbound to the Soviet Union from December 1942.
Kfg Kuestenfleigergruppe.
KMF Series code for fast outbound military convoys to the Mediterranean.
KMS Series code for slow outbound military convoys to the Mediterranean.
Knickebein German radio beam bombing aid.
Kriegsmarine The German Navy prior to 1945.
Kriegstagebuch Daily log kept by German ships at sea and shore headquarters.
KTB See Kriegstagebuch.
KX Series code for outbound military supply convoys to the Mediterranean.
LCA Landing Craft (Assault) (also referred to as ALC)
LCG Landing Craft (Gun).
LCM Landing Craft (Mechanised) (also referred to as MLC).
LCN Landing Craft (Navigation).
LCS Landing Craft (Support).
LCT Landing Craft (Tank).
LCV Landing Craft (Vehicle).
LSI Landing Ship (Infantry).
LOA Length Over All (of a ship)
LRASV Long Range Air-to-Surface-Vessel radar.
LSS Landing Ship (Sternchute).
LST Landing Ship (Tank).
Luftwaffe German Air Force.
LWOST Low water, ordinary spring tides
ME109 MesserschmittBf 109 fighter.
MEl 10 Messerschmitt Bf 110 fighter-bomber.
MFV Motor Fishing Vessel.
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MI5
MI6
ML
MT
MTB
MV
NCSO
NOIC
OA
OB
OIC
ON
ONS
OOW
OP
OR
ORB
PPI
PQ
PRU
QP
Quisling 
R Boat 
RA
RACOB
RDF
SBNO
SC
Schnotchel
SHAEF
SL
SO
SOE
Squid
SS
Ultra
UXB
VANP
VP
WN
WS
Würzburg
XDO
Security Service.
Secret Intelligence Service,
Motor Launch.
Motor Transport.
Motor Torpedo Boat.
Motor Vessel.
Naval Control of Shipping Officer.
Naval Officer in Charge.
Series code for outbound convoys from the Thames. These passed tlirough the English 
Channel until 3 July 1940, then were diverted to join FN and EN convoys before 
passing outward thtough the North Western Approaches.
Series code for outbound convoys from Liverpool which, from 7 July 1940, were 
diverted through the North Channel.
Operational InteUigence Centre (Admiralty).
Series code for convoys from Methil to Bergen that ran until 9 April 1940. Code letters 
used, from 15 July 1941 and in pkce of OB, for outbound 9 knot convoys to North 
America.
Series code for IVz knot outbound convoys to North America from 15 July 1941, 
Officer of the Watch.
Observation Post,
Other Ranks (non-commissioned).
Operations Record Book kept by RAF squadrons, stations, groups and commands. 
Plan Position Indicator (radar display).
Series code for convoys outbound to the Soviet Union to November 1942.
Photo Reconnaissance Unit (RAF).
Series code for convoys inbound from the Soviet Union, to November 1942 
Norwegian followers of the fascist puppet dictator Vidkun Quisling.
American designed wooden assault craft.
Series code for convoys inbound from the Soviet Union from December 1942.
Rear Admiral Combined Operations Bases,
Radio Direction Finding. British cover name for radar.
Senior British Naval Officer.
Series code for slow inbound convoys from North America.
A breathing tube that could be rrised above the surface to allow a U-boat to run 
submerged on diesel engines, thus conserving battery power.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.
Series code for inbound ocean convoys from Freetown, Sierra Leone, to UK 
Senior Officer.
Special Operations Executive.
Ahead throwing anti-submarine mortar, which fired a battery of three contact-fuzed 
depth charges. Employed larger charges than Hedgehog (q.v.).
Steam Ship.
Disguised form in which Enigma decrypt-derived intelligence was transmitted to 
operational commands.
Unexploded bomb (also used to refer to unexploded air-dropped mines).
Vice Admiral Northern Patrol.
Series code for MTB anfi-shippmg operations off Norway.
Series code for coastal convoys from the Clyde to Methil.
Series code for outbound convoys to the Middle East and India via Suez or the Cape, 
Also known as Winston’s Specials’.
German parabaloid radar system.
Extended Defence Officer.
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APPENDIX 1
ADMIRALTY FLEET CHARTS SHOW ING SWEPT CHANNELS AS USED  
BY COASTAL CONVOYS OFF THE EAST COAST OF SCOTLAND-
APPENDIX 2
TRAINING BEACHES AT CTC INVERARAY
Furnace Beach
Creggans Beach
P.M.’s Beach
RE Beach
Cambrai Hards
RAC andREME 
Beach
Admital’s Beach
Gash
Beach
Salmon Beach
Auchnatra Beach
Castle Beach
Dunderave Beach
Rubha Mor Beach
Noble’s Beach
Ardkinglas Beach
Bathaich Blian 
Beach
Ardno Beach
Ard na Slaite 
Beach
Ard na Gailich 
Beach
A  300 yard shingle beach with access to the main road used for driving vehicles on and o ff craft in
exercises with follow-up formations. Usable at all states o f tide. ______ _____  _______
A 120 yard beach o f mud and stones with access to a track leading to the main road. Unusable for craft 
equipped, like LCTs, with kedge anchors due to the presence of a submarine cable to Strachur. Usable at all 
states of  tide. Little used other than for embarking troops for Exercise NEWTON BAY.
A shingle and sand beach with three prepared exits to the track leading round the loch to the main road. 
Usable at all states o f  tide. Used for loading and unloading vehicles for exercises . __________    _  __
A beach some 200 yards south o f the RE Pier, tlie soutlimost pier the HMS Quebec, with prepared exits for 
wheeled and tracked vehicles. Usable at all states o f the tide for the same purpose as P.M.’s Beach.
Three concrete hards each capable o f taking one LCT or LST, though not usable two hours either side o f  I 
low water. U sed for loading and unloading tanks, SP guns and vehicles o f  all types for exercises. _ _J 
N ot used for trainiag as such, this 60-yard sand beach was used for the beaching o f landing craft and a | 
fairway past the rocky spit at the north-eastern extremity was marked by spars.______  _______
Eighty yard beach o f sand and stones with direct access to the main road, but with, at its northern end, a 
dangerous spit marked by a buoy. Most landing craft could beach here at all states o f the tide, though LSTs 
were restricted to four hours either side o f high water. Used for loading and unloading veMcles and troops 
for exercises.
A small beach immediately south o f  Inveraray Pier normally used for loading personnel in minor landing 
craft for unit training and exercises. _________________________________________ __ _______________
A  100-yard shingle beach with direct access to the main road. Used for loading and unloading vehicles and 
personnel. Larger landing craft restricted to two hours either side o f  high water. N ot used during the 
salmon season.
A 75-yard stone beach with two exits, one for wheeled and one for tracked vehicles, to the main road. 
Used for loading and unloading vehicles and personnel._________  ____ _ ______________
A 50-yard shingle beach west o f  Dunderave Castle suitable only for minor landing craft. N o exit for 
vehicles.
A 100 yard shingle beach with two exits, one for wheeled and one for tracked vehicles, to the main road. 
Used for loading and unloading vehicles.  ___ ___________ _____
A 100 yard shingle beach suitable for aU types o f  landing craft three hours either side o f high water with a 
vehicle exit to the road. Approved for the use o f  2” mortar smoke and flares, 4” Naval smoke mortar, no. 
77 smoke grenades, bangalore torpedoes and small explosive charges. Used for training assault company 
groups in assault landings, deployment exercises for tanks or SP guns, exercises for follow-up formations, 
exercises for Assault Battalion Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises.
Beach of  fine shingle used for wading vehicles from LCTs.
A  semi-circular 75-yard beach with a prominent spit at the south west end used for training Assault 
Company Groups, re-embarking vehicles waded ashore at Noble’s Beach, exercises for Assault Battalion 
Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises._________  _
Strachur Beach
Rosebank Beach
Stucreoch
Beach
Newton Bay Beach
A  150-yard beach of fine shingle used for exercises for Assault Battalion Groups and sometimes used in 
Assault Brigade Group exercises. Approved for the use o f 2” mortar smoke and flares, 4” Naval smoke 
mortar, no. 77 smoke grenades, bangalore torpedoes and small explosive charges._______  ___
A  200-yard beach o f fine shingle with easy access to the main road used for exercises for Assault Battalion 
Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises. Approved for the use o f 2” mortar smoke 
and flares, 4” Naval smoke mortar, no. 77 smoke grenades, bangalore torpedoes and small explosive 
charges. Care had to be taken that no bombs fell on Ardno Farm and that Bangalore torpedoes were not 
detonated too close.
A 150-yard loose shingle beach with access to the main road used for exercises for Assault Battalion 
Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises. Approved for the use o f 2” mortar smoke 
and flares, 4” Naval smoke mortar, no. 77 smoke grenades, bangalore torpedoes and small explosive 
charges. Care had to be taken that no bombs fell on the main road.___
A 100-yard shingle beach with easy access to the main road. Used for craft training and sometimes used in 
Assault Brigade Group exercises.     _ j_______
Muddy sand and shingle beach used for wet landings by troops and wading vehicles.
A 200-yard beach o f stones with access to the main road used for driving vehicles on and o ff craft.
A  200-yard stone beach with two exits to the main road for wheeled or tracked vehicles. Used m 
conjunction with Exercise NEWTON BAY.
A 175-yard beach used for Exercise NEWTON BAY. Usable by LCAs and LCTs two hours either side o f  
high water. Hinterland very boggy and this prevented the movement o f vehicles off the beach. 
Ammunition and explosives used he r e . __
APPENDIX 3
MAP O F T H E  COAST O F  SOUTH-W EST NORW AY SH O W IN G  T H E  
IN N E R  LEADS PASSAGE AS USED BY GERM AN SH IPPIN G . (AIR 41 74)
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